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Abstract 
 
As a result of growing discontent with Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) and 
the expansive nature of the substantive protection standards in Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs), States around the world are revisiting their investment treaties. 
Developing countries are the most frequent respondents in ISDS cases. They have 
shared a growing concern that BITs restrict their right to regulate in the public interest. 
These realities trigger two research problems motivating this dissertation: how and 
why did developing countries sign these treaties; and how and why have their reactions 
to emerging policy constraints differed.  
While there is a considerable literature addressing the first problem, there is a dearth 
of studies addressing the second. This political economy study conducts a qualitative 
comparative case study analysis of three developing countries – Egypt, South Africa, 
and Bolivia – that share similarities in the way they signed BITs, but reacted 
differently to their constraints. Mobilising Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 
framework, this thesis assesses what options are available to developing countries (in 
practice) and which factors determine why a particular route is pursued. This 
framework is supplemented by Poulsen’s adaptation of the Bounded Rationality 
theory and Gwynn’s use of the Structural Power Framework to enable a historical 
analysis of how and why BITs were signed and later contested.  
This thesis argues that in order to reflect the options available to developing countries, 
Hirschman’s framework must be reconceptualised to take into consideration the 
dynamics of the investment treaty regime and the challenges facing developing 
countries when deciding which route to take. It proposes revising Hirschman’s 
framework so that ‘exit’ is reconceptualised, ‘voice’ is replaced with ‘quasi-exit’, and 
‘loyalty’ with ‘silence’. The main factors that influence the decision to take one route 
or another include structural power dynamics influenced by a country’s international 
economic position, and its regime’s ideological motives. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
 
The investment treaty regime is facing a legitimacy crisis. Realisation of the extent to 
which Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and the Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
mechanism (ISDS) can threaten the sovereign right of host States to regulate, together 
with uncertainty regarding the economic benefits of joining the regime, have resulted 
in an attack on the regime by scholars, policymakers and civil society representatives 
alike. As part of the backlash against the investment treaty regime, both developed and 
developing countries have reacted, although in varying modes. Capital-exporting 
countries have reaffirmed their role as regime shapers by selectively amending their 
treaties. As rule takers and predominantly respondents to investor–State arbitration 
cases, developing countries (particularly capital-importing ones) are more exposed to 
the risks posed by the regime and significantly less powerful in terms of shaping or 
reforming the regime. Reactions of developing countries that have vocally contested 
the regime have varied, ranging from silence to attempts to exit the regime. This thesis 
investigates both how and why developing countries signed BITs and how and why 
they have reacted differently.  
In contrast to the regulation of world trade, no comprehensive multilateral accord 
exists for global investments flows (Berger, 2013, p. 2). Instead, the investment treaty 
regime is composed of thousands of investment treaties (including more than 2,900 
BITs1), complemented by the ISDS mechanism. The regime has been shaped by 
capital-exporting countries; these have sought to promote BITs since the 1950s, in an 
attempt to protect their nationals’ foreign investments in developing countries. While 
the motives of capital-exporting countries for establishing this regime are clear, the 
rationale for developing countries’ membership is less straightforward (Katselas, 
2014). Indeed, developing countries have historically approached foreign investment 
with scepticism (Katselas, 2014); their opposition to the rules promoted by the capital-
exporting countries, on the grounds of protecting their sovereignty, was one of the 
primary reasons why a multilateral agreement never materialised. Nevertheless, 
capital-exporting exporting countries, with the help of multilateral institutions like the 
                                               
 
1 This thesis focuses on BITs. However it is important to note that global investment flows are also 
protected by investment provisions/chapters in more than 300 other trade and investment agreements. 
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World Bank and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), were able to promote BITs and the investment treaty regime to 
developing countries on the premise that BITs would stimulate foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows. The proliferation of BITs amongst developing countries 
coincided with the rise of neoliberalism, which advocated for the liberalisation of 
inward FDI as an integral driver of economic development at a time when other 
sources of capital and credit were scarce (Katselas, 2014; Puig, 2013; Williamson, 
2009).  
A few decades later a significant rise in ISDS cases filed by investors against 
developing States triggered a backlash from developing countries, which began to 
revisit their membership of the neoliberal regime. Doubts arose over the benefits of 
BITs and concerns were expressed about their potential costs (Trubek, 2017). 
While BITs proved to be effective instruments in protecting foreign investors, they 
have failed to contribute to inclusive economic development in host States (El-Kady, 
2016). Critics have argued that the current investment treaty regime is facing a 
legitimacy crisis, citing several structural challenges facing the regime (Morosini and 
Badin, 2017).  
One of the main criticisms directed towards the regime is the absence of a clear link 
between signing BITs and the level of FDI inflows. Another major criticism relates to 
the controversial substantive clauses in BITs that unduly protect private property at 
the expense of the right of host countries to regulate in the public interest (Morosini 
and Badin, 2017). The structure of most BITs reveals a significant imbalance between 
clauses safeguarding the interests of investors and provisions preserving the interests 
of host States (e.g. policy space and increased FDI inflows). Broadly drafted 
investment protection provisions are not adequately complemented with provisions 
for host States’ regulatory rights, investor obligations, and the protection of public-
policy concerns (El-Kady, 2016). The expansive nature of the substantive protection 
standards in BITs has also led to inconsistent and unintended interpretations of BIT 
provisions by arbitral tribunals in ISDS cases, including challenges against policy 
measures taken in the public interest (El-Kady, 2016). In addition to the sovereignty 
costs that result from the raft of decisions by arbitration tribunals that use the vague 
wording of provisions in BITs to craft rulings that pose a threat to the regulatory 
autonomy of host States (Trubek, 2017), the substantial awards also represent a 
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significant burden on the public budgets of developing countries. Even when claims 
are settled or dismissed in favour of the host State, the potential compensation payment 
(in case of settlement) and arbitration costs, in general, are costly for host States. 
Finally, the legitimacy crisis of the investment treaty regime is also linked to 
the deficiencies of the ISDS mechanism. These shortcomings include the potential 
disparity of treatment between foreign investors and domestic investors, costly and 
lengthy procedures, allegations of arbitrators’ bias, lack of arbitrator accountability, 
lack of transparency, the inconsistency of awards, the absence of an appeals 
mechanism, and constraint on policy space (Morosini and Badin, 2017). 
The magnitude of the legitimacy crisis facing the investment treaty regime increased 
significantly when some capital-exporting countries found themselves in the unusual 
position of being respondents to claims by investors challenging their regulatory 
measures. Despite the bilateral nature of these investment treaties, BITs were initially 
seen as constraining only the capital-importing partner. Accordingly, these 
developments led several major capital-exporting countries to revise their treaties in 
order to retain more policy space themselves (Trubek, 2017, p. 296). Since 2002, 
traditional investment treaty making through BITs has been losing momentum. In 
2017, only 18 BITs were signed representing a considerable decline compared to the 
200 BITs signed in 1996 (UNCTAD, 2018a). This trend reflected a turning point in 
the investment treaty making process as governments’ increased awareness of the 
potential costs of BITs has led to reflection on their membership of the regime and the 
review of their commitments under BITs (Calvert, 2017; Jandhyala et al., 2011; 
Poulsen and Aisbett, 2013; UNCTAD, 2018a). The next development was the 
beginning of a backlash against the regime as developing and developed countries 
began to contest the investment treaty regime.  
 Capital-exporting countries have responded to the legitimacy crisis facing the regime 
in their capacity as regime shapers and rule makers. Their reactions consisted of 
amending the wording of certain substantive clauses to narrow their scope of 
protection and introducing procedural reforms to limit their exposure to investment 
arbitration. While attempting to reform the existing regime, the objective remained the 
safeguarding of the existing neoliberal investment protection model. Developing 
countries, however, have been the more frequent respondents to arbitration cases and 
the constraints on their policy space have been considerably higher, with significant 
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implications for their capacity to implement their development strategies. 
Consequently, developing countries that have vocally contested the regime have 
criticised the unbalanced foundations of the regulations in the existing investment 
treaty regime with the charge that it overprotects investors at the expense of the host 
State's regulatory space. However, unlike their developed counterparts, their reactions 
have differed, ranging from introducing alternative frameworks to maintaining the 
status quo. The establishment of the investment treaty regime through thousands of 
bilateral treaties has meant that it lacks a central body where multilateral negotiations 
could take place and where all members would have a seat at the table and some voice 
in determining the nature of the regime (Katselas, 2014). Thus, whereas historically in 
the 1960s and 1970s developing countries were able to form blocs and collectively 
defy investment protection rules promoted by capital-exporting countries, under the 
current investment treaty regime, power dynamics, amongst other factors investigated 
in this thesis, have determined how they have reacted. 
These realities trigger the three main research questions motivating this dissertation: 
1) how and why did developing countries sign investment treaties; 2) how and why 
have their reactions to emerging policy constraints caused by the investment regime 
differed; and 3) to what extent does Hirschman’s Exit, Voice and Loyalty framework 
reflect the options available to developing countries that are discontent with the 
regime?  
In contrast to the ample legal literature on BITs, economists and political scientists 
have only relatively recently started to investigate the political economy of BITs. 
Existing literature has focused on investigating the impact of BITs on policy space, 
the relationship between BITs and FDI, and the diffusion of BITs amongst developing 
countries. In terms of studying the reactions of developing countries, most efforts in 
the existing literature have focused on categorising the different reactions and 
assessing the effectiveness of the different options in theory. Less attention has been 
paid to the actual experience of developing countries that have attempted different 
routes of contestation. There is a clear gap in the literature when it comes to accounting 
for the variation in reactions of developing countries that have vocally contested the 
regime (Calvert, 2017). Furthermore, the implications of these experiences in terms of 
the actual options available to developing countries to act on their dissatisfaction with 
the regime in practice have also been neglected. 
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 This thesis seeks to fill this gap in the literature by analysing the different reactions 
of developing countries that have expressed their discontent with the investment 
regime, through a detailed and comprehensive comparative case study analysis using 
original empirical research. This political economy study conducts a qualitative 
comparative case study analysis of three developing countries – Egypt, South Africa, 
and Bolivia – that share similarities in the way they signed BITs, but which reacted 
differently to their constraints. Mobilising Hirschman’s Exit, Voice and Loyalty 
framework, this thesis assesses what options are available to developing countries (in 
practice). Moreover, this thesis argues that in order to gain an in-depth understanding 
of the feasible options available to developing countries discontent with the regime, 
the factors that influenced both how and why they joined the regime and why they 
reacted differently must be taken into consideration. Hence, to provide greater 
theoretical  depth to a “Hirschman-ian” categorisation of the different responses of 
dissatisfied developing countries, additional theoretical frames are deployed.  
Three factors have been identified to supplement the Hirschman framework in this 
thesis: ideological motives of the ruling regime, bounded rational behaviour of 
government officials, and structural power dynamics. These three factors generally 
contribute to explaining both the entry to and contestation of the regime. However, 
based on the findings of the case studies, the extent to which they answer the questions 
of how and why developing countries joined the regime and why they reacted 
differently varies. While structural power dynamics play a pivotal role in explaining 
the research questions of how and why they joined the regime and why they reacted 
differently, bounded rational behaviour is deemed more relevant to explaining how 
developing countries joined the regime, and ideological motives are more useful in 
determining the routes adopted when reacting to discontent.  
Accordingly, to explain how and why developing countries joined the regime this 
thesis adopts an eclectic approach combining the Structural Power framework as 
adapted by Maria Gwynn and the Bounded Rationality theory as adapted by Lauge 
Poulsen. However, to account for why developing countries discontent with the 
regime have reacted differently, this thesis builds on contributions from the existing 
literature and argues that the ideological motives of the regime and structural power 
dynamics determine the route adopted. The ideological position of the regime (mainly 
whether or not the country embraces the neoliberal model), determines whether the 
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State will seek to exit the system or whether it will attempt to practice voice. The 
structural power dynamics influenced by the economic position of the country and the 
results of a cost-benefit assessment by the country’s officials determine whether it has 
the leverage to challenge its capital-exporting treaty partners and proceeds with either 
route or maintain the status quo. 
Finally, while scholars and practitioners have argued that developing countries can 
choose between exit or voice, the findings of this dissertation reveal that the actual 
choices available to these countries are more restricted and complicated than 
understood in the existing literature. This thesis concludes that in order to reflect the 
options available to developing countries in practice, Hirschman's framework can be 
reconceptualised to take into consideration the power dynamics of the investment 
treaty regime and the challenges facing developing countries when deciding on which 
route to adopt. The revised framework includes a reconceptualised ‘exit’, the 
replacement of ‘voice’ with ‘quasi-exit’, and ‘loyalty’ with ‘silence’. 
The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 provides the necessary context 
for addressing the two main areas this thesis focuses on: (i) how and why did 
developing countries sign these BITS, in light of the significant costs and uncertain 
benefits associated with these treaties; and (ii) how and why have they reacted 
differently? It first outlines how the terms ‘policy space’ and ‘investment treaty 
regime’ are defined in this thesis. The rest of the chapter addresses the key arguments 
on how the investment treaty regime constrains the policy space of States to regulate 
and on the current legitimacy crisis facing the regime. Lastly, it documents how both 
developing and developed States that have expressed their discontent with the regime 
have reacted. Chapter 3 reviews how the existing literature on the investment treaty 
regime addresses the three research questions articulated above and identifies the 
literature gap that this thesis aims to fill. The chapter also outlines the main theories 
and frameworks that are used in the comparative case study analyses conducted in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Chapter 4 outlines the research objectives and the methodology 
of the thesis. It documents the case selection process adopted and the primary and 
secondary sources that informed the qualitative analysis of the case studies. It also 
illustrates how the case studies are structured and the manner in which frameworks 
identified in Chapter 3 are employed in each case study. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present 
detailed analyses of the experiences of Bolivia, South Africa, and Egypt. Each case 
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study provides an analysis of the historical process of signing BITs and traces the 
events that led to the realisation of the extent to which the country's membership of 
the investment treaty regime had constrained its policy space (including its experience 
with ISDS cases). Finally, after analysing the factors that determine the route taken by 
the country, each case study concludes with an assessment of the extent to which a 
specific Hirschman category can explain the routes adopted by the country. In the final 
chapter, Chapter 8, the findings of the three case studies are used to revisit the research 
questions running through the thesis. The chapter analyses the main factors that 
influenced the route taken by each country and presents the revisions proposed to 
Hirschman’s framework in this thesis, in order to illustrate the routes available to 
developing countries that are discontent with the regime in practice. To demonstrate, 
further, how the findings of this thesis apply to other developing countries, examples 
of other countries that fit under each of the new categories (‘reconceptualised exit’, 
‘quasi-exit’, and ‘silence’) are provided. Finally, the chapter concludes with the 
contributions of this thesis to the literature on the political economy of the investment 
treaty regime and identifies avenues for further research.
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Chapter 2. Investment Treaty Regime Facing a Legitimacy 
Crisis?  
 
1. Introduction 
In spite of the rapid proliferation of BITs in recent decades, the current investment 
treaty regime is at a crossroads. The regime has been subject to criticisms from 
developing and increasingly from developed countries, due to the growing number of 
investor claims against sovereign States triggered through substantive protection 
standards in BITs and challenging a wide range of regulatory measures undertaken by 
States (Perrone, 2014; Singh and Ilge, 2016).With over 855 known investment treaty 
arbitration cases filed to date,2 in addition to an unknown number of cases in which 
the threat of arbitration has been used as a bargaining tool by investors, host States are 
increasingly finding themselves defending their domestic laws and policies in 
international arbitral tribunals (Langford et al., 2018). Furthermore, in several cases, 
these claims have resulted in substantial compensation awards for measures and 
policies that many States believe are ‘both legitimate and within their exclusive 
purview as sovereigns’ (Langford et al., 2018, p. 72).  
In both policy and academic circles, fundamental concerns have been raised about the 
expansiveness of the substantive rights granted to foreign investors under BITs. 
Moreover, the ISDS mechanism has been criticised for lack of transparency, 
inconsistency and alleged bias in favour of investors amongst other shortcomings. 
These concerns have culminated in what is commonly referred to as a ‘legitimacy 
crisis’ triggering a backlash against the regime by a number of developing and more 
recently developed countries (Langford, 2011; see Waibel, 2010; Behn, 2015). 
This chapter addresses key arguments on how BITs and the ISDS mechanism 
constrain the ability of States to regulate, leading to the crisis of legitimacy in the 
investment treaty regime. It also documents how both developing and developed 
States that have expressed their discontent with the regime have reacted. In doing so 
                                               
 
2 See Figure 7. 
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this chapter provides the context for the two main areas this thesis focuses on: (i) how 
and why did developing countries sign these BITs, in light of the significant costs and 
uncertain benefits associated with these treaties; and (ii) how and why have they 
reacted differently?  
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 clarifies a set of conceptual 
issues related to the use of “investment treaty regime” in this thesis. Section 3 clarifies 
that the term policy space will be defined as the regulatory power of host States for 
the purpose of this thesis. Section 4 provides an overview of how BITs evolved and 
gave rise to particular concerns with regard to policy space, particularly for developing 
countries. Section 5 analyses how BITs and ISDS can have an impact on the policy 
space of host States at different stages of the policy making process. Finally, Section 
6 explores how developed and developing States that have expressed their discontent 
have reacted differently, focusing on their role as principals in the investment treaty 
regime.  
2. Investment Treaty Regime 
An international regime is essentially a system of governance in a particular area of 
international relations (Salacuse, 2015). According to Puchala and Hopkins (1982, pp. 
245–246), international regimes ‘constrain and regularise the behaviour of 
participants, affect which issues among protagonists are on and off the agenda, 
determine which activities are legitimised or condemned, and influence where, when, 
and how conflicts are resolved’. Another leading international relations scholar, 
Krasner (2009, p. 113), has defined an international regime as ‘principles, norms, 
rules, and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in 
a given area of international relations’. On this basis, it has been argued ‘that 
international investment treaties as a group represent a convergence of expectations 
by States as to how host governments will behave toward investments from other 
regime members. The norms and rules embodied in investment treaties are intended 
to constrain and regularise such behaviour in order to fulfil those expectations’ 
(Salacuse, 2010, p. 431).  
This broad definition ranges from formal arrangements (e.g. international 
organisations and treaties) to more informal arrangements (e.g. shared norms), and 
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actors include States as well as non-State actors, including foreign investors 
(Bonnitcha et al., 2017).  
In line with the above, Salacuse (2010, p. 431) has argued ‘that international 
investment treaties as a group represent a convergence of expectations by States as to 
how host governments will behave toward investments from other regime members. 
The norms and rules embodied in investment treaties are intended to constrain and 
regularise such behaviour in order to fulfil those expectations’. On this basis, the 
investment treaty regime could be defined as a regime that is composed of investment 
treaties in addition to the arbitration institutions applying and interpreting these 
treaties. However, such a strictly legal definition of the regime neglects the context in 
which this regime was established and why certain regulatory norms were privileged 
over others. Hence this thesis follows a more socio-legal approach in defining the 
investment treaty regime by incorporating the legal architecture that has been 
developed through international investment treaties and arbitral institutions as well as 
the normative foundations upon which this regime has been established and continues 
to foster. In doing so, the regime refers to the principles and norms that have shaped 
the regime as a result of the environment/context in which it has evolved.  
The legal framework of the investment regime consists of three main components 
(Bonnitcha et al., 2017, p. 3): (i) investment treaties; (ii) the set of treaties, rules, and 
institutions governing investment treaty arbitration; and (iii) the decisions of arbitral 
tribunals applying and interpreting investment treaties. Concerning the first 
component of the legal architecture, the majority of investment treaties are bilateral,3 
i.e. BITs between two States and they are primarily used for investment protection.4 
These are the type of investment treaties this thesis focuses upon as they have evolved 
into the dominant mechanism for the international regulation of FDI (Guzman, 1998). 
Although each BIT is legally separate and distinct, thus binding only States that have 
concluded it, BITs as a group are extremely similar with respect to structure, purpose 
and principles (Salacuse, 2015). Practically all BITs include protections against 
uncompensated expropriation and discrimination against foreign investment. One of 
                                               
 
3 According to UNCTAD (2018a), of the 3,322 known international investment treaties, 2,946 are BITs.  
4 Several other international investment treaties involve more parties and issues, such as Chapter Eleven 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In recent years, the investment treaty regime 
has been moving towards multi-issue and plurilateral agreements (Bonnitcha et al., 2017). 
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the most significant features of BITs is the investment dispute settlement mechanism. 
Historically, investment treaties provided only for State-to-State dispute settlement. 
However, since the end of the Cold War, practically all BITs have included provisions 
that provide a broad and binding consent to investment treaty arbitration of disputes 
between foreign investors and host States (Bonnitcha et al., 2017), or what is 
commonly known as ISDS.  
The second component of the legal architecture is the set of complementary treaties, 
rules, and institutions that govern the adjudication of investment disputes in 
investment treaty arbitration. The two most important set of rules are the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the New York 
Conventions, particularly due to their enforcement mechanisms (Bonnitcha et al., 
2017). In these Conventions it is stipulated that if a State refuses to pay compensation 
after having lost an investment treaty arbitration, investors can bring court proceedings 
before the courts of any member States of the conventions to seek an order allowing 
the investor to seize commercial assets of the non-compliant State (Bonnitcha et al., 
2017). While there are exceptions, like sovereign immunity, these Conventions ensure 
the investment treaty regime is enforceable in practice through courts in member 
States. The rules governing investment treaty arbitration in BITs do not provide an 
appeal mechanism and there is no requirement for foreign investors to exhaust local 
remedies before filing international arbitrations. Furthermore, investment treaty 
arbitration considers the State as a single actor responsible for the conduct of all its 
organs. As a result, arbitrations have targeted the acts of the executive, the judiciary, 
the legislature, specialised agencies and sub-national levels of governments 
(Bonnitcha et al., 2017).  
Finally, the third component of the legal architecture is the decisions of the 
international arbitration tribunals. Due to the lack of a formal system of precedent, 
tribunals often refer to previous decisions of other tribunals even though they are not 
bound by these decisions. As Bonnitcha et al. (2017, p. 6) argue, this has resulted in 
the development of an informal jurisprudence that provides substantive meat to the 
bare bones of vague investment treaty protections.  
In order to better understand the nature of the investment treaty regime, it is important 
to take into consideration the normative foundations of the regime and not merely the 
existing legal architecture. As argued by Tan (2013, p. 26), studying international law 
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through the self-referential lens of formalist legal theory by focusing on purely textual 
and interpretative aspects of international rules and institutions fails to account for 
their contemporary context or what Berman (2005, p. 492) describes as ‘the 
multifaceted ways in which legal norms are disseminated, received, resisted and 
imbibed’ (cited in Tan, 2013). Accordingly, this thesis addresses the regime from a 
socio-legal perspective by taking into consideration the broader context in which these 
instruments are elaborated and implemented as well as the actors, actions and 
interactions that formed this context (Perry-Kessaris, 2013). It is important to note that 
the emergence of international rules regulating investment was not a process of 
creating a legal regime on a blank canvas (Miles, 2010). International investment law 
cannot be separated from its socio-political environment. Indeed the political and 
economic context from which it emerged determined its core character (Miles, 2010). 
The investment treaty regime has developed in response to a variety of geopolitical, 
economic, institutional, and ideological developments (Cutler and Lark, 2017). The 
consolidation of the regime coincided with broader transformations in the global 
political economy associated with the increasing power of multinational corporations, 
economic liberalisation and decreased State control under neoliberal economic 
ideology, as well as the growth and promotion of FDI as the primary driver of 
economic development (Cutler and Lark, 2017, p. 278). Cutler (2016, p. 99) argues 
that the regime forms a key element in the constitution of the normative foundations 
of transnational capitalism and that it has played a significant role in relocating 
authority between private and public actors in international economic governance. The 
regime managed to play such a transformative role in the global political economy by 
granting foreign investors and arbitration tribunals with the authorities typically 
afforded to States (Cutler and Lark, 2017). Indeed, to the extent to which the regime's 
role is considered to be foundational, it has been described as a form of "new 
constitutionalism" by critical political economy scholars (Cutler, 2016; Schneiderman, 
2008). New constitutionalism here refers to: 
 ‘a political project aimed at the continuous expansion of capitalism through the 
entrenchment into national and international legal frameworks of neoliberal, market-
oriented laws and policies that favor privatization, liberalization, and deregulation of 
trade, investment, and financial services, and a host of economic, social, and cultural 
activities’ (Cutler, 2016, p. 99; see Cutler, 2014; and Gill and Cutler, 2014). 
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Chapter 3 of this thesis analyses how these political and ideological preferences of 
capital exporting countries became entrenched as the rules of this regime. However 
for the purposes of this chapter it is essential to note that these preferences have 
defined the norms and principles that have shaped this regime. Moreover, according 
to Cutler (2016, p. 99), the constitutional disciplines of investment activities are 
evident in three characteristics of this regime: (i) the significant insulation of foreign 
investment from interference by States; (ii) the agreement to standards of behavior that 
limit the policy and autonomy of States; and (iii) the commitment to dispute settlement 
in private arbitral proceedings subject to minimal legal review by national 
governments and courts. 
Effectively, the regime has served to delocalise, denationalise and privatise decision 
making over foreign investment triggering significant concerns and questions 
regarding the growing influence of private actors have in the operation of global 
governance (Cutler and Lark, 2017). As will be demonstrated in this thesis, this re-
allocation of power and loss of policy space for host States has been the primary source 
of contestation by the members of this regime. In response to domestic pressures in 
critical public policy areas, several countries from both the developed and developing 
parts of the world have sought to re-balance their relationship with private actors by 
re-evaluating their membership within the regime (Cutler and Lark, 2017).  
Finally, this section aimed to clarify the scope of the investment treaty regime studied 
in this thesis. In this study, the regime refers to not only the legal framework provided 
through the investment treaties and arbitration institutions but also the norms and 
principles that have shaped the regime as a result of the social, political and economic 
environment in which the regime has evolved. In the same manner adopted by “social 
systems”, this socio-legal approach enables us to include the norms and principles that 
may have not been ‘incorporated in the formal law making process, yet they still create 
normative standards and expectations of appropriate behaviour’ (Chinkin, 2003, pp. 
24–25; cited in Tan, 2013).  
Going forward in this thesis, the terms ‘investment treaty regime’ and ‘international 
investment regime’ will be used interchangeably.  
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3. Policy Space as Regulatory Power 
The failure of neoliberal structural adjustment policies to induce inclusive economic 
development in developing countries has revived interest in the role of the State in 
development (Calvert, 2016). Calls for an increase in national ownership over 
development policies and more context-specific development programmes have led to 
a growing interest in the issue of policy space in the development literature over the 
past decade (Gallagher, 2005; Rodrik et al., 2004). For domestic institutions to play a 
role in formulating the policies required to achieve inclusive growth, a certain degree 
of policy space and autonomy is needed to ensure national development strategies 
address the country’s social and economic objectives with the relevant and appropriate 
policy-mix (Calvert, 2016). Before addressing the different ways in which BITs and 
the ISDS mechanism have constrained the policy space available to host States to 
regulate their economy, it is important to clarify how policy space is defined in this 
thesis.  
The term ‘policy space’ was first coined by the UNCTAD in its 2002 Trade and 
Development Report (UNCTAD, 2002). Although it has emerged recently, it captures 
an idea that has a long heritage. It can be traced to the work of Raul Prebisch, for 
instance, who recognised the importance of being integrated into the global economy 
but advocated for more active and interventionist developmental policies in order to 
secure economic development (Hannah and Scott, 2017). The phrase ‘policy space’ 
took off at the São Paulo Conference in 2004 as UNCTAD addressed the issue of 
restrictions on the available policy space for developing countries. In the São Paulo 
Consensus it was defined as ‘the scope for domestic policies especially in the areas of 
trade, investment and industrial development, which might be framed by international 
disciplines, commitments and global market considerations’ (UNCTAD, 2004, p. 2). 
In later UNCTAD reports the definition evolved to ‘the freedom and ability of the 
government to identify and pursue the most appropriate mix of economic and social 
policies to achieve equitable and sustainable development in their own national 
contexts, but as constituent parts of an interdependent global economy’ (UNCTAD, 
2014a, p. vii). In this thesis, the term ‘policy space’ is used to describe the degree of 
autonomy that States have to regulate their economy as per their development 
objectives while observing their obligations under existing BITs.  
The definitions of regulation have generally oscillated between the conceptualisations 
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of centred regulation and de-centred regulation (Prabhash, 2012). Centred regulation 
refers to regulation that involves only the State. De-centred regulation also involves 
non-State actors such as Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs) and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (Prabhash, 2012). Furthermore, ‘regulation’ is a 
social phenomenon that extends beyond law in the sense that regulation does not need 
to come from the State, and thus law can be seen as one form of regulation (Baldwin 
et al., 1998; Black, 2002; Morgan and Yeung, 2007). Since the focus of this thesis is 
on the policy space available to the host States, this section will address the centred 
regulatory concept.  
Centred regulation can be defined in two ways. One definition refers to the stipulation 
of rules by government supplemented by mechanisms for monitoring and 
enforcement, usually performed through a specialist public agency (Majone, 1996). 
This definition, however, provides a narrow understanding of regulation, because here 
regulation is only carried out by specialist public regulatory bodies mainly aimed at 
correcting market failures. It generally excludes redistributive policies of the State 
from the scope of regulation (Krajewski, 2003).  
Another way to define centred regulation is that it includes any form of State 
intervention in the economy, whatever form that intervention might take (Black, 2002; 
Mitnick, 1980). This is a broader understanding of regulation under which the State 
may intervene not just through specialist regulatory bodies but also through direct 
State intervention (Prabhash, 2012). Thus, according to this understanding, regulation 
is the State’s intervention through various policies and measures to control or 
influence the behaviour of others (Black, 2002). Following this logic, one can define 
regulatory power as ‘the ability of the host State to adopt policies and laws to achieve 
a variety of policy objectives’ (Prabhash, 2012, p. 14). Considering that each of the 
three case studies in this thesis will focus on how BITs have restricted policy makers 
from achieving their policy objectives, I intend to use ‘policy space’ to reflect 
regulatory power in the broader sense as developed by Prabhash (2012).  
Much of the debate regarding the role of national policies in development concerns 
the concept of policy space and focuses on the tension between international economic 
integration and the autonomy available to nation States to pursue policies that support 
their economic development (Mayer, 2009). Over the past few decades, the tension 
between international integration and policy space was exacerbated by two 
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developments (Mayer, 2009). Firstly, the neoliberal policy agenda, which many 
developing countries pursued during the 1980s and 1990s which not only limited 
domestic policy space but also failed to achieve the desired acceleration of economic 
development even by the admission of institutions like the World Bank (World Bank, 
2005). Secondly, the increased internationalisation of markets and the associated 
stronger influence of foreign factors on national development have further diminished 
the policy space available to achieve domestic policy objectives (Mayer, 2009).  
This has been particularly the case for developing countries that as a group are being 
more tightly constrained in their national development strategies by proliferating 
regulations formulated and enforced by international organisations (Wade, 2003) and 
capital-exporting countries. The rules written into multilateral and bilateral 
agreements, as will be demonstrated below, actively prevent developing countries 
from pursuing the public policies historically adopted by now-developed countries 
when they were in a catching up position. In effect, the new regulations are designed 
to expand the options of multinational firms to enter and exit developing economies 
more easily, with fewer restrictions and obligations (Wade, 2003). Accordingly, these 
regulations and obligations result in the shrinkage of both development space and the 
space for ‘self-determination’ (Wade, 2003, p. 622). Hence, a major criticism of BITs 
has been that they can be perceived as attempts to ‘kick away the ladder’ for 
developing countries, in the words of Ha-Joon Chang (2002) and Friedrich List (1885) 
before him. 
The next section provides an overview of how BITs evolved and the emergence of 
policy space concerns for members of the investment treaty regime.  
4. BITs Evolution and the Emergence of Policy Space Concerns 
Before and since the formation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), several 
attempts to create a comprehensive multilateral agreement on investment were made 
but failed to materialise (Kurtz, 2002). Indeed, all binding international investment 
treaties have been created outside the WTO system and exist largely at a bilateral or 
regional level, except for services-related investments (Yazbek, 2010).5 This absence 
                                               
 
5 These treaties are covered under the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the 
limited application of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment Measures (Kurtz, 2002). 
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of investment rules from the international economic trading scene has by no means 
inhibited the conclusion of investment agreements (Yazbek, 2010). On the contrary, 
BITs have been increasingly used since 1959 to regulate foreign investment flows 
between developed and developing countries. From their early days, BITs were 
typically weighted in favour of protecting foreign investments from expropriation by 
newly independent host countries (Kurtz, 2002).  
The period from 1990 to 2002 witnessed an explosive proliferation of BITs globally, 
as the number of new BITs signed averaged 154 BITs per year during that period (El-
Kady, 2013). BIT negotiations were based on template models with a uniform set of 
core legally binding investment protection provisions placed on the host country to 
facilitate the operation of foreign investors in that State (El-Kady, 2013; Yazbek, 
2010). A more detailed account of why some of these provisions are considered 
controversial is provided in Section 5.1.  
The international investment regime has evolved over time, taking on a normative 
dimension, which limits the policy space of host State governments, specifically in 
their pursuit of economic development objectives (Yazbek, 2010). This presents major 
challenges for governments both in the present and in the future (UNCTAD, 2007). 
Over the past two decades, BITs have increasingly included a wider variety of 
disciplines affecting more areas of host country activity in a more complex and 
detailed manner (UNCTAD, 2007, p. xi). According to a UNCTAD report (2007, p. 
xi), these treaties put more emphasis on public policy concerns, in particular through, 
inter alia, the inclusion of safeguards and exceptions relating to public health, 
environmental protection and national security. 
The wider implications of BITs provisions were initially ill-recognised, as BITs were 
seen basically as signals for a safe investment climate. Eventually, however, as 
arbitration cases accumulated, BITs emerged as a threat not only to the ability of host 
States to regulate, but also to public budgets,6 through increasingly high costs for 
arbitration purposes (Van der Pas et al., 2015). Developing countries are now aware 
                                               
 
6 Foreign investors file arbitration claims for and receive compensations that can run into hundreds of 
millions of dollars. 
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of the substantively high costs associated with the investment regime promoted in 
bilateral and other international investment treaties (Van der Pas et al., 2015).  
The next section of this chapter provides a more detailed account of the main 
arguments on how BITs and the ISDS mechanism constrain the ability of States to 
regulate, leading to what has been described as a crisis of legitimacy in the 
international investment regime.  
5. The Conflict between BITs and Policy Space for Host States  
Coinciding with the significant rise in investment treaty arbitration cases since the 
beginning of the new millennium, the debate over the impact of BITs on policy space 
has intensified. Supporters of the investment treaty regime argue that it promotes the 
rule of law in international economic relations, and protects foreign investors from 
arbitrary State policies and measures (see Schill, 2016). Critics, however, argue that 
the regime limits the ability of States to regulate in the public interest (Sornarajah, 
2015). Scholars have argued that investment treaties like BITs restrict the policy 
autonomy of the host countries’ governments while enabling foreign investors to 
unduly intervene in domestic democratic processes and policy-making (Blackwood 
and McBride, 2006; Chang, 2006, 2004; Gallagher, 2005, 2008; Wade, 2003). This 
argument has been supported by several studies that demonstrate how foreign 
investors have used investment protection standards in treaties like BITs to challenge 
public policies adopted by the government of a host country (Calvert, 2016). The 
studies highlighted how policies related to industrial development, public health, the 
environment, social justice and natural resource governance have been challenged 
through BITs (see Cho and Dubash, 2005; Manger, 2008; McBride, 2006; Spears, 
2010; Yazbek, 2010). These studies also endorsed the conclusion that by signing BITs 
developing countries were sacrificing policy space in exchange for uncertain 
economic benefits (Calvert, 2016). 
The criticisms above are said to amount to a legitimacy crisis of the investment treaty 
regime (see Bonnitcha et al., 2017; Brower et al., 2003; Franck, 2005), similar to the 
legitimacy crisis of the international trade regime around the time of the WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999 (see Esty, 2002; Keohane and Nye, 2001).  
The rest of this section will assess some of the main arguments on how BITs and the 
existing ISDS mechanisms constrain the policy space available for developing 
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countries at multiple stages of the policy making process. Section 5.1 demonstrates 
how investment treaties provide the means by which actors discipline governments for 
adopting policies during and after the policy's implementation (Calvert, 2016). It 
focuses on how the expansive application of investment protection standards has been 
used to challenge a wide range of State regulatory activities. Section 5.2 addresses the 
issue of ‘regulatory chill’, which denotes the process whereby the threat of claims 
through BITs can be used to prevent governments from adopting certain policies, 
including regulatory regime changes, as they might breach some of the broadly 
interpreted provisions in BITs. Finally, Section 5.3 will address how issues of policy 
shrinkage have been compounded by deficiencies in the investment treaty arbitration 
system.  
5.1 Challenging Regulations by the Host State 
One way to conceptualise the relationship between investment treaties and regulatory 
power is in terms of investment disputes. According to this conceptualisation, the host 
country, unaware of the implications of the investment treaties, exercises its regulatory 
power, which the foreign investor challenges under investment treaty arbitration 
(Prabhash, 2012). The tribunal decides whether the regulatory measure of the host 
country is legal or not by interpreting the investment treaty in question. This approach 
focuses on how different provisions of the investment treaties are worded and whether 
these provisions balance investment protection with regulatory power (Prabhash, 
2012). If a tribunal concludes that the regulatory measure of the host State is illegal, it 
will require the host State to compensate the foreign investor. Paying compensation to 
the foreign investor will increase the cost of regulation, which may deter the host 
country from adopting such regulations in the future (Prabhash, 2012).  
5.1.1 Broad Definitions and Investment Protection Standards 
The growing number of investor claims against sovereign States challenging a wide 
array of public policy decisions and regulatory measures has evoked deep concerns 
about the potential costs associated with such treaties (Singh and Ilge, 2016). The 
vaguely termed provisions in BITs can result in expansive interpretations by arbitral 
tribunals, leading to substantial monetary claims by foreign investors (Singh and Ilge, 
2016). This section will provide a few examples of how broadly framed provisions 
have been (or can be) expansively interpreted by lawyers and tribunals. Section 5.1.2 
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will illustrate the range of State activities that have been the subject of investor-State 
disputes.  
Firstly, concerning definitions, investment treaties tend to include extensive 
definitions of ‘investors’, as a result, consent by host States to arbitration in investment 
treaties opens these countries up for thousands of potential claimants (Bonnitcha et al., 
2017). The list of potential claimants includes multinational firms, their shareholders, 
financial institutions, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and individual investors. The 
definition of ‘investments’ equally expands the scope of protection offered by 
covering disputes not only over FDI, but also portfolio investments, contracts, 
intellectual property rights, and much more (Bonnitcha et al., 2017). As a result of 
these broad definitions, companies can make use of different treaties through corporate 
restructuring (see Dolzer and Schreuer, 2012). 
Secondly, most investment treaties offer a core of six substantive protections to foreign 
investors: most-favoured-nation treatment (MFN); national treatment (NT); fair and 
equitable treatment (FET); a guarantee of compensation for expropriation; an umbrella 
clause; and a free transfer of funds clause. These provisions can be split into ‘relative’ 
standards of protection and ‘absolute’ standards of protection (Bonnitcha et al., 2017).  
The two main relative standards of protection included in BITs are the MFN and NT 
provisions. 7  MFN prevents host States from treating foreign investors of one 
nationality better than foreign investors of another nationality and NT prevents host 
States from treating its own investors better than foreign investors. Both clauses are 
typically broadly formulated and generally apply to all State conduct affecting foreign 
investment. While most investment treaties contain relatively similar substantive 
protections, there is a degree of variation in the provisions provided and the scope of 
protection provided in some cases.  
For nearly two decades, the discussion on MFN has been dominated by the 
controversy triggered by the Maffezini v. Spain (1997) case (Batifort and Heath, 2017; 
see Douglas, 2011). An original interpretation of MFN by the ICSID tribunal 
regarding the possibility for investors protected under a BIT to import more favourable 
                                               
 
7 They are 'relative standards' in the sense that their application requires a comparison of the way a State 
treats one foreign investment with the way it treats its domestic investments or foreign investments 
from a different country. 
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provisions from a third-party BIT made by their host state in that case8 led to  what 
has been described as ‘a seismic shift in international investment law’ (Nikièma, 2017, 
p. 1). Under this interpretation of MFN, several decisions rendered by international 
arbitral tribunals suggest that an investor can use the MFN clause in the treaty that is 
applicable to their home State to search the universe of treaties to which the host State 
is party, identify more favourable clauses and protections in those other treaties, and 
use the MFN provision to replace or supplement the protections of the agreement.9 
This allows the foreign investors to isolate, extract and import more favourable 
provisions from other treaties which can broaden States’ obligations, undoing what 
may have been the results of hard-fought negotiations between the host and home 
country, and nullifying what might have been purposeful limits in the agreement (IISD 
and UN Environment, 2017). 
The basic framework adopted by tribunals to adjudicate claims on NT is based on a 
three-step analysis process (Dolzer and Schreuer, 2012, p. 200). First, a tribunal must 
determine whether the investors are in ‘like circumstances’ through a relative class of 
comparators. The tribunal must then determine whether the treatment accorded to a 
foreign investor is less favourable than the one enjoyed by domestic investors. Lastly, 
it must determine the host State’s intent and whether there was a justification for this 
differentiation. The central question is whether particular domestic investments can 
reasonably be compared to the foreign investment in question (Bonnitcha et al., 2017). 
Accordingly, difficult questions arise for tribunals when determining whether 
differences in treatment constitute de facto discrimination10 in practice. For example, 
in the case of Occidental v. Ecuador I (2004), the tribunal adopted a broad approach 
to the choice of the comparator in the NT claim made by the investor (Bonnitcha et 
al., 2017). It held that Ecuador's imposition of value-added tax on oil exports, but not 
on the export of other products, breached NT, even though the tax applied equally to 
oil exports by both foreign and Ecuadorian companies.11 This is because the tribunal 
                                               
 
8 see Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain. Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to 
Jurisdiction. ICSID, Case No. ARB/97/7, para 56,64. 
9 For example, see  AWG Group Ltd. v. The Argentine Republic. UNCITRAL, 2003; and Bayindir 
Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan. ICSID, Case No. ARB/03/29. 
10 I.e. discriminatory administrative practices that are not authorised by law. 
11 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador I. London Court of 
International Arbitration. Award. Administered Case No. UN 3467, 1 July 2004, para 167-173. 
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found that Ecuadorian companies in the mining, seafood, and cut flowers sectors were 
relevant comparators (i.e. in ‘like circumstances’) in assessing the treatment of a 
foreign investor in the oil sector, simply because all were involved in producing goods 
for export. 12  This broad interpretation and decision was sharply criticised (see 
Bonnitcha et al., 2017;  Kurtz, 2009). 
Other tribunals have interpreted ‘like circumstances’ differently (Bonnitcha et al., 
2017), for instance, the SD Myers v. Canada tribunal held that ‘the assessment of ‘like 
circumstances’ should take into consideration circumstances that would justify 
governmental regulations that treat firms differently in order to protect the public 
interest’.13 It identified firms’ environmental impacts as an example of a factor that 
could justify a conclusion that two firms were not in ‘like circumstances’, 
notwithstanding their competitive relationship.14 
Overall, NT has only played a minor role in the practice of the investment treaty 
regime to date (Bonnitcha et al., 2017). Most of the arbitration claims alleging the 
breach of the NT involve allegations of de facto discrimination (see Bjorklund, 2018; 
Henckels, 2015). As illustrated in Figure 1, only eight tribunals have decided NT 
claims in favour of investors. 
The second type of protection standards are the so-called ‘absolute standards’ of 
protection. These standards include FET, expropriation (direct and indirect), umbrella 
clauses and free transfer of funds. They are absolute in the sense that they require host 
States to guarantee foreign investors specific standards of treatment, regardless of how 
they treat other investments. The fact that these investment treaty protections are often 
formulated in vague, imprecise terms, grants arbitral tribunals a significant degree of 
discretion in their interpretation and application. 
The free transfer of funds provision found in most BITs typically stipulates that each 
contracting party shall grant to an investor of the other contracting party the 
unrestricted right to transfer abroad funds related to an investment. The clause 
generally covers a broad range of funds related to an investment, including incoming 
                                               
 
12 Ibid. 
13 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada. Partial Award. UNCITRAL, 13 November 2000, para 
250. 
14 Ibid. 
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transfers (e.g. the initial investment in the host State) and outward transfers (e.g. 
returns or proceeds from the sale of the investment) (UNCTAD, 2000). The 
implications of this clause on development and the right to regulate are that it generally 
doesn't include exceptions that may be necessary to allow temporary derogation to 
address severe macroeconomic problems (e.g. balance of payments crises) 
(UNCTAD, 2000). In the majority of cases, the clause does not allow for restrictions 
on transfers if required for the enforcement of a host State’s existing domestic laws 
(e.g. for fraud prevention) (UNCTAD, 2000). Critics have pointed how through this 
clause investment treaties can chill the use of capital controls in times of crisis (see 
Siegel, 2013). Despite the extensive literature on the need for capital controls as part 
of a State’s ‘macro-prudential regulatory toolkit to maintain financial stability’, only 
c.10 per cent of investment treaties create exceptions for restrictions on the transfer of 
funds during balance of payments crises or other macroeconomic emergencies 
(Bonnitcha et al., 2017, p. 116; see Broner and Ventura, 2016; Kant, 1998; Ostry et 
al., 2010). 
Another example of an absolute standard of protection is the umbrella clause. Some 
investment treaties allow investors to circumvent or avoid what was agreed to in an 
investment contract or to initiate multiple claims, under treaty clauses commonly 
referred to as umbrella clauses. Their formulation varies, but a typical umbrella clause 
stipulates that each State party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into 
with regard to investments of nationals of the other State party (see UNCTAD, 2007). 
An umbrella clause could allow a foreign investor to assert State obligations from 
beyond the treaty itself (legislative, contractual and treaty-based) under the coverage 
of the treaty and its dispute settlement mechanisms (Šarkinović, 2011). It could also 
allow the investor to forum shop or initiate proceedings before both the domestic 
courts of the host State and the treaty-based dispute settlement mechanism (IISD and 
UN Environment, 2017).  
The debate over whether the umbrella clause in a host State’s BIT applies to 
obligations arising under otherwise independent investment contracts between the 
investor and the host State started over a decade ago when two tribunals (deciding 
shortly after one another) adopted conflicting interpretations of the umbrella clause in 
their decisions (Wong, 2006). One the one hand, the SGS v. Philippines (2002) tribunal 
adopted an expansive interpretation of the umbrella clause deciding that breach of the 
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host state’s contractual commitments would amount to a breach of the BIT, and the 
matter would be subject to ICSID jurisdiction. 15  On the other hand, the SGS v. 
Pakistan (2001) tribunal adopted a more restrictive interpretation of the umbrella 
clause deciding that the local forum would adjucate the investor’s contractual claim.16 
Dissatisfaction with tribunals’ interpretation of this provision has prompted some 
States to exclude this clause from new investment agreements (e.g. Chapter 9 of the 
TPP, Indian Model BIT, Chapter 8 of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA), and Canada-China BIT) (Šarkinović, 2011; IISD and UN 
Environment, 2017).  
Finally, the last two absolute standards of protection covered in this section, FET and 
expropriation are the two most frequently invoked clauses by investors in arbitration 
claims. Figure 1 below illustrates how often investors have alleged breaches of 
substantive protections and how often investment tribunals have upheld each type of 
claim. As of July 2017, the FET provision was invoked by claimants in about 80 per 
cent of ISDS cases for which information on breaches alleged was available, followed 
by indirect expropriation with 75 per cent. ISDS tribunals most frequently found 
breaches of FET (65 per cent) and indirect expropriation (32 per cent) in cases decided 
in favour of the investor or decided in favour of neither party (liability found but no 
damages awarded) (UNCTAD, 2017a). 
Almost all BITs contain an expropriation provision. A typical expropriation clause 
reads as follows:17  
Investments of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be expropriated 
or subjected to measures having an effect equivalent to nationalisation or 
expropriation…except for a public purpose, under due process of law, in a non-
discriminatory manner and against prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation. 
The article as with almost all BITs distinguishes between direct expropriations 
(investments that shall not be nationalised or expropriated) and indirect expropriations 
(measures having an effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation). Direct 
                                               
 
15 See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines. Decision of the 
Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction. ICSID, Case No. ARB/02/6, para 169. 
16  See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Decision on 
Objections to Jurisdiction. ICSID, Case No. ARB/01/13, para 166-173. 
17 Article 8 of the Egypt-Canada BIT (1996). 
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expropriation involves a transfer of title or physical seizure of an investment and is 
usually easy to identify. Instead, the more important question in arbitral practice is 
how to identify indirect expropriation. As demonstrated in Figure 1, indirect 
expropriation is the second most common breach alleged by investors of all known 
investment treaty arbitrations, and the subject has proven highly controversial (see 
Bonnitcha et al., 2017; Fortier and Drymer, 2004; Ratner, 2008; Schneiderman, 2008).  
Indirect expropriation refers to the deprivation of the substantial benefits flowing from 
the investment without any formal ‘taking’ of the property (Dolzer and Schreuer, 
2012; Salacuse, 2015). However, there is no commonly accepted definition of indirect 
expropriation; determining whether it has occurred will depend on how arbitration 
tribunals interpret the facts and the treaty language (IISD and UN Environment, 2017).  
While there seems to be a consensus over the view that actions by the State can only 
amount to indirect expropriation if it results in a substantial deprivation of the 
investor’s investment, there remains an on-going controversy about where and how to 
draw the line between indirect expropriation and a State’s sovereign right to exercise 
its regulatory powers (Bonnitcha et al., 2017; see Sornarajah, 2010; Schneiderman, 
2008). This uncertainty raises sustainable development concerns (IISD and UN 
Environment, 2017). In several cases, tribunals have ruled that measures taken for a 
public purpose, such as health, environmental protection and provision of basic 
services, amounted to indirect expropriation after investors claimed they had a 
substantial negative impact on their business. Examples include Abengoa v. Mexico 
(2009),18 and Biwater v. Tanzania (2010).19 Some tribunals have established implicit 
exceptions to the concept of indirect expropriation, stating that non-discriminatory 
regulatory measures in pursuit of legitimate policies do not amount to indirect 
expropriation regardless of the magnitude of loss, or interference with, an investment 
(e.g. Methanex v. US (2005).20 
In recent years, the evolution of the economic and regulatory environment has brought 
to the forefront these questions regarding indirect expropriations (UNCTAD, 2012). 
                                               
 
18 Abengoa, S.A. y COFIDES, S.A. v. United Mexican States. ICSID, Case No. ARB (AF)/09/2. 
19 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania. ICSID, Case No. ARB/05/22. 
20 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America. Award. UNCITRAL, 3 August 2005, Part IV, 
Chapter D, para 7. 
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As States have recognised how arbitration tribunals have expansively interpreted this 
provision, there have been attempts to introduce clarifications to narrow the scope of 
protection provided under indirect expropriation clauses in new treaties. These 
clarifications include the appropriate criteria to (a) determine whether an indirect 
taking has occurred; and (b) to distinguish indirect expropriation from regulation in 
the public interest, which is non-compensable despite the economic impact on 
particular investments (UNCTAD, 2012).  
Another major concern with the expropriation provision in BITs is how tribunals 
determine compensation. Compensation can be awarded for different treaty breaches 
and involve different categories of damages, subject to the treaty language and the 
tribunals’ assessment of the specific circumstances of a case (Rosert, 2014). With 
regards to the scope of compensation, a significant number of BITs adopt the standard 
of ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation (UNCTAD, 2007). This is the so-
called Hull formula,21 which was first claimed by the United States in 1938. ‘Prompt, 
adequate and effective’ compensation means that the investor should be granted, as 
soon as the investment is made (prompt), an amount equal to the total value of its 
expropriated investment (adequate) in a freely transferable and exchangeable currency 
(effective) (Nikièma, 2013). In some cases, the Hull formula refers to full 
compensation; which includes full compensation for losses suffered and lost profits. 
In general, tribunals have concluded that full compensation is always due in the event 
of expropriation, despite the diversity of terms used in BITs (Nikièma, 2013). 
Almost no BITs provide any guidance on methods of assessment of the injury. The 
determination of the damages is thus left to the discretion of arbitration tribunals and 
accountancy firms, who use various and unpredictable formulas from case to case 
(Nikièma, 2013; see Salacuse, 2015, p. 356; Ball, 2001; Wälde and Sabahi, 2008). 
Furthermore, the lack of clarity regarding principles guiding the determination of the 
scope of compensation and the damages incurred by the claimants also extends to the 
methods for calculating ‘full compensation’ or the ‘market value’ of an investment 
(Nikièma, 2013; Salacuse, 2015). The common practice of the tribunals is to apply a 
combination of methods to varying degrees (Salacuse, 2015). In many cases, however, 
                                               
 
21 The famous formula was introduced by U.S. Secretary of State Cornell Hull in his note of July 21, 
1938, in response to the Mexican nationalisations of 1917.  
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the tribunals’ decisions fail to state why one calculation method was preferred over 
another, as the calculation of compensation and particularly of lost profits is generally 
left to accounting firms (Nikièma, 2013). 
In addition to calls for more clarity and transparency regarding the determination of 
the scope of compensation and the calculation of damages, the current approach 
adopted for calculating compensation has been severely criticised for failing to 
consider factors that may balance investor and host State interests. In some cases 
tribunals have tended to disregard the regulatory purpose of the measures taken 
altogether (Kriebaum, 2015). For example, in the Santa Elena v. Costa Rica (1996) 
case, the tribunal stated that:  
Expropriatory environmental measures – no matter how laudable and 
beneficiary to the society as a whole – are, in this respect, similar to any other 
expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to implement its policies: 
where property is expropriated, even for environmental purposes, whether 
domestic or international, the state’s obligation to pay compensation remains.22 
 
Hence, a legitimate or even laudable cause does not necessarily affect the 
compensation requirement (Kriebaum, 2015). Furthermore, it is possible to envisage 
scenarios in which compensation should not cover the entire market value of the 
investment, especially in the case of indirect expropriation (Nikièma, 2013). These 
scenarios include historical circumstances under which the investment was acquired23 
or the host State’s socio-economic situation when the treaty breach occurred. 24 
Accordingly, the assessment of compensation should take into account other financial 
and non-financial factors in order to achieve a result that strikes a balance between the 
interests of investors and those of the host State (Nikièma, 2013). 
The final provision addressed in this section is the FET clause, which exists in more 
than 95 per cent of BITs and is considered as the most important substantive protection 
standard (Bonnitcha et al., 2017). As demonstrated in Figure 1, it is the most common 
breach alleged by investors and found by tribunals. A typical FET clause will state 
that each contracting State shall in its territory in every case accord investments by 
                                               
 
22 Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica. Award. ICSID, Case No. 
ARB/96/1, para 72. 
23 Examples of such cases will be provided in Chapter 7.  
24 See Siemens A.G. v. Republic of Argentina. ICSID, Case No. ARB/02/8. 
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investors of the other contracting State fair and equitable treatment.25 This short and 
open-ended formulation provides broad interpretive discretion to investment tribunals 
(Harten, 2007; Sornarajah, 2010). In some cases, arbitration tribunals have 
acknowledged that the lack of a precise definition of FET in BITs grants tribunals 
wide interpretive powers. 26  For instance, the arbitration tribunal in Rumeli v. 
Kazakhstan (2005) stated that the FET standard in treaties is ‘intentionally vague in 
order to give tribunals the possibility to articulate the range of principles to achieve 
the treaty’s purpose in particular disputes’.27 Investors have invoked the FET standard 
to challenge a wide range of State activities, including changes to legislation of general 
application, decisions of executive agencies of the host State specifically addressed to 
the investor in question, and the actions of the host State’s judiciary (Bonnitcha et al., 
2017). 
FET expands the scope of protection provided to investors even beyond what is offered 
by indirect expropriation, as host States may breach FET even if the impact of State 
conduct on the foreign investor falls short of a ‘substantial deprivation’ of an 
investment necessary for it to be considered as expropriation (Bonnitcha et al., 2017). 
The FET standard has been described as an all-purpose tool used to cover any gaps 
left by more specific standards of investment protection (e.g. MFN and NT) or to 
strengthen the claimant’s argumentation related to any standard (Islam, 2016; Klager, 
2010; see Sornarajah, 2015). 
Arbitral tribunals, States, and academics have all failed to agree on the meaning of 
FET. Tribunals have considered a range of factors in determining whether host States 
have breached FET, including (Bonnitcha et al., 2017): (i) the extent to which State 
conduct interferes with or alters a foreign investor’s legal rights under domestic law; 
(ii) the extent to which State conduct breaches promises made to foreign investors; 
(iii) the extent to which State conduct is consistent with standards of procedural 
fairness and due process; (iv) the extent to which State conduct pursues a legitimate 
policy objective; and (v) the likely effectiveness of the State conduct in achieving its 
                                               
 
25 Article 2(2) of the German Model BIT (2009). 
26  Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania. Award. ICSID, Case No. 
ARB/05/22, para 593. 
27 Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. vs Kazakhstan. Award. 
ICSID, Case No. ARB/05/16, para 583. 
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intended policy objective. However, the most controversial factor that tribunals have 
considered when determining whether the standard has been breached is the 
‘legitimate expectations’ of investors when entering into the investment (Miles, 2010; 
Sornarajah, 2015). This element has been interpreted as requiring the host State to 
notify the investor of all regulations that will govern the investment for its duration 
and requiring the host State to maintain a stable legal and business framework 
throughout the term of the investment (Miles, 2010, p. 42; see Schreuer and Kriebaum, 
2009).28 As will be demonstrated in Chapter 6, this interpretation of FET treatment, 
which has been described as being heavily weighted towards furthering the interests 
of foreign investors, can be particularly constraining for host States (Miles, 2010; 
Sornarajah, 2015). 
The open-ended nature of the FET provision, coupled with its high success rate for 
investors, has made it the most controversial substantive guarantee in the modern 
investment treaty regime (Bonnitcha et al., 2017). For proponents of the investment 
treaty regime, FET embodies the rule of law in the regime (see Schill, 2013). For the 
critics, however, it has disempowered governments from modifying their laws, even 
if the regulations or measures are in the public interest (see Alvarez, 2011). 
Consequently, as will be demonstrated in Section 6 further below, amendments to the 
FET provision or its exclusion all together has been a common theme in the different 
reactions of both developing and developed countries that have expressed their 
discontent with the investment treaty regime and acted upon it.  
                                               
 
28 See Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States. Award. ICSID, Case 
No ARB/AF (00)/2, para 154. 
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Figure 1: Breaches most frequently alleged and found, 1987–31 July 2017 
(Number of known cases) 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2017), UNCTAD ISDS Navigator. 
5.1.2 Investor-State Disputes 
Having given an overview of how broadly framed provisions may be expansively 
interpreted, the following section will illustrate the range of State activities that have 
been the subject of investor-State disputes. Many scholars argue that a wide range of 
sovereign decisions of host States are capable of being caught in the broad net of 
investor-State dispute settlement due to the vague and broad language of investment 
treaties (Schill, 2011). Investors have used investment treaties to address a much 
broader range of concerns about executive, legislative, and judicial acts—such as 
transparency, predictability, and fairness in government decision-making (Bonnitcha 
et al., 2017). 
 Investment disputes between foreign investors and host States have covered a wide 
range of regulatory measures, such as: environmental policy; 29  regulating 
privatisations; 30  regulatory measures related to supply of drinking water;31  urban 
                                               
 
29  See Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States. ICSID, Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1; 
Methanex Corporation v. United States of America. UNCITRAL, 2005. 
30 See Eureka BV v. Republic of Poland. ICSID, Case No ARB/01/11. 
31 See Biwater Gauff Ltd v. United Republic of Tanzania. ICSID, Case No. ARB/05/22. 
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policy;32 monetary policy;33 taxations policies;34 energy;35 public postal services;36 
electricity services;37 tourism;38 and many others (Dolzer and Schreuer, 2012; Footer, 
2009; Kaushal, 2009). Moreover, there have been cases in which tribunals have 
arbitrated over the actions of the judiciary in the host States (Johnson et al., 2015).39 
Thus, it is safe to conclude, that arbitral tribunals have adjudicated many sovereign 
decisions of host countries (Dolzer and Schreuer, 2012; Kaushal, 2009) as violations 
of the investment treaties. Most arbitrations have been brought by investors from 
developed countries against developing and transition States. Countries such as 
Argentina, Venezuela and Egypt have been subject to dozens of arbitrations. 
Increasingly, however, investors also bring arbitrations against developed countries. 
An empirical study of investor-State arbitration cases by Williams (2016),40 reveals 
that the majority of investment treaty arbitrations arise from administrative or 
executive action, although legislative measures are the single most common source of 
publicly known investment treaty arbitrations (see Figure 2). Concerning the most 
common measures that have triggered investor-State arbitration cases, the study 
reveals that the top three measures are (Williams, 2016):41 (i) the cancellation of a 
project, agreement or licence. Investor-State disputes triggered by this measure span 
different industries and levels of development, but are generally administrative 
(although a number also involve judicial decisions). (ii) Expropriation of a foreign 
investment makes up the next largest category of measures taken, although it is worth 
                                               
 
32 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Chile. ICSID, Case No. ARB/01/7. 
33 See Enron Corporation v. Argentina. ICSID, Case No. ARB/01/3; Sempra Energy International v. 
Argentina. ICSID, Case No. ARB/02/16.  
34 See Occidental Exploration and Production Co v. Republic of Ecuador. LCIA, Case No. UN 3467; 
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35 Duke Energy Electroquil Partners v. Republic of Ecuador. ICSID, Case No. ARB/04/19. 
36 United Parcel Service of America v. Canada. Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, 2007. 
37 Nykomb Synergetics v. Republic of Latvia. Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 2003. 
38 Waguih Elie George v. Egypt. ICSID, Case No. ARB/05/15. 
39 See Chevron v. Ecuador. UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23; Eli Lilly v. Canada. ICSID, Case No. 
UNCT/14/2; Awdi v. Romania. ICSID, Case No. ARB/10/13. 
40 The study is based on an original data set of known disputes and includes 583 ICSID and UNCITRAL 
cases, as well as those held at other arbitral forums where information was available (Williams, 2016). 
41 See Figure 3. 
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noting that the series of expropriations undertaken by the Venezuelan regime (under 
Hugo Chavez) make up over 25 per cent of these cases. (iii) The third most frequent 
measure is the rather broad category of regulatory change. Included within this 
category are measures that ban specific industrial activities; ban certain substances 
(for example, pesticides); or other changes to the regulatory framework of an entire 
industry.  
Figure 2: Domestic institutions and investor-State arbitration 
 
Source: Williams (2016) 
Figure 3: Measures that triggered investor-State arbitration cases 
	
Source: Williams (2016) 
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Finally, in this section the relationship between investment treaties and host country's 
regulatory power was conceptualised in terms of the potential disputes that can be 
brought against the host State for violating provisions of these treaties through 
exercising its regulatory power. According to Prabhash (2012), this conceptualisation 
is best suited to understanding the relationship between investment treaties and 
regulatory power in the case of countries where there is inadequate knowledge about 
the implications of the investment treaties, and hence these treaties are yet to be 
internalised in the exercise of regulatory power. Moreover, even if regulators in the 
host State adopt a regulatory measure under the belief that such measures are 
compatible with the investment treaty, they tend to abandon them once threatened to 
be sued by foreign investors under the investment treaty (Mann, 2007; Tienhaara, 
2011). The fact that the provisions of investment treaties were broadly defined has 
empowered tribunals with a degree of discretion to interpret the terms occurring in 
these treaties and, hence, they operate as lawmakers in certain instances (Schill, 2011). 
Some scholars hold arbitral interpretation responsible for emerging problems in the 
arbitration system, arguing that arbitrators have failed to interpret investment treaties 
in a manner that balances interests of competing stakeholders by adopting pro-investor 
interpretation of these treaties to further enhance investment protection (Karl, 2008; 
Sornarajah, 2008). The issues with the investment arbitration system will be addressed 
in Section 5.3 further below. The next section, however, addresses another 
conceptualisation of the relationship between investment treaties and regulatory 
power.  
5.2 Regulatory Chill  
As stated by UNCTAD in the World Investment Report of 2003, the right to regulate 
is the sovereign prerogative of a country arising from the control over its own territory 
(UNCTAD, 2003). Nevertheless, as established in the previous sections, BITs require 
countries to exercise this sovereign right in accordance with their obligations for the 
protection of foreign investors. As a result of this confrontation, another hypothesis 
on the relationship between investment treaties and a host country’s regulatory power 
exists in the literature on BITs and policy space. The hypothesis states that once 
signed, investment treaties such as BITs result in ‘regulatory chill’ in the host State 
(High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2003; Schill, 2007; Tienhaara, 2009). 
According to Bonnitcha (2011), regulatory chill occurs when a host country does not 
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exercise its regulatory power because it realises that its regulations may violate the 
investment treaty for which it can be sued by the investor. Tienhaara (2018) adds that 
the regulatory chill hypothesis suggests that governments will fail to regulate in the 
public interest in a timely and effective manner because of concerns about ISDS. 
According to this hypothesis, through ISDS BITs have significant potential for indirect 
impacts on the way in which host States exercise their regulatory powers (Bonnitcha, 
2016). ISDS is expected to have this effect on host States because of the substantial 
financial risk involved (as will be demonstrated below governments have been found 
liable for hundreds of millions and, in some cases, even billions of dollars) as well as 
the difficulty in predicting outcomes (Tienhaara, 2011; UNCTAD, 2014a). 
This particular hypothesis has been contested on the ground that regulators in host 
States are often unaware of the investment treaties they signed and of disputes that can 
be brought under them (Coe and Rubins, 2005). It has also been argued that it is 
difficult to find such cases ‘because they require counter-factual evidence about the 
regulations that would have existed in the absence of the purported chilling’ 
(Bonnitcha, 2011, p. 134; Tienhaara, 2017). Furthermore, according to Bonnitcha 
(2011, p. 134), regulatory chill due to protection provided by BITs is difficult to isolate 
because, in addition to identifying the chilling effect, one must be able to exclude the 
possibility that it was attributable to some other cause. Nevertheless, several scholars 
have put forward case studies that suggest that investor threats of arbitration had an 
impact on the development of specific policies (see Schneiderman, 2008; Tienhaara, 
2011, 2009). For instance, Indonesia exempted a number of foreign investors from a 
ban on open-pit mining in protected forests after receiving threats of arbitration claims 
in the range of 20–30 billion USD (Tienhaara, 2011). The timing of the government’s 
actions, statements to the media and other factors suggest that the government was 
strongly motivated to remove the threat of arbitration (see Gross, 2003).42 
Finally, according to Prabhash (2012), a critical assumption made in the regulatory 
chill hypothesis is that regulators in host States have full knowledge about their 
investment treaties and of the disputes that can be brought against them under such 
international treaties. Considering that studies conducted on the experience of 
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developing countries in signing BITs reveal that officials tend to have inadequate 
knowledge about their investment treaties  until they experience arbitration cases 
(Poulsen and Aisbett, 2013), it is more likely that the regulatory chill effect occurs in 
the case of countries that have had experience with arbitration. Once they face 
investment arbitration claims and realise the potency of BITs, policy-makers are likely 
to start internalising their investment treaties in their exercise of regulatory power 
(Prabhash, 2012).  
5.3 Investment Treaty Arbitration  
The investment treaty regime relies heavily on arbitration for the enforcement of its 
substantive rules, but in light of the increasing number of ISDS cases, the debate about 
the usefulness and legitimacy of the ISDS mechanism has gained momentum (Behn 
et al., 2018; Zhan, 2016). In parallel with the growth of investment treaty arbitration 
cases, there has been a significant backlash against its use by a vocal States, scholars, 
and civil society actors (Behn et al., 2018). Initially, the ISDS mechanism was 
designed to ensure a neutral forum for investors to settle their disputes with States 
before an independent and qualified tribunal, granting a swift, cheap and flexible 
process for settling investment disputes (Zhan, 2016). However, the actual functioning 
of ISDS has revealed systemic deficiencies in the system (Zhan, 2016). These 
deficiencies have been well documented in the literature and have been summarised 
in the UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2013 as listed below. After summarising 
the main criticisms directed towards the investment treaty arbitration system, the rest 
of this section will expand further on some of the issues listed above to demonstrate 
their impact on the regulatory power of respondent States. 
• Legitimacy: it is questionable whether three individuals, appointed on an 
ad hoc basis, can be entrusted with assessing the validity of States’ acts, 
particularly when they involve public policy issues. The pressures on 
public finances and potential disincentives for public interest regulation 
may pose obstacles to countries’ sustainable development paths 
(UNCTAD, 2013 see Van Harten, 2007). 
• Transparency: even though the transparency of the system has improved 
since the early 2000s, ISDS proceedings can still be kept fully confidential 
– if both disputing parties so wish – even in cases where the dispute 
involves matters of public interest (UNCTAD, 2013; see Behn, 2015) . 
 47 
 
• Nationality planning/‘Treaty shopping’: investors may gain access to ISDS 
procedures using corporate structuring, i.e. by channelling an investment 
through a company established in an intermediary country with the sole 
purpose of benefitting from an investment treaty concluded by that country 
with the host State (UNCTAD, 2013;  Baumgartner, 2016). 
• Consistency of arbitral decisions: recurring episodes of inconsistent 
findings by arbitral tribunals have resulted in divergent legal 
interpretations of identical or similar treaty provisions as well as 
differences in the assessment of the merits of cases involving the same 
facts. Inconsistent interpretations have led to uncertainty about the 
meaning of key treaty obligations and lack of predictability as to how they 
will be read in future cases (UNCTAD 2013; see Franck, 2005) . 
• Absence of an appeal mechanism: substantive mistakes of arbitral 
tribunals, if they arise, cannot be corrected effectively through existing 
review mechanisms. In particular, ICSID annulment committees, besides 
having limited review powers, 43  are individually created for specific 
disputes and can also disagree among themselves (UNCTAD 2013; see 
Kim, 2011) . 
• Arbitrators’ independence and impartiality: an increasing number of 
challenges to arbitrators may indicate that disputing parties perceive them 
as biased or predisposed. Particular concerns have arisen from a perceived 
tendency of each disputing party to appoint individuals sympathetic to their 
case. Arbitrators’ interest in being re-appointed in future cases and their 
frequent ‘changing of hats’ (serving as arbitrators in some cases and 
counsel in others) amplify these concerns (UNCTAD, 2013; see 
Gaukrodger and Gordon, 2012). 
                                               
 
43 It is notable that even having identified ‘manifest errors of law’ in an arbitral award, an ICSID 
annulment committee may find itself unable to annul the award or correct the mistake (UNCTAD, 
2013). See CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina. ICSID, Case 
No. ARB/01/8. See Article 52(1) of the ICSID Convention which specifies the grounds for approving 
an annulment request.  
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According to a study by Hodgson and Campbell (2017), 44  the average claim in 
investor-State arbitrations based on BITs and other international investment treaties is 
c. 1.2 billion USD (c. 719 million USD excluding the Yukos v. Russia arbitrations),45 
and the average award (when claimant succeeds) is c. 486 million USD (c. 110 million 
USD excluding the Yukos award). Billion dollar awards, such as the 50 billion USD 
award against Russia in relation to the dissolved Yukos oil company and the 1.77 
billion USD award for Occidental in a dispute with Ecuador,46 highlight just how large 
the stakes can get (Rosert, 2014). Thus, exposure to ISDS carries significant financial 
risks for governments. Under this system, the State is always the respondent, never the 
claimant, and it is the only party liable for treaty breaches under existing agreements.47 
Even when States ‘win’ an arbitration, they often have to pay their legal fees, as there 
is no established ‘loser pays’ principle in the regime (Bonnitcha et al., 2017). 
According to Hodgson and Campbell (2017), the successful party recovers some 
portion of its costs in 51 per cent of cases. The costs for respondents include legal 
expenses (c. 4.9 million USD on average) and tribunal costs (c. 0.9 million USD on 
average) (Hodgson and Campbell, 2017). The costs of these arbitrations depend on 
many factors that are largely outside of the respondent States' control (e.g., the 
compensation claimed by the investor, the length and complexity of the proceeding) 
(Rosert, 2014). Among known arbitrations, tribunals have often awarded far less than 
what investors claim, yet some States have had to pay hundreds of millions of dollars 
in compensation, and a few awards have exceeded 1 billion USD as illustrated in 
Figure 4 (Bonnitcha et al., 2017). This is of particular concern to developing countries, 
as these figures represent a significant burden on public budgets. A study by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) warned that large 
awards could ‘seriously affect a respondent country’s fiscal position’ (Gaukrodger and 
                                               
 
44 Hodgson and Campbell (2017) conduct an empirical analysis of 324 investment treaty arbitration 
awards and 52 decisions on annulment. 
45 Consisting of three cases heard by the same arbitral tribunal in parallel: Yukos Universal Limited 
(Isle of Man) v. Russian Federation. UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 227; Veteran Petroleum Limited 
(Cyprus) v. Russian Federation. UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 228; Hulley Enterprises Ltd. (Cyprus) 
v. Russian Federation. UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 226.  
46 Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Republic 
of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador. ICSID, Case No. ARB/06/11. 
47 In a rare number of investment treaty arbitrations, respondent States have made counterclaims against 
the investor that commenced the arbitration (Rosert, 2014; see Bjorklund, 2013) 
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Gordon, 2012, p. 7). Naturally, the impacts of large damages awards on low-income 
and lower-middle-income countries are even more significant (Rosert, 2014). Relative 
to government budgets and in per capita terms developing countries pay significantly 
more in damages than developed nations (Gallagher and Shrestha, 2011).  
Figure 4: Amount of compensation in investment treaty arbitration48 
 
Source: (Bonnitcha et al., 2017) using data from UNCTAD IISD Navigator as of September 2016 
States’ expectation of high costs and the threat of sizeable claims can also influence 
negotiations between the investor and the State outside of the arbitration setting, 
providing claimants with leverage to demand compensation or other concessions in 
exchange for a settlement (Rosert, 2014). How often and successful investors are in 
doing so is unknown, but according to Gallagher and Shrestha (2011, p. 5), it can be 
assumed that they ‘occur much more frequently than actual cases’. In some cases, 
investors were successful in watering down the government measures that led to the 
dispute (Gallagher and Shrestha, 2011) and in other cases, a settlement is reached. It 
is important to note that settlements can be worth hundreds of millions and even 
billions of dollars (Rosert, 2014).49 Furthermore, according to an OECD study, high 
costs of ISDS or the threat of such costs can have a dissuasive effect on States and 
investors can use the spectre of high-cost ISDS litigation to bring a defiant government 
to the negotiating table for purposes of achieving a settlement of the dispute 
                                               
 
48 Data collected by Bonnitcha et al. (2017) only includes known investment treaty arbitrations where 
UNCTAD had information about the amount of compensation claimed, awarded, or agreed to in 
settlement. 
49 Examples include: a c.920 million USD settlement reached in a dispute between a subsidiary of the 
Danish Maersk Group and Algeria related to a windfall tax on oil profits. See Mærsk Olie, Algeriet A/S 
v. People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria. ICSID, Case No. ARB/09/14. In another case, Venezuela 
paid 600 million USD to the Dutch building materials company CEMEX to settle a dispute. See 
CEMEX Caracas Investments B.V. and CEMEX Caracas II Investments B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela. ICSID, Case No. ARB/08/15. 
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(Gaukrodger and Gordon, 2012, p. 22). Hence, they can also use the threat of 
arbitration claims to induce a regulatory chill as discussed above.  
In 2017, at least 65 new treaty-based ISDS cases were initiated, bringing the total 
number of known cases to 855 (UNCTAD, 2018b). About one-third of all concluded 
cases were decided in favour of the State (claims were dismissed either on 
jurisdictional grounds or on the merits), and about one-quarter were decided in favour 
of the investor, with monetary compensation awarded (UNCTAD, 2018b). A quarter 
of cases were settled and, in most cases, the specific terms of settlements remain 
confidential. In the remaining proceedings, cases were either discontinued, or the 
tribunal found a treaty breach but did not award monetary compensation (UNCTAD, 
2018b). As in previous years, the majority of new cases were brought against 
developing countries and transition economies (UNCTAD, 2018b). Despite the recent 
increase in claims against developed countries, developing countries remain the most 
frequent respondents to investment treaty arbitration claims. 
In addition to the deficiencies of the system which were listed above, critics have 
claimed that tribunals have systematically displayed certain biases when handling 
investment treaty arbitration cases. One of the claims is that tribunals 
disproportionately favour the private property interests of foreign investors over host 
States’ space to regulate and legislate in the public interest (Behn et al., 2018). A 
public statement on the international investment regime supported by many leading 
academics criticised the current ISDS system arguing that it poses a serious threat to 
democratic choice and the capacity of governments to act in the public interest by way 
of innovative policy-making in response to changing social, economic, and 
environmental conditions.50 
Other critiques hold that the investment treaty arbitration process is inadequately 
deferential to respondent States and that this results in either a pro-investor or anti-
developing State bias (Behn et al., 2018). Issues of policy space shrinkage are 
compounded by the alleged commercial bias of arbitral proceedings as observed by 
many analysts (Calvert, 2016; see McArthur and Ormachea, 2009; Olivet and 
                                               
 
50 Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, 2010. Toronto, ON, Osgoode Hall Law 
School. Available at: https://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement-international-investment-
regime-31-august-2010/ (Accessed 12 September 2018). 
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Eberhardt, 2012; Van Harten, 2008). Critics have argued that ICSID and other 
international tribunals are composed on an ad hoc basis of judges that have a 
commercial law background (as opposed to human rights or public law) (Calvert, 
2016). The investment treaty arbitration system uses a private law arbitration model 
based on arbitration followed in international commercial arbitration (ICA), to 
addresses public law questions (Harten, 2007; Salacuse, 2010; Schill, 2010; Van 
Harten and Loughlin, 2006). According to the critics, this ensures judges will interpret 
and apply investment rules according to commercial norms and will, therefore, be less 
sensitive to conflicts with human rights and domestic economic and social priorities 
(see Olivet and Eberhardt, 2012).  
Arbitrators also lack the ability to interpret and apply provisions of investment treaties 
in light of countries’ domestic circumstances and context (Calvert, 2016). An example 
of how the domestic circumstances are ignored at times by tribunals is the manner in 
which different interpretations of the ‘necessity defence doctrine’51 provided for in 
BITs have led to very different outcomes in investor-State disputes in the post-crisis 
Argentine context (Calvert, 2016; see Gomez, 2012; Kent and Harrington, 2012).52 
Considering that arbitrators are not accountable to an oversight mechanism, such 
arbitral processes are criticised as interfering in the democratic exercise of countries' 
policymaking processes (see Van Harten, 2008).  
Apart from the scope and potential costs of investment treaty arbitration, the 
mechanism is notable for the identity of the arbitrators. Bonnitcha et al. (2017) provide 
a table that illustrates the exclusive list of ‘elite’ arbitrators that sit together in the 
majority of tribunals in investment treaty arbitrations (see Figure 5). Western men 
dominate the list of most frequent arbitrators, and fewer than half are experts in public 
international law. Consequently, ‘the delegation of adjudicative powers to such a small 
group of relatively homogenous individuals, most of whom have been lawyers in 
                                               
 
51 The necessity defence refers to the provisions found in BITs and under international law, which 
explicitly exempt government action taken during times of crisis from full treaty coverage. 
52 According to Peterson (2012), arbitrators rejected Argentina’s necessity defence with unanimous 
decisions in five cases (CMS, Sempra, Enron, BG and National Grid) and by a two to one majority in 
three cases (Suez, Impreglio and El Paso). Arbitrators accepted the defence (to some extent) in three 
cases (LG&E, Continental Casualty and Total). 
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private practice, has prompted considerable controversy in recent years’ (Bonnitcha et 
al., 2017, p. 28; see Van Harten, 2012a). 
Figure 5: Most frequently appointed investment arbitrators53  
 
Source: Extracted from Bonnitcha et al. (2017)  
So far, there have only been a few tentative efforts towards empirically assessing 
outcome asymmetries in investment treaty arbitration cases, and the results are mixed 
(Behn et al., 2018). A study by Van Harten (2012b) examined trends in legal 
interpretation instead of case outcomes in 140 investment arbitration cases and finds 
statistically significant evidence that arbitrators favour: (1) the position of claimants 
over respondent States, and (2) the position of claimants from major Western capital-
exporting States over claimants from other States. According to the study, there is a 
range of possible explanations for the results, and further inferences are required to 
connect the observed trends to rationales for systemic bias (Van Harten, 2012b). 
Another study by Schultz and Dupont (2014) investigated the empirical manifestations 
of the uses and functions of investment arbitration, analysing over 500 arbitration 
claims from 1972 to 2010. The study found that less developed respondent States were 
                                               
 
53 Total number of arbitration cases covered in this table is 696. Column 5 refers to the arbitrators’ 
professional career as a whole (Bonnitcha et al., 2017). 
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twice as likely to lose an investment treaty arbitration case in comparison with cases 
defended by developed respondent States (Behn et al., 2018). 
On the other hand, a series of empirical studies by Susan Franck and colleagues 
consistently find that there is no demonstrable relationship between a respondent 
States’ development status and outcomes in investment treaty arbitration cases (see 
Franck and Wylie, 2015; Franck, 2014, 2009). These studies argue that the perceived 
relationship between respondent State development status and investment treaty 
arbitration outcomes may have conflated development concerns with concerns relating 
to democratic governance or respondent States’ internal governance practices (Behn 
et al., 2018). Moreover, because economic development and domestic governance are 
such interdependent factors, any anti-developing State bias may actually result from 
poor domestic governance structures as opposed to its relative wealth or poverty (Behn 
et al., 2018).  
Finally, a more recent study by Behn et al. (2018) analyses investment treaty 
arbitration outcomes for all known concluded cases as of January 2017. The study 
finds that instead of an anti-developing State bias disfavoring less developed 
respondent States in investment treaty arbitration, there appears to be a strong pro-
developed State bias favouring more developed respondent States (Behn et al., 2018). 
Accordingly, higher economic development at the respondent State level is associated 
with lower claimant (investor) success rates in investment treaty arbitration (Behn et 
al., 2018). The study also finds partial support for the conflation theory. Behn et al. 
(2018) argue that while a State’s overall democratic governance levels per se do not 
explain pro-developed respondent State favouritism in investment treaty arbitration, 
two particular governance aspects can possibly explain higher degrees of respondent 
State success in defending against investment treaty arbitration cases: the strength of 
a State's ability to protect property rights and the degree to which a State maintains 
impartial bureaucracies. 
In defence of the system, proponents of investment treaty arbitration argue that host 
States are to blame for the recent explosion in arbitrations. They argue that arbitrations 
are filed as a result of arbitrary, discriminatory, and or predatory behaviour by the host 
States. Accordingly, the investment treaty regime increases the cost for States of 
failing to conform with norms of ‘good governance’ and the ‘rule of law’, which also 
provides an incentive for domestic reforms in the countries that are performing poorly 
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in these areas (Bonnitcha et al., 2017). Furthermore, by joining the investment regime, 
these countries can provide strong investor protections and a neutral dispute resolution 
mechanism which are both necessary to attract much needed FDI (Bonnitcha et al., 
2017). Other scholars argue that investment treaties are only going through ‘growing 
pains’, which will disappear as the system matures. They argue that the investment 
treaty system does not adversely affect the host State’s right to regulate (Krishan, 
2011; Paulsson, 2006; Schill and Brower, 2009). The argument often is that under 
general international law host countries have the regulatory power to adopt ‘non-
discriminatory’, ‘good faith’ regulatory measure for public policy without attracting 
any international liability (Alvarez, 2009; Paulsson, 2006; Schill and Brower, 2009), 
which has been recognised by many tribunals.54 However, again it is important to state 
here that the precise boundaries of justified ‘public policy’ are unclear (Salacuse, 
2010). Even scholars like Stephan Schill who defend the investment treaty regime 
recognise that certain aspects of the system have to be critically evaluated (Schill, 
2011).  
Critics, however, remain unpersuaded by these arguments. They argue that foreign 
investors are already privileged in many developing countries and that tribunals have 
often awarded compensation ‘over and above what is reasonable’ (Bonnitcha et al., 
2017, p. 31). Moreover, ‘the unpredictable nature of a dispute settlement system 
premised on ad hoc arbitration, and the financial stakes involved for arbitrators 
themselves renders investment treaty arbitration unsuitable for settling disputes arising 
from the exercise of State authority’ (Bonnitcha et al., 2017, p. 31). According to 
critics, these risks are particularly unreasonable, considering there is no convincing 
evidence that the treaties are economically or politically useful for host countries. 
In conclusion, while proponents of the investment treaty regime may argue that the 
term ‘legitimacy crisis’ is an exaggerated description of the current state of affairs in 
the investment arbitration system, it seems that the investment treaty regime and 
particularly the investment treaty arbitration system is at a crossroads, with signs of 
                                               
 
54 Methanex Corporation v. Mexico. NAFTA Award, August 3, 2005; Tecmed v. Mexico. ICSID, Case 
No ARB/AF (00)/2; Feldman v. Mexico, Award, 16 December 2002, 18 ICSID Review-FILJ (2003) 
488; Saluka v. Czech Republic, para 255; Parkerings-Campignet AS v. Lithuania. ICSID, Case No 
ARB/05/8, 11 September 2007, para 332.  
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growing unease appearing in both the developing and developed world. Investment 
treaty arbitration is affecting a large range of sovereign regulatory powers and thus 
certainly raises questions about the relationship between investment treaties and host 
country’s policy space (Wells, 2011). Whereas developing countries began to reject 
the ISDS mechanism over a decade ago, it has been a subject of highly publicised 
public debates in the EU and the US more recently. In September 2015 the EU 
proposed to replace the existing system of party-appointed arbitrators with standing 
investment tribunals, which in turn are meant to provide the template for a multilateral 
investment court (Council of the European Union, 2016). The rejection of ISDS by 
the European Parliament and Commission has conferred unprecedented political 
legitimacy on the critics of the existing system, even if some of the critics have 
responded that the EU proposals do not really answer their objections (Howse, 2017). 
The implications of these changes for developing countries are still unknown, as EU 
member States have not indicated the intention to remove ISDS from the existing BITs 
with developing countries. Accordingly, it is important to examine the possible routes 
for developing countries that are discontent with the ISDS system and the investment 
treaty regime as a whole.  
The next section addresses how countries began to realise the significant costs of 
joining the regime compared to the uncertain benefits. It also documents the different 
reactions of countries that have expressed their discontent with the investment treaty 
regime.  
6. Backlash Against the Investment Treaty Regime: How States 
Have Responded Differently 
6.1 The Wakeup Call: BITs Bite!  
It was not until they were targeted in dispute settlement claims that most governments 
quickly began to take seriously the legal consequences of BIT obligations: ‘The rise 
in investment treaty claims has therefore led to spatially and temporally dispersed 
arrival of important information about the potential costs of BITs’ (Poulsen and 
Aisbett, 2013, p. 2). BIT-based Investor-State disputes had only 37 cases recorded 
between 1990 and 1999, compared to 408 between 2000 and 2011 (El-Kady, 2013). 
The year 2015 witnessed the highest number of new treaty-based cases ever filed with 
an estimated 80 cases initiated. The total number of known investment treaty 
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arbitration cases reached 855 by January 2018 (UNCTAD, 2018b).55  
As the number of investment treaty arbitrations has grown; the number of BITs has 
decelerated considerably, ‘as even developed countries have been surprised about the 
potential breadth of key BIT-standards’ (Poulsen and Aisbett, 2013, p. 5). 
Policymakers in host States had generally underestimated the potential costs of 
arbitration, both financial and political (UNCTAD, 2011). Today, many governments 
have gained a much better understanding of the costs and benefits associated with 
BITs and some are re-evaluating the previously unchallenged assumption that the 
economic benefits outweigh the loss of policy space (Kaushal, 2009; Sornarajah, 
2010).  
While the costs of joining the regime have become clear, the benefits remain uncertain. 
Hence, in addition to the realisation of the extent to which BITs and the ISDS 
mechanism can constrain policy space, another important reason cited for the decline 
in the number of BITs signed is the growing concerns about the effectiveness of BITs 
in attracting FDI. Empirical research to date is at best mixed on the issue of whether 
the treaties actually encourage investment and, in turn, that any signalling effect of the 
treaties influences investor decision-making about where to commit capital. (Van 
Harten, 2010).56 In light of the increase in the number of ISDS cases globally and the 
inconclusive evidence of the impact of BITs on FDI flows, governments increasingly 
realising the importance of alternative, less risky, policy tools, including more targeted 
investment promotion policies to attract FDI strategically (El-Kady, 2013). While 
BITs remain a major policy tool used on the international investment scene, they are 
increasingly perceived as ineffective in the absence of other FDI determinants such as 
market size, income levels, natural resource availability, and labour cost and skills (El-
Kady, 2013). This uncertainty about the merits of BITs as FDI attraction tools has led 
countries to question the trade-off between restricting policy space and increasing 
exposure to ISDS, and the promise of increased FDI flows as a result of treaty 
protection (El-Kady, 2013). 
                                               
 
55 See Figure 7. 
56 See Appendix I for a list of Quantitative Studies Examining the Relationship between BITs and FDI.  
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The realisation of the extent to which BITs and ISDS threaten the sovereign right of 
host States to regulate coupled with the uncertainty regarding the economic benefits 
of joining the regime has resulted in an attack on the regime by members and critics 
alike. As part of the backlash against the investment treaty regime, both developed and 
developing countries have reacted, although in varying degrees. 
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Figure 6: Annual and cumulative number of BITs, 1980-2017  
	
Source: UNCTAD (2018a), UNCTAD IIA Navigator 
Figure 7: Trends in known treaty based ISDS Cases 1987-2017  
	
Source: UNCTAD (2018b), ISDS Navigator 
The rest of this section proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 argues that despite the 
constraints, States still have an essential role to play in the regime from a critical IPE 
perspective. Section 6.3 demonstrates how developing and developed countries have 
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recognised the conflict between policy space and BITs and have reacted differently as 
principals in the investment treaty regime.57  
6.2 Despite of the Constraints States Still Have a Role to Play in the 
Investment Treaty Regime  
Pursuant to a critical IPE account, even if the role of the State is altered, it still has a 
continuing role to play in the global political economy (Schneiderman, 2013). This 
changed role may not have been very well captured, however, in Robert Cox’s initial 
formulation: ‘The domestic-oriented agencies of the State are now more and more to 
be seen as transmission belts from world-economy trends and decision making into 
the domestic economy, as agencies to promote the carrying out of tasks they had no 
part in deciding’ (Cox, 1996, p. 193). Cox has since abandoned this metaphor as he 
conceded such a unidirectional description of States was misleading, given States are 
active agents shaping, sometimes resisting, the rules and institutions of global law 
(Cox, 2002, p. 33). Nevertheless, Schneiderman argues that the metaphor remains 
useful as it underscores the continuing role of States in the structuration of economic 
globalisation even as States pre-commit to behave in certain ways via transnational 
legal commitments (Schneiderman, 2013). 
Furthermore, Schneiderman claims that critical IPE scholars inspired by the account 
provided by Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation (1944) have been better 
equipped than most to understand that, in the era of economic globalisation, the spread 
of markets is not spontaneous and unplanned but requires the deliberate planning by, 
and intervention of, States (Schneiderman, 2013). He compares that to the 
international investment regime, arguing that States are critical both to the 
construction and ongoing maintenance of the regime, even though their role may be 
less apparent considering the rising power and influence of investors and MNCs 
(Schneiderman, 2013). States are, nevertheless, both authors of the regime and parties 
to the disputes that inevitably arise (Roberts, 2010). Given that global law emerges out 
of the global take-up of local law, Schneiderman elaborates that we should naturally 
expect States to be championing global regimes that mimic rules drawn from their 
own national legal systems (Schneiderman, 2013). From this angle, we should 
                                               
 
57 An explanation of the role of States as principals vs. their role as litigants in the investment treaty 
regime is provided in Section 6.2. 
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understand that many of the disciplines enforced by investment arbitration tribunals 
are drawn from, or complement, the national legal orders of powerful capital-
exporting States (Schneiderman, 2008). Considering that States still play an important 
role in the system (although to varying degrees), a study evaluating the options 
available to developing countries that have committed to BITs and hence this 
investment regime is timely and much needed. 
6.2.1 The Reactions of States as Principals in the Investment Treaty Regime  
States have significant stakes in how investment treaties are used and interpreted as 
they are respondents in all treaty-based claims and their investment treaty 
commitments can have far-reaching implications for public policy, fiscal positions and 
the policy-making process (Gordon and Pohl, 2015). The tension between the rights 
afforded to foreign investors under investment treaties and the legitimate rights of 
sovereign States to regulate in the public interest of their citizens precipitated a 
backlash from a growing number of States claiming that these treaties are undercutting 
their national sovereignty (Langford et al., 2018). According to Langford et al. (2018), 
the investment treaty regime is under attack, with even some prominent ‘insiders’ 
expressing concern (see Echandi et al., 2013; Joubin-Bret and Kalicki, 2015). The 
backlash has resulted in a single overarching strategy by States discontent with the 
regime, namely the reassertion of sovereign control by limiting legally or effectively 
the expansive rights granted to investors (Langford et al., 2018). This response from 
host States has been labelled as the ‘return of the State’ by Alvarez (2011). A full exit 
from the investment treaty regime is not feasible for neither developed or developing 
countries as BITs58 have survival clauses that render them somewhat resilient to 
change or termination (Lavopa et al., 2013).59 While several States have sought to 
make changes to their commitments in order to address perceived or real gaps and 
                                               
 
58 The denunciation of the ICSID Convention does not immediately prevent investors filing claims 
against host States as well.  
59 The vast majority of investment treaties have clauses that extend some or all effects of the treaty 
beyond termination by a fixed period during which treaty protections still hold for investments that 
have been made – or approved or committed– prior to termination of the treaty. The shortest fixed 
survival period in the sample is five years, and the longest is 25 years. The average length of treaty 
effects beyond termination is 12.5 years and has been stable for many years (Gordon and Pohl, 2015). 
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imbalances, only a minority have launched a vocal and existential attack on the 
investment regime (Langford et al., 2018, p. 73). 
Before proceeding with documenting the different reactions and the attempts to 
address these responses in the investment treaty regime literature, it is important to 
note that there two roles that the States perform in the regime. The first is the State as 
a principal, i.e. treaty maker and regime shaper; the second is the State as a litigant in 
investment treaty arbitration (Langford et al., 2018; see Roberts, 2010).  
Tactics adopted by States as principals include (Langford et al., 2018): imposing 
moratoriums on the signing of new BITs; refraining from ratifying signed BITs; 
publicly criticising the regime; calling for the renegotiation of BITs already in force; 
adjusting negotiating strategies over new investment treaties including development 
of model BITs and amending or excluding controversial provisions like FET, 
expropriation and ISDS; terminating existing BITs; and withdrawing from arbitration 
institutions (mainly ICSID). On the other hand, in their role as litigants in the regime 
States have adopted the following tactics (Langford et al., 2018, p. 75):  
attempting to bind adjudicators to sovereignty protecting interpretations of 
certain treaty provisions; commencing domestic criminal proceedings against 
foreign investor claimants after a dispute arises; refusing to comply with 
awards; engaging in delay tactics; increasing the use of procedural motions for 
challenging arbitrators; requesting security for costs and other forms of 
injunctive relief; and making novel challenges to the jurisdiction of tribunals. 
This thesis will focus on the State as a principal, analysing how different developing 
countries have reacted once they realised that their membership in the investment 
treaty regime constrained their sovereignty to regulate in the public interest and 
vocally expressed their discontent.  
Both developed and developing countries are paying far greater attention today to the 
scope of their treaty obligations and are seeking a better balance between investor 
rights and the right to regulate in the public interest (Singh and Ilge, 2016). Whereas 
capital-exporting countries have reasserted themselves in their role as treaty-makers 
and overall regime shapers (Langford et al., 2018), developing and capital-importing 
countries that have expressed their discontent with the regime have reacted in different 
ways.  
Notable developments in State practice amongst developed countries include 
recognition by developed capital-exporting countries like Australia, United States, 
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Canada and Norway of conflicts between investment protection and their regulatory 
power as host countries. NAFTA States introduced a note of interpretation aimed at 
limiting and rejecting the expansive interpretation given by arbitral tribunals on the 
meaning of the FET provision (Salacuse, 2010).60 In response to concerns expressed 
by civil society on the effect of investment treaties on Canada’s regulatory power, the 
Canadian government adopted a new model investment treaty in 2004 (Newcombe, 
2005) before revising it in 2012.  
In the same vein, the US adopted a new model investment treaty in 2004, to address 
the concerns that the 1994 model investment treaty did not balance investment 
protection with regulatory power (Vandevelde, 2009). The US updated its Model BIT 
text again in 2012 to limit the expansive interpretations of arbitration tribunals (Singh 
and Ilge, 2016). In Europe, Norway developed a new BIT model in 2008, in response 
to concerns related to investment treaties and the host State’s regulatory power. Due 
to strong opposition from civil society and political groups, Norway had to abandon 
its draft model BIT in 2009, which paved the way to a new draft model BIT published 
in 2015. The main changes introduced in the new model BIT relate to the State’s 
ability to regulate for the protection of health, human rights, safety, and environmental 
issues, and, to a lesser extent, labour rights (Choudhury, 2016). 
Finally, in 2011 the Gillard government in Australia vowed that it would no longer 
include provisions on ISDS in bilateral and regional agreements.61 The new policy 
was justified by reference to the principles of ‘no greater rights’ for foreign investors 
and the government’s ‘right to regulate’ to protect the public interest (Tienhaara and 
Ranald, 2011). Although the Abbott government reversed this policy in 2014, 
Australia has since decided on the inclusion of the ISDS provision on a case-by-case 
basis (Singh and Ilge, 2016).  
As rule takers and predominantly respondents to investor-State arbitration cases, 
developing countries (particularly capital-importing ones) are more exposed to the 
                                               
 
60  At the time of writing negotiations between the US, Canada and Mexico have resulted in an 
agreement to introduce changes to the current agreement including a scale-back of ISDS rules (see 
Gertz, 2018).  
61 See the 2011 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade report, Gillard Government Trade 
Policy Statement: Trading our way to more jobs and prosperity. Available at: 
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/126547/20110502-1209/www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade/trading-
our-way-to-more-jobs-and-prosperity.html (Accessed 2 October 2015). 
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risks posed by the regime and significantly less powerful in terms of shaping or 
reforming the regime. Developing countries that have expressed their discontent with 
the regime have reacted variously. In a few cases, States have decided to terminate 
some or all of their BITs and denounce the ICSID Convention. Bolivia and Ecuador 
for instance, gave up their membership of ICSID. Venezuela soon followed in 2012 
and sent a notice to the World Bank denouncing the ICSID Convention. Both Bolivia 
and Ecuador proceeded to terminate all their BITs. 
A second approach that has been adopted by some developing countries is the decision 
not to renew expiring BITs and to replace them with either a new revised BIT or 
domestic legislation. The new model BIT or domestic law in this approach generally 
maintains the main principles of the investment treaty regime but amends or excludes 
provisions that are deemed too expansive or controversial. This approach was first 
adopted by South Africa, as it decided not to renew most of its expiring BITs and to 
issue a new investment protection law to regulate FDI inflows. The new law has 
maintained some of the fundamental principles and provisions that existed in its BITs 
but has excluded two of the most important features that exist in the vast majority of 
the BITs, namely the FET provision and international investor-State arbitration.62 
India and Indonesia followed South Africa’s lead in refusing to renew their expiring 
treaties, but aim to replace them with BITs that reflect their new model treaties that 
have amended some of the substantive protection standards and narrowed the scope 
of the ISDS clause. 
The third and last type of reaction by developing countries that have expressed their 
discontent with the investment treaty regime is remaining committed to BITs signed 
and other related treaties like the ICSID Convention, due to fear of the possible 
consequences of denouncing and terminating these agreements, amongst other 
reasons. Egypt, for instance, has faced over 33 investment treaty arbitration cases and 
has vocally criticised the unbalanced nature of the investment treaty regime. 
Nevertheless, the State has settled for incremental reforms compared to the more 
substantive reforms conducted by countries that the two previous approaches 
explained above.63 Other examples include Argentina, under the Kirchners and not the 
                                               
 
62 More detailed analysis of South Africa’s experience is provided in Chapter 6. 
63 An in-depth analysis of Egypt's case will be provided in Chapter 7. 
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current administration. Between 1997 and 2016 Argentina was involved in a total of 
59 investment treaty claims before arbitration tribunals (Pérez-Aznar, 2016). Under 
both the Cristina Kirchner and Néstor Kirchner administrations, the government of 
Argentina was very critical of BITs and investor-State dispute settlement mechanisms 
(Pérez-Aznar, 2016). Although there were voices calling for the termination of BITs 
and denunciation of the ICSID Convention, these proposals never materialised (Pérez-
Aznar, 2016).  
However, it is important to clarify again that this description is based on the 
assessment of the reaction of the State in its role as a principal and not a litigator (as 
explained above). States that have expressed their discontent with the regime and 
refrained from substantially revising their commitments or membership of the 
investment treaty regime may have reacted strongly in a different capacity or role. 
Argentina, in particular, is a good example of a State that has reacted strongly through 
its role as a litigator and not a principal. This is evident in its refusal to recognise and 
comply with some of the awards rendered by arbitration tribunals under Cristina 
Kirchner’s rule (see Calvert, 2017).  
7. Conclusion  
While the debate over the pros and cons of the investment treaty regime continues, 
there has been wide recognition of the significant impact BITs can have over the policy 
space available for host States to regulate. This chapter has illustrated why the 
investment treaty regime is currently facing a crisis and how as part of the backlash 
against the regime its members have reacted differently. Whereas capital-exporting 
developed countries have generally reacted in similar fashion by tweaking their model 
BITs or new treaties to address their concerns, developed countries have had a wider 
range of reactions. Accordingly, this chapter has provided the necessary context for 
addressing the two main areas this thesis covers: (i) how and why did developing 
countries sign these BITs, in light of the significant costs and uncertain benefits 
demonstrated above; and (ii) how and why have they reacted differently? 
Chapter 3 reviews how the literature on BITs has addressed these research questions 
articulated in Chapter 1 and identifies the literature gap that this thesis aims to 
contribute to filling. The chapter will also outline the main theories and frameworks 
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that are used in the comparative case study analysis that is conducted in Chapters 5, 6 
and 7. 
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Chapter 3. Literature Review and Analytical Framework 
1. Introduction 
One of the main objectives of this thesis is to identify the options available to 
developing countries that have decided to vocally express their discontent with the 
investment regime after realising the extent to which membership constrains policy 
space. The thesis deploys Hirschman’s framework of Exit, Voice and Loyalty to 
categorise different options available to developing countries in practice. It does so on 
the basis of close scrutiny of 3 case studies. However, to give greater theoretical depth 
to a “Hirschman-ian” categorisation of different responses to discontent with the 
investment regime, additional theoretical frames are mobilised. These are necessary 
to account for, on the one hand, why and how countries join the investment regime in 
the first place and, on the other, why they adopt different routes after expressing 
discontent with the regime.  
This chapter examines how the existing literature on the investment treaty regime 
addresses these questions and points to the literature gap that this thesis fills. This 
allows for the identification of the main factors and theories that are used for the 
comparative case study analysis that is conducted in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
The first part of this chapter reviews efforts in the existing literature to categorise the 
different options available to States who are dissatisfied with their membership of the 
investment treaty regime. One framework that has been used in the literature to classify 
the different options available and which will be explored further in this chapter is 
Albert Hirschman’s Exit, Voice and Loyalty framework. After demonstrating how 
Hirschman’s framework has been applied in the literature on BITs and investment 
treaty arbitration, an analysis of the challenges and limitations facing developing 
countries when deciding on which route to take reveals the need to reconceptualise 
Hirschman’s framework in order to reflect the dynamics of the regime and the feasible 
options available to these countries.  
The second part of the chapter analyses the different theoretical frameworks that have 
been used to explain the diffusion of BITs amongst developing countries. Several 
leading scholars in the field argue that for developing countries, in particular, there has 
been a perceived need to sign BITs in order to remain competitive as a destination for 
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FDI and to conform to the norm that signing BITs was in line with the reform-minded 
model economy (Elkins et al., 2006; Jandhyala et al., 2011). However, the assumption 
made by these scholars that governments of developing countries signed these BITs as 
part of a careful and rational process to compete for capital are vigorously questioned 
by scholars like Poulsen and Gwynn. Based on their findings from studying the 
experience of developing countries in signing BITs they have proposed two theories 
which they argue more accurately reflect how and why BITs were signed by 
developing countries respectively. While Poulsen’s hypothesis, based on his adaptation 
of the Bounded Rationality framework, allows us to understand how BITs were 
processed and why they were not taken seriously by governments of developing 
countries until they faced investment arbitration cases, Gwynn’s use of the Structural 
Power lens provides an explanation of why developing countries agreed to sign these 
treaties in the first place, despite either historically resisting the investment protection 
rules included in BITs or adopting a more regulated approach to attracting FDI. For the 
rest of this thesis these two hypotheses will be combined to explain how and why 
developing countries signed BITs despite the significant costs and uncertain benefits 
associated with these treaties. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated in the case studies, 
the thesis argues that the Structural Power lens can also be used to explain the variation 
in the forms of contestation of the investment treaty regime by developing countries. 
The third and final part of this chapter addresses a gap in the literature on BITs and 
policy space that this thesis aims to fill. It is argued in this chapter that despite the 
growing literature on BITs and policy space, one area that has been inadequately 
addressed is how and why developing countries that have expressed their discontent 
with the regime reacted differently. In order to fill this gap, a comparative case study 
analysis of three developing countries that have responded differently is conducted 
with the purpose of: (i) reconceptualising Hirschman’s framework in order to reflect 
the actual options available to developing countries in practice, as opposed to the 
options that have proposed in theory; and (ii) providing insights in the factors that 
influence the decision of a developing when deciding on which route to adopt.  
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2. Using Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Framework to 
Classify the Different Reactions of Different Routes Identified in the 
Literature  
The first half of this chapter deals with the literature on how States have reacted 
differently after expressing their discontent with the investment treaty regime. It 
proceeds as follows. First, an overview of Hirschman's framework and its application 
to different fields is provided. The second section demonstrates how it can be applied 
to the investment treaty regime. The third section argues that, in light of the existing 
dynamics in the regime and the challenges facing developing countries, the framework 
needs to be reconceptualised to reflect the actual options that are feasible for 
developing countries.  
2.1 Overview of Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Framework 
In his seminal book Albert Hirschman makes a basic distinction between the alternative 
ways a member can react to deterioration in business firms and, in general, to 
dissatisfaction with organisations: one, exit is for a member to leave the organisation, 
and the other, voice is for members to agitate and attempt to reform from within. The 
book illustrates the relationship of consumer exit, an economic concept, to consumer 
voice, a political one, in the marketplace and beyond (Katselas, 2014). Exit, which is 
generally defined as the ability of one party to leave or sever the relationship with the 
other party (Hirschman, 1970), is associated with Adam Smith's invisible hand, in 
which buyers and sellers are free to move silently through the market, continually 
forming and destroying relationships. Voice comes from the world of politics and is a 
concept used in political science to assess participation (Hirschman, 1970). As 
Hirschman puts it, voice ‘is here defined as any attempt at all to change, rather than to 
escape from, an objectionable state of affairs’ (Hirschman, 1970, p. 30).  
According to Hirschman (1970), most organisations are dominated by either exit or 
voice mechanisms. Katselas (2014) argues that Hirschman’s great insight was that the 
two forces have a dynamic relationship that can be imagined on a set of scales. If there 
are significant penalties associated with exit, then voice becomes the only option 
(Hirschman, 1970). Moreover, higher prospects for effective use of voice reduce the 
likelihood of exit. Conversely, the presence or availability of the exit option can sharply 
reduce the probability that the voice option will be taken up widely and effectively 
(Hirschman, 1970). Since voice requires effort, it will only be used in situations where 
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influence is likely to work (Hirschman, 1970). Both may spur recuperation of an 
organisation that is in decline; however, that is not a given, and organisations are not 
uniformly sensitive to the two responses (Katselas, 2014; see Hirschman, 1970, p. 74). 
Furthermore, depending on the type of organisation involved and the specific 
circumstances, exit and voice may complement or counteract each other (Hirschman, 
1970, p. 74). Loyalty moderates between the voice and exit options (Hirschman, 1970). 
According to Hirschman, loyalty makes exit less likely and voice more effective: while 
loyalty may postpone exit, its ‘very existence is predicated on the possibility of exit’ 
(Hirschman, 1970, p. 82).  
Finally, Hirschman's theorisation suggests that voice often provides better solutions to 
slack than exit (Gleeson, 2016), as exit often undercuts voice while being unable to 
counteract decline. Hence, loyalty is conceptualised as the primary motivator behind 
the decision to choose voice over exit.  
2.2 Application of Hirschman’s Framework in Different Fields and How 
it Can be Applied to the Investment Treaty Regime 
When Hirschman first wrote about his theory of Exit, Voice and Loyalty in 1970, he 
focused primarily on markets and consumer goods, but, as Gehlbach (2006, p. 396) 
argues, the enduring popularity of Hirschman’s framework can be attributed to the 
ability of this simple model to seemingly explain an array of political, economic, and 
social phenomena. Gehlbach (2006) further elaborates that in subsequent work 
Hirschman’s framework has been used to address the role of exit and voice in 
applications as diverse as the theory of the State (see Hirschman, 1978; and Rogowski, 
1998), revolution (see Hirschman, 1993; and Pfaff and Kim, 2003), trade protection 
(see Aggarwal et al., 1987), political parties (see Kato, 1998; and Schlesinger, 1975), 
globalisation (see Schoppa, 2006), labour organisation (see Freeman and Medoff, 
1985), and education (see Chubb and Moe, 1988).  
Recognising that all organisations are inherently unstable, the theory of Exit, Voice, 
and Loyalty serves as a method for understanding the pulls and pushes in and out of 
organisations (Welsh et al., 2014). Hirschman’s theory so concisely outlines the 
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balancing factors for any organisation that others soon applied it to States and 
international organisations (Welsh et al., 2014).64  
However, applying Hirschman’s theory to the investment treaty regime is not so 
straightforward, as it is not considered as a formal organisation. International or 
multilateral organisations are typically comprised of plenary assemblies involving all 
member States and executive organs (Katselas, 2014; see Alvarez, 2006). Member 
States delegate authority to the organisation that, in theory, can neutrally make 
decisions which maximise the welfare of all member States and possibly even address 
distributional issues among them (Katselas, 2014; see Guzman and Landsidle, 2008). 
The investment treaty regime as defined in Chapter 2 does not have a formal, 
centralised organisation governing the regime.  
Nevertheless, Hirschman did not limit his reconnaissance to formal membership 
organisations or institutions. He illustrated, through examples, that the analysis can be 
applied to virtually any relationship (Katselas, 2014, p. 322). While there is no formal 
international investment organisation, there is undoubtedly a ‘club’ of sorts, or a 
‘voluntary association’, according to Katselas (2014), which qualifies as an 
organisation that States have created and joined in Hirschman’s terminology 
(Hirschman, 1970, p. 3). By signing BITs that contain a consent to investor-State 
arbitration, States become members of this organisation (Katselas, 2014). According 
to Katselas (2014, p. 323), the particular emphasis on the inclusion of the provision on 
ISDS is because States’ consent to investor-State arbitration is the relevant delegation 
of authority that created and empowered the organisation. Considering that the vast 
majority of BITs contain this consent, this criterion does not exclude many States that 
have signed BITs from the organisation.65  
The characterisation of the investment treaty regime as a voluntary association is useful 
as, according to Hirschman, voluntary associations are among the few types of 
organisations where both exit and voice may play essential roles, and where neither 
                                               
 
64 Weiler (1991) used the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty framework to analyse the historical development of 
the EU up to the early 1990's. Examples of how the framework was used to classify the different options 
available to States in the investment treaty regime are provided below. 
65 According to UNCTAD, 2441 of the 2572 BITs mapped (c. 95%) include ISDS provisions. United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development. International Investment Agreements Navigator. 
Available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/ (Accessed 2 July 2018). 
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may be dominant (Katselas, 2014; see Hirschman, 1970, p. 76–77, 120). Moreover, as 
Katselas (2014) argues, the voluntary association lens is also useful because it serves 
as a reminder that States created the regime and are its principals and members (see 
Yackee, 2012, p. 398). Accordingly, investment arbitration tribunals exercise authority 
delegated by the State to settle investor-State disputes that would otherwise be subject 
to national judicial processes (Katselas, 2014). As Anthea Roberts recognised (Roberts, 
2010, p. 196): ‘whether investment tribunals are viewed as agents or trustees, they are 
accountable to two or more principals – the treaty parties.’ Roberts (2010, p. 191) adds 
that one way of understanding this dynamic is through the concepts of ‘exit’ and 
‘voice’. Finally, despite the lack of a central governing body, the investment treaty 
regime exists for the same reason that formal multilateral international organisations 
exist, because States thought it would help them accomplish their economic objectives 
and judged the expected benefits would be worth the anticipated membership costs 
(Guzman and Landsidle, 2008; Katselas, 2014; Koremenos, 2008). 
Exit and voice are both at work in the investment treaty regime, as the balancing of 
goals, and the concerns raised in the theory of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty are all present 
in the context of investment treaty regime (Welsh et al., 2014). Hence, it comes as no 
surprise that the Hirschman’s exit and voice have been used by several scholars to 
categorise State tactics as principals in the investment treaty regime (Langford et al., 
2018). Examples of scholars that have used the framework include: (i) Katselas (2014) 
examined States' options for spurring change in the investment arbitration club through 
exit and voice; (ii) Langford et al. (2018) used exit and voice to categorise the different 
tactics States adopted as principals and litigants in the investment treaty regime with 
the aim of reasserting sovereign control and increasing policy space to regulate; (iii) 
Roberts (2010) used exit and voice to demonstrate the different ways States can 
influence investment arbitration tribunals and their scope of interpretation, and finally; 
(iv) Gordon and Pohl (2015) provide an inventory of countries’ options to alter their 
positioning vis-à-vis investment treaty law through exit and voice.  
This thesis aims to reconceptualise Hirschman’s framework so that it can reflect the 
different routes adopted by developing countries and hence the options available to 
them, taking into consideration the specific dynamics of the investment treaty regime 
and the limitations faced by developing countries. Developing countries (with a few 
exceptions) are generally described as the model rule-takers of the global economy 
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(Molina, 2013). They exercise little influence in shaping rules of international 
cooperation and frequently have low bargaining power (Molina, 2013). However, 
despite power asymmetries, some scholars argue that developing countries can engage 
with global governance rules, and in some instances find room to manoeuvre and 
leverage existing constraints (Jones et al., 2010; Keohane, 1971; Molina, 2013). At 
times, they exhibit loyalty to disadvantageous rules, due to the overwhelmingly costs 
of policy reversals, or due to regime priorities; occasionally, when they find 
alternatives, they seek to exit from international regimes altogether (Molina, 2013). 
While there are developing countries that fit the first category of being loyal to the 
disadvantageous rules (e.g. Egypt), there are others that have contested the 
international investment regime in one way or the other (e.g. Bolivia, Ecuador, South 
Africa, India, Indonesia). 
When it comes to BITs, like all other aspects of political economy, each country faces 
its own particular political and economic considerations when making and 
implementing policy. Whereas some States were able to adjust, others have lacked the 
political and economic power or facilitating conditions to enable them to take measures 
to address these issues by either renegotiating or exiting the treaties that expose them 
to the constraints highlighted above. A number of countries are said to be considering 
action, but are choosing to wait and see the fate of the countries that have already 
embarked on attempts to exit or reform their treaties before deciding on what route 
would be most suitable for them. 
The next section illustrates how the framework has been used to classify the different 
options available to States in the investment regime once they realise the constraints 
their membership poses on their policy space, as well as the different routes already 
taken by States in the regime. The section also demonstrates why there is a need to 
reconceptualise Hirschman’s framework in order to reflect the actual options (in 
practice) available to developing countries that have expressed their discontent with 
the investment treaty regime.  
2.3 How Hirschman’s Framework has been Used in the Investment 
Treaty Regime Literature and the Case for Reconceptualisation 
The challenges facing developing countries emerging from BITs, as outlined above, 
including concerns related to their development dimension and the balance between 
rights and obligations of investors and States, have led to a situation in which almost 
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all countries are party to one or several BITs, but many are dissatisfied with the current 
treaty regime (UNCTAD, 2014a). According to UNCTAD, efforts by States to address 
these challenges reveal four broad paths of action (UNCTAD, 2014b, p. 1):  
(i) maintain the status quo, e.g. largely refraining from changes in the way countries 
enter into new investment treaty commitments; (ii) implement selective adjustments, 
e.g. modifying models for future treaties but leaving the treaty core and the body of 
existing treaties largely untouched; (iii) disengage from the investment treaty regime, 
e.g. unilaterally terminating existing treaties or denouncing multilateral arbitration 
conventions; and, finally, (iv) undertake a systematic reform to address the investment 
treaty regime’s challenges in a holistic manner.  
Each of these routes involves a number of trade-offs that entail giving up some policy 
space in return for benefits from the treaty partners (UNCTAD, 2014a). There are 
several factors that UNCTAD identify as decisive in choosing a particular route. These 
include the level of economic development, relative trade and investment positions, 
geopolitical factors, and the general approach to bilateral and regional economic 
cooperation (UNCTAD, 2014a). There are also circumstances in which substantial 
change to a State’s legal system might be considered unavoidable and desirable 
(Bonnitcha, 2014). One such circumstance is when a State changes its form of 
government (Teitel, 2000). This is particularly significant when incoming governments 
face pressure to enact social and economic reforms after replacing regimes that failed 
to achieve inclusive economic growth (Iqbal, 2012).  
In the literature on the investment treaty regime, these options have been categorised 
as exit or voice. This study adds Hirschman's loyalty as a third category. The rest of 
this section is divided into three subsections: exit, voice and loyalty. In each subsection, 
the actions that can fall under each category are listed. Moreover, by highlighting the 
challenges or limitations facing States when adopting each route (particularly 
developing countries), the case for the need to reconceptualise Hirschman’s framework 
in order to reflect the actual options available to developing countries in practice and 
the factors that lead to each action is made.  
2.3.1 Exit  
Exit involves a break with the regime. In the literature a range of actions have been 
classified as exit, including: systemic termination of treaties with no intent to 
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renegotiate, termination of some treaties, treaty modifications, and refusing to ratify 
signed treaties. The most common definition of exit in the existing literature is the 
termination of existing investment treaties  (see Gordon and Pohl, 2015; Langford et 
al., 2018; UNCTAD, 2017c). However, the definition of the investment treaty regime 
in this thesis extends beyond the legal architecture and includes the normative 
foundations of the regime (see Chapter 2). Hence, for the purpose of this thesis, exit 
refers to both exiting the legal framework66 of the regime with no intent to renegotiate, 
as well as abandoning the neoliberal principles of foreign investment protection that 
shaped the regime in domestic law and other international investment agreements or 
provisions.   
This path of action might be particularly attractive for countries in which concerns with 
the constraints posed by investment treaties feature prominently in the domestic policy 
debate (UNCTAD, 2014b). Disengaging from the investment treaty regime might be 
perceived as the strongest or most far-reaching path of action. Ultimately, it would 
result in the removal of international commitments on investment protection that are 
enshrined in BITs and would result in the effective shielding from ISDS related risks 
(UNCTAD, 2014b). In practice,67  however, most of the desired implications will 
materialise only over a considerable amount of time and only for one treaty at a time. 
Exiting the regime does not immediately protect the State against future ISDS cases 
(UNCTAD, 2014b), as BIT commitments usually endure through survival clauses 
which oblige treaty partners to honour commitments for another 10-15 years on 
average. 
Furthermore, there may be a need to review national legislation, State contracts, and 
other regional or international investment treaties, as they may also provide consent 
for ISDS (including arbitration under ICSID) (UNCTAD, 2014b). Finally, unless 
termination is undertaken on a consensual basis, a government’s ability to terminate a 
BIT is limited. Its ability to do so depends on what is stipulated in each BIT 
                                               
 
66 It is worth noting that exit in this thesis also includes the denunciation of the ICSID Convention 
which has generally been categorised as voice in the literature (see Gordon and Pohl, 2015; Langford 
et al., 2018).  
67 From the experience of developing countries like Bolivia and Ecuador that have taken this route.  
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respectively and may be available only at a particular, limited point in time (UNCTAD, 
2014b). 
Hirschman describes the economist’s approach to exit (as opposed to a political 
scientist’s approach) as neat and impersonal, with the recuperation occurring as an 
automatic process (Hirschman, 1970). The recuperation comes by way of Adam 
Smith’s Invisible Hand ‘as an unintended by-product of the customer’s decision to 
shift’ (Hirschman, 1970, p. 15). However, the mechanics of exit are very different in 
the legal, political, and economic realms occupied by international investment treaties 
(Katselas, 2014). The challenges and sophistication of the exit process in the 
investment treaty regime is not captured in Hirschman’s theory.  
Exit from the BIT treaties is far from neat, as ‘total’ exit from the obligations under a 
BIT requires the resigning State to travel a long, challenging, and very open road 
(Katselas, 2014) due to the survival clauses discussed above. Hence, any policy space 
gained by the decision to exit is limited to new investments/investors at least for 
another 5-20 years reducing its immediate impact. Countries that have pursued the exit 
route were still subject to costly arbitration cases triggered through BITs post-
termination. Moreover, other criteria specified by Hirschman for choosing exit include 
the certainty that comes with exit and the low costs associated with the decision to 
exit, both of which are not highly likely for developing countries. Accordingly, there 
is a need to reconceptualise Hirschman's framework to reflect the nature of exit in the 
investment treaty regime. 
2.3.2 Voice  
In the investment treaty regime, three main tactics have been identified for States that 
seek to adopt the voice option (as principals) to address their discontent with the regime 
(Gordon and Pohl, 2015):68 (i) using instruments to influence the interpretation of the 
investment treaties; (ii) amending treaties; and (iii) renegotiation of new treaties to 
replace old ones. The first two methods can be classified under selective adjustments 
and the third under systematic reform (UNCTAD, 2014b).  
                                               
 
68 This is not an exhaustive list of all the voice channels in the regime but rather the ones that have been 
most frequently mentioned and used.  
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One channel for voice is subsequent agreement and practice (Katselas, 2014). The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides that treaty interpretation 
shall take into account ‘any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions’ and ‘any subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation.’69 Joint instruments can be used to clarify the meaning of 
certain clauses and/or treaty parties’ intent, which may help to reduce the uncertainty 
caused by broadly worded provisions that often lead to contradictory interpretations in 
ISDS proceedings (UNCTAD, 2017b). Once an investment treaty has been adopted, 
treaty partners can use additional devices such as side agreements, protocols, 
understandings or exchanges of letters to clarify further the meaning of certain clauses 
and hence enhance predictability for investors, treaty partners and tribunals (Gordon 
and Pohl, 2015; UNCTAD, 2014b). Some treaties have built in explicit mechanisms 
that allow States to control the interpretation and application of their treaties more 
directly than through influencing interpretation. These mechanisms include the 
possibility to issue authoritative interpretations of the treaty that are binding on 
tribunals, and consultation procedures among treaty partners in relation to prudential 
and tax issues when these are raised in investor-State disputes (Gordon and Pohl, 
2015). 
The instruments mentioned above provide an option for States to influence the use and 
interpretation of existing treaty text. However, these mechanisms are limited in their 
scope, particularly when States need to amend their treaty obligations more 
substantially (Gordon and Pohl, 2015). For such more substantial expressions of voice, 
States may resort to amending treaty text or replacing the treaty entirely by a new 
document (Gordon and Pohl, 2015) or legislation that better meets their policy 
objectives. 
According to UNCTAD (2017), the expansively formulated obligations common to 
old BITs may sometimes be challenging to fix through a joint interpretation. If treaty 
partners can successfully agree on amending treaty provisions, the parties can achieve 
                                               
 
69 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Done at Vienna 23 May 1969. Entered into force 27 
January 1980. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1151, p. 331. Available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a10.html (Accessed 2 August 2018). Articles 31(3)(a)–(b). 
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a higher degree of change and thereby ensure that the amended treaty reflects their 
evolving policy preferences. Typically, amendments are limited in number and do not 
affect the overall design and philosophy of a treaty (UNCTAD, 2013). It is quite rare 
to find BITs that contain provisions that provide explicitly for the possibility of treaty 
amendments (Pohl, 2013). One of the main challenges associated with this option is 
that the negotiation over the amendments between the two treaty partners may lead to 
‘horse trading’ in which desired amendments are achieved only through a quid pro quo 
with parties demanding other amendments (UNCTAD, 2017b, p. 82). This is 
particularly an issue for developing countries seeking amendments in BITs with 
capital-exporting countries due to the asymmetries of power between the two parties. 
Comprehensive data on amendments are not available (UNCTAD, 2017b). Existing 
evidence suggests, however, that States have thus far used amendments somewhat 
sparingly (Gordon and Pohl, 2015). Exceptions include the EU member States,70 which 
have made amendments by using protocols before and after accession to the EU 
(UNCTAD, 2017b). Other countries have used amendments more sporadically to 
include adjustments to the ISDS mechanism (e.g. the Exchange of Notes (1997) to the 
Paraguay–United Kingdom BIT (1981), the Protocol (2000) to the Panama–United 
States BIT (1982), the Protocol (2003) to the Germany–Moldova BIT (1994). 
The third and final channel for voice covered in this section is the renegotiation of new 
treaties to replace old ones. This option is categorised under systematic reform as it 
offers the opportunity for treaty partners to undertake a comprehensive revision of the 
treaty instead of selectively amending individual clauses (UNCTAD, 2017b). About 
130 BITs have been replaced in this way, mostly by other BITs (UNCTAD, 2017b). 
Countries that have been active in this respect over the past 20 years include Germany, 
followed by China, Egypt, Romania and Morocco (Langford et al., 2018). It is 
important to note, however, that the replacement of treaties is not necessarily the result 
of States practicing voice. Indeed, the majority of the countries mentioned above have 
essentially renegotiated BITs that are ripe for renegotiation due to their limited 
                                               
 
70 The countries referred to are the following Eastern European States: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Romania. 
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investment protections: Egypt,71 Germany,72 and Morocco73 (Langford et al., 2018). 
There is also no clear evidence to indicate that Romania or China’s renegotiations were 
related to their discontent with the expansive nature of the protection provided in their 
old BITs (Langford et al., 2018).  
As is the case with the option of amending treaties, renegotiating new treaties rests on 
the ability of the two treaty partners to find common ground. Hence, the partners need 
to have aligned interests or share similar views if the new treaty is to include reform-
oriented elements (UNCTAD, 2017b). Other challenges for developing countries are 
the cost and time intensive nature of negotiating treaties from scratch (UNCTAD, 
2017b), not to mention the technical (legal) and administrative capacity required. 
Considering the challenges associated with this route, it should come as no surprise 
that developing countries that have expressed their desire to introduce substantial 
reforms to BIT obligations to increase their regulatory space have struggled to 
renegotiate new treaties with capital-exporting countries.  
One of the main objectives of developing countries’ decisions to review their BITs is 
to reduce their legal exposure to investment arbitration claims before arbitration 
tribunals. Whether the loyalty or exit option will succeed in achieving this goal is 
difficult to predict according to scholars in favour of the voice option (see Lavopa et 
al., 2012). This is because loyalty entails a minimal regulatory role for the State, which 
must wait for reform to happen from within the system through a consensus amongst 
members (who do not necessarily share the same interests or concerns: capital-
exporting v. developing countries). Regarding exit, as demonstrated above BITs have 
a built-in self-defence mechanism that render them somewhat resilient to change 
                                               
 
71 Egypt's 13 renegotiated BITs were first signed during the period 1966–88 and renegotiated versions 
were signed between 1994 and 2010. See: UNCTAD. ‘Egypt’. International Investment Agreements 
Navigator. Available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/62#iiaInnerMenu/ 
(Accessed 20 August 2018). 
72  Germany's 18 renegotiated BITs were first signed during the period 1959–83 and renegotiated 
versions were signed between 1996 and 2010. See: UNCTAD. ‘Germany’. International Investment 
Agreements Navigator. Available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/78#iiaInnerMenu (Accessed 20 August 2018). 
73 Morocco’s 12 renegotiated BITs were first signed during the period of 1961–89 and renegotiated 
versions were signed in the period of 1996–2007. The status of the two remaining BITs is unclear as 
neither the original versions (signed in 1997 and 2001) nor the renegotiated versions (signed in 2001 
and 2006) have entered into force. See: UNCTAD. ‘Morocco’. International Investment Agreements 
Navigator. Available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu 
(Accessed 20 August 2018). 
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through termination. Accordingly, those in favour of voice opine that developing 
countries seeking to reduce the constraints posed on their policy space to regulate 
through ISDS and expansive protection standards are better off renegotiating their 
BITs. Renegotiation does not require the termination of the treaty, it may be 
implemented at any time and does not trigger the application of survival clauses, hence 
making changes to the treaty immediately applicable. 
Based on these arguments voice seems to be the ideal route to adopt until a critical 
caveat is recognised: for this strategy to be successful, the developing country must be 
able to tackle both the legal and political challenges in the process of brokering a deal. 
These challenges will entail getting their treaty counterparts (capital-exporting 
countries) to substantially amend or remove clauses (which can also be considered 
privileges) that they have publicly refused to compromise on.74 
To date, no developing country that has expressed its discontent with the regime and 
sought to introduce substantial reforms to their BIT obligations has been able to do so 
through the channels of voice described above.75  Changes in BITs as a result of 
interpretations, treaty amendments and replacements have been incremental and non-
substantial. Moreover, as will be demonstrated later in this thesis, developing countries 
that have sought to reform their legal commitments under the existing regime have 
struggled to convince their capital exporting partners to renegotiate the BITs between 
them. 
Based on the above, this thesis will analyse the experience of one of the developing 
countries that sought to voice its discontent with the regime and introduce systematic 
reforms by initially attempting to renegotiate new treaties to replace their existing BITs 
before realising it was not feasible.  
2.3.3 Loyalty  
In the investment treaty regime literature, Hirschman's loyalty has been considered as 
one of the factors that determine whether a State chooses to exit or to resort to voice 
                                               
 
74 While open to changing some of the controversial substantive clauses and the ISDS provision in new 
treaties amongst themselves, e.g. TTIP, capital-exporting countries have not displayed the same 
willingness to make similar changes in treaties with developing countries, as will be demonstrated in 
the South Africa case study. 
75 To the best of the author’s knowledge. 
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when dissatisfied with membership of the regime. In addition to the relative difficulty 
of exit, it is possible that some States retain their memberships due in part to some 
degree of attachment, or loyalty, to the regime (Katselas, 2014). As per Hirschman’s 
theorisation, loyalty functions to hold exit at bay for a finite period of time, because 
unlike faith it retains an enormous dose of reasoned calculation (Hirschman, 1970, p. 
79). Loyalty is difficult to gauge in the investment treaty regime due to its fragmented 
nature and the difficulty of exit (Katselas, 2014). However, it can be argued that States 
that retain their membership in the regime by remaining committed to their existing 
treaties and/or conventions, even after they face investment treaty arbitrations, are the 
ones that show signs of loyalty.  
For the purpose of this thesis, the path that will be initially classified as loyalty in the 
investment treaty regime is the one identified by UNCTAD (2014b) as maintaining the 
status quo. Under this option, States refrain from making any substantive changes to 
their commitments under their international investment treaties, thereby sending an 
image of continuity and investor friendliness to foreign investors (UNCTAD, 2014b). 
Any amendments or updated treaties under this category will include incremental 
changes, e.g. refining the wording of specific clauses to add more clarity or bringing 
them in line with the latest best practices in the regime identified by institutions like 
UNCTAD and the OECD.  
The States most likely to find this path attractive are those that stand to gain the most 
and risk the least from membership of the investment regime. This is apparently the 
case for capital-exporting countries that are keen to protect their nationals’ 
investments abroad via BITs and have a lower risk of being respondents compared to 
capital-importing developing countries. For developing countries that have faced a 
significant number of investment treaty arbitration cases and do not have a strong 
outward investment perspective, the assumption that their decision to refrain from 
making substantive reforms or existing the regime is down to loyalty is not as 
convincing. The inconclusive evidence on the economic benefits BITs provide to 
capital importers further complicates matters. As Hirschman argues, while a member 
can remain loyal to an organisation in the face of discontent without being influential 
themselves, it would not be possible without ‘the expectation that someone will act or 
something will happen to improve matters’ (Hirschman, 1970, p. 78). Nevertheless, 
an explanation for why developing countries in the situation mentioned above may 
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remain loyal to the regime is that the State may have determined that it has more to 
gain and less to lose from seeking to reduce its risk from within the regime than from 
the outside (Katselas, 2014).  
2.3.4 Concluding Remarks 
 Having established how Hirschman’s framework has been applied to the investment 
treaty regime in the existing literature and why there is a need to reconceptualise the 
framework to reflect the actual routes adopted by developing countries, the rest of this 
chapter examines how the literature has addressed the two other research questions in 
this thesis.  
As argued in Chapter 2, while there is uncertainty regarding the benefits of joining the 
regime for developing countries, there has been recognition of the costs incurred as a 
result of joining the regime. This realisation triggers an important question regarding 
how and why developing countries joined this regime in light of the above. Another 
critical issue which is insufficiently addressed in the existing literature is why reactions 
of developing countries that have expressed their discontent with the uncertain benefits 
and significant costs of being a member of the regime have varied. Addressing these 
two issues would contribute significantly to our understanding of the challenges facing 
developing countries in the investment treaty regime, but more importantly in the 
context of this thesis, they are integral to understanding the options available to these 
countries when they attempt to contest the regime and to explain why they chose one 
route or the other. Hence, the next two sections of this chapter address how the existing 
literature tackles these two issues and identifies some of the theories/frameworks that 
are used in the case studies.  
3. Why and How Developing Countries Signed BITs  
Although hardly known to anyone but specialised lawyers two decades ago, BITs have 
become one of the most potent legal tools underwriting economic globalisation 
(Poulsen, 2017). As demonstrated in Chapter 2, in recent years, foreign investors have 
realised the potency of this adjudicative tool, which brought developing countries, in 
particular, on the respondent end of significantly costly claims concerning a wide 
range of regulatory actions (Poulsen, 2017). The vague and broad constitution-like 
promises in investment treaties (Gwynn, 2016), have actually given ad hoc tribunals 
considerable flexibility to determine when and to what extent regulation of foreign 
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investors by host States requires compensation to investors. This has accordingly 
triggered the need to explain why developing countries adopt treaties that restrict their 
discretion to regulate and expose them to expensive compensation damages (Gwynn, 
2016). 
There have been numerous theories and claims that have tried to explain why 
developing countries sign BITs. Some of these claims include that developing 
countries signed BITs because they were beneficial for them (Dolzer, 1981; Elkins et 
al., 2006; Guzman, 1998; Kaushal, 2009; Salacuse and Sullivan, 2005; Swenson, 
2005; Vandevelde, 2000), as their FDI and prosperity would be increased. Another 
explanation provided was that BITs resulted from competition over FDI (Elkins et al., 
2006; Salacuse and Sullivan, 2005, 2005).76 Other explanations have stated that BITs 
were, in essence, an effort to clarify international investment rules (Kaushal, 2009; 
Kononov, 2011; Sornarajah, 2010), with some suggesting that the signing of BITs 
were merely photo opportunities when diplomatic representatives were visiting 
developing countries (Poulsen and Aisbett, 2013; Sornarajah, 2010). 
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the different theories proposed to explain 
how and why developing countries signed BITs. A critique of ‘rational choice’ 
theories is followed by a demonstration of how Poulsen’s adaptation of the Bounded 
Rationality Framework and Gwynn’s adaptation of the Structural Power Framework 
can explain how and why developing countries signed BITs respectively.  
3.1 Rational Choice Hypothesis  
The first argument of the rational choice hypothesis is ‘emulation’, which states that 
the spread of BITs during the 1990s was a result of a norm-cascade, where developing 
countries adopted the treaties without any strategic objective, but rather as acts of 
political symbolism to signal adherence to the principles of the Washington Consensus 
(Jandhyala et al., 2011). This is backed up with statistical evidence indicating that the 
propensity of countries to adopt BITs during the 1990s was particularly driven by 
whether peer or similar countries did so (Poulsen, 2017). 
                                               
 
76 Guzman (1998) proposed that developed countries were in a prisoner’s dilemma and so when acting 
on their own; to compete with one another developing countries signed BITs.  
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Poulsen (2017) questions this perspective, by arguing that BITs were poor public 
relations instruments until recently: unlike human rights treaties or trade agreements, 
they were typically signed entirely under the radar during the 1990s and received little 
attention by parliaments, the press, or the public at large (see Montt, 2009). Whereas 
some BITs were indeed adopted to display friendly diplomatic relations or show a 
commitment to economic globalisation (Jandhyala et al., 2011), the primary driver has 
been the expectation that they are essential strategic instruments to attract capital. This 
is indicated in the preambles of BITs and was the primary justification when UNCTAD 
and the arbitration industry promoted the treaties.77 
After demonstrating that the expectation that these investment treaties would attract 
investment flows was a more important driver of the BIT-movement than emulation, 
Poulsen turns to the second traditional argument of the rational choice theory 
framework, which is that BITs were the result of a careful, and rational, competition 
for capital. At the time BITs proliferated rapidly, loans by International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) to developing countries had diminished, and many governments saw 
FDI as an alternative source of capital (Poulsen, 2017). However, as Poulsen argues, 
the aim of the treaties does not tell us much about the process with which they were 
adopted, and standard rational choice accounts raise some puzzling questions. 
There are a couple of variations of the rational competition argument that can be 
considered. One popular perspective is that BITs are decisive instruments to overcome 
problems of obsolescent bargaining (Guzman, 1998). Without a treaty with a binding 
consent to international arbitration, the argument is that many developing countries 
would be unable to make a ‘credible commitment’ that the assets of foreign investors 
remain safe post-establishment. However, a strong rebuttal of that argument is that, 
while investment treaties may be helpful for some investment decisions in certain 
circumstances, they have never been a functional necessity to attract inflows of foreign 
capital given the availability of alternative risk-mitigating instruments (Alvarez, 
2011a; Yackee, 2010). Moreover, as highlighted in Chapter 2, the results of empirical 
studies on the relationship between FDI and BITs have been inconclusive. While some 
                                               
 
77 For example, as illustrated in UNCTAD (1998), these clauses are typically worded as follows: by 
‘signing BITs … developing countries are sending a strong signal of their commitment to provide a 
predictable, stable and reliable legal environment for foreign direct investors, to stimulate investors´ 
confidence, and boost FDI flows.’ 
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scholars have argued that investment treaties occasionally have an impact on the legal 
structure of foreign investments; very few seem to have a tangible impact on their 
destination and size (Allee and Peinhardt, 2014; Poulsen and Aisbett, 2013). Indeed, 
several studies find ‘no correlation between FDI and BITs’.78  
Another view of the rational choice theory is that developing countries used BITs as a 
costly signal to imperfectly informed investors about their commitment to foreign 
capital (Büthe and Milner, 2009). However, again scholars have refuted this argument 
by arguing that treaties were hardly relevant for investor-State relations until the late 
1990s (Poulsen and Aisbett, 2013). Indeed, very few investors or developing country 
governments realised the potency of the treaties until recently (Poulsen and Aisbett, 
2013).  
3.2 Bounded Rationality Framework 
Whilst acknowledging their contributions, Poulsen (2017) argued that the leading 
rational choice explanations for the diffusion of BITs leave us with too many 
unanswered questions (Poulsen, 2017). Many developing countries were at least 
‘intended rational’ (Simon, 1957) when spreading their BIT-networks, as they 
typically followed the logic of expected consequences: ‘BITs lead to FDI’ (Poulsen, 
2017). Nonetheless, Poulsen’s theory argues that while most developing countries 
competed for capital when signing BITs, they were not as rational as often assumed. 
Poulsen attempted to address these oversights by advancing a new theory of BIT-
diffusion based on experimental insights from behavioural economics (Poulsen, 
2017). A core argument from Poulsen’s work is that a Bounded Rationality framework 
has considerable potential to explain how officials from developing countries have 
approached and signed BITs. 
Under the Bounded Rationality framework, policy-makers are seen as goal-oriented, 
and thereby rational in the broadest sense of the word.79 Moreover, rather than using 
                                               
 
78 See Appendix I.  
79 Herbert Simon proposed the bounded rationality theory as an alternative basis for the mathematical 
modelling of decision-making, as used in economics, political science and related disciplines. It 
complements ‘rationality as optimisation’, which views decision-making as a fully rational process of 
finding an optimal choice given the information available (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002). Simon who 
coined the term ‘bounded rationality’ used the analogy of a pair of scissors, where one blade represents 
‘cognitive limitations’ of actual humans and the other the ‘structures of the environment’, illustrating 
how minds compensate for limited resources (such as time and knowledge) by exploiting known 
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the laws of statistics, policy learning is biased by cognitive shortcuts consistently 
found in experimental studies on human judgments and decision-making (Poulsen and 
Aisbett, 2013). Applying this framework, Poulsen proposes a BIT diffusion process 
characterised by bounded rather than comprehensive rationality on the part of 
developing country decision-makers. According to his hypothesis, developing country 
governments began adopting BITs because they were presented by developed 
countries and other BIT-proponents as easy and readily ‘available’ policy blueprints 
to attract foreign investment (Poulsen, 2017). Decision makers in developing countries 
systematically overestimated the economic benefits of BITs. They wanted to believe 
the treaties were important to attract capital, which in turn had an impact on their 
information processing (Poulsen, 2017). Instead of relying on statistical and legal 
studies, the assumption that these BITs would attract FDI was based on anecdotal 
evidence and the claims of the IFIs and capital-exporting countries promoting these 
treaties. Finally, these governments ignored the costs of these BITs and only a few 
realised the power granted to third parties (international arbitration tribunals) to 
determine the meaning of the broad principles in these treaties in practice, or the fact 
that they conflicted with some of their national policies (Poulsen, 2017). It was not 
until a country was hit by a claim itself that the potency of the treaties became apparent 
to them, which explains why developing countries only started to contest the regime 
after they became respondents to arbitration claims. 
3.3 How the Structural Power Framework Can Complement the Bounded 
Rationality Theory 
Poulsen’s hypothesis has addressed some of the shortcomings in rational choice theory 
explanations and has explained why BITs were signed without being reviewed and 
were not initially taken seriously. However, it does not explain the paradoxical 
behaviour of developing countries that signed BITs which contained the same 
investment protection standards they had initially rejected in multilateral forums. The 
theory also fails to explain why governments that advocated for a more regulatory 
approach to FDI ended up signing BITs which provided minimal space for regulation 
                                               
 
structural regularity in the environment. In his own words (Simon, 1956, p. 129): ‘a great deal can be 
learned about rational decision making by taking account of the fact that the environments to which it 
must adapt possess properties that permit further simplification of its choice mechanisms.’ Thus, models 
of bounded rationality describe how a judgment or decision is reached (that is, the heuristic processes) 
rather than merely the outcome of the decision (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002, p. 4). 
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by the State. In order to explain why developing countries agreed to sign BITs despite 
their previous stance on FDI protection and regulation, it is imperative to understand 
the context in which these treaties were signed. This section will demonstrate how 
analysing the behaviour of governments of developing countries using the Structural 
Power framework can explain the paradox mentioned above.  
Gwynn argues that the insufficiency of the above explanations of why developing 
countries signed BITs is due to the lens used to analyse the international investment 
regime. The international investment framework could be analysed using a different 
lens – a structuralist one, as Gwynn illustrates in her book Power in the International 
Investment Framework (2016). In international relations, the paradigm of 
structuralism is an alternative approach for understanding actors’ behaviour. Instead 
of focusing on the actors per se, this paradigm explains actors’ decisions by taking 
into account the surrounding structures in which the actors’ relationships are built, e.g. 
world economic structures, and how these can influence and affect actors’ decisions 
(Gwynn, 2016; see Steans et al., 2010).80 There have been scholars who have stressed 
the relevance of structural factors for explaining an actor’s behaviour and phenomena 
in international relations (Gwynn, 2016). Kenneth Waltz, for instance, stated that a 
‘structural approach can provide the foundations for a successful theory of 
international politics’ (cited in Little, 2007, p. 168). Gwynn (2016) argues that in a 
similar vein, Susan Strange proposes a theory of structural power, according to which 
it ‘confers the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape 
frameworks within which States relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to 
corporate enterprises’ (Strange, 1998, p. 25). The ability to ‘shape the frameworks’ 
comes from controlling broad structures that, according to Strange (1988), can be 
categorised according to security, production, finance and knowledge. The actor that 
has control over these structures does not need to offer evidence for its exercise of 
power because the control of these structures allows the actor’s interests to take 
precedence over the interests of other actors (Gwynn, 2016; see Tooze and May, 
2002).  
                                               
 
80 In this particular context, the actors are the governments of developing and developed countries that 
signed BITs. 
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According to Gwynn (2016), the advantage of using this structuralist lens to analyse 
the international investment framework is that it gives a panorama of the whole 
framework rather than focusing on just the treaty. It does so by including the 
developments of foreign investment regulations in both the multilateral and bilateral 
settings. This leads to what Gwynn refers to as a paradoxical phenomenon (Gwynn, 
2016, p. 127):  
while foreign investment was regulated at the multilateral level according to 
what developing countries wanted, when signing BITs, developing countries 
have agreed to provisions which surpassed or contradicted what developing 
countries had previously achieved at the multilateral level. 
As described above, BITs became the core of the international investment regime. By 
applying Strange’s concept of structural power, Gwynn provides a historical account 
that illustrates how the framework for international investment was not a result of a 
consensus, but that particular preferences of capital-exporting countries became the 
entrenched rules of the international investment regime (Gwynn, 2016). 
Considering that trade and investment are intertwined, other political and economic 
factors that developed over time have to be considered to understand why developing 
countries signed BITs (Gwynn, 2016). In 1955, during the trade rounds of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a resolution was enacted that ‘urged 
countries to conclude bilateral agreements to provide protection and security for 
foreign investment’ (GATT Contracting Parties, 1955; see also Kononov, 2011). From 
the early 1960s through the mid-1970s, the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
dominated by developing countries, passed a series of resolutions intended to 
emphasise the sovereignty of nations concerning foreign investment (Guzman, 1998). 
First, in 1962, the Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources was 
passed (United Nations General Assembly, 1962). This resolution provided that in 
cases of expropriation, ‘appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in 
force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty’ must be paid 
(Guzman, 1998). Second, in 1973, UN Resolution No. 3171, Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources supported developing countries by stating that (United 
Nations General Assembly, 1973, Article 3): 
the application of the principle of nationalization carried out by States, as an 
expression of their sovereignty in order to safeguard their natural resources, 
implies that each State is entitled to determine the amount of possible 
compensation and the mode of payment, and that any dispute which might 
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arise should be settled in accordance with the national legislation of each State 
carrying out such measures.  
Finally, in 1974, two other important resolutions were passed in favour of developing 
countries. One of them was the UN Resolution No. 3201, which established a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) to address the inequalities between the 
developed and developing countries. The other was UN Resolution No. 3281, which 
introduced the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. The Charter 
established that each State has the right to: ‘regulate and exercise authority over 
foreign investment within its national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and 
regulations … No State shall be compelled to grant preferential treatment to foreign 
investment’ (United Nations General Assembly, 1974, Article 2 (2) (a)). It further 
stated that ‘where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be 
settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals’ (United 
Nations General Assembly, 1974, Article. 2 (2) (c)).  
 Nevertheless, the fact that UN General Assembly Resolutions are de lege ferenda 
(what the law ought to be) and, therefore, not binding, left an open door for those 
dissatisfied (major capital-exporting countries) to seek alternative ways to regulate 
foreign investment in a manner that would meet their interests (Gwynn, 2016).  
The departure from the UN resolutions’ provisions on foreign investment started with 
the wave of BITs in Europe and the BIT program in the United States.81 In 1986, the 
GATT issued a Ministerial Declaration which stated that: ‘Following an examination 
of the operation of GATT Articles related to the trade restrictive and distorting effects 
of investment measures, negotiations should elaborate, as appropriate, further 
provisions that may be necessary to avoid such adverse effects on trade’ (GATT 
Contracting Parties, 1986). In the same round in 1986, the Agreement on Trade 
Related to Investment Measures (TRIMs) was proposed. 82  However, the TRIMs 
Agreement, which was agreed only in 1994, did not contain the controversial core 
provisions in BITs such as compensation for expropriation and settlement of foreign 
investment disputes in international courts (Gwynn, 2016). 
                                               
 
81 The United States started its BIT program in 1977. With this program came the idea of the detachment 
of disputes pertaining to foreign investment from domestic courts (Vandevelde, 2005). 
82 Other agreements that touch on investment issues, like the GATTs were also proposed and then later 
agreed and adopted in 1994 together with the creation of the WTO. 
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By 1989, with the Washington Consensus, a wave of neo-liberalism came about. In 
addition to promoting liberalisation of trade policies and openness to foreign 
investment, developing nations adopting protectionist measures restricting FDI were 
criticised. In the words of John Williamson (1990, p. 15): ‘a restrictive attitude limiting 
the entry of foreign direct investment (FDI) is regarded as foolish. ... The main 
motivation for restricting FDI is economic nationalism, which Washington 
disapproves of, at least when practised by countries other than the United States.’ 
Many developing countries did go on to embrace the economic proposals for reform 
and complied with what was established in the trade rounds of the GATT (Gwynn, 
2016). This entailed a commitment to liberalising markets, which included liberalising 
their treatment of foreign investments. According to Sornarajah (2009, p. 1) the pillars 
of neoliberalism relevant to the area of foreign investment may be identified to include 
the following:  
(i) the need for safeguards of property rights in the host state, particularly 
property brought in or acquired by the foreign investor; (ii) the securing of 
judicial safeguards for such property through external arbitration in the 
absence of a court system in the host state which would provide secure 
protection in the face of executive or political displeasure; and (v) the 
redefinition of the rule of law to encapsulate these neo-liberal ideas. 
The peak phase regarding the frequency of BIT conclusions occurred during the rise 
of the Washington Consensus model, which identified the liberalisation of inward 
foreign investment as an essential driver of economic development for developing 
States (Katselas, 2014). The number of BITs signed globally during the 1990s 
increased from 385 to 1,857 (Vandevelde, 2005). The rise of BITs was even 
considered as evidence of the success of neoliberal policies in the last decade of the 
twentieth century. A significant factor in the increased number of BITs during the 
aforementioned period relates to the role played by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank in developing countries (Prieto-Rios, 2015).  
According to a structuralist perspective, the world economic structure would allegedly 
influence States’ behaviour and, thus, it is important to take into account (Gwynn, 
2016). At the time of the BITs boom in the developing world, this economic structure 
cannot be omitted as some financial institutions played an integral role in the 
developing countries’ decision to agree to BITs (Gwynn, 2016). Indeed, developing 
countries which were facing economic difficulties during that period (e.g. debt crisis) 
turned to Bretton Woods institutions in order to bail them out and were consequently 
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dictated to by the economic conditionalities imposed by these IFIs. The IMF and the 
World Bank advocated the need for developing countries to create a friendly and pro-
investor climate in order to attract foreign investments as sources of capital, 
technology, and knowledge (Hinojosa and Bebbington, 2010; Prieto-Rios, 2015). A 
study by Elkins, Guzman and Simmons (2006) which conducted an econometric 
analysis of the different diffusion processes of BITs revealed a correlation between 
receiving IMF credits and entering into BIT agreements. The IMF demanded the 
liberalisation of foreign investments. In the IMF’s stabilisation programs ‘greater 
hospitality for foreign private investment’ (Kaushal, 2009, p. 504) was required. This 
meant that developing countries had to agree to certain measures, inter alia, not to 
restrict investments, to give them national treatment and to be willing to privatise 
(Kaushal, 2009). The World Bank played a similar role through the policy 
prescriptions set as conditionalities in different credit facilities provided to developing 
countries. While Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and conditionalities 
imposed by the IMF and World Bank never explicitly mentioned BITs, they included 
policy prescriptions that were modelled on the Washington Consensus prescriptions 
and pressured developing States into adopting the neoliberal economic model through 
changes in their legal frameworks (Sornarajah, 2009). As the case studies in this thesis 
reveal, the forceful and far-reaching nature of conditionalities imposed by the IMF and 
World Bank meant that the funding they provided was used as a powerful policy tool 
(Kaushal, 2009) and played a significant role, albeit indirectly, in the diffusion of BITs 
amongst developing countries.  
Having provided the context for the evolving investment regime, we can revisit what 
was termed by Gwynn as a paradoxical phenomenon. In multilateral forums like the 
WTO, a large group of developing countries objected to investment standards which 
were part of the Singapore Issues83 at the different WTO Ministerial Conferences 
(Khor, 1997). The main features of the investment rules proposed by the EU countries 
and supported by other developed countries included many similarities with the 
protection standards in BITs. A few examples of the proposed rules are non-
                                               
 
83 Four issues that were introduced to the WTO agenda at the December 1996 Ministerial Conference 
in Singapore: trade and investment, trade and competition policy, transparency in government 
procurement, and trade facilitation. These issues were promoted by developed countries (led by the 
European Union). Developing countries rejected these issues as they argued it would restrict national 
governments in their domestic economic policy making.  
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discrimination standards like NT and MFN, a broad definition of expropriation that 
includes indirect expropriation and a dispute settlement provision potentially allowing 
investor-State dispute settlement (Khor, 2007). 
Several of the developing countries that objected to this proposal, however, continued, 
at a bilateral level, to sign BITs (Gwynn, 2016). With the agreement and ratification 
of these treaties, BITs as a framework for international investment were ‘legitimately’ 
put into place, ending the historical debates on foreign investment rules but reflecting 
the minority’s interests that were once hindered at a multilateral level (Gwynn, 2016). 
Gwynn argues that the Structural Power Framework can explain what seems as 
paradoxical behaviour by developing countries. According to Gwynn (2016), 
developing countries joined the investment treaty regime because they were dependent 
on structures beyond the treaty itself, like that of finance, which had an impact on their 
choice. It is due to this structural connection to specific political contexts – to the 
international financial institutions’ involvement in creating a particular framework or 
other structures surrounding the relationship of the treaty partners – that the BIT 
framework was embraced by several developing countries (Gwynn, 2016).  
It is important to note that Gwynn’s study focused on Latin American countries who 
had signed their BITs on the back of a debt crisis. In this case, the main actors who 
held structural power were IFIs and capital-exporting countries who controlled the 
financial structure dimension by being the primary source of credit needed by the Latin 
American countries to recover from the debt and economic crises. Several other 
developing countries shared similar experiences during the 1980s and the 1990s, and 
there was a trend amongst developing countries of adopting neoliberal policies that 
were part of SAPs imposed by IFIs like the IMF in return for credit. However, this 
scenario does not apply to all developing countries, and more importantly, there are 
cases in which the structural power was held by other actors and the structures 
controlled were also different. For instance, as will be demonstrated in the South 
Africa case study in Chapter 6, structural power was held by the domestic corporate 
sector which controlled the production dimension as well as the knowledge dimension. 
Hence, the Structural Power framework can be adopted in other contexts and should 
not be restricted to the relationship between governments of developing countries and 
IFIs or capital-exporting countries.  
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Gwynn (2016) also provides an important clarification as she emphasises that the 
structural factors that affect the choices of agreeing to a framework must not be 
confused with coercion. According to Gwynn, those with the ability to define 
frameworks can dispense with the use of coercion because the control of different 
structures amounting to the framework can determine the outcome (Gwynn, 2016). 
While structural factors can limit a country’s choice, there is always a choice (Gwynn, 
2016). The degree of limitation of these choices, the actors involved, and the structures 
controlled, might all differ for each country. 
As Gwynn (2016) argues, the value added by the structuralist perspective is that it 
provides alternative explanations to the question of why developing countries signed 
BITs. This perspective provides insights into why developing countries signed BITs 
by focusing on more than just the bargaining of the treaty per se and by considering 
other factors that had an impact on their adoption.  
Finally, under this framework, the answer of why developing countries signed BITs 
lies in the structural elements surrounding the formation of the international 
investment framework. Moreover, as this thesis will argue these structural elements 
have not only influenced the decision of developing countries to join the regime, but 
also play a crucial role in determining which route developing countries adopt after 
they contest the regime. 
4. Literature Gap: Analysing How and Why Developing Countries 
Have Reacted Differently 
Several studies have attempted to classify and categorise the different reactions of 
States as part of the backlash against the investment treaty regime. Moreover, efforts 
to reform BITs have also received attention (Calvert, 2016; see Hindelang and 
Krajewski, 2016; Mysore and Vora, 2016). Studies that have attempted to assess the 
routes discussed above generally tend to argue strongly in favour of voice as a more 
constructive and effective path for States reach their objectives of increasing their 
policy space while minimising the costs entailed (see Gordon and Pohl, 2015; Gwynn, 
2016; Johnson et al., 2018; Katselas, 2014; Lavopa et al., 2013). This recommendation 
is in line with Hirschman’s preference for voice as the most effective option for 
recuperation.  
 93 
One issue, however, that has not been adequately addressed in the literature on BITs 
and the investment treaty regime is why developing countries that have expressed their 
discontent with the regime react differently. Despite the expanding literature on BITs, 
the existing literature on investment treaties and policy space has yet to ‘fully grasp 
the emergent forms of contestation’ (Calvert, 2016, p. 4). As Calvert (2016) argues, 
we know little about the divergence in government approaches towards the investment 
regime, mainly why some countries terminate BITs while others seek to reform them. 
Two studies that have attempted to address this gap either directly or indirectly are 
briefly outlined below, before this section concludes with how this thesis will aim to 
contribute to filling this gap in the literature.  
Calvert (2016) attempted to contribute to filling the gap mentioned above by 
examining how political ideology and State-society relations shape government 
responses to the constraints posed by the investment treaty regime. According to 
Calvert (2016), interest group pressure, domestic economic performance, global 
power politics and investor claims all influence government attitudes towards investor 
rights. However, the importance policy-makers assign to these factors relative to 
public and political interests will vary according to policymakers' normative beliefs 
and State-society relations (Calvert, 2016): decisions to either follow or terminate 
BITs are not products of purely rationalist calculations and are strongly influenced by 
policy-maker perceptions, which are in part subjective. She illustrates this argument 
with a comparative case study analysis of Argentina’s and Ecuador’s reaction to facing 
ISDS claims and expressing their discontent with the regime. According to Calvert’s 
findings, the variation in government approaches, namely Ecuador’s decision to 
terminate BITs and Argentina’s decision to maintain them, stems from ideological 
differences and State-society relations (Calvert, 2016). Ideological differences, which 
reflect their social bases, caused policy-makers to weigh the costs and benefits of BITs 
relative to domestic interests differently. These factors will be considered in the three 
case studies analysed in this thesis.  
The second study was conducted by Koivumaeki (2015a) who analyses the motivating 
factors behind the attempts of countries like Bolivia and Venezuela to evade the 
constraints of the international investment regime, with a particular focus on BITs. 
The findings of Koivumaeki’s research indirectly contribute to the aforementioned 
gap in the literature, as they reveal that the prevailing economic conditions represent 
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a determining factor in the decision of both countries to pursue the route they chose 
(Koivumaeki, 2015b). Koivumaeki’s findings suggest that the decision of Latin 
American countries to exit or attempt to exit84 the investment treaty regime, was part 
of a strategic plan and not solely explained by their leaders’ ideology as commonly 
argued in the literature (Koivumaeki, 2015b, 2015a). The decision to challenge the 
regime was only taken after careful considerations of the economic costs and benefits 
of their actions. As a result of the expected future price increases in oil and gas, the 
Bolivian and Venezuelan governments’ projections indicated that the future gains of 
nationalisation would exceed the costs of arbitration and potential compensation 
(Koivumaeki, 2015a). This thesis draws on Koivumaeki’s hypothesis and research 
when analysing the factors behind Bolivia’s decision to exit the regime in Chapter 7.  
Finally, this thesis aims to contribute to filling the aforementioned gap by going a step 
further then what has been done so far: it undertakes a comparative study of the 
experience of three developing countries that have expressed their discontent with the 
investment treaty regime, yet reacted differently. By conducting such a comparative 
case study analysis, this study provides insights into the factors that determined why 
these three countries chose different routes to deal with similar problems. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated how Hirschman’s framework has been applied to the 
investment treaty regime and why it is useful to categorise different routes adopted by 
developing countries after they express their discontent with the regime in this 
framework. A review of how Hirschman’s framework has been used in the existing 
literature to categorise the different options available to developing countries, 
however, revealed the need to reconceptualise the framework in order to reflect the 
dynamics of the investment regime and the challenges facing developing countries. 
This is the objective of the thesis which proceeds on the basis of careful examination 
of three developing countries’ response to discontent with the investment regime. The 
Hirschman categorisation will then be re-assessed in Chapter 8 as the author sums up 
the empirical findings of the case studies.  
                                               
 
84 In the case of Venezuela, the exit is considered incomplete as the State has denounced the ICSID 
Convention but has only terminated a few of its BITs.  
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In order to understand the different options available to developing countries, it is 
imperative to analyse how and why they joined the regime and why they reacted 
differently. Accordingly, the second half of the chapter focused on how these two 
questions have been addressed in the literature and identified existing theories that will 
serve as building blocks for the analysis of the case studies. These supplement the 
Hirschman framework to understand actual options available to developing countries 
discontent with the investment regime.   
This chapter argues that an eclectic approach can be adopted to explain how and why 
developing countries signed BITs, combining the Bounded Rationality framework 
with the Structural Power framework. The Bounded Rationality framework as adapted 
by Poulsen, is drawn upon to account for how governments did not adopt a careful or 
strategic approach to assessing the benefits and costs of these treaties or to negotiating 
these treaties to ensure they did not conflict with their national policies. The Structural 
Power framework as adapted by Gwynn, on the other hand, can explain the role of 
structural power exercised by different actors (including IFIs, capital-exporting 
countries and the domestic corporate sector) in influencing the decision of each 
government to adopt neoliberal policies that effectively led to the signing of BITs. 
Moreover, as will be demonstrated in the case studies, both of these frameworks will 
also be used to analyse different aspects of the contestation of the regime by 
developing countries.  
Finally, this thesis contributes to filling a gap in the existing literature by accounting 
for the variation in the forms of contestation of the regime by dissatisfied developing 
countries. In Chapter 8, the findings of the case studies will be used to build on some 
of the factors identified in the literature to explain why countries reacted differently 
after expressing their discontent with the investment treaty regime. These factors 
include the ideology of the ruling regime, State-society relations, and strategic 
decision making based on cost-benefit assessments by the State. 
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Chapter 4. Research Questions and Methodology 
  
1. Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research objectives of this thesis and illustrates the research 
methodology employed. Section 2 identifies the three research questions that this 
thesis aims to address using the findings of the comparative case study analysis. 
Section 3 sets out the methodology adopted in this study by explaining the case 
selection process and indicating the primary and secondary sources of research that 
were used to inform the qualitative comparative case study analysis. The strategies 
adopted to identify the interviewees approached for this study are also explained in 
this section. Furthermore, Section 3 outlines the structure of the case studies and 
explains how the theoretical frameworks identified in Chapter 3 are employed in the 
case studies. Finally, Section 4 provides an overview of the three case studies in 
addition to the steps adopted to filter and select the countries for each case study and 
the justifications for the relevance of each country selected. 
2. Research Questions  
The research questions addressed in this thesis are: (1) how and why do developing 
countries sign BITs that constrain their policy space with limited economic benefits? 
(2) What are the factors that drive developing countries to decide on whether to exit, 
use voice, or remain loyal to their BIT commitments? (3) How can Hirschman’s 
framework be reconceptualised to reflect the different routes adopted by developing 
countries in dealing with their dissatisfaction with the international investment 
regime?  
3. Research Design and Methodology  
This thesis employs a qualitative comparative case study analysis drawing on the 
experiences of Egypt, South Africa and Bolivia. These three countries signed BITs as 
part of an economic liberalisation process, yet began to openly criticise the regime 
after realising the extent to which BITs and the ISDS mechanism constrained policy 
space. However, their reactions have differed and each of the case study countries 
adopted a different route in response to their discontent with the investment treaty 
regime. The comparative study draws on two theories from the existing investment 
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treaty literature (the Structural Power and Bounded Rationality theories, as adapted by 
Gwynn and Poulsen respectively) to explain how and why each country joined the 
investment treaty regime and how they eventually contested it. The main contribution 
of this thesis is the analysis of how and why developing countries constrained by BITs 
reacted differently and determining the route available to dissatisfied developing 
countries in practice. The study builds on some of the scholarly contributions to the 
investment treaty literature on factors driving specific reactions of developing 
countries, and assesses the extent to which Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 
framework can reflect different routes taken by developing countries that have vocally 
expressed their discontent with the regime.  
In selecting the case studies, a criterion sampling approach was adopted: the countries 
selected represented each of Hirschman's categories, as discussed in Chapter 3. Bolivia 
represents countries which attempted to exit the regime entirely and was categorised 
as an 'exit' case. South Africa attempted to reform its commitments under the 
investment regime, representing the ‘voice’ route; and Egypt remained loyal to its 
commitments under the regime despite openly contesting it, thus representing the 
‘loyalty’ option. Another important criterion applied in the selection of the cases was 
the extent of the expression of discontent with the regime. While a significant number 
of developing countries have become respondents to ISDS cases and are wary of the 
threat posed by the investment treaty regime, a smaller group have openly contested 
the regime and expressed their intent to either reform or exit their treaties.  
The three cases act as ‘critical incident case studies’, which, according to Patton (1990, 
p. 247), consider the factors that are ‘critical to the success or failure of an activity or 
event and associated outcomes’. Chapter 8 examines the findings of the three case 
studies, identifying the main factors that influenced their respective decisions to take 
different routes and, in so doing, building on contributions by scholars like Calvert 
and Koivumaeki. The three cases also represent the range of reactions by developing 
countries that have publicly expressed their discontent with the regime thus far, and 
hence allows the author to examine how their experience in adopting each route in 
practice compares to the theoretical routes and options for developing countries 
proposed in the existing literature (as demonstrated in Chapter 3). The final outcome 
will be a revised version of Hirschman's framework, reflecting the possible routes 
available for developing countries that are discontent with the investment regime.  
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Each case study traces the process the country has undergone, from signing its BITS, 
to the moment it realised they constrained its policy space and the subsequent 
response. In each study an analysis of the historical process of signing BITs is 
conducted, an overview of the features of the BIT network is outlined, and the events 
that led to the realisation of the extent to which BITs can affect the country's policy 
autonomy (including experience with ISDS cases) is traced. Finally, after analysing 
the factors that determined the route taken by each country, the case studies conclude 
with an assessment of the extent to which the relevant Hirschman category can explain 
the routes adopted by the country. The qualitative analysis for each case study was 
informed by data collected from primary and secondary sources. Semi-structured 
interviews were held with public officials, lawyers, and policy and academic experts 
(see Appendix II). Initially, potential interview participants were identified through 
contacting institutions that were responsible for managing investment treaties and 
defending arbitration cases in each country, as well as officials, practitioners, 
academics and lawyers identified via official documents, legal transcripts, news 
archives and academic and policy publications. 
Further participants were identified using the snowballing technique, which entailed 
requesting references from the initial respondents for other relevant subjects. This 
sampling strategy enabled the author to expand the scope of the participants and access 
participants who were not accessible through the initial strategies. The research 
collected during fieldwork was supplemented with secondary data from academic 
sources as well as reports by multilateral institutions (e.g. UNCTAD) and news 
articles, where relevant.  
The next section briefly outlines the steps adopted to filter and select the countries for 
each case study and the justifications for the relevance of each country selected.  
4. Justifications for Each Country Selected 
Countries were purposively selected on the dependent variable to represent each of 
the categories exit, voice, and loyalty. The steps followed in the case selection 
procedure were:  
1. List all developing countries that have vocally expressed their discontent with 
the investment treaty regime after becoming respondents to ISDS cases. 
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2. Classify countries identified through step 1 on the basis of how they reacted in 
their role as principals into one of Hirschman’s three categories, as defined in 
Chapter 3. 
3. When there were several cases in any category, preference was given to the 
country that was in a more advanced stage in the process. This was in order to 
ensure that there was sufficient scope for data collection through interviews 
and secondary data published on the countries’ experience, in order to address 
the research questions of this thesis.  
4. The language barrier was taken into consideration: only one of the case studies 
entailed the need for translation and accordingly a budget for translation was 
included in the funding received for the fieldwork.  
5. Preliminary research on secondary data available and communication with 
potential interviewees was conducted to ensure that there was sufficient access 
to official documents and interviews to develop each case study.  
The rest of this section explains how each of the case studies selected fit the analytical 
framework adopted in this thesis and also provides the justification for each case, 
along with the sources of information and potential alternative candidates for each 
case study. 
4.1. Bolivia as a Case Study for Exit  
Bolivia’s decision to denounce the ICSID Convention, terminate its BITs and 
introduce a new domestic legal framework as part of an economic transformation that 
entailed a rejection of the neoliberal approach to FDI regulation makes it consistent 
with the definition of exit outlined in Chapter 3. During the neoliberal era which lasted 
for two decades from 1985-2005, the State signed 22 BITs of which 21 were ratified. 
Upon the election of Morales in 2006, Bolivia adopted a new policy agenda that 
entailed reversal of the neoliberal policies adopted by the previous regimes and ending 
the dependency on the Bretton Woods institutions that had a pivotal role in the policy-
making process in Bolivia. This policy shift attracted considerable scholarly attention, 
because of the potential links to other small developing economies, but the 
implications of Bolivia's policy reversal have not yet been wholly unpacked (Molina, 
2013). Between 2006 and 2010, the Morales regime implemented a series of measures 
with the aim of promoting a more inclusive economic development model through 
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increasing the capacity of the State to provide welfare to its citizens. These policies 
included increasing the State’s share of hydrocarbons revenues, a significant rise in 
public investments, and upgrading existing social transfer mechanisms for children 
and the elderly. 
In May 2006, less than a year in office, President Morales renationalised the oil and 
gas production chain. Other nationalisations followed in the energy, mining and 
telecommunications sectors, leading to a surge in investment arbitration cases filed 
against Bolivia. Bolivia was familiar with the ISDS system through the infamous 
Bechtel case85 that was triggered by the failed privatisation of water and sewage 
services in the city of Cochabamba and the subsequent ‘Water War’. In 2007 Bolivia 
became the first State to withdraw from the ICSID Convention, arguing that the widely 
used forum for investor-State dispute settlement was biased towards investors. In line 
with this policy, the 2009 Bolivian Constitution established that domestic investment 
has priority over foreign investment and abandoned the neoliberal norms and 
principles of investment protection embodied in the investment treaty regime. The 
new investment regulation framework introduced by the Constitution subjects foreign 
investors to Bolivian jurisdiction, laws and authorities exclusively. Furthermore, the 
new Constitution prohibits the State from settling investment-related disputes with 
foreign investors in international tribunals. In 2006 Bolivia started to systematically 
refuse to renew each BIT that reached its expiration date before the State collectively 
denounced all of its remaining BITs in 2013.  
Despite the termination of its BITs and its withdrawal from the ICSID Convention, 
Bolivia remains tied to the system for at least another decade or so due to survival 
clauses in the BITs. Since its decision to exit, Bolivia has faced 13 arbitration cases. 
Chapter 5 analyses how and why Bolivia signed its BITs before tracing its experience 
under the investment treaty regime and analysing the factors that motivated its 
decision to exit the regime. Bolivia’s exit process is studied to determine the extent to 
which Hirschman’s theory captures the exit route for developing countries in the 
investment treaty regime.  
The Bolivia case study proceeded on the basis of interviews with government officials 
                                               
 
85 Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia. ICSID, Case No. ARB/02/3. 
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and Ministers involved in the process of reviewing and terminating Bolivia’s BITs, as 
well as State attorneys defending Bolivia in the investment arbitration cases filed 
against them. Former officials, academics and lawyers, as well as representatives of 
chambers (commerce and industry) and international financial institutions were also 
interviewed during two fieldwork trips in 2015 and 2016 to gather information from 
the various stakeholders involved (See Appendix II). During fieldwork, secondary 
data was also collected in the form of published and unpublished documents issued by 
governmental departments on the processes of terminating BITs and the outcomes of 
arbitration cases.  
Finally, Ecuador and Venezuela were two possible alternates to Bolivia as an exit case 
study. However, Bolivia was in a more advanced position regarding the exit process 
compared to its two counterparts, which were either still in the process of exiting at 
the time of this study or had stopped short of a complete exit from the regime. In the 
case of Venezuela, it had denounced the ICSID Convention but had only terminated 
one of its BITs at the time of writing. Ecuador, on the other hand, had denounced the 
ICSID Convention but had only terminated a few of its BITs when this research project 
started. It eventually terminated all of its BITs in 2016 after an internal audit of its 
BITs was conducted. Hence, Bolivia was the most suitable candidate for this category.  
4.2 South Africa as a Case Study for Voice 
As established in Chapter 3, to the best of the author’s knowledge, thus far, developing 
countries that have expressed their discontent with the regime and sought to introduce 
substantial reforms to their BITs have not been able to do so through the traditional 
channels of voice proposed by scholars and practitioners in the existing literature. 
Accordingly, the ‘voice’ case study in this thesis examines the experience of South 
Africa, which sought to introduce substantive reforms to its legal commitments under 
the regime through renegotiating its BITs, before realising it was not a feasible option.  
In the immediate post-Apartheid era (1994-1999), South Africa signed 27 BITs, the 
majority of which were with capital-exporting European countries. Signing these BITs 
was an integral component of the new regime’s policy of opening up the country to 
FDI and was seen as an essential diplomatic signal confirming South Africa's re-entry 
to the international community after years of isolation under Apartheid. In total, South 
Africa signed 49 BITs, only 21 of which entered into force. However, after realising 
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how these treaties constrained their ability to introduce progressive social and 
economic policies, the South African regime sought to change its approach. 
Despite having never signed the ICSID Convention, South Africa has been involved 
in two public ICSID cases. It was the second case however that rang the alarm bells 
for South African officials regarding the threat BITs posed to its transformative 
agenda. In 2007, an Italian investor registered an investment arbitration claim in 
ICSID against South Africa, alleging that the Black Economic Empowerment 
legislation (BEE) amounts to expropriation without adequate compensation. This case 
sparked a three-year comprehensive and public review of investment policy in South 
Africa which was concluded in 2010. The review highlighted the inconsistencies 
between some of the key protection standards in BITs and certain articles in the South 
African Constitution as well as the manner in which the investment rules in these BITs 
posed a constraint on the country’s policy autonomy. After considering the results of 
the review, a series of landmark decisions were taken by the South African 
government. These decisions included amending the current investment regulatory 
framework to ensure that it is consistent with the South African Constitution and 
allows the State to regulate in the public interest. Accordingly, the South African 
government approached its partners to explore the possibility of renegotiating its BITs 
to introduce these reforms. However, when it became apparent that this option was 
not feasible, it notified its treaty partners (mainly capital-exporting countries) that it 
would not be renewing its expiring BITs. South Africa then proceeded with replacing 
its treaties with a domestic legal framework that encapsulated some of the main 
features in the traditional BIT template, yet introduced significant amendments to its 
investment protection model. The fundamental reforms included the exclusion or 
amendment of certain controversial protection standards (e.g. FET) as well as 
replacing the ISDS mechanism with domestic remedies and State-State arbitration.  
South Africa was the first developing country to attempt to re-negotiate its BITs (to 
adopt the voice route, as per Hirschman's theory). Prior to its experience, developing 
countries either made incremental changes to their treaties or decided to attempt to 
exit the regime completely. Despite exiting its BITs, South Africa has maintained a 
neoliberal approach to FDI regulation and retained some of the key principles that 
underpinned the existing investment treaty regime. Furthermore, it has remained 
engaged in multilateral discussions in UNCTAD and UNCITRAL regarding reforms 
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to the investment treaty regime. South African officials have also indicated the 
country’s willingness to sign new BITs using the new South African model BIT as 
reference, as well as to reconsider international investment arbitration if current reform 
proposals are fruitful. Chapter 6 analyses South Africa’s decision to sign BITs and 
traces its experience in the investment treaty regime including its arbitration 
experience and its pioneering review process. The case study assesses the factors that 
led to South Africa’s decision to pursue the voice route through a ‘hybrid’86 tactic. It 
evaluates the extent to which Hirschman’s framework can be used to reflect the route 
taken by South Africa and other developing countries that are attempting to introduce 
substantial reforms to their commitments under the existing investment treaty regime.  
South African authorities and particularly the Department for Trade and Industry 
(DTI) have generally ensured that the review of its BITs and the subsequent policy 
measures (including non-renewal of existing BITs and new legislation) were 
conducted in a public and transparent manner. Consequently, out of the three case 
studies, South Africa was the case that had the greatest amount of accessible 
information, particularly regarding its experience with the investment treaty regime 
from the review process onwards. However, the same cannot be said concerning public 
documentation of the process of signing BITs; hence, for this phase, the study relies 
on secondary research from scholars who have studied South Africa’s experience in 
signing BITs in addition to semi-structured interviews with policy officials.  
The sources for the rest of the case study include data collected from semi-structured 
interviews with policy officials involved in the review process and in developing the 
new investment regulation framework conducted during three fieldwork visits in 2014, 
2015 and 2016. Interviews were also conducted with academics, lawyers, civil society 
representatives and stakeholders representing some of the main capital-exporting 
treaty partners (including officials from chambers of commerce and diplomats). These 
interviews listed in Appendix II were supplemented with secondary data collected 
from reports by public institutions (e.g. DTI), civil society organisations, and 
stakeholder reports by bodies representing the capital-exporting treaty partners in 
consultations conducted by the South African government.  
                                               
 
86 Combining both exit and voice tactics. See Langford et al. (2018) 
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It is important to note that important interviews and material collected for this case 
study took place in a fieldwork trip in July-August 2014 during the author’s placement 
as a research associate at the Global Economic Governance programme (GEG) at 
Oxford University, as part of a Masters degree programme. The material collected was 
used in a working paper that was drafted by the author of this thesis and published by 
GEG in 2015 after the author had started his PhD programme. This paper is frequently 
cited in Chapter 6.  
India and Indonesia would have been two possible alternatives to South Africa as case 
studies for the voice route. Both have expressed their discontent with the unbalanced 
nature of the investment treaty regime, which protects investors at the expense of the 
host State’s ability to regulate. Although at different stages of the process, both 
countries have reviewed their existing BITs and decided to replace their existing BITs 
with treaties that would be negotiated based on new model BITs. As is the case with 
Bolivia, South Africa was considered a better choice for this case study because both 
India and Indonesia were at a much earlier stage of their respective processes when 
this project started.  
4.3 Egypt as a Case Study for Loyalty  
Egypt represents a rare case in the developing world for a country that has publicly 
condemned the investment treaty regime: despite conducting more than one internal 
BIT review and developing a few model BITs, it has maintained the status quo by not 
only retaining its existing BITs, but also codifying the controversial clauses in these 
existing BITs in its new investment legislation over the past few years.  
Egypt has concluded more than 100 BITs in total, 72 of which entered into force. 
Despite being a capital importer, Egypt ranks seventh worldwide regarding the 
number of BITs signed according to UNCTAD,87 behind major capital-exporting 
countries such as Germany, China, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and France. 
Egypt has also faced a total of 33 investment arbitration cases, placing it among the 
top five countries in the world concerning the number of arbitration cases faced as a 
                                               
 
87  See UNCTAD. International Investment Agreements Navigator. Available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/ (Accessed 2 July 2017). 
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respondent.88  
In the aftermath of the January 25th revolution in 2011, a series of judicial verdicts 
rescinded privatisation deals as well as the sale of public assets (e.g. land) to investors, 
on corruption grounds. These verdicts, along with other measures aimed at redressing 
the corruption legacy of the Mubarak regime and addressing socio-economic 
inequality levels in Egypt, triggered a wave of investment arbitration cases. After 
conducting an internal BIT review in 2006, the Egyptian government concluded that 
the costs of its membership in the regime had outweighed the benefits it received thus 
far. Post-2011, Egyptian officials have vocally criticised the investment treaty regime 
and called for reforms to Egypt’s BITs to balance investor rights with the rights of the 
host State to regulate. Nevertheless, despite regularly voicing its intentions to reform 
its BITs in UNCTAD forums and issuing more than one model BIT in the past decade 
(albeit with incremental changes only), the State has refrained from either exiting the 
regime or amending its existing BITs. Notwithstanding the growing awareness 
globally of the threats posed by BITs and corresponding efforts to reform these treaties 
by an increasing number of developing and developed countries, Egypt has remained 
reluctant to introduce substantial reforms to its existing investment protection model. 
Instead, successive governments post-2011 have not only remained loyal to these BITs 
but have also ensured new domestic legislation is consistent with the protection 
standards offered in these BITs.  
Chapter 7 traces Egypt’s experience with the investment treaty regime. It analyses the 
historical process that led to the signing of BITs and joining the regime, as well as the 
factors that led to the State’s decision to maintain the status quo, despite being one of 
the top respondents to ISDS cases in the world and publicly expressing its discontent 
with the regime. Finally, the case study concludes with an assessment of whether 
Hirschman’s conceptualisation of loyalty reflects the route taken by the Egyptian 
regime.  
Out of the three case studies, Egypt was the most difficult in terms of accessing data 
on the policy adopted towards investment treaties and getting the consent of officials 
for interviews. A significant number of the interviews conducted with officials in the 
                                               
 
88  See UNCTAD. International Dispute Settlement Navigator. Available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (Accessed 2 July 2017). 
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departments responsible for managing Egypt’s international economic agreements 
(General Authority for Investment and Free Zone and the Ministry of Investment 
(GAFI)) or defending the State in arbitration cases (Egypt State Law Authority 
(ESLA)) were done an on an informal basis. Nevertheless, sufficient data has been 
collected on Egypt’s experience in the investment treaty regime to answer the research 
questions addressed in this thesis. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
State officials, international experts from multilateral institutions, and Egyptian 
arbitrators and lawyers (see Appendix II). These interviews were supplemented with 
secondary data from government documents, scholarly publications and reports by 
multilateral institutions like UNCTAD.  
Finally, while the majority of developing countries that have faced several arbitration 
cases have maintained the status quo, once they have publicly criticised the regime 
and indicated their intention to contest the regime they have usually taken either of the 
two previously discussed routes. Egypt is one of the exceptional cases in which a 
country has vocally expressed its discontent with the regime and signalled its intent to 
reform its BITs yet eventually settled for incremental changes and retained its existing 
BITs. The closest example to the Egyptian case is the Argentinian experience under 
the Kirchners’ administrations. Argentina is ranked as the country that has faced the 
highest number of arbitration cases as a respondent in the world. More than half of the 
cases that have been filed by investors against the State were triggered by emergency 
measures adopted during a severe financial crisis that hit the country at the beginning 
of the new millennium. The regime was vocal in its criticism of the constraints BITs 
and the ISDS mechanism imposed on its sovereignty to manage its economic crisis. 
However, despite calls by legislators and officials to exit the regime or amend existing 
treaties, both Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Kirchner maintained the status quo. Hence, 
in its role as a principal in the investment treaty regime, Argentina displayed the same 
kind of ‘loyalty’ demonstrated by the Egyptian regime, by refraining from replacing 
its existing BITs or withdrawing from the ICSID Convention. However, unlike their 
Egyptian counterpart, Argentina contested the regime in its role as a litigant, as 
Cristina Kirchner’s government initially refused to comply with several awards 
rendered by arbitration tribunals against the State. Hence, while Argentina could have 
been used as a case study for ‘loyalty’, considering this thesis is only focusing on the 
reaction of developing countries as principals, Egypt represented a more convincing 
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case given its compliance to the regime in its different roles, be it as a principal or 
litigant.  
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated the research methodology adopted in this thesis and the 
research objectives of the comparative case study analysis that will be conducted in 
the next three chapters. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 of this thesis will provide a detailed 
analysis of the experience of Bolivia, South Africa and Egypt with the investment 
treaty regime. The findings of these case studies will be used in Chapter 8 to address 
the research questions outlined above.
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Chapter 5. Exit: A Bolivian Case Study  
1. Introduction 
In May 2007, Bolivia became the first country to denounce the ICSID Convention. 
Bolivia proceeded to terminate all of its BITs, initiating a backlash against the 
investment treaty regime amongst developing countries. Unlike its counterpart South 
Africa, Bolivia's decision to terminate its BITs was not an effort to introduce reform 
to the investment treaty regime. Instead, Bolivia replaced its BITs with a new domestic 
legal framework that rejected the main principles of the regime by prioritising 
domestic over foreign investment and empowering the State to play a more prominent 
role in regulating FDI. When Bolivia decided to terminate its BITs, investment treaty 
terminations were very infrequent, due to the uncertainty and potential economic costs 
associated with the exit route. Accordingly, Bolivia's experience becomes a critical 
case study as it represents a rare example of a developing country that has decided to 
exit the regime. This chapter offers an in-depth study of Bolivia's experience with the 
investment treaty regime, tracing the process the country has undergone from joining 
the regime, to realising the extent to which its membership of the regime constrained 
its policy space, and the subsequent response.  
Considering that Bolivia’s experience is still a work in progress, this case study does 
not aim to assess the effectiveness of Bolivia’s decision to exit the regime. Instead, 
the objective of this case study is to analyse how Bolivia signed its BITs and the factors 
that determined why Bolivia proceeded with the exit route. To explain how and why 
Bolivia signed its BITs an eclectic approach is adopted, combining two theories from 
the existing literature on BITs. The Structural Power framework is deployed to justify 
why Bolivia joined the in investment treaty regime by signing BITs, despite 
historically rejecting some of the key investment rules in these BITs in multilateral 
forums, while the Bounded Rationality framework is used to explain why Bolivia only 
realised the potency of its BITs after facing its first arbitration claim. Concerning 
Bolivia’s reaction to its discontent with the regime, this chapter finds that ideological 
motives of the regime had a definite influence on the government’s preference for the 
reversal of existing neoliberal policies and exiting the investment treaty regime. 
However, the determining factors in Bolivia’s decision to proceed with its 
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nationalisation programme and exit the regime were structural power dynamics 
influenced by the upturn in its economic fortunes and the outcome of a cost-benefit 
assessment conducted by the government. The favourable economic conditions 
resulted in a shift in structural power dynamics in favour of the State and enabled it 
confront its creditors and capital exporting partners with its decision to exit the regime. 
Furthermore, the State proceeded with its decision to nationalise the country’s 
strategic sectors and exit the regime after it was satisfied by the assessments which 
concluded that the benefits outweighed the costs.  
Based on the findings of this case study, Hirschman's conceptualisation of exit will be 
revised in Chapter 8 to reflect the complicated nature of exit in the investment treaty 
regime and also to capture the conditions in which exit might be considered feasible 
for developing countries.  
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the historical economic 
and political context in which Bolivia signed its BITs and provides an overview of the 
key provisions in Bolivia’s BITs. Section 3 conducts an appraisal of Bolivia’s BIT 
signing process. After analysing how Bolivia developed its BIT network, Section 4 
addresses the factors that triggered Bolivia’s decision to reverse the neoliberal policies 
in place and revise its membership of the investment treaty regime (including its first 
investment treaty arbitration case). Section 5 traces Bolivia’s exit from the investment 
treaty regime and the context in which the exit occurred. Section 6 analyses the 
potential factors that motivated Bolivia’s decision to exit the regime. Finally, Section 
7 concludes the chapter by arguing that Hirschman's conceptualisation of exit needs 
to be revised to take into account the dynamics of the investment treaty regime.  
2. Historical Context of the BIT Signing Process  
This section documents how the global recession combined with the commodity bust 
and the resulting debt crisis, led Bolivia to resort to IFIs like the World Bank and the 
IMF as well as major capital-exporting countries for funding. Foreign investment 
liberalisation was a core component of the neoliberal economic reform programme 
that Bolivia had to implement as part of the conditionalities dictated by its creditors. 
It was in this context that Bolivia signed BITs and joined the investment treaty regime. 
The section concludes with an overview of the main features of Bolivia’s BITs. 
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2.1 Build up to the Crisis and Bolivia's Turn to Neoliberalism 
Towards the end of the 1970s, the Bolivian economy experienced a steep decline that 
almost led to a total collapse by the mid-1980s. This economic bust occurred 
unexpectedly on the back of the boom years of the previous decade (Jorgensen, 1992). 
The failure to undergo any structural transformation meant Bolivia's economic growth 
and development relied on volatile factors such as commodity prices and the state of 
the global economy. Under President Hugo Banzer (1971-1978), both the fiscal deficit 
and current account deficit widened, and Bolivia had to rely on external funding to 
finance these deficits and provide macroeconomic stability (Kehoe and 
Machiado,2014). As a result, external debt increased by c. 1.5 billion USD during the 
period between 1971-1978 (World Bank, 1992), compared to an increase of c. 340 
million USD in the previous decade (1960-1970) (Kehoe and Machiado, 2014). The 
fragility of Bolivia's economic and political system was exposed in 1978, the year that 
marked the beginning of a four year period of intense political instability, during which 
seven military and two civil governments took office (Sachs and Morales, 1989; Spatz, 
2006).  
The economic difficulties resulting from the inability to raise enough external funding 
due to the global recessions in the 1980s were exacerbated by the steep decline in 
commodity prices and the significant rise in interest on loans (which had a significant 
impact on the size of the existing debt). As economic conditions were deteriorating 
both domestically and globally, commercial banks stopped lending to Bolivia and 
negotiated an emergency rescheduling agreement, which Bolivia defaulted on shortly 
after it was signed. Lending from the international community was also halted except 
for two loans that came from the Argentinian government (Sachs and Morales, 1989).  
All of these factors placed Bolivia’s economy in peril. The significant decline in both 
sources of income, coupled with the governments’ inability to raise sufficient fiscal 
revenue, led the government to resort to seigniorage (printing more money) in order 
to finance its widening fiscal deficit (Sachs, 1986). By 1985, Bolivia was experiencing 
the most severe economic crisis of its history (Kehoe and Machiado, 2014), suffering 
from hyperinflation and a debt crisis. The Bolivian economy was in a precarious 
position, inflation had reached c. 24000 per cent, GDP per capita had fallen by more 
than a fifth since 1980, and fiscal deficits reached 25 per cent of GDP (Jorgensen, 
1992). The political and social situation reached its nadir as shortages were widespread 
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and popular discontent was threatening the peace of La Paz and other major cities 
(Jorgensen, 1992). One of the consequences of hyperinflation was Bolivia’s inability 
to service its external debt. Payments to all international creditors, both public and 
private, were in arrears by 1985 and payments internally to various creditors were also 
in default (Sachs and Morales, 1989) 
With the economy on the verge of collapse elections were called in 1985 by the Siles 
Zuazo government. Less than a month after being elected, President Paz Estenssoro 
initiated a comprehensive stabilisation and Structural Adjustment Programme under 
the name of the New Economic Policy (NEP). The NEP was introduced in an attempt 
to resolve the twin crises by implementing structural reforms to reduce inflation and 
generate foreign resources. Launched through Supreme Decree No. 21060 of 1985, 
which was promulgated by President Estenssoro, the structural reforms stipulated in 
the NEP represented a fundamental change in Bolivia’s economic ideology, ushering 
in the neoliberal economic model that was sweeping Latin America at the time. The 
structural reforms were framed in line with the Washington Consensus model and 
aimed to transform the economy from a State-led economy to a free market economy 
by deregulating product and factor markets, liberalising trade and FDI regimes, 
privatising public companies and floating the local currency, amongst other reforms. 
The NEP was described as ‘South America's second most radical neoliberal 
restructuring programme (after Chile)’ (Kohl and Farthing, 2006, p. 60). 
The Bolivian government claimed that by adopting an aggressive combination of 
austerity and liberalisation measures it aimed to control inflation and reduce the 
deficits (Aguirre, 2010; Kohl and Farthing, 2006). However, by incorporating these 
neoliberal policies in the NEP and adopting them, the Bolivian government also had 
the explicit intention of regaining the support of the IMF, World Bank, Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB) and the United States (Kohl and Farthing, 2006).89 While 
these actors played a significant role in bailing the Bolivian economy out of the debt 
crisis, their intervention marked the beginning of a phase in which they exercised 
substantial influence on Bolivia’s economic policy-making process. This phase lasted 
for two decades and ended with the election of President Evo Morales in 2005.  
                                               
 
89 These institutions had halted their activities in Bolivia during President Suazo's term (1982–85) (Kohl 
and Farthing, 2006). 
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The SAP adopted under the umbrella of the NEP was described as a ‘shock and awe’ 
strategy, which would help Bolivia restore ‘business confidence’ by regaining 
credibility among IFIs and bilateral donors (Conaghan et al., 1994; Dunkerley, 1990; 
Sachs and Morales, 1989). In March 1986, the Estenssoro government achieved its 
objective of ‘international legitimacy’ when the IMF approved the structural reforms 
planned, and soon after the World Bank and IADB followed suit (Kohl and Farthing, 
2006). The next section focuses on one of the main conditionalities Bolivia had to 
satisfy in order to receive credit from the IFIs; this pertained to liberalisation of the 
FDI regime.  
2.2 Liberalisation of the FDI Regime  
The SAP adopted under the Estenssoro government in the form of the NEP helped 
stabilise the economy and reduce internal and external imbalances (World Bank, 
1991). Inflation was brought down to 16 per cent on average during the period between 
1987 and 1990, and the fiscal deficit was reduced to 3.3 per cent of GDP in 1990 
(World Bank, 1991, p. i). As a reward for adopting these neoliberal reforms, Bolivia 
managed to negotiate two Paris Club deals in 1986 and 1988 which led to a 
rescheduling of about 710 million USD of debt service payments in arrears (World 
Bank, 1991, p. 7). Bolivia also managed to repurchase approximately two-thirds of its 
commercial bank debt at 11 cents to the dollar, using funds provided by official donors 
(World Bank, 1991, p. 7).  
Nevertheless, while stabilisation was achieved, growth was sluggish (below three per 
cent on average between 1987-1990) and failed to keep up with the population growth 
rate (World Bank, 1991). The reforms also failed to induce private investments which 
were considered as the principal objective of the NEP. According to the World Bank, 
‘the structural adjustment programme enacted was based on the presumption that the 
private sector would act as the main engine of growth in the reactivation of the 
economy’ (World Bank, 1991, p. iii). The Bank claimed that there were two main 
factors that could explain Bolivia's disappointing performance in attracting private 
investment to support higher economic growth. First, public enterprises dominated 
key sectors of the economy that presented strong growth potential (e.g. hydrocarbons, 
telecommunications, electricity, mining and transport). Second, Bolivia lacked an 
institutional framework to ensure private agents clarity, predictability, and 
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enforceability of the legal and regulatory principles governing their activities (World 
Bank, 1995, p. 1). 
Considering the scarcity of capital in Bolivia, IFIs (the World Bank in particular) 
exercised their leverage by applying pressure on President Jamie Zamora’s 
government to implement further reforms (Tsolakis, 2009). This included deeper 
investment liberalisation. These reforms targeted removing obstacles for foreign 
investment and privatising public sector companies. In addition to investment 
incentives, measures to change the legal framework governing investment in Bolivia 
were demanded by the creditors to provide greater protection to foreign investors and 
limit regulation by the government. The Bolivian government complied with these 
demands as President Zamora issued Supreme Decree No. 22407 of 1990, which had 
been in the works for some time. Chapter IV of the Decree offered broad assurances 
to private investments by national and foreign investors. It also guaranteed that foreign 
and national investors would enjoy equal rights and treatment, be subject to the same 
fiscal duties, enjoy property rights and face no restrictions on capital transfer. The 
Zamora government followed up that Decree with three new pieces of legislation as 
part of its efforts to attract foreign investors. These legislations were the new 
Investment Law (Law No. 1182 of 1990), in addition to Hydrocarbons and Mining 
laws which opened SOEs to private capital (Tsolakis, 2009). This wave of legislation 
and measures adopted was described as a deep process of liberalisation of the economy 
(Aguirre, 2010).  
The new Investment Law, in particular, was a significant turning point in Bolivia's 
economic transformation, as it represented the adoption of the investment protection 
rules that it had resisted for decades. A more detailed background on the history of 
Bolivia’s resistance of these investment protection standards is provided in Section 3. 
The Investment Law was in line with the neoliberal transformation of the Bolivian 
economy as it followed some of the fundamental tenants of the Washington Consensus 
model. The Law guaranteed equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors, placed 
no restriction on repatriation of profits, provided for full payment in the case of 
expropriation and included settlement mechanisms for cross-border commercial and 
investment disputes including international arbitration (Spatz, 2006). The Investment 
Law also guaranteed the unimpeded repatriation of profits, the free convertibility of 
currency and free import and export of goods, services and capital (Spatz, 2006). The 
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introduction of the Law was lauded by IFIs who praised the replacement of investment 
incentives with measures to improve the legal framework governing foreign 
investment in Bolivia. The World Bank praised the government for issuing the new 
Investment Law, stating that by providing legislative sanction for ‘internationally 
accepted investment rules the Investment Law finally eliminated the important 
investment impediment of legal uncertainty’ (World Bank, 1991, p. 11).  
The Investment Law was complemented domestically by the Arbitration and 
Conciliation Law No. 1770 of 1997. The Arbitration Law was based on the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law (1985 
version) and governed the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
generally (Aguirre, 2014). The Arbitration Law stipulated that foreign arbitral awards 
shall be recognised and enforced in Bolivia in accordance with the New York and 
Panama Conventions (Aguirre, 2014). On the international level, Bolivia committed 
to BITs and Multilateral Agreements that followed the same approach of further 
liberalising the investment regime. Bolivia signed multilateral investment agreements 
with agencies such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) (Spatz, 2006). As a member of the 
Andean Community,90 Bolivia approved a foreign investment regime known as the 
Common Regime on the Treatment of Foreign Capital (Aguirre, 2012). Decision No. 
291 of 1991 issued by the Commission of the Andean Community provided a liberal 
general policy framework that was in line with the approach adopted in the Bolivian 
Investment Law (Aguirre, 2012).  
The signing of BITs which is the primary focus of this chapter was an integral 
component of the regulatory system that was required to provide the foreign 
investment guarantees demanded by the IFIs. Supreme Decree No. 22626 of 1990, 
issued by President Zamora, stated that BITs which were signed during the President’s 
official visits to Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg, as well as Italy were in adherence 
with Article 7 of the Investment Law. Article 7 of the Law stipulated that foreign 
investment shall be granted further protection through bilateral or multilateral 
instruments to be signed by the Bolivian government.91  This Decree marked the 
                                               
 
90 The Andean Community is composed of Bolivia, Perú, Ecuador, and Colombia. 
91 Investment Law No. 1182, 17 September 1990, Official Gazette of Bolivia. 
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beginning of the expansion of Bolivia’s BITs network as it revealed that it was an 
integral part of the new investment framework. The Decree also granted authorisation 
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs to sign the US BIT and to formalise Bolivia’s 
accession to the ICSID Convention (both of which were finalised and ratified several 
years later). 
In addition to the investment protection legislation and agreements, Bolivia was under 
immense pressure from the Bretton Woods institutions to privatise key public sector 
institutions. Accordingly, Bolivia embarked on a wide-ranging privatisation 
programme of State companies and ventures. This programme was facilitated through 
the enactment of a Privatisation Law in April 1992 and the Capitalisation Law of 
March 1994,92 both of which were part of the conditionalities imposed by the creditors 
(Aguirre, 2010; Spatz, 2006). The Privatisation Law provided the regulations for the 
disposal of public companies and other State-owned assets, which resulted in the 
privatisation of 81 small and medium-sized companies for a total of 279 million USD 
(Antelo, 2000; Spatz, 2006). The Capitalisation Law was introduced to expand the 
scope of the privatisation process and accelerate it (Spatz, 2006). It did so by 
facilitating the privatisation of six major State monopolies over the following few 
years. These include ENDE (electricity), ENFE (railway), ENTEL 
(telecommunications), Fundidora de Vinto (mining), LAB (airlines), and YPFB 
(hydrocarbons) (Spatz, 2006).  
These privatisations were vital because they proved to be the main destination for FDI 
as demonstrated in Figure 8 below. Indeed, the privatisations were deemed to be more 
effective than any of the efforts to attract FDI including the laws and agreements that 
liberalised the Bolivian economy (Nina and te Velde, 2003). More significantly, the 
privatisation process was a crucial landmark in recent Bolivian history as it is widely 
considered as one of the main triggers for the emergence of protest movements that 
surfaced in 2000 (Arsel et al., 2014). These protests and the social unrest that followed 
led to a regime change and the revision of the neoliberal model which included 
reversing the liberalisation of FDI regulations and effectively led to the termination of 
BITs as well as the denunciation of the ICSID Convention (see below). 
                                               
 
92 Law No. 1330, 24 April 1992, Official Gazette of Bolivia; Law No 1544, 21 March 1994, Official 
Gazette of Bolivia. 
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Figure 8: FDI inflows in Bolivia (as a percentage of GDP) with and without 
investments directed towards Capitalised Enterprises (CEs) 
 
 
Source: Nina and te Velde (2003) using data from Central Bank and Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Investment of Bolivia. 
 
Having described the context in which Bolivia joined the investment treaty regime, 
the next section provides a brief overview of the main features of Bolivia’s BITs. 
2.3 Overview of Bolivia’s BITs 
Bolivia signed its first BIT with Germany, on March 23, 1987, and continued to sign 
BITs with other countries until 2002. In total the Bolivian State signed 22 BITs, of 
which 21 were ratified. In 1991, Bolivia signed the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID 
Convention) which came into force in 1995. Surveying the content of Bolivia's BITs, 
it comes as no surprise that they are generally consistent with the protection clauses 
that were stipulated in the Investment Law No. 1182 of 1990 (discussed above). This 
is mainly because most of Bolivia's BITs were based on templates provided by its 
capital-exporting partners. All of Bolivia's BITs were signed during the neoliberal era 
(See Appendix III for list of Bolivian BITs). 
A summary of the key provisions in Bolivia’s BITs is provided below:  
• All of Bolivia’s BITs provide protection for both direct and indirect 
expropriation. These measures can only take place if required for public 
need/purpose, on a non-discrimination basis and if prompt adequate and 
effective compensation is provided.  
• The majority of Bolivia's BITs provide an expansive definition of investment 
with virtually no restrictions. ‘Investment’ is generally defined as any type of 
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asset including personal or real property, equity shares, credits in cash, 
royalties, contractual rights, and concessions. 
• All of Bolivia's BITs recognise investors’ right to both NT and MFN standards 
of protection.  
• Most of Bolivia's BITs guarantee FET to foreign investors. In the majority of 
these BITs, the FET clause is unqualified and provides that the State will not 
in any way impair (through arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory 
measures) the management, maintenance, use enjoyment or disposal of 
investments of the other contracting party. 
• The majority of Bolivia’s BITs provide investors with full protection and 
security and guarantee the right of free transfer of capital investments and 
profits.  
• All of Bolivia’s BITs contain the ISDS provision. The vast majority of these 
BITs allow investors to submit arbitration claims to ICSID. In general, dispute 
settlement provisions in Bolivia's BITs provide that the investor and the host 
State should first attempt to resolve their dispute by consultation or other 
amicable means within a term of six months (cooling period). Notably, none 
of Bolivia’s BITs require the exhaustion of domestic remedies before investors 
can turn to international arbitration.  
• The majority of Bolivia’s BITs have an initial ten-year duration, and in most 
cases, they can be extended thereafter for an indefinite period of time if neither 
party decides not to renew the treaty. All of Bolivia’s BITs contain survival 
clauses which extend treaty protections for existing investors for another 10 
years (in most treaties) beyond the date of termination. 
Before addressing how Bolivia realised the extent to which BITs can constrain its 
policy space, Section 3 analyses how and why Bolivia signed its BITs.  
3. An Appraisal of Bolivia’s BIT Signing Process 
As is the case with Egypt and South Africa, there is little if any documentation 
available on how Bolivia's BITs were signed. The similarities between Bolivia's BIT 
signing experience and that of its counterparts do not end there, as its approach to 
signing and processing its BITs reflects the same trends found in the two other case 
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studies in this thesis. Like its counterparts, Bolivia signed its BITs without a prior 
assessment of the costs and benefits of these treaties and with minimal negotiation 
regarding the contents of these BITs. Moreover, Bolivia also only started to take BITs 
seriously and to restrict the signing of new BITs once it was hit with an investment 
treaty arbitration case. However, due to its history with investment protection rules, 
Bolivia's experience in signing BITs has more in common with the Egyptian 
experience than it does with the South African. Bolivia was part of the Latin American 
block that had fiercely resisted the investment protection standards promoted by the 
capital-exporting countries in the West during the 1960s and 1970s. The State 
eventually agreed to these protection standards when it began to sign BITs on the back 
of a severe economic crisis, and in the context of converting to the neoliberal economic 
model under pressure from IFIs (as demonstrated above). 
In line with the methodology used in the two other case studies, this section adopts an 
eclectic approach to explain how and why Bolivia signed its BITs. Poulsen's 
hypothesis on the bounded rational behaviour of governments will be used to explain 
the trends in Bolivia's approach to signing BITs. Gwynn's adaptation of the Structural 
Power framework is deployed to explain why Bolivia signed BITs that included the 
very same investment rules that it rejected in multilateral forums both before and after 
it signed BITs.  
3.1 Analysing Bolivia’s Approach to Signing BITs through the Bounded 
Rationality Lens 
According to Poulsen (2017), while developing countries signed BITs with the 
expectation that they would help to attract FDI inflows, the manner in which these 
BITs were adopted seems less rational than often portrayed in the existing literature. 
Poulsen’s findings (discussed in Chapter 3) are consistent with some of the key themes 
deduced from Bolivia's approach to signing and processing its BITs. Firstly, it can be 
argued that the Bolivian regime wanted to believe that BITs would unlock FDI, as 
proposed by multilateral institutions like UNCTAD and the World Bank as well as the 
capital-exporting countries promoting these treaties. As discussed above, Bolivian 
officials were desperate to attract capital inflows on the back of the debt crisis. 
Accordingly, the context in which these BITs were signed could help explain why 
these officials signed BITs without a thorough assessment of the benefits and costs of 
these treaties and with minimal negotiation. A former Bolivian Diplomat, Julio 
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Aguilar, who took on different positions – including as an ambassador and the Vice 
Minister for International Trade – during his diplomatic career, which spanned from 
1986 to 2006, is quoted stating that ‘1985 was the beginning of the (neoliberal) shock 
therapy in Bolivia. There was no investment, and the mines were closing, so we had 
to reactivate production. This was the context in which the treaties were signed. There 
was no debate whatsoever’ (cited in Koivumaeki, 2015a, p. 109). Aguilar elaborated 
that ‘since the productive sector was unable to re-start itself after the economic crisis 
and the structural reforms, politicians and technocrats wanted to attract new 
investment and, as a consequence, they did not question the treaties … the treaties 
faced little to no opposition’ (cited in Koivumaeki, 2015b, p. 140). The former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Javier Murillo, also confirmed this view as he noted that, 
due to Bolivia’s history with nationalisations in the mining and hydrocarbons sector, 
a degree of distrust existed among investors and further incentivised politicians to sign 
the treaties (cited in Koivumaeki, 2015b, p. 140).  
These statements are in line with Poulsen's argument that ‘bounded rational 
governments’ would find the claim regarding the efficacy of BITs important for their 
adoption (Poulsen, 2014, p. 8). According to Poulsen, the trend was for governments 
in developing countries to take ‘inferential shortcuts’ (Poulsen, 2014, p. 8) based on 
the benefits of signing BITs that were being promoted by the IFIs. This is likely to 
have led to overestimating the benefits of BITs.  
In Bolivia's case, there was clearly no specific body that was responsible for managing 
BITs, which were mainly signed by Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, BITs 
were not being adequately analysed or evaluated by Congress. A report published by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Congress in 1995 revealed that during 
the period between 1978-1994, in which Bolivia experienced political and economic 
instability, laws and international agreements were approved in an expedited manner, 
due to the short duration of the Congressional sessions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and National Congress, 1995). Consequently, a large number of international 
agreements were approved without detailed discussion or assessment of their contents 
(Luna, 2017). It is worth noting that around 13 of Bolivia's 21 ratified BITs were 
signed between 1987 and 1994. During that period the executive branch dominated 
the legislative bodies which implied that bodies like the Congress played more of a 
reactionary role. Although the National Congress's foreign policy prerogatives at the 
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time primarily entailed its power to approve all treaties, accords, and international 
agreements, this authority or practice, however, was not always respected, particularly 
in the late 1980s (US Library of Congress, 1989). 
The second observation on Bolivia's experience is consistent with Poulsen's argument 
that developing countries began adopting BITs because they were presented by their 
capital-exporting partners as readily ‘available’ policy blueprints to attract foreign 
investment. In addition to failing to thoroughly assess these treaties before signing 
them, it is also clear that the Bolivian government did not have a model of its own and 
that BITs were based on blueprints developed by the capital-exporting countries. As 
revealed in Decree No. 22626 of 1990,93 the President at the time was signing BITs 
during diplomatic visits to European countries to promote the new Investment Law 
and framework. The consistency in the protection standards included across Bolivia’s 
BITs, as demonstrated in Section 2.3 above, further strengthens the case for assuming 
that there was minimal negotiation or input from the Bolivian side.  
Thirdly, as argued by Poulsen, developing country officials only realised the potency 
of BITs when the country faced a claim itself. In interview, the Deputy Attorney 
General revealed that while Bolivia might have been aware of the concession it was 
making by allowing investors to resort to international arbitration, officials did not 
realise the extent of the power that these treaties afforded investors. It was only after 
the first investor-State dispute, which took place in the aftermath of the Water War in 
2001, that the Bolivian government grasped the threats posed by these BITs (Interview 
with Pablo Menacho, 2015). Only one BIT was signed after that case was registered, 
the Costa Rica BIT, and it never entered into force. This experience, which is covered 
in more detail in Section 4 below, forced Bolivian officials to take these BITs more 
seriously when they developed their strategy for economic and social reform post-
2005.  
As demonstrated in this section, Bolivia’s approach to signing BITs is consistent with 
Poulsen’s theory on how developing countries processed their BITs displaying 
bounded rational behaviour. However, the question of why Bolivia accepted the same 
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investment rules in its BITs that it had resisted in multilateral forums for decades 
remains unanswered. The next section first documents Bolivian and Latin American 
history in rejecting investment protection rules promoted by capital-exporting 
countries, before explaining how Gwynn’s adaptation of the Structural Power theory 
is useful to explain the dichotomy in Bolivia’s stance towards investment protection 
rules in bilateral and multilateral settings.  
3.2 Explaining Bolivia’s Paradoxical Behaviour using the Structural 
Power Framework  
3.2.1 Bolivian and Latin American History with Investment Protection Rules  
In 1868, Carlos Calvo, an Argentine diplomat and legal scholar, introduced the Calvo 
Doctrine when arguing for policies to ensure State sovereignty. The doctrine is 
primarily based on the following propositions (Calvo, 1896; Garcia-Mora, 1950, p. 
206):  
1) Equality, sovereignty and independence are paramount rights of the States;  
2) States, being equal, sovereign and independent, have the right to expect non-
interference from other States, and finally;  
3) Aliens have to abide by the local law of the State wherein they reside 
without invoking diplomatic protection of their governments in the prosecution 
of claims arising out of contracts, insurrection, civil war or mob violence. 
 
Under this doctrine, no foreign investor should expect greater protection and treatment 
than that given to nationals of the host State. Furthermore, investors should submit 
their disputes directly to the host State's domestic legal system and not be accorded 
protection by foreign powers. Many countries in Latin America have adopted these 
doctrines as a means of protecting their interests. Accordingly, it became State practice 
to include provisions obliging a foreign party to submit its dispute to local courts in 
relevant treaties or legislation (Gwynn, 2016). These clauses have been referred to as 
‘Calvo Clauses’. Since 1886, several Latin American States have incorporated Calvo 
Clauses into their constitutions. Bolivia, for instance, had a Calvo Clause in Article 18 
of the 1948 Constitution (Fitzgibbon Russell H., 1948, p. 35) : 
Foreign subjects and enterprises are, in respect to property, in the same position 
as Bolivians, and can in no case plead an exceptional situation or appeal 
through diplomatic channels unless in case of a denial of justice.  
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The next significant development in the region occurred in 1938, when, due to a 
dispute between the governments of the United States and Mexico, the Hull principle 
rose to prominence. Cordell Hull, then US Secretary of State, issued a letter to the 
Mexican government demanding prompt, adequate and effective compensation for the 
expropriation of land, previously owned by US nationals, as part of the agrarian reform 
taking in place in Mexico at the time. Hull also proposed to submit the dispute to 
arbitration under international law. In response, the Mexican government referenced 
the Calvo Doctrine and asserted that States had no obligation to foreign investors 
under international law other than that of non-discrimination. Instead, foreign 
investors were expected to submit their claims to the host States' legal system to settle 
the dispute (Calvert, 2016).  
This event triggered a debate between Latin American countries and the US over 
compensation on expropriation and the settlement of foreign investment disputes 
which eventually became a debate between developed and developing countries in 
multilateral forums. Other capital-exporting countries joined the United States in 
championing the Hull formula and were opposed by developing countries who were 
advocating for the Calvo Doctrine (Calvert, 2016).  
During the 1960s and 1970s, Latin American countries were revelling in their newly 
found independence and were determined to protect their sovereignty. The Andean 
Common Market of which Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru were 
members, adopted Decision No. 24 of the year 1970. This Decision stipulated that 
member countries would not grant investors more favourable treatment than that 
granted to national investors in addition to not enacting legislation that would enable 
foreign investors to seek dispute resolution outside the jurisdiction of the host State 
(Dolzer and Stevens, 1995, p. 9). Efforts by capital-exporting countries to push 
through a multilateral agreement on investment rules were also unsuccessful due to 
the continued disagreement between developing and developed countries over the 
rights of investors vis-a-vis the rights and obligations of the host State (Calvert, 2016; 
Subedi, 2012). Amongst these treaties was the 1967 Draft Convention on the 
Protection of Foreign Property advanced by the OECD. The failure to adopt the OECD 
Draft Convention stands out in particular, since most of the BITs eventually signed by 
Bolivia, and several other developing countries were generally based on the OECD 
model. Another rejected convention that is worth noting is the ICSID Convention. The 
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first draft prepared on the future ICSID Convention in 1963 was approved by the 
Board of Governors of the World Bank in September 1964, at the annual meeting of 
the World Bank in Tokyo. However, at that time, the following Latin American 
countries voted against it, in what became known as the ‘Tokyo No’: Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Republic Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (Boeglin, 2013). A few decades later Bolivia acceded 
to the Convention and later experienced its first investment treaty-based arbitration 
under the auspices of ICSID. 
At this point in history, however, Latin American countries were joined by other 
developing countries in establishing a strong bloc in UN forums actively opposing the 
attempts of developed countries to impose their own rules of foreign investment 
protection. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 3, a series of UN resolutions were in favour 
of the sovereignty of developing countries over their resources. Theses resolutions 
also contained provisions strengthening the position of host States stating that, in case 
of compensation for expropriation or disputes, the law of the host countries should be 
applied. 
Future political and economic developments did not allow for these rules to be the 
framework for international investments (Gwynn, 2016). Instead, the interests of the 
developed countries prevailed, as they managed to enforce their investment protection 
standards through BITs. For Bolivia and its Latin American counterparts, in particular, 
the resistance against these investment rules which were embodied in BITs, broke 
down in the wake of the debt crises in the 1980s (Calvert, 2016). Major capital-
exporting countries like the United States and other European countries began 
marketing the advantages of foreign capital to economic development (Calvert, 2016) 
and the need for investment protection treaties like BITs in order to facilitate FDI. 
Their efforts were complemented by IFIs like the World Bank and UNCTAD that 
promoted these treaties over the following few decades. Furthermore, as will be 
discussed below, IFIs like the IMF pressured developing countries like Bolivia to 
liberalise foreign investment regulation paving the way for BITs to be signed with 
capital-exporting countries. The next section demonstrates how the actors that held 
structural power through their control of the financial dimension played a crucial role 
in influencing Bolivia’s decision to sign BITs, despite its previous resistance to the 
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same investment rules. The Structural Power theory can also explain why, even after 
it signed BITs, Bolivia continued to resist similar investment protection rules in 
multilateral forums like the WTO. For, as the Bolivian government was signing BITS 
with the US (1998), Spain (2001) and Paraguay (2001), it was simultaneously 
objecting to the introduction of investment issues in WTO Ministerial Conferences in 
Seattle (1999), Doha (2001) and Cancun (2003). This contradictory stance towards 
investment rules in bilateral and multilateral settings is a clear indication that structural 
factors have an important role to play (Gwynn, 2016). 
3.2.2 The Role of Structural Power  
The dichotomy in Bolivia’s multilateral stance and bilateral stance towards investment 
protection roles has been described as a paradox by scholars in the investment treaty 
literature. As argued in Chapter 3 this alleged paradox can be explained using 
Gwynn’s adaptation of the Structural Power framework. When analysing the context 
in which Bolivia signed its BITs through a lens of Structural Power, the influence of 
Bolivia’s dependence on the financial dimension in the form of financial credit clearly 
emerges. As Gwynn (2016) elaborates, under the financial dimension of structural 
power, the choice of the financially weaker party is constrained when dealing with the 
actors bearing this economic structural power. Bolivia’s debt and economic crises 
meant it had to rely on ‘high-conditionality lending’ (Sachs and Collins, 1989, p. 255) 
from IFIs like IMF and the World Bank to bail it out. The rest of this section 
documents how actors that controlled the financial dimension, namely IFIs and 
capital-exporting countries like the US, strongly influenced Bolivia’s decision to 
undergo intensive investment liberalisation which effectively led to its decision to sign 
BITs and join the investment regime.  
Section 2 demonstrated how Bolivia resorted to IFIs like the World Bank and IMF to 
bail it out of its debt crisis. The emphasis placed on investment protection and 
liberalisation in the conditionalities imposed by the IFIs consequently meant that 
Bolivia had to significantly weaken its previously stringent resistance over investment 
protection standards promoted by capital-exporting countries, if it were to receive the 
financial support its economy desperately needed. As several other South American 
countries had signed BITs in similar circumstances, the proliferation of BITs in the 
region has been described as a legacy of the Third World debt crisis of the 1980s 
(Spronk and Crespo, 2008). While acknowledging that it is not directly connected to 
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it, the Latin American debt crisis has undoubtedly contributed to the development of 
the international investment framework via the proliferation of BITs in that region 
(Gwynn, 2016; Pastor, 1989). Moreover, institutions like IMF, IADB and the World 
Bank played a significant role in the decision of South American countries to join the 
BITs framework (Gwynn, 2016). While there are no documents available to prove that 
signing BITs was specified as one of the conditionalities, the content of these BITs 
was consistent with the investment liberalisation reforms required by the funding 
institutions and donor countries. Having already documented the context in which 
Bolivia signed its BITs in Section 2, this section will expand on the influence and 
leverage IFIs and capital-exporting countries like the US (who were also creditors) 
had over Bolivia during the period in which it signed its BITs.  
The IMF played a crucial role in Bolivia between 1986 and 2006 as the country 
operated continuously under IMF agreements during that period (Weisbrot and 
Sandoval, 2006). It served as a ‘gatekeeper’ for other sources of external financing 
and played an important role in coordinating policies with the World Bank and IADB 
in Bolivia. Together with the US Treasury Department, these institutions were able to 
exert substantial influence over domestic economic policy in Bolivia (Weisbrot and 
Sandoval, 2006). From 1985 onwards, the composition of Bolivia’s public debt 
drastically changed as private banks were no longer the major source of credit. By 
2000, private bank lending had been replaced by multilateral and bilateral debt with 
the IADB, the United States and Japan as the most important lenders (Kohl, 2006). An 
illustration of the level of dependence Bolivia developed on multilateral creditors can 
be provided through a graph by Kehoe and Machiado (2014) in Figure 9, which traces 
the increase in debt from multilateral sources from just above 20 per cent of Bolivia’s 
total debt balance in 1985 to c. 90 per cent in 2005. Furthermore, to emphasise the 
level of influence the IMF exercised, it is worth noting that as a result of reaching an 
agreement with the IMF in the 1980s, the Bolivian government was able to negotiate 
the rescheduling of the debt it owed to the Paris Club (Kehoe and Machiado, 2014). 
These negotiations which started in 1985 lasted until 1999 and resulted in the 
reduction of Bolivia’s external debt by over 3 billion USD as demonstrated in the table 
compiled by Kehoe and Machiado (2014) using data from the Central Bank of Bolivia 
in Figure 10 below.  
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Figure 9: Composition of external creditors  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: Kehoe and Machiado (2014)  
Figure 10: External debt reduction (millions USD) 
		
Source: Kehoe and Machiado (2014)  
 
As documented above, the adoption of a new investment regulatory framework was a 
cornerstone of the NEP and considered a priority by the Bretton Woods institutions. 
The promulgation of Investment Law No. 1182 of 1990 signalled Bolivia’s official 
acceptance of the investment protection rules it had resisted for decades, as the Law 
contained the same protection standards that existed in the BITs that Bolivia began to 
ratify in 1990 as well. The Investment Law included an article which specifically 
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mandated the Bolivian government to sign bilateral and multilateral treaties that would 
provide guarantees to foreign investors. 94  Hence, the signing of BITs can be 
considered part of the new investment framework demanded by the creditors.  
Whereas the US signed its BIT with Bolivia only in the late 1990s, it had a strong 
influence on the adoption of the new investment framework in Bolivia earlier in that 
decade through the Enterprise Initiative for the Americas (EAI), a programme 
promoted by President Bush in the 1990s. Under this Initiative, the US signed 
‘Framework Agreements’ with Latin American countries (Gwynn, 2016). EAI rested 
on three pillars through which the US could support economic reform and sustained 
growth in Latin America (Harrington, 1992). The first was to promote trade 
liberalisation in Latin America through entering into free trade agreements with 
individual countries or regional groupings (Harrington, 1992). The second was to 
promote investment liberalisation by helping ‘countries compete for capital by 
reforming traditional policies that tended to discourage private investment’ 
(Harrington, 1992, p. 5). The third pillar was to increase incentives for reform by 
offering additional debt relief measures (Harrington, 1992). Hence, the bait of this 
programme was that it offered financial support to developing countries as well as 
debt relief in return for trade and investment liberalisation (Gwynn, 2016). An 
investment loan programme and a 1.5 billion USD multilateral investment fund that 
was managed by the IADB provided the funds required to implement this Initiative 
(Gwynn, 2016). In 1991, under the framework of the EAI, the US and Bolivia agreed 
to an 80 per cent reduction in Bolivia's 38 million USD debt (Harrington, 1992). The 
structural power element is clear here through the use of the financial dimension 
(Gwynn, 2016), in this case, financial support and debt relief to influence the decision 
of the Bolivian government in undergoing further investment liberalisation.  
The carrot and stick approach of the IFIs and the United States proved essential to 
ensure that Bolivia implemented the neoliberal reforms under five successive 
governments (Kohl, 2006). By conforming to IFI demands, Bolivia had little room to 
manoeuvre when negotiating conditions (Kohl, 2006). IFI funding remained essential 
over the next two decades as half of Bolivia's public investment was funded through 
                                               
 
94 See Section 2. 
  
128 
international aid during that period (Kohl, 2006). This dependency ensured strict 
compliance of Bolivian governments with the neoliberal prescriptions imposed by IFIs 
to guarantee a steady flow of funds that serviced the public debt (Kohl and Farthing, 
2006).  
Finally, as Gwynn (2016) argues, in order to explain why developing countries 
reversed their position on investment rules and signed BITs, it is imperative that the 
context in which these treaties were signed is taken into consideration. Bolivia’s 
dependency on financial credit and the strong conditional factor attached to funding 
significantly influenced its decision to adopt a new investment framework and join the 
investment treaty regime. The next section traces the roots of the revolution against 
neoliberalism in Bolivia, and the eventual decision to exit the regime.  
4. Growing Discontent with Neoliberal Policies and Bolivia's First 
Investment Arbitration Case  
The neoliberal hegemony which started in 1985 and lasted until 2005, was 
consolidated in the second phase of reforms which were launched in 1993 under 
pressure from IFIs to deepen the market reforms and enable investors to play a more 
prominent role in the economy (Kohl, 2006). Under President de Lozada, Bolivia 
underwent one of the most aggressive privatisation programmes in the region. As 
discussed in Section 2, the Capitalisation Law facilitated the sale of 50 per cent of 
several major SOEs, which provided 60 per cent of the total government revenues, to 
multinational corporations (Bauer and Bowen, 1997; Brada et al., 1997). The Law also 
led to the partial privatisation of five strategic industries, which represented 12.5 per 
cent of Bolivia's GDP and employed a large percentage of the labour force. The 
privatised sectors included oil and gas, telecommunications, airlines and electricity 
(Kohl, 2002).  
While the government had predicted that the capitalisation process would create 
hundreds of thousands of jobs and boost economic growth (Kohl, 2006; MNR-MRTK-
L, 1993), the results failed to match these expectations. Although firm efficiency 
increased, the transfer of ownership resulted in a net cost to the government as 
revenues lost reached 255 million USD in 1997 alone, and continued to fall in 1998, 
as oil and gas companies, which had provided nearly half of government revenues, 
were privatised in mid-1997 (Kohl, 2002; La Razón, 1997a; Molina, 1998). Even 
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though production of oil and natural gas continued to rise, government revenues were 
not increasing as much, due to the introduction of regulations that lowered taxes and 
royalties from 50 to 18 per cent in an attempt to attract investments in exploration and 
production (Kohl, 2002).  
FDI increased primarily in the oil and gas sector following the privatisation of the 
State-owned petroleum company YPFB; however, these investments had limited 
linkages to the rest of the economy and generated much fewer jobs than predicted, 
hence failing to provide the necessary stimulus for the desired economic growth. 
Moreover, as employment in the public sector declined the private sector was unable 
to fill the gap resulting in further informalisation of the Bolivian economy (Assies and 
Salman, 2003; CEPAL, 2001). The informal sector continued to be the main source of 
employment as more workers lost their jobs as a result of the privatisation of the SOEs 
and weak economic growth (Kohl, 2006; Peirce, 1997; Whitehead, 1997).  
In addition to lost revenue and growing unemployment, the economic restructuring 
also had a range of other impacts (Kohl, 2002; Villegas Quiroga, 1997). Most 
significantly, essential services were privatised, and subsidies were slashed, leading 
to an increase in energy, electricity and later water prices (Kohl, 2002).95 In 1997, 
under pressure from the IMF and the World Bank and faced with a growing budget 
deficit, President Banzer imposed an economic austerity plan that increased gasoline 
and diesel prices by 25 per cent and further reduced public spending (Kohl, 2002; La 
Razón, 1997a, 1997b). These measures led to strikes and riots in December 1997 
(Kohl, 2002), and triggered the beginning of a turbulent period in Bolivia’s history, 
witnessing a continuous wave of protests until the election of Morales in 2005.  
By the late 1990s, it was clear that the neoliberal economic reforms had failed to 
deliver the inclusive and sustainable economic growth. Slow growth characterised the 
period between 1986 and 2005, with GDP per capita growth averaging 1.1 per cent 
(Kehoe and Machiado, 2014). According to the IMF, Bolivia’s situation was puzzling, 
as it was a country perceived to have one of the best structural reform records in Latin 
America, yet it experienced sluggish per capita growth, and made virtually no progress 
in reducing income-based poverty measures (IMF, 2005, p. 1). At the time, Bolivia 
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had one of the highest inequality rates in the world (Gigler, 2009). With a share of 
only four per cent of national income, the bottom 20 per cent of households lived in 
extreme poverty, while 62 per cent of the income was concentrated in the hands of the 
top 20 per cent of the population (Gigler, 2009; World Bank, 2002). Discontent with 
the Bolivian government's policies led to protests, which increased in frequency and 
severity leading to the shutdown of the country several times in 2000 and 2001 (Kohl 
and Farthing, 2001). While not all economic troubles can be linked to the economic 
restructuring, almost every protest included demands to end neoliberal economic 
policies (Kohl, 2002). In the following years, protests culminated in two major revolts 
namely the Water War and the Gas War.  
The next section focuses on the Water War, which was a significant turning point in 
Bolivia’s relationship with BITs and the investment treaty regime, as it triggered its 
first investment treaty arbitration.  
4.1 Water War: The realisation that BITs bite and the spark for Bolivia’s 
revolution against neoliberalism  
The Cochabamba Water War is widely credited as the event that sparked the new cycle 
of protests, which created a state of crisis and public discord in Bolivia, leading to the 
downfall of two presidents and galvanising support for Morales to get elected by the 
end of 2005 (Gramont, 2006; Spronk, 2007). 
In 1999, as part of the privatisation programme, the Bolivian government granted a 
consortium led by Bechtel (major American infrastructure company) a 40-year water 
and sewage services privatisation concession for the city of Cochabamba (El-Hosseny, 
2018). Almost immediately after the concession was signed, there was an intensely 
hostile reaction by the residents and media in Cochabamba (Gramont, 2006). The deal 
to privatise water provision provided what was described as ‘a lightning rod’ for the 
Bolivian population’s growing frustration with a stagnant economy and persistent 
poverty, both of which have been increasingly blamed on neoliberal policies adopted 
by the government (Gramont, 2006, p. 6). Only months after the company Aguas del 
Tunari (AdT) assumed control, it implemented a steep increase in prices. This 
triggered widespread protests by the Bolivian people (El-Hosseny, 2018). The 
Bolivian citizens resisted these decisions by forming the Committee to Defend Water 
and Life and, between January and April 2000, they organised protests that brought 
the city to a halt on several occasions (Kohl, 2006). After resorting to the military and 
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declaring a state of siege on the 8th of April, the Bolivian government finally conceded 
to public pressure and revoked the concession (Kohl, 2006). As a result, AdT filed an 
ICSID claim against Bolivia using the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT.96 
This event was a considered a significant milestone as it revealed the potency of the 
BITs signed by Bolivia, which later represented one of the main obstacles to 
implementing the economic and social reform agenda post-2005. In addition to raising 
Bolivia’s awareness on how BITs can bite, this experience provided the State with a 
warning for the challenges it was going face when it aimed to reverse other 
privatisation deals under President Morales.  
Few ICSID cases have garnered the global attention which extended beyond the 
realms of the field of international arbitration, as the AdT case did (Gramont, 2006). 
The failed privatisation of a basic public service and the revolution that followed 
captured the attention of the international media and social movements around the 
world. Civil society actors in Bolivia and around the world framed the Water War and 
the ICSID case as part of the anti-globalisation movement (Gramont, 2006). Indeed, 
the case was the first ICSID case in which a third party intervention took place (El-
Hosseny, 2018). Civil society organisations sought to stand as parties to the dispute 
by filing a petition on August 28, 2002, before the tribunal, requesting permission to 
intervene in the arbitration case. The petitioners argued that as a result of Bechtel's 
decision to raise water prices by an average rate of 50 per cent, Cochabamba's 
residents’ access to water had been restricted, particularly the poorer ones ( La 
Coordinadora para la Defensa del Agua y Vida, et al., 2002; El-Hosseny, 2018).97 The 
tribunal summarily rejected all of the petitioners' demands in a letter by the President 
of the tribunal dated January 23, 2003.98  
The case was eventually dropped after domestic and international pressure forced AdT 
to withdraw its claim without receiving the compensation it had originally demanded. 
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A few months before AdT had succumbed to public pressure and withdrew its claim, 
however, the ICSID tribunal had ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the merits of the 
case in a 2-1 decision dated October 21, 2005. The tribunal rendered this decision 
despite the strenuous objections by the Bolivian party who argued that the Concession 
Agreement did not allow for international arbitration and that AdT manipulated the 
system by creating shell companies in the Netherlands for the sole purpose of being 
able to draw on the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT to file an arbitration case against 
Bolivia. 99  Hence, despite seemingly escaping unscathed, the developments that 
occurred in the arbitration proceedings revealed the expansive nature of the protection 
BITs provide to investors as well as the arbitrators' broad interpretation of the 
protection offered by these BITs and the unpredictable nature of their decision making.  
At the heart of the controversy and debate that surrounded this case in the investment 
arbitration field was the reality that at the time AdT signed the Concession Agreement 
in September 1999, its ownership structure did not afford it a basis on which to assert 
a claim to ICSID jurisdiction (Gramont, 2006). The parent company Bechtel was 
incorporated in the United States, and at the time the US-Bolivia BIT had not yet 
entered into force. AdT changed its upstream ownership by transferring a 55 per cent 
ownership stake to a Dutch company in December 1999. This shareholding change 
allowed AdT to use the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT. AdT’s allegedly weak ties with the 
Netherlands and the timing of the change (after the protests had started and a few 
months before the concession was revoked) led Bolivia to argue that the change in 
shareholding structure and the subsequent use of the Netherlands BIT was an abuse of 
process, while AdT claimed the change in ownership was for tax purposes. 100 
Long after the majority ruled in favour of AdT, this case remained a controversial 
topic debated in the field. As Peterson (2005, p. 3) argues, what is most notable about 
the majority ruling, is its ‘express confirmation that the definition of corporate 
“nationals” found in many BITs is a capacious one’.101 Peterson further elaborated, 
that the majority stated that ‘national routing’ of investment or effectively structuring 
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an investment through a third country so that it comes under the protective canopy of 
a BIT is considered a legitimate exercise (Peterson, 2005).102 This decision leaves 
investors with considerable discretion in structuring their investments through a 
holding company to take advantage of BIT protections that might have not been 
otherwise available (Gramont, 2006). Hence, this case exposed Bolivia to one of the 
major controversial issues surrounding BITs and the investment treaty regime i.e. the 
widespread practice of ‘treaty shopping’ (Lee, 2015; Mitchell et al., 2015; Schill, 
2008; van Os and Knottnerus, 2011).103 Scholars have also noted that the ability to 
manipulate the system this way undermines the understanding of BITs as expressions 
of bilateral bargains because an investor can opt into almost any BIT regime it chooses 
(Schill, 2008). This feature of the BIT regime has been heavily criticised and cited as 
one of the reasons why the existing system needs urgent reform. 
Finally, for Bolivia, this was an eye-opener and as it embarked on its economic 
transformation under the Morales regime, BITs and ISDS were given serious attention. 
The next section addresses Bolivia’s economic transformation under Morales and its 
exit from the investment treaty regime. 
5. Bolivia’s Exit from the Investment Treaty Regime 
Bolivia’s decision to exit its BITs and the investment treaty regime was part of an 
economic transformation process with the objective of reversing the outcomes of the 
neoliberal era. In addition to introducing progressive economic policies, two other 
critical components of the economic reform agenda were the overhaul of the 
hydrocarbons sector and the renationalisation of enterprises that were privatised 
during the neoliberal era. Before tracing the exit process, this section first covers the 
context in which the exit process began including the new economic agenda and the 
measures adopted by the State to increase its share in hydrocarbon revenues and 
restore its control over strategic sectors.  
                                               
 
102 Ibid, para 330d.  
103 Treaty shopping can be explained as an act in which multinational corporate investors alter their 
corporate structure so as to qualify for more favourable investment protection, both in terms of 
jurisdiction and substantive provisions, through treaties signed by other countries and not their original 
home State. 
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5.1 Context in which Exit Occurred 
5.1.1 New Economic Agenda 
In December 2005, Evo Morales was elected as Bolivia's first indigenous president. 
This marked the beginning of a new era in Bolivia. One of the critical features of this 
era has been the rejection and reversal of some of the key neoliberal policies adopted 
under the previous regimes. Morales took office on the back of a wave of massive 
social upheavals and popular mobilisations that started in 2000 (Burbach, 2006; 
Spronk, 2007). The Movement for Socialism (MAS), which was led by Morales, 
played a major role in mobilising the masses for the second major uprising that 
followed the Water War, which culminated in what became known as the Gas War in 
October 2003.104 The demands that came out of the Gas War and became known as 
the ‘October Agenda’ included nationalisation of gas reserves, justice for the death of 
70 citizens who died in the rebellion and a new Constitution. 
The Gas War led to the resignation of President de Lozada, who fled the country. 
Before Morales was elected there were two interim presidents who struggled in the 
face of escalating protests calling for more radical economic and social reforms. 
Morales and his party were elected based on the goals in the October Agenda, and 
hence he inaugurated his term with a broad mandate for change (Molina, 2013). The 
new policy agenda was documented in the National Development Plan (NDP) which 
was announced in June 2006. The NDP was the first plan under the new regime to 
propose a roadmap for social, economic, and political change (Molina, 2013). The 
Plan had two main objectives: to end Bolivia’s dependence on primary exports, and to 
reverse the outcomes of the structural adjustment policies implemented during the 
neoliberal era (Molero Simarro Ricardo and José Paz Antolín María, 2012).  
In the first five years under Morales, Bolivia went from adhering to Washington 
Consensus policies, to repelling them, in addition to contesting the institutions that 
had played a leading role in installing these policies (Molina, 2013). In the first two 
years, the State made a clear statement of its position towards the role of the World 
Bank and IMF in the Bolivian economy and aid policy in general (Molina, 2013). This 
statement came through policy decisions that included refusing to renew a World Bank 
                                               
 
104 An uprising waged against the effort to export unprocessed gas through Chile. 
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framework for multilateral ODA,105 as well as repayment of the outstanding debt owed 
to IMF and refusal to adopt any new IMF programs thereafter (Molina, 2013). 
Although the World Bank continues to operate in Bolivia, it has dropped behind 
multilateral institutions like the IADB and the Andean Development Corporation in 
terms of lending volume. While these changes do not represent a complete exit from 
the aid regime, they significantly reduced the role played by the Bretton Woods 
institutions in dictating Bolivia’s economic policies (Molina, 2013). 
 During its first term, the Morales administration achieved some of the key objectives 
outlined in the NDP. These included significantly increasing the government’s share 
of revenues from the hydrocarbon sector (through the overhaul of the hydrocarbons 
sector and the nationalisation programme), boosting public investment to create jobs, 
and upgrading social welfare programs, e.g. Bono Juancito Pinto,106  Bono Juana 
Azurduy,107 and Renta Dignidad108 (Molina, 2013).  
The next section traces the overhaul of the hydrocarbons sector by the Bolivian 
government, which provided the State with the economic resources it needed to 
proceed with the nationalisation programme and its exit from the investment treaty 
regime.  
5.1.2 Overhaul of the Hydrocarbons Sector and Setting the Platform for 
Nationalisation and Bolivia’s Exit of the Investment Treaty Regime 
The overhaul of the hydrocarbons sector was implemented in phases under three 
different presidents. A new Hydrocarbons Law (Law No. 3058 of 2005) was passed 
under President Carlos Mesa in July 2005. The Law introduced a new tax that 
increased the State’s participation in the hydrocarbons sector from 18 to 50 per cent 
of production and ordered the Bolivian government to renegotiate contracts with the 
MNCs operating in the sector. The Congress passed the Law despite President Mesa's 
objections who deemed the reforms to be too radical. Mesa was succeeded by another 
                                               
 
105 Namely the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). 
106 A conditional cash transfer program designed for primary school students. 
107 Conditional cash transfer programme that provides a stipend to expectant and new mothers. 
108 The first universal pension programme (no conditions or means tests to receive the benefit) in Latin 
America.  
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interim President, Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé who implemented the new tax policy but 
refrained from renegotiating the contracts under pressure from MNCs who threatened 
to resort to international arbitration. The last phase took place under the Morales 
administration which renegotiated the contracts and issued the Nationalisation Decree 
No. 28701 of 2006. The Decree mandated the Bolivian government to recapture the 
majority stake in the previously privatised enterprises and to introduce a further 
increase in the State’s participation in the hydrocarbons sector, which reached 82 per 
cent of the production value. 
When Vice President Carlos Mesa, took over the presidency after the resignation of 
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada in the aftermath of the Gas War in October 2003, he 
promised to hold a referendum over the legislative and regulatory reforms of the gas 
sector in response to the growing calls for nationalisation by the public and in an 
attempt to establish his public mandate (Koivumaeki, 2015a). The referendum was 
held in July 2004 and the main outcomes of the referendum included the following 
(Blackaby and Richard, 2015): (i) the 1996 Hydrocarbons law should be repealed; (ii) 
YPFB should be re-established and regain control over the privatised oil and gas 
companies; and (iii) the government should recover ownership over all hydrocarbons 
at the wellhead.  
Over the next five years, and mostly under the leadership of Evo Morales (who 
officially took office in 2006) the measures voted for in the referendum were 
implemented. Before Morales took office, however, both interim presidents that 
preceded him were reluctant to adopt these measures due to fears of retaliation by 
MNCs who threatened to resort to international arbitration.  
President Mesa was wary of the backlash the government would face from MNCs if 
it were to implement the measures the public voted for in the referendum. However, 
MAS capitalised on the results of the referendum and the growing public pressure to 
challenge Mesa’s less radical reform attempts. In response to the pressure, Guillermo 
Torres, then Minister of Energy, proposed a change in the terms of the existing 
contracts between the MNCs and the State (Koivumaeki, 2015a). This move rang 
alarm bells for the MNCs and triggered retaliation in the form of threats to initiate 
arbitration cases. In an attempt to induce a regulatory chill by pressuring the 
government to halt any plans on amending the existing contracts, MNCs articulated 
their threats to resort to arbitration if the contracts were amended in both private and 
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in public mediums (Koivumaeki, 2015a). Guillermo Torres recalls that multinationals 
wrote to the State to notify it of their discontent with the measures undertaken by the 
authorities and reminding it of their rights (cited in Koivumaeki, 2015a). Public 
statements were also made in the media by some multinationals operating in the sector. 
After a meeting between representatives of six major oil companies (which included 
Repsol, British Gas, Petrobras and Total) and the Senators drafting the new 
hydrocarbon law, the President of Repsol stated to the local press that if the wording 
of the bill was not changed (with particular reference to the part that requires the 
change of contracts without a negotiation) they will have no choice but to resort 
arbitration or leave the country (La Razón, 2004).  
The threats were effective as Mesa fiercely resisted proposals made by MAS to raise 
royalties and renegotiate contracts with MNCs. In a State address, Mesa stressed the 
necessity of drafting a hydrocarbons law that would be acceptable to the ‘international 
community’ (cited in Webber, 2010). In his speech Mesa further elaborated on why 
he believes these proposals by MAS should be disregarded (cited in Webber, 2010):  
It’s a law that the international community will not accept and that the 
petroleum companies will take to arbitration ... It’s clear and everyone has told 
us: Brazil has told us, Spain has told us, the World Bank, the United States, the 
International Monetary Fund, Great Britain, and the entire European Union … 
Bolivian gentlemen, approve a law that is viable and acceptable for the 
international community. 
 
In the event, as demonstrated below, these threats never materialised, and several years 
later, Mesa admitted that he regretted succumbing to the threats made by MNCs.109 
Mesa claimed that he was convinced at the time that Bolivia would face a flurry of 
arbitration cases if he proceeded with the plans to amend contracts and didn’t think 
the State could afford the economic costs of these cases (cited in Koivumaeki, 2015a).  
Nevertheless, Mesa was unable to stop the Congress from passing the new 
hydrocarbon legislation. MAS eventually gained more control in the Congress by 
taking over the presidency of the Economic Development Commission. Their 
dominating position allowed them to override the government’s objections and to pass 
their version of the legislation which increased taxes and royalties from 18 per cent to 
50 per cent and stipulated the renegotiation of existing contracts. Following the 
                                               
 
109 Eventual arbitration claims were mainly triggered by the nationalisation process.  
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promulgation of the new Hydrocarbons Law, Morales and his party mobilised 
protesters against Mesa for his reluctance to proceed with the nationalisation plans and 
fulfil the demands expressed in the referendum. Eventually, Mesa was forced to step 
down after facing increased pressure from protests and political opponents. 
The second interim President, Veltzé took over and in his eagerness to immediately 
ease the public pressure, he partially implemented the new Hydrocarbons Law by only 
introducing the new taxes and leaving the existing contractual terms unchanged 
(Koivumaeki, 2015a). Veltzé’s decision to refrain from renegotiating the contracts 
was due to the pressure applied by MNCs operating in the sector. A few companies 
voiced their disapproval of the plan to amend the contracts and distribution of revenues 
and some initiated arbitration proceedings before eventually backing down. According 
to Veltzé, Repsol, British Gas, and Total commenced arbitration proceedings in July 
2005, but later withdrew their claims at his request (cited in Koivumaeki, 2015b). 
The next section addresses the last phase of the overhaul process which took place 
under the Morales administration. Morales went a step further than his predecessors 
by renegotiating all of the existing contracts with MNCs and embarked upon a 
nationalisation programme which coincided with Bolivia’s exit from the investment 
treaty regime.  
5.1.3 The Nationalisation Process  
From the very beginning of the Morales era and as a result of the popular pressure, 
nationalisation (or what the regime clarified as the recapitalisation of the strategic 
SOEs that were privatised in the neoliberal era) was a clear priority. The NDP focused 
specifically on the hydrocarbons sector, anticipating the nationalisation policies that 
took place a few years later (Molina, 2013). After his election in December 2005, 
Morales spent the first few months of his presidency preparing his nationalisation plan. 
On May 1, 2006 he announced the Nationalisation Decree and the plan for the State 
to recover control over its oil and gas resources (Blackaby and Richard, 2015). The 
plan was not limited to the hydrocarbons sector as it included the renationalisation of 
enterprises in other strategic sectors including power, electricity, mining and telecom. 
The plan consisted of two main components (Koivumaeki, 2015a): the first was to 
renegotiate the oil and gas contracts which was also stipulated in the Hydrocarbons 
Law. The Nationalisation Decree also effectively raised the royalty rate on Bolivia’s 
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two most productive oil and gas fields to 82 per cent through the imposition of an 
additional 32 per cent in the participation rate of the YPFB (on top of the existing 50 
per cent royalty rate) (Blackaby and Richard, 2015). Moreover, as per the Decree the 
oil and gas companies must agree to the new contractual terms proposed by the 
government in 180 days or risk expropriation (Blackaby and Richard, 2015). The 
second component of the nationalisation plan was for the State to recapture majority 
ownership of the privatised companies. 
The rationale behind starting with the first component (renegotiating the contracts) 
before embarking on the nationalisation programme was that most of the State’s 
revenue was generated through the extraction of the hydrocarbons (Blackaby and 
Richard, 2015). The privatised companies (be it in the hydrocarbons sector or in the 
other sectors) contributed significantly less in terms of State revenue (Koivumaeki, 
2015a). Accordingly, it was imperative for the State to complete the renegotiation of 
contracts first before nationalising the companies as the windfall of revenue generated 
from the new terms allowed the State to offer compensation to the shareholders of the 
companies in question and/or settle the arbitration cases (that resulted from the 
nationalisation process) at an early stage of the proceedings. This strategy adopted by 
the State will be expanded on further in Section 6.  
Despite publicly condemning the government’s decision to force them to sign new 
contracts, all the MNCs operating in the field agreed to renegotiate contracts. Within 
the 180 days specified by the government in the nationalisation decree, YPFB 
successfully renegotiated all of its ‘shared risk’ oil and gas contracts, transforming 
them into service or operating contracts in compliance with the new regulatory 
framework (Blackaby and Richard, 2015). The first step of the process was considered 
a resounding success by the government as Bolivia managed to re-write all its oil and 
gas contracts with the MNCs based on the terms defined in the Nationalisation Decree 
without facing a single case of investment arbitration. 
The second step involving nationalising the privatised companies, however, proved to 
be somewhat more complicated. While, the government was able to reach an 
agreement with a few of the companies, in several cases the disparity between the 
government’s valuation of the shares and that of the investors meant that the 
nationalisation process led to a flurry of arbitration cases. In May 2006, President 
Morales renationalised the oil and gas production chain. Other nationalisations 
followed in the energy, mining and telecommunications sectors (Brauch, 2014). The 
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nationalisation programme was comprised of 14 main decrees issued between 2006 
and 2014 (see Appendix V for the list of decrees). The government adopted a 
negotiation strategy which will be analysed in more detail below in Section 6 and 
successfully managed to negotiate compensation packages with several companies 
avoiding arbitration.110 However, the nationalisation process still triggered 11 of the 
15 investment treaty arbitration cases faced by the Bolivian State to date (see 
Appendix IV for details on Bolivia’s investment treaty arbitration cases). There is 
currently only two cases of the 11 related to the nationalisation measures that are 
pending (Glencore and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA (BBVA)), as eight of 
them have been settled before the tribunals reached a verdict and Bolivia lost one, the 
Rurelec case.111  
The next section traces Bolivia’s exit from the investment treaty regime. The exit 
process started with the denunciation of the ICSID Convention, before the new 
Constitution in 2009 established the main principles of the new investment framework 
and mandated the government to conduct a review of Bolivia’s BITs. The review 
recommended the termination of Bolivia’s BITs and the last step of the exit process 
was the introduction of new investment and arbitration legislation.  
5.2 Tracing Bolivia’s Exit Process  
Even before facing its first arbitration case as a result of the nationalisation process, 
Bolivia’s plans to exit from the investment treaty regime were underway. In an 
interview, the Deputy Attorney General discloses that preparations for Bolivia’s exit 
from BITs and ICSID began shortly after Morales took office. The initial step was to 
establish two bodies in 2007 to plan for the exit process and manage the disputes that 
were triggered by the nationalisation Decrees (Interview with Pablo Menacho, 2015). 
The first entity was the National Council for Legal Defence under the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs which was in charge of the legal and technical work regarding 
arbitration cases. The second entity was under the Ministry of the Presidency which 
handled the political aspects of Bolivia’s exit plans (Interview with Pablo Menacho, 
2015). Bolivia took its first major step in the exit process in May 2007 (a few months 
before the first arbitration case triggered by the nationalisation decrees) as the Ministry 
                                               
 
110 These include: Repsol, Petrobas, GDF Seuz, Air BP and Shell.  
111 See Appendix IV. 
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of Foreign Affairs sent a formal notice to ICSID declaring its withdrawal from the 
ICSID Convention. In remarks about their decision to exit Bolivian officials also 
declared their plans to revisit the BITs signed by the State (Vis-Dunbar et al., 2007). 
As arbitration cases started to accumulate, the Bolivian government realised that 
having two entities in charge of handling arbitration cases led to coordination and 
efficiency problems. This led to the introduction of the Ministry of Legal Defence in 
2008 which combined the tasks of the two bodies into one institution (Interview with 
Pablo Menacho, 2015). The next important milestone was in 2009, when the new 
Constitution was adopted. The Constitution introduced the principles for the new 
investment framework and mandated the renegotiation or termination of BITs. In 
2010, the government created, also by Constitutional mandate, the State Attorney 
General’s office (Procuraduría General del Estado) which became responsible for 
promoting, defending and protecting the interests of the State in various fields, 
including disputes with foreign investors. Shortly after, in 2011, an internal review of 
Bolivia’s BITs was conducted, commencing the process to replace these treaties with 
a new framework as mandated by the Constitution. After terminating the BITs, the 
government repealed the Investment and Arbitration Laws that were promulgated in 
the 1990s and replaced them with new legislation in 2014 and 2015, respectively to 
complete the overhaul of the FDI regime and Bolivia’s exit of the investment treaty 
regime. The rest of this section traces the exit process in more detail.  
5.2.1 Denouncing the ICSID Convention  
The first step in the process of exiting the investment treaty regime was the 
denunciation of the ICSID Convention. On May 2, 2007, the World Bank received a 
written notice of denunciation of the Convention from the Bolivian State (ICSID News 
Release, 2007). As per Article 71 of the ICSID Convention,112 the denunciation took 
effect six months after receipt of notification, in November 3, 2007. The State declared 
the need to replace the current investment dispute settlement mechanism due the 
shortcomings of the existing system. The Bolivian government justified its decision to 
withdraw from the dispute settlement mechanism by citing the following problems: 
                                               
 
112 Article 71 of the ICSID Convention stipulates that: ‘Any Contracting State may denounce this 
Convention by written notice to the depositary of this Convention. The denunciation shall take effect 
six months after receipt of such notice’. 
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(i) perceived bias toward investors; (ii) lack of transparency and appeal mechanisms; 
(iii) high transaction costs of proceedings; and (iv) unpredictable and irrational 
decisions by tribunals (Arismendi, 2010; Lazo, 2014).  
Despite denouncing the Convention, investors were still allowed to resort to ICSID 
through BITs that provided consent to ICSID jurisdiction. As per Article 72, the 
Bolivian government was still obliged to honour its obligations under the ICSID 
Convention arising out of consent given by it (or by one of its subdivisions, agencies 
or nationals) before its notice of denunciation was received by the World Bank (i.e. 
before May 2, 2007). This meant that investors could still file claims at ICSID until 
BITs expired (including survival clause duration) and the Investment Law or any other 
treaty/agreement that provided consent for ICSID jurisdiction was revoked.  
5.2.2 New Constitution and BIT Review  
The second step in the exit process was introducing the main principles for Bolivia’s 
new investment framework through the new Constitution which was adopted in 2009. 
The new Constitution established that domestic investment has priority over foreign 
investment, and that foreign investors may not be treated more favourably than 
domestic investors. It also subjects foreign investment to Bolivian jurisdiction, laws 
and authorities exclusively and rejects international arbitration as a means to settle 
disputes with foreign investors (Brauch, 2014; Valle Velasco, 2012). 
In the Chapter on International Relations, Article 255 of the Constitution provides the 
guiding principles for the negotiation, subscription and ratification of international 
treaties which include: independence and equality among States, no intervention in 
internal matters; defence and promotion of human, economic, social, cultural and 
environmental rights; and protection and preference for Bolivian production (Valle 
Velasco, 2012). After providing general guidance for Bolivia’s approach to 
international treaties, Article 320 of the Constitution goes a step further with regards 
to treatment of foreign investment by establishing the main standards to be adopted in 
Bolivia’s new investment framework for regulating foreign investment and its 
relationship with domestic investment. The Article provides that (Valle Velasco, 
2012): 
I.  Bolivian investment will take priority over foreign investment.  
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II.  Every foreign investment will be subjected to the Bolivian jurisdiction, 
laws and authorities, and no one may invoke an exceptional situation, 
nor appeal to diplomatic claims to obtain a more favourable treatment.  
 
III.  The economic relations with foreign States or enterprises shall be 
conducted under conditions of independence, mutual respect and 
equity. More favourable conditions may not be granted to foreign 
States or enterprises than those established for Bolivians. 
 
IV.  The State acts independently in all of its decisions on internal 
economic policy, and shall not accept demands or conditions imposed 
on this policy by States, banks or Bolivian or foreign financial 
institutions, multilateral entities or transnational enterprises. 
 
V.  Public policies will promote internal consumption of products made in 
Bolivia. 
Through Article 320, the Constitution reverted back to Bolivia’s historical position on 
foreign investment treatment by reflecting standards like the Calvo Doctrine which 
had been undermined by BITs (Menacho, 2015). The Article also provided the 
grounds for Bolivia’s new investment framework as it was the basis for terminating 
the existing BITs, as well as replacing the old investment and arbitration laws with 
new ones that reflected the new vision (Menacho, 2015). After establishing the 
standards and principles for transforming Bolivia’s investment framework, one of the 
transitionary provisions of the Constitution mandates that any existing treaties that 
contradict clauses in the Constitution shall be renegotiated or denounced within four 
years of the election of the ‘Executive Organ’.113 Given that the elections (convened 
by the new Constitution) took place in December 2009 and that the government of 
President Morales began its new term on January 22nd, 2010, the deadline established 
by the Constitution to denounce and bring international treaties in line with the new 
Constitution was in 2014. 
Accordingly, the Bolivian government formed an inter-ministerial committee to 
review the existing BITs, following the Constitutional mandate to denounce and, if 
necessary, renegotiate all treaties that contradicted the Constitution (Brauch, 2014; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2013). The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs held an internal workshop (‘Workshop’) that gathered the General 
Directorates of Legal Affairs of the Ministries comprising the Executive Body of the 
                                               
 
113 See the Ninth Transitionary Provision in the Bolivian Constitution (2009) (Valle Velasco, 2012). 
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State, on May 17th 2011, to discuss the status of the international treaties that did not 
conform with the Constitutional Articles stated above (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2013). According to an unpublished official 
memorandum drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (‘Review Memorandum’) to 
document this process, the title of the Workshop was the ‘Denunciation of 
International Treaties for their adaptation to the Political Constitution of the State’. 
The objective of this Workshop was to clarify the procedure for denouncing and/or 
renegotiating treaties, agreements or other international instruments, signed by 
Bolivia, which might potentially have been unconstitutional, as well as assessing their 
scope and legal effects (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
2013). 
According to the Review Memorandum, the BITs were reviewed to assess their 
compatibility with Article 320 of the Constitution (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2013). Some of the key clauses included in BITs signed 
by Bolivia outlined in Section 3 clearly contradicted the standards set in Article 320. 
Examples of these clauses and why they would be considered unconstitutional based 
on the 2009 Constitution include: (i) NT and FET contradicted with Article 320 (1) 
which stipulates that Bolivian investments will be prioritised over foreign 
investments; (ii) expropriation (specifically what constitutes expropriation and how 
compensation would be determined) and ISDS clauses both violate Article 320 (2) 
which stipulates that foreign investment will be subjected to the Bolivian jurisdiction, 
laws and authorities exclusively.  
As a result of the contradiction between various clauses of the BITs signed by Bolivia 
with the Constitutional precepts, the conclusion reached after the legal and technical 
evaluation conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in coordination with the 
competent and relevant public entities was that BITs amongst other treaties that violate 
the Constitution would be denounced to ‘retrieve the economic, legal, and political 
sovereignty of the Plurinational State of Bolivia’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2013, p. 12). As part of the outputs of the Workshop a 
law was drafted to provide guidance on the termination process as well as the criteria 
and procedures that need to be adopted in signing any future international treaties. The 
draft legislation named ‘Law for Treaties Celebration’ was used as a reference for 
terminating and or renegotiating treaties even before it was ratified in September 2013 
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as Law no. 401. Article 71 of the Law for Treaties Celebration outlined the process by 
which BITs and other treaties that were deemed unconstitutional were to be terminated 
in the following clauses:114  
I. Pursuant to the Ninth Transitory Provision of the Political Constitution 
of the State, the International Treaties prior to its promulgation and that 
do not contradict it will be maintained in the internal legal order with 
the rank of Law.  
 
II. It is the responsibility of the Executive Branch to denounce and 
renegotiate the International Treaties signed, ratified or to which the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia has adhered prior to February 7, 2009 and 
which are contrary to the Political Constitution of the State, prior legal 
technical evaluation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in coordination 
with the competent Public Entities, observing the interests and 
sovereignty of the State and only fulfilling the procedure foreseen in 
the respective international instruments subscribed. 
 
III. After the four years stipulated in the Ninth Transitory Provision of the 
Political Constitution of the State, International Treaties identified as 
contrary to their mandates and the interests of the State, may be 
renegotiated and/or denounced in accordance with the procedure 
established in the Treaty itself. 
The Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade and Integration revealed in interview that in 2006 
Bolivia started to notify its partners that they would not be renewing BITs that reached 
their expiration dates (Interview with Walter Clarems Endara, 2015). Since different 
BITs expired on different dates, in May 2013 the government decided to collectively 
denounce the remaining BITs in order to comply with the Constitutional mandate to 
renegotiate or terminate treaties that contradicted the Constitution within a four year 
period from the beginning of Morales’s second term (see Table 1 below).  
The Bolivian government proceeded with the termination of its 22 BITs within the 
timeframe set in the Constitution and following the guidelines set in Law No. 401 of 
2013. The list of BITs terminated and the date of termination is provided in Table 1 
below. It is worth noting that several BITs were denounced before the Workshop took 
place. 
                                               
 
114 Law No. 401, 18 September 2013, Official Gazette of Bolivia.  
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Table 1: List of Bolivia’s terminated treaties 
Treaty Denounced/Terminated Date of Termination 
Bolivia-Italy BIT (1990) February 22, 2011 
Bolivia-United States of America BIT 
(1998) 
June 7, 2012 
Austria-Bolivia (1997) June 30, 2012 
Bolivia -Sweden BIT (1990) July 3, 2012 
Bolivia-Paraguay BIT (2001) September 3, 2012 
Bolivia-Spain BIT (2001) January 4, 2012 
Bolivia-Argentina (1994) May 13, 2013  
Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union-
Bolivia (1990) 
May 14, 2013  
Bolivia-France BIT (1989) May 13, 2013  
Bolivia-China BIT (1992) May 13, 2013  
Bolivia-Germany BIT (1987) May 13, 2013  
Bolivia-Romania BIT (1995) May 14, 21013  
Bolivia-Denmark BIT (1995) May 13, 2013  
Bolivia-United Kingdom BIT (1988) May 13, 2013  
Bolivia-Ecuador BIT (1995) May 7, 2013  
Bolivia-Peru BIT (1993) May 7, 2013  
Bolivia-Chile BIT (1994) May 7, 2013  
Bolivia-Netherlands BIT (1992) November 1, 2009  
Bolivia-Switzerland BIT (1987) December 27, 2006  
Bolivia-Korea, Republic of BIT (1996) January 11, 2007 
Bolivia-Cuba BIT (1995) July 9, 2008  
Free Trade Agreement between the 
Republic of Bolivia and the United States 
of Mexico 
June 7, 2010  
 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Plurinational State of Bolivia (2013)	
5.2.3 New Investment and Arbitration Laws  
The new foreign investment regulations which were first documented in the 
Constitution before being embodied in the respective laws for investment protection 
and arbitration demonstrated that this was not an attempt to reform the system by 
amending a few controversial clauses. Instead, it was an act by Bolivia to introduce an 
alternative framework with the aim of providing the State with the policy space and 
sovereignty required for achieving its social and economic objectives.  
The promulgation of Law No. 516 of 2014, the Investment Promotion Law (LPI) was 
the next step in restructuring Bolivia’s investment regime (Brauch, 2014).  Along with 
exiting BITs and the ICSID Convention, the adoption of the LPI was a significant step 
in redesigning the national legal framework regulating investment to reflect the 
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principles established in the Constitution (Brauch, 2014; Interview with Walter 
Clarems Endara, 2015).  
The LPI starts by clarifying the principles guiding any investment activities in the 
Bolivian economy. Article 3 of the LPI highlights one of the main principles, which 
is the sovereignty of the State in conducting economic and social planning, directing 
the economy and exercising control over the strategic sectors established in the 
Constitution (Valle Velasco, 2014). 115  The LPI also reiterates the Constitutional 
principle of prioritising domestic over foreign investments, as a mechanism to 
strengthen the domestic market as per Article 3 (h) (Brauch, 2014; Valle Velasco, 
2012). With regards to treatment of investments, Article 6 (II) stipulates that private 
investors can participate in strategic sectors but only subject to the rights granted by 
the State (Brauch, 2014; Valle Velasco, 2012). With the exception of protecting 
strategic sectors, the LPI does not restrict investment in any other economic sector, as 
long as the State’s economic planning role is respected and Bolivian law is complied 
with (Brauch, 2014). In terms of investor obligations Article 11 of the LPI provides 
that all investments must comply with domestic laws and regulations on labour, tax, 
customs, environmental and other matters (Brauch, 2014). 
Finally, the section of Additional Provisions in the LPI articulates that any new 
investment treaties must conform to this law in addition to the Constitution. The first 
Additional Provision stipulates that treaties concerning foreign investments which are 
renegotiated in accordance to what is set forth in the Ninth Transitory Provision of the 
Constitution, shall conform to the regulations established in the both the Constitution 
and the LPI. It also states that upon the publication of this Law, every investment 
framework agreement or international trade agreement regarding investments which 
is signed by the State will be based on the dispositions established in this Law (Valle 
Velasco, 2014). One aspect that remained vague in the LPI was the dispute settlement 
mechanism for foreign investments. The Third Transitionary Provision of Law, 
however, mandated the Ministry of Justice and Office of the Attorney-General to draft 
a new law on conciliation and arbitration within 90 days from the promulgation of the 
LPI (Brauch, 2014).  
                                               
 
115 Strategic sectors include minerals, hydrocarbons, the electromagnetic spectrum, genetic resources, 
and water and energy sources (Constitution, Article 348 (I) and (II)). 
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In June 2015, Law No. 708, the Conciliation and Arbitration Law (LCyA) was 
promulgated. According to Deputy Attorney General, Pablo Menacho, the Law was 
enacted to provide legal security (predictability) to both the State and the investor 
(Menacho, 2015). The Law, however, incorporates significant modifications on the 
previous Arbitration Law (No.1770 of 1997), which was repealed and introduces 
specific rules concerning investment dispute resolution involving the Bolivian State 
that is consistent with the new Constitution and Investment Law. Pursuant to the 
LCyA, any disputes that involve the State and arise from or are related to an 
investment made under Law No. 516 for the Promotion of Investments shall be bound 
by the following rules (Gutierrez and Zelada, 2017): (i) Investment controversies shall 
be subject to Bolivian jurisdiction, laws and authorities; (ii) The parties must submit 
the controversy to conciliation prior to arbitration; (iii) Conciliation or arbitration will 
be held locally; and (iv) Conciliation or arbitration will have the territory of Bolivia 
as their seat. Hearings, evidence production and other procedures, could be conducted 
outside of Bolivian territory. 
Bolivia’s exit from the investment treaty regime and introduction of a new domestic 
legal framework to regulate FDI did not prevent it from facing international arbitration 
cases filed by foreign investors. Survival clauses in most of Bolivia’s BITs meant that 
these treaties could still be used for investments that were made prior to the 
termination process for another ten years in most cases. As discussed earlier, Bolivia 
faced 15 investment treaty-based arbitration cases, most of which were triggered by 
the renationalisation process. This raises the question of why Bolivia proceeded with 
the exit option even though it was clear that these treaties would continue pose a threat 
from existing investors and they would ultimately have to pay hefty sums in terms of 
compensation for the claimants. Was it a matter of ideology, avoidance of arbitration 
or was there a strong element of pragmatism? This is what the next section addresses.  
6. Motivations Behind Bolivia’s Decision to Exit the Investment 
Treaty Regime: Arbitration Costs, Ideology, Strategic Approach?  
Bolivia’s decision to exit its BITs and denounce the ICSID Convention has attracted 
considerable attention in the field of international investment law, because of the 
potential implications for other developing economies. Most of the literature on 
Bolivia’s exit, however, has focused on the reality that an immediate complete exit 
was never feasible because of the survival clauses in BITs and certain articles in the 
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ICSID Convention. Hence, despite its decision to exit the regime, Bolivia has faced 
13 publicly known investment treaty arbitration cases since its decision to denounce 
the ICSID Convention. In total Bolivia has had to compensate investors in the region 
of 780 million USD based on available data so far (see Appendix IV) with three cases 
still pending (South American Silver, Glencore and BBVA).  
There are several factors to consider when analysing Bolivia's decision to exit the 
regime which it had joined by signing BITs and joining the ICSID Convention. The 
previous sections demonstrated how the State was facing popular pressure to reverse 
the privatisations and economic policies adopted in the neoliberal era. The Morales 
administration also made it clear that it was critical of the neoliberal principles 
underlying the investment treaty regime as Bolivia's BITs shaped an obstacle to the 
implementation of the new economic agenda. Bolivia's decision to exit, however, 
revealed the ‘sticky’ quality of the regime (Salacuse, 2015) that ensures investors are 
still able to use BITs and resort to ICSID even after the State had terminated these 
instruments. Despite being aware of the arbitration threats and potential costs, the 
Bolivian government persisted with the decision to exit. This has led critics to describe 
Bolivia’s decision as an uncalculated move and one driven by ideological motivations 
rather than pragmatic ones.  
This section analyses the different motives that have been used to explain or justify 
Bolivia’s decision to exit. It considers the arguments in favour of arbitration costs and 
ideological motives being factors that explain the decision to exit, before arguing that 
there is evidence that the State adopted a strategic and pragmatic approach in deciding 
to exit. The section concludes that while the Bolivian regime’s ideological position 
may have directed the State towards the exit route, it was the shift in structural power 
dynamics in favour of the State that enabled it to proceed with its decision to exit the 
regime. This shift in structural power dynamics was a result of a significant upturn in 
Bolivia’s economic status which empowered the State to confront its capital exporting 
partners and creditors with its decision to exit the regime. Furthermore, the favourable 
outcome of the cost-benefit assessments conducted by the Bolivian government 
convinced the State to proceed with its decision to exit the regime. 
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6.1 Arbitration Costs/History  
It is difficult to establish a clear relationship between arbitration history, costs and 
Bolivia's decision to exit the investment treaty regime, both because the exit process 
began before Bolivia had lost a case, and also due to the reality that survival clauses 
would enable investors to continue to benefit from the terminated BITs for another 
decade or so (May, 2016). When Bolivia became the first State to denounce the ICSID 
Convention in May 2007, it had only faced two arbitration cases one of which was 
settled (the AdT case) and the other case, Quiborax,116 was still pending at the time. 
Hence, Bolivia decided to leave ICSID without having lost a case or incurred any 
significant financial costs.  
Accordingly, Bolivia's experience with arbitration and the costs incurred do not 
provide a compelling explanation for Bolivia's exit. A more credible argument in 
Bolivia's case is that costs of potential arbitration cases might have inspired its 
decision to exit this investment regime (May, 2016). Bolivia had already experienced 
investment arbitration and realised the scope of protection provided by BITs, and 
hence it was quite aware that the economic transformation project which entailed a 
nationalisation programme would inevitably lead to investment treaty arbitration 
cases. However, if the logic behind this decision to exit was to avoid the costs, then 
the explanation becomes less convincing. As discussed earlier, terminating BITs and 
denouncing the ICSID Convention does not allow States to release themselves from 
their obligations under the regime immediately. 
The desire to prevent future investors from taking advantage of the expansive 
protection standards provided by BITs can be considered as a motivating factor to exit 
BITs. However, it still does not entirely explain why the Bolivian government 
proceeded with its plans to exit the system and pursue its nationalisation plans while 
being completely aware of the arbitration threat it was facing which eventually led to 
substantial amounts of funds paid in settlements or awards to investors. 
6.2 Ideological Motivations 
 An alternative explanation that has been used to explain why countries like Bolivia 
and its Latin American counterparts proceeded with their plans regardless of the costs 
                                               
 
116 See Appendix IV for background information on the Quiborax case.  
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is the ideological one. According to May (2016, p. 34), anti-neoliberalism provides an 
alternative explanation for Bolivia’s decision to exit the system and also offers a 
‘connecting explanation between anticipated costs and exit’. As demonstrated in this 
case study, after Morales took office there was a significant change in politics and a 
major economic transformation reversing the neoliberal policies that had been in place 
for decades. On the domestic scene, the reversal of the neoliberal policies was evident 
in the nationalisation programme, the expansion in the role of the State in regulating 
the economy and providing social welfare, the redistribution of land, and the 
protection of domestic players and sectors. The government's stance on neoliberal 
policies soon shifted to the international scene as Morales became a vocal critic of 
capitalism including the international trade and investment frameworks (May, 2016). 
In 2007, at the 5th Annual Summit of the Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our 
Americas (ALBA), Morales called on Venezuela and Nicaragua to join Bolivia in 
withdrawing from ICSID. The proposal submitted by Morales in the Summit stated 
(Reuters, 2007):  
(We) emphatically reject the legal, media and diplomatic pressure of some 
multinationals that ... resist the sovereign rulings of countries, making threats 
and initiating suits in international arbitration. 
 
A few days later, the Bolivian government delivered a written notice to the ICSID 
Secretariat, announcing Bolivia’s formal denunciation of the ICSID Convention 
(Fiezzoni, 2011; May, 2016).  
The context in which Bolivia’s exit took place and the statements made by Morales 
and his government signified that it was part of a broader struggle and revolt against 
the prevailing neoliberal economic order (May, 2016). Bolivia had grievances from 
its experience with ICSID and BITs, but more generally, there was a fundamental 
problem with the ideological grounds which these instruments and institutions were 
premised on (May, 2016). Upon taking office, it was clear to the Morales regime that 
BITs shaped a serious obstacle to its plans to introduce more progressive economic 
policies and to prioritise developing the domestic sectors and players over continuing 
his predecessors' policy of depending on FDI as the major engine of growth. 
It would be misleading, however, to argue that the decision to exit was driven by 
purely ideological motives. The ideological argument seems to signify that as part of 
his commitment to his nationalistic goals, Morales was willing to accept the expected 
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high costs of his policy decisions by overlooking the consequences of breaching the 
BITs. However, a study by Koivumaeki (2015a) reveals that Morales and his 
government assessed the legal implications of BITs carefully before choosing to 
undergo the nationalisation plans. Moreover, forecasts of rising gas prices and the 
expected revenues conducted by the government, played a significant role in the 
decision to implement the nationalisation plan which effectively led to the decision to 
proceed with exiting the investment treaty regime. (Koivumaeki, 2015a) describes this 
explanation as the ‘strategic argument’ whereby Morales took the decision to persist 
with the economic policies that could be challenged by investors through BITs after 
an assessment revealed that the expected gains from nationalisation, the new contracts, 
and taxation decrees would exceed the costs incurred by terminating BITs and the 
arbitration cases triggered through these treaties.  
6.3 Strategic Approach  
This section demonstrates how during the first few months in Morales's first term the 
government was carefully preparing for BITs and their legal implications. Bolivia had 
already experienced investment arbitration before Morales was elected. Moreover, as 
documented in Section 5, the MNCs began to warn the State about the legal and fiscal 
measures they were prepared to take in the hydrocarbons sector soon after the results 
of the referendum were announced. Hence, by the time Morales took power, BITs and 
the danger they posed were public knowledge. According to an interview with the 
Deputy Attorney General, MNCs aware of the intention of Morales to push through 
the reforms his predecessors were reluctant to enforce, warned the government that 
they intended to pursue international arbitration as soon as he took office (Interview 
with Pablo Menacho, 2015). Other key officials who were involved in the decision 
making process, including former hydrocarbons Minister Soliz Rada and diplomat 
Alvarado Aguilar, confirmed that the MNCs used the threat of arbitration to pressure 
the government to back down from its plans in the early days of Morales’s first term 
(cited in Koivumaeki, 2015b). 
These threats were far from ignored by the Bolivian government as the State began to 
prepare itself for the arbitration cases it was expecting to face. According to The Vice-
Minister of Foreign Trade and Integration, the government became well aware of the 
reality that Bolivia was exposed to potential arbitration cases because of how these 
treaties were structured (Interview with Walter Clarems Endara, 2015). The approach 
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from the very beginning was to analyse each nationalisation act as a potential 
arbitration case and assess the costs compared to the economic benefits gained by the 
State. 
The leader of the government's technocratic negotiation team at the time, Manuel 
Morales Olivera 117  revealed that the contract renegotiation component of the 
Nationalisation Decree was designed in a particular way to attempt to avoid enabling 
companies to trigger or invoke their BITs (cited in Koivumaeki, 2015b). Olivera 
clarified that companies would find it difficult to invoke BITs because the decree did 
not call for the cancellation of any existing contracts; instead, it stated that State-
owned company YPFB would not be able to execute any contracts that the legislature 
had not approved, as required by the Constitution (cited in Koivumaeki, 2015b). 
Accordingly, since the existing contracts which were signed in the 1990s and had not 
been individually approved in Congress, they would need to be amended to avoid 
violating the Constitution (Koivumaeki, 2015b). Furthermore, the team assigned to 
renegotiate the contracts consulted law firms that specialised in international 
arbitration such as Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP (see Zelaya, 2007). Part 
of the preparations occurred before Morales took office, as a group of lawyers and 
technocrats from the Superintendency of Hydrocarbons travelled to Argentina during 
President Mesa's short tenure to study Argentina's experience with international 
arbitration according to the former head of the Superintendency Hugo De La Fuente 
(cited in Koivumaeki, 2015b).  
Perhaps what demonstrates the extent to which BITs were an integral component of 
the Morales administration’s plans most is how the contract renegotiation process was 
handled. In the renegotiations of the exploration and extraction contracts, the 
government adopted a carrot and stick approach to convince companies to sign the 
new contracts without filing any investment claims through their BITs (Koivumaeki, 
2015a). Concerning incentives, the government signed a new agreement with 
Argentina to export gas at a higher price (from 3.2 USD/MBTU to 5 USD/MBTU) 
ensuring that the companies would still find the new terms attractive. According to a 
lawyer in one of the MNCs, negotiating the price increase would ensure the MNCs 
                                               
 
117 Also former President of YFPB.  
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remain profitable (cited in Koivumaeki, 2015b). Another incentive provided by the 
government was that the MNCs’ past investments would be taken into consideration 
and factored into the new contracts (Koivumaeki, 2015a). These incentives played an 
important role in enticing the companies to compromise and accept the new terms and 
taxes without resorting to arbitration. The stick used by the government in the 
negotiation process was the intimidation tactics and the short timelines (Koivumaeki, 
2015a). The intimidation tactics included threats of taking over the operations of the 
companies, but these never reached a formal stage. The short timelines were 
particularly effective as some companies suspected that the choice of setting the 
deadline to agree on the new contracts in less than six months was a deliberate tactic 
adopted by the government to limit their ability to resort to arbitration (Koivumaeki, 
2015a). The source of suspicion was the reality that most of the BITs signed by Bolivia 
provided in the case of an investment dispute the investors would need to wait for six 
months (‘cooling off period’) before initiating an arbitration case. This effectively 
meant that by resorting to arbitration cases the company could diminish their chances 
of staying in the country and benefiting from the rise in commodity prices if the 
government takes over the company. As the case would drag on (considering the 
lengthy timelines of arbitration proceedings), they would not be able to recover their 
sunk costs either (Koivumaeki, 2015a). The government's carrot and stick approach 
proved successful as all the companies agreed to the new terms and taxes imposed 
without resorting to arbitration. Moreover, the revenues generated as a result of these 
measures were crucial to the Bolivian government's decision to proceed with the 
nationalisation plan. 
The second component of the nationalisation plan involved the reacquisition of the 
majority stake in the previously privatised companies and was a much more difficult 
process to implement. It is worth noting that from the onset the plan was not to expel 
the existing investors/shareholders and take full ownership of these companies, but 
instead to negotiate compensation for a majority stake in these institutions. While 
Bolivia did face several arbitration cases triggered by the nationalisations that took 
place, they were able to avoid several others. The reduction of the number of 
arbitration cases filed against the State and the ability of the government to reach quick 
settlements in most of the arbitration cases was due to a concerted effort to negotiate 
compensation with a clear strategy in place according to former President of YPFB 
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Olivera (cited in Koivumaeki, 2015b). Well aware of the threat posed by its BITs the 
Bolivian government avoided radical expropriation and instead sought to settle with 
the companies, using the revenue gained through the renegotiated contracts and taxes 
to try to limit the arbitration cases to the extent possible.  
Despite the careful planning illustrated above, the accumulated costs of the arbitration 
cases and the compensations reached in settlements still represented a significant 
burden on a small developing country like Bolivia. This brings us to the second part 
of the strategic approach which is the cost-benefit analysis that was conducted by the 
Bolivian government. The positive results of this analysis convinced the Morales 
administration to proceed with the nationalisation plan and the termination of BITs, 
despite the costs of the first and the continued threat posed by BITs even post-
termination. In interview, the Minister of Economy (who was appointed in 2006 and 
oversaw the nationalisation program) revealed that the government assessed the 
feasibility of the nationalisation plan prior to issuing the decrees and approaching the 
investors that owned a majority stake in the targeted companies (Interview with Luis 
Arce, 2015). According to the Minister of Economy, the government also hired an 
independent auditor to value the entities targeted for renationalisation before 
submitting offers to the MNCs that controlled the privatised entities (Interview with 
Luis Arce, 2015). Furthermore, a feasibility study was completed to analyse how much 
revenue the government would generate as a result of recapturing a majority stake in 
the privatised enterprises and whether these companies would remain profitable under 
its ownership (Interview with Luis Arce, 2015). A senior official at the State Attorney 
General's office also confirmed that an internal study was completed prior to 
undertaking the nationalisation programme (Interview with senior official at the State 
Attorney General’s Office, 2015). The study forecasted State revenues as a result of 
the nationalisations, the proposed increase in tax rates and renegotiated contracts 
against the expected compensation costs (Interview with senior official at the State 
Attorney General's Office, 2015). These studies were not accessible, and in general, 
public information on the government's projections of gas prices and revenues 
generated are scant. Nevertheless, a few examples of the revenue projections that 
convinced policy makers that the nationalisation plans and Bolivia's exit of the 
investment treaty regime were feasible are addressed below.  
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One example of the financial planning process that guided the government's decision-
making process is demonstrated in the government's estimated annual hydrocarbon 
royalties, which the government calculated and presented to the legislature every year. 
The table below is compiled and used by Koivumaeki (2015a) to illustrate that the 
government was expecting a significant increase in royalties alone (i.e. not including 
the substantial increase in tax revenue as a result of the new Hydrocarbons Law). In 
2006 and 2007, the government projected an 83 per cent and 62 per cent increase in 
royalties respectively. The forecasts slumped temporarily from 2008-2010 as a result 
of the financial crisis and recovered in 2011 (Koivumaeki, 2015a). The timing of 
Morales's rise to power coincided with the beginning of a commodity price boom 
which meant there were strong grounds for the new regime to predict that the positive 
trend would persist over the following few years, at least given the increase witnessed 
in the two years before taking office and the estimates provided by the Ministry of 
Hydrocarbons. As the estimated production volumes were constant and were based on 
observed values and are not as volatile as the oil prices, the growth in revenues was 
driven by the rise in gas prices (Koivumaeki, 2015a).  
Figure 11: Estimated royalties in the government budget in Bolivia 
 
 
Source: (Koivumaeki, 2015b) based on data from the Bolivian Ministry of Economy and Public 
Finance (2003-2011) 
Fiscal revenues grew steadily following the establishment of the new Hydrocarbons 
Law and the Nationalisation Decree of 2006. During the period over which the 
nationalisation process was implemented (2006-2013) these revenues reached 34.6 
billion USD (Campodonico, 2016). In addition to the significant role played by the 
rising oil and gas prices, the most important source of fiscal revenue was the 50 per 
cent royalty introduced by the Hydrocarbons Law (composed of the 32 per cent Direct 
Tax on Hydrocarbons ‘IDH' + 18 per cent royalty payment that already existed) 
  
157 
(Campodonico, 2016). In an attempt to measure the impact of the measures adopted 
by the Morales regime on the size of the fiscal revenue generated, Campodonico 
(2016) has constructed the graph below using official data published by Fundación 
Jubileo (2016). The graph compares the total revenue generated as a result of the new 
legislation with the revenue that would have been generated if Morales had stuck to 
the pre-2005 regulations. In order to measure the increase that corresponds to the 
measures taken after 2005, the graph provides five categories or sources of revenue. 
The first three from the bottom upwards represent revenue generated by the measures 
that were in place before 2005. The two categories on top are the revenues generated 
by the measures introduced post-2005 (Campodonico, 2016). According to the graph, 
if the pre-2005 framework were still in place, total fiscal revenues would have 
amounted to 15.4 billion USD. The impact of the new measures introduced post-2005 
was a massive increase in revenue with an additional 19.2 billion USD was generated 
as a result of these policies. 
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Figure 12: Bolivia: hydrocarbon rent - before and after 2005 (in billions of 
USD) 
  
Source: Campodonico (2016) using official data published by Fundación Jubileo (2016). 
As the government began to reap the fruits of the measures taken to boost public 
revenues, the reality of a significant surplus that could cover compensation payments 
and possible arbitration costs placed it in a strong position when negotiating to reclaim 
a majority stake in the privatised companies. According to the former president of 
YPFB Santos Ramírez and other officials at the State-owned company, there were 
clear instructions from Morales to seek a 51 per cent majority stake in the companies 
and not a complete takeover. The objective set by Morales was to reach amicable 
settlements and avoid international arbitration when possible (cited in Koivumaeki, 
2015b). The first agreement reached was with Petrobras which involved a 
compensation payment of 112 million USD for the refineries which were bought for 
104 million USD in 1999 (Campodonico, 2016). The second agreement followed in 
May 2008, when the State promised to pay Repsol the stock market value for shares 
required for majority ownership of Andina (Koivumaeki, 2015a). From that period 
onward Bolivia started to face arbitration cases as expropriation claims due to 
nationalisation triggered 11 cases to date. The vast majority of these cases were settled 
with the total sum of payments made by the State reaching c. 780 million USD 
(excluding legal and arbitration fees).118  
                                               
 
118 See Appendix IV. 
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The magnitude of the costs incurred as a result of challenging the investment treaty 
regime reveals why many developing countries that realise the extent to which BITs 
constrain their policy space refrain from exiting the system. In studying Bolivia's 
experience, we can conclude that the State only proceeded with its plans when officials 
were confident they had the means to meet the costs of challenging the investment 
treaty regime. Since taking office, the Morales administration pursued its economic 
mandate strategically and pragmatically. During the planning phase, a cost-benefit 
assessment of its plans was conducted, and the implementation of the new economic 
policies and measures were only sanctioned after determining that the gains would 
exceed the costs. The estimated increase in royalties combined with the expected 
growth in tax revenues boosted the government's confidence about the economic 
viability of the decision to proceed with its nationalisation plans and its ability to deal 
with threats posed by BITs.  
Finally, the significant upturn in Bolivia’s economic fortunes also meant a change in 
the structural power dynamics that strongly influenced its decision to join the regime. 
As demonstrated above, Bolivia no longer depended on IFIs and capital exporting 
countries for financial credit. Therefore it can be concluded that Bolivia’s decision to 
exit the investment treaty regime was not only guided by ideological motives. Indeed,  
it was the shift in structural power dynamics as a result of the favourable economic 
conditions and the positive outcomes of the cost-benefit analysis conducted by the 
government that empowered the State to proceed with its decision to exit the regime.  
The final section of this case study argues that based on Bolivia’s experience, a 
reconceptualisation of Hirschman’s exit is required for it to reflect the nature of exit 
in the investment treaty regime. 
7. Conclusion: Does Hirschman’s Framework explain Bolivia’s 
Exit? 
According to Hirschman, members of an organisation or system would only consider 
the exit option in the following conditions: when there is an attractive alternative and 
the costs of exiting are low; the certainty of exit outweighs the uncertainty of possible 
reform within the system; and the ability of the member to influence the system is 
high. The exit option in the investment treaty regime literature is regarded as the most 
radical approach to change, in which countries seek to leave the treaty system entirely. 
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Until recently, exit from investment treaty obligations has been rare (Gordon and Pohl, 
2015). This reality is not surprising considering that none of the three conditions above 
for choosing the exit option under the Hirschman framework entirely apply to 
developing countries that are discontent with their BITs and considering how to react. 
First, while internal reform may not be feasible due to asymmetries in power between 
the treaty parties or other misaligned interests (as will be demonstrated in Chapter 6), 
a unilateral termination from a BIT will not necessarily provide certainty either. In 
most BITs, unilateral termination is typically permitted after the treaty has been in 
force for a specified number of years, often ten or fifteen, and generally takes effect 
following a specified waiting period after notice is provided, commonly six months or 
a year. In addition to the timing constraints on termination, most BITs contain survival 
clauses, as discussed above, which extend the treaty's provisions, including the 
availability of investor-State arbitration for 10, sometimes 15 or even 20 years after 
the termination of the treaty. Hence, a complete exit is never feasible in the short run 
at least, leaving the State exposed to arbitration claims until the survival clauses 
elapse.  
Secondly, developing countries as capital importers are not among the power brokers 
within the investment treaty regime and hence their ability to influence or change the 
system is limited. Thirdly, the costs of exit are not low, as illustrated in this case study. 
There are high political and economic costs associated with exit, that range from being 
out favour with IFIs (e.g. World Bank and IMF) and capital-exporting countries, 
which represent an essential source of credit and FDI, to the exorbitant financial costs 
of arbitration. Hence, the exit option may not be feasible or attractive to a developing 
country in a vulnerable economic or political position.  
This case study provides an example of a developing country that decided to exit the 
investment treaty regime despite uncertainty regarding both the outcome and the costs 
of this decision as demonstrated above. Bolivia became the first to denounce the 
ICSID Convention in 2007 and went on to terminate its BITs, signalling the beginning 
of a backlash against BITs and ISDS amongst developing countries. Unlike other 
developing countries like South Africa (and more recently India and Indonesia), 
Bolivia’s decision to exit its BITs was not a prelude to exercising voice by introducing 
a new BIT or domestic framework that represented a reformed version of the 
international investment framework. Instead, it was a rejection of the norms and 
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principles of foreign investment protection embodied in the existing investment treaty 
regime and the introduction of an alternative framework in which domestic investment 
was prioritised over foreign investment and in which the State played a more 
prominent role in regulating FDI. Furthermore, while Hirschman saw loyalty as a 
mitigating factor in taking the decision to exit, this chapter demonstrated that a 
member’s decision to exit depends on structural dynamics and the ideological motives 
of the ruling regime.  
The objective of this case study was to analyse how Bolivia signed its BITs and how 
it reacted to the constraint BITs posed on the State's ability to regulate and the factors 
that made the exit option a feasible one. Any attempt to assess the success of Bolivia’s 
policy reversal and its exit from the investment treaty regime should be considered 
premature. However, it is important to understand the motives behind Bolivia’s 
decision to exit and the conditions that made it possible. This analysis provides 
valuable insights for developing countries that are discontent with their membership 
of the investment treaty regime and are looking for particular options on how to react. 
Finally, it can be concluded that while Hirschman's conceptualisation of exit might 
reflect some of the factors that influenced Bolivia’s decision, it nonetheless needs to 
be revised to account for the complicated nature of exit in the investment treaty 
regime. In Chapter 8, Hirschman’s conceptualisation of exit is revised to account for 
the findings of this case study.
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Chapter 6. Voice: A South African Case Study 
1. Introduction  
In the very early days of the post-Apartheid era, the ANC faced immense pressure by 
the South African corporate sector and to a lesser extent IFIs to conform to the 
dominant neoliberal economic model by facilitating private investments at the expense 
of the ability of the State to regulate. As part of the economic liberalisation process 
South Africa was undergoing, it started signing BITs during the second half of the 
1990s to demonstrate to the international investment community that it was open and 
a haven for foreign investments. South African officials did not thoroughly assess 
these treaties before they agreed to sign them and hence only became aware of the 
extent to which these treaties constrained their regulatory space once South Africa 
faced its first serious investment arbitration claim. 
After experiencing an arbitration case that challenged legislation aimed at redressing 
the legacies of the Apartheid era, South Africa's response to the threats posed by BITs 
was to conduct a public and comprehensive review of its BITs. Whereas a few of its 
Latin American counterparts had already denounced the ICSID convention and started 
to unilaterally terminate their treaties before they had expired, South Africa decided 
not to renew its BITs and to introduce domestic legislation to provide a new regulatory 
framework for FDI. The review included feedback from different stakeholders, both 
foreign and domestic. The new investment protection and arbitration legislation that 
followed excluded or amended the clauses that were deemed too expansive and 
restricted access to international arbitration while keeping the rest of the standards that 
existed in the original BITs. 
 While South Africa did proceed to withdraw from BITs, its experience cannot be 
categorised under the same category as Latin American countries like Bolivia. Unlike 
its Latin American counterparts, South Africa's decision was not part of a radical 
change in economic policies and ideology. Indeed, South Africa remained committed 
to the neoliberal approach to FDI regulation and only sought to introduce reforms that 
ensured it retained the policy space necessary to achieve its development objectives. 
South Africa decided not to renew the expiring treaties as opposed to prematurely 
terminating them and sounded out its partners to check if there was any prospect of 
renegotiating treaties before proceeding to replace BITs with a national framework. 
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Furthermore, despite exiting the legal framework of the regime by refusing to renew 
its BITs, South Africa ensured the domestic legislation that replaced these BITs 
excluded some of the controversial clauses, yet retained most of the norms and 
principles that shaped the investment treaty regime. Hence, based on the definition of 
the investment treaty regime outlined in Chapter 2, South Africa has only partially 
exited the regime.  
This chapter offers an in-depth study of South Africa’s relationship with the 
investment treaty regime, examining how and why South Africa signed BITs, how it 
realised they constrained its policy space, and what route it decided to take in response. 
In line with the eclectic approach adopted in the other case studies, this chapter 
combines two theories from the literature on BITs to explain how and why South 
Africa signed its BITs. The Structural Power framework is used to explain the 
influence of the economic and political context, while Poulsen's adaptation of the 
Bounded Rationality framework is deployed to explain how BITs were signed without 
being reviewed and why the South African government only realised their potency 
once it faced its first serious investment arbitration case. As for South Africa’s reaction 
to its discontent with the regime, this chapter finds that its ideological position towards 
FDI regulation had a strong influence on its preference for the voice route. While it 
lacked the bargaining power to convince its capital-exporting partners to renegotiate 
the existing BITs between them, it still had enough leverage to confront its partners 
with its decision to replace its existing BITs with a new domestic framework which 
introduced its desired reforms. Hence, unlike its Egyptian counterpart, structural 
power dynamics did not prevent it from introducing its desired reforms to its legal 
commitments under the investment treaty regime. 
Based on Hirschman's framework, South Africa's chosen route would fall under the 
exit category, and indeed its experience has been described as an example of a country 
that has decided to exit the international investment regime.119 In this case study, 
however, it is argued that South Africa's partially exited the regime in order to practice 
voice and that Hirschman's definition of voice needs to be reconceptualised to take 
into consideration the limitations imposed on the ability of developing countries to 
                                               
 
119 See Gordon and Pohl (2015) and Katselas (2014). 
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introduce amendments or reforms to their BITs with capital-exporting countries. South 
Africa's experience demonstrates that the options for voice are not feasible for 
developing countries that lack the bargaining power to renegotiate their treaties. 
Accordingly, this chapter concludes that the only way for developing countries to 
exercise voice is first to exit their treaties. This route which combines both exit and 
voice tactics is defined as ‘quasi-exit’ and will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 
8.  
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 traces South Africa's history 
with foreign investment and the context in which it signed its BITs. Section 3 provides 
an overview of South Africa's BIT network. In Section 4, an appraisal of South 
Africa's BIT signing process is conducted. Sections 5 and 6 trace South Africa's 
reaction to its arbitration experience including a comprehensive review that was 
conducted to assess South Africa's experience with BITs. Section 6 also covers South 
Africa's decision to replace its BITs with a national framework and the reaction of 
foreign investors to these changes. In the final section, South Africa's categorisation 
as an example of a developing country that has chosen the exit route is contested, and 
it is argued that there are grounds to consider its chosen route as an example of the 
possible route to practice voice for dissatisfied developing countries in the investment 
treaty regime.  
2. Historical Context of the BIT Signing Process 
During the Apartheid era, South Africa was treated as a pariah State, and many States 
followed an approach of economic isolation and pressure in the form of sanctions. The 
isolation included disinvestment and divestment from South Africa (Schlemmer, 
2016). As a result of the combination of international sanctions and tight capital 
controls, FDI inflows were minimal during Apartheid barely reaching 300 million 
USD from 1980 to 1993 (Poulsen, 2017). South Africa's position in the international 
arena was very precarious, and the negotiation and conclusion of international 
investment agreements were not on the agenda (Schlemmer, 2016). The primary 
source of investments in the Apartheid era was the government, as public investment 
was directed towards roads, dams, rail, electronics and armaments (Langalanga, 
2016). With the economy being isolated through sanctions and disinvestment, the 
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regime adopted an import substitution policy and focused on developing domestic 
‘strategic’ industries in armaments, chemicals and energy (Langalanga, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the South African legal system under Apartheid was generally 
favourable to foreign investments. Some of the legislation that was directly related to 
foreign investment regulation included the Expropriation Act No. 63 of 1975 and the 
Arbitration Act No. 42 of 1965. The Expropriation Act prohibited expropriation unless 
it was in the public interest following the general principle of international investment 
law, whereas the Arbitration Act codified the New York Convention on the 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Langalanga, 2016). 
The end of the Apartheid era and the rise of the African National Congress (ANC) to 
power after the 1994 elections witnessed a new era in which economic liberalisation 
was an integral pillar. The ANC government adopted conservative macroeconomic 
reforms, including liberalisation of commodity trade and the investment regime 
(Poulsen, 2017). In a statement made to Foreign Affairs in 1994, Nelson Mandela 
remarked (Mandela, 1993): 
It is obvious to me that the primary components of our international economic 
relations, which must feed our development strategy, are the strengthening of 
our trade performance and our capacity to attract foreign investment. We do 
not expect foreign investment to solve our economic problems, but we 
understand it can play a valuable role in our economic development. 
The importance ascribed to foreign investment as a significant tool to drive economic 
growth was also illustrated in the 1994 White Paper on the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP). The RDP emphasised the regime's commitment to 
establishing the necessary climate to attract foreign investors and ensuring that foreign 
investors enjoyed the same treatment as domestic investors by applying the principle 
of national treatment (South African Parliament, 1994). The RDP was later replaced 
by a more neoliberal strategy that diminished the role of the State in regulating the 
economy, the Growth Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR). The 
GEAR programme which was adopted in 1996 emphasised economic growth as a 
potent stimulus of FDI (Vickers, 2003). In practice, South Africa implemented a series 
of measures to liberalise its investment regime in almost all sectors. These measures 
included: allowing foreign investors 100 per cent ownership, revoking discriminatory 
taxes imposed on non-residents, removing restrictions on capital repatriation and 
getting rid of performance requirements (Poulsen, 2017). South Africa's policies 
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concerning FDI were tailored to win investor confidence in the South African regime 
and its economy because FDI was seen as a crucial tool to achieve its developmental 
goals (Yazbek, 2010). 
This outward-looking neoliberal strategy of growth was complemented by South 
Africa's efforts to attract foreign investors which included developing an investment 
promotion agency, signing double taxation treaties and a substantial unilateral 
reduction in tariffs in the process of opening up of its markets. However, South 
Africa’s main efforts to attract foreign investors came through signing a series of BITs. 
Between 1994 and 2009 49 BITs were signed by the State, only 21 of which entered 
into force. These treaties were a core component of the regime’s strategy of opening 
up the country to FDI as well as assuring foreign investors that their investment would 
not be subject to expropriation or nationalisation (Peterson, 2006). 
More importantly, all these policies and efforts to attract FDI were essentially meant 
to serve the overarching objective of socio-economic transformation in post-Apartheid 
South Africa. The post-Apartheid regime had inherited an economy in deep structural 
crisis, trapped in a low-growth equilibrium, economic exclusion and 
underdevelopment (DTI, 2003). The efforts to attract FDI were supposed to contribute 
to the greater objective which according to the State was to redress the legacy of 
disempowerment and fundamentally transform the country's political, social and 
economic landscape (DTI, 2003, p. 7). However, these reforms had disappointing 
outcomes as South Africa failed to attract much FDI throughout the 1990s and the 
economy struggled to achieve sustainable economic growth while suffering from one 
of the highest unemployment rates in the world (Poulsen, 2017). What South Africa 
did not realise at the time was that signing BITs would not only fail to attract FDI but 
would have a significant impact on its ability to regulate the economy. As Peter 
Draper, a former South African official remarked, ‘we were essentially giving away 
the store without asking any critical questions or protecting crucial policy space’ (cited 
in Provost and Kennard, 2015).  
Eventually, South Africa realised that its membership of the investment treaty regime 
imposed constraints on its developmental agenda, subjecting the country to the threat 
of costly investment arbitration (Poulsen, 2017). This realisation occurred when the 
State was exposed to ISDS claims, see below. The next section provides an overview 
of South Africa’s BITs including a summary of the main provisions in these BITs.  
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3. Overview of South Africa’s BITs 
The first South African BIT was signed with the UK in September 1994, signalling 
the start of South Africa’s ‘reintegration’ into the world economy (Tralac, 2004). In 
the first five years (1994-1999), South Africa signed 27 BITs, the majority of which 
were with capital-exporting countries. Another 22 BITs were signed between 2000 
and 2009, mainly with developing countries; however, only two of these treaties 
entered into force. Overall, most of South Africa's BITs were with European countries 
and European Union members, in particular, the rest of the BIT partners included 
States from Latin America, Africa and the Middle East.120 
A comparison of the provisions of the South African BITs reveals that there was little 
change or progression in the government's approach to the negotiation and signing of 
the BITs (Schlemmer, 2016). Most of South Africa’s BITs were loosely modelled on 
the British model, of the UK BIT. South African BITs generally contained definitions 
of ‘investment’, ‘investors’, ‘returns’ and ‘territory’, and clauses on the promotion and 
treatment of investments, compensation for losses, dispute settlement and transfers of 
investments and returns (Tralac, 2004). The only BIT that contained clauses that are 
relatively different from those contained in the other BITs is the one signed with 
Canada (Schlemmer, 2016). The different wording and the carve-outs contained in 
this BIT, however, were due to Canada's insistence on including clauses to ensure the 
BIT was consistent with its own model BIT and policy position (Schlemmer, 2016).121  
A summary of the main clauses included in South Africa’s BITs is included below:  
• The definition of investment in South African BITs is broad in scope and is 
not a ‘closed’ list (Schlemmer, 2016). Definitions include ‘every kind of 
assets’ and the most common examples of assets include: movable and 
immovable property, other property rights (mortgages, liens and pledges), 
shares, stock and debentures of companies, claims to money and intellectual 
property rights.  
 
                                               
 
120 See Appendix III for a list of South Africa’s BITs. 
121 The Canada-South Africa BIT never entered into force.  
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• FET is provided for in all South African BITs. In the majority of the BITs, the 
FET clause is unqualified and stipulates that neither contracting party shall in 
any way impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of investments in its territory of 
nationals or companies of the other contracting party. The FET clause is often 
complemented with the full protection and security protection standard. 
 
• NT and MFN standards are provided in the majority of South Africa's BITs. In 
most BITs, both standards apply to the investment and activities of investors 
in general and also to returns of investments. A few BITs (only four of which 
have entered into force) contain an exception to the national treatment standard 
in favour of South Africa. The exception exempts the State from applying the 
national treatment standard to any law or measure applied for the purpose of 
equality in its territory or designed to protect or advance natural or legal 
persons, or categories thereof, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination in its 
territory.122 
 
• All of South Africa's BITs contain an expropriation clause that covers both 
direct expropriation and indirect expropriation. Most of the BITs make 
provision for prompt, adequate and effective compensation. 
 
• South Africa’s BITs generally contain a provision guaranteeing the free 
transfer of capital investments and profits.  
 
• The vast majority of South Africa's BITs contain a broadly drafted ISDS 
clause. In most BITs the ISDS provision generally requires disputes to be 
notified in writing to the other party to the dispute and to be settled amicably 
through negotiations within a three to six months period (cooling off period). 
If no settlement can be reached within that period, the dispute may be 
submitted to international arbitration at the choice of the investor. The most 
                                               
 
122 This exception is only included in BITs with the following countries: Russia, China, Mauritius and 
Nigeria. 
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frequently used arbitration forum is ICSID with particular reference also to the 
Additional Facility of ICSID since South Africa is not a party to the ICSID 
convention. None of the South African BITs contained an obligation to exhaust 
local remedies. 
 
• The majority of South Africa's BITs provide for an initial duration of 10 to 20 
years, that can be renewed for an additional period, or that will become a treaty 
of indefinite duration unless any of the parties notifies the other party before 
the date of expiry that it wants to terminate the treaty. South Africa's BITs 
generally provide survival clauses that extend the protection granted by BITs 
for investments made prior to the expiry or termination of the treaty for an 
additional period of 10 to 20 years after it is no longer in force. 
 
In the next section, an appraisal of South Africa’s BIT signing process is conducted to 
gain a better understanding of how and why South Africa signed BITs that constrained 
its ability to implement the most comprehensive and far-reaching social policy since 
Apartheid, the black empowerment programme (BEE). 
4. An Appraisal of South Africa’s BIT Signing Process  
In Chapter 3, it is argued that an eclectic approach can be adopted to explain how and 
why developing countries signed BITs by combining two theories from the literature 
on BITs. Poulsen's adaptation of the Bounded Rationality framework is used to explain 
how governments signed BITs without thorough review and only started to take them 
seriously once the State was hit by an investment arbitration claim. The Structural 
Power framework is deployed to explain how the context in which these BITs were 
signed can have a significant influence on the decision of governments in developing 
countries to accept the content of these BITs. In line with the Egypt and Bolivia case 
studies, South Africa's experience in signing BITs reflects trends that are consistent 
with Poulsen's theory. These trends include the assumption that BITs are harmless and 
will increase FDI inflows based on anecdotal evidence and in the absence of a legal 
and economic review. Moreover, South Africa only started to review its BITs once it 
faced an arbitration claim that revealed the potency of these BITs.  
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Where South Africa differs from its counterparts, Egypt and Bolivia, is its position on 
investment protection rules in multilateral forums. Unlike its counterparts, South 
Africa's decision to sign BITs did not represent a paradox as it did not have a history 
of resisting the investment protection rules. Furthermore, after it signed BITs, South 
Africa, unlike Egypt and Bolivia, consistently supported the US and EU proposals to 
include negotiation of the ‘Singapore Issues’ including the investment issue at the 
WTO (Lee, 2006). Hence, there was no contradiction in South Africa's position on 
investment protection rules in bilateral and multilateral settings.  
Another key difference is that while South Africa was going through a transition, it 
was not suffering from an economic or debt crisis and hence IFIs did not have the 
same leverage they had over countries like Bolivia and Egypt. Nevertheless, IFIs like 
the IMF did not need to impose neoliberal policies on the South African post-
Apartheid regime. In South Africa, the neoliberal shift was largely internally 
generated. The actor that held structural power in South Africa's case is the corporate 
sector. Through its indispensable role in South Africa's economic development and its 
enormous capacity to generate propaganda, the corporate sector was able to shape the 
economic model adopted by the incoming ANC government as demonstrated below. 
The impact of the IFIs came through the policy advice provided which paved the way 
for capital-exporting countries to approach the South African government with BITs 
to sign. Accordingly, in this case study, the Structural Power framework is adopted to 
explain how the economic context in which South Africa signed its BITs had a 
significant influence on its decision to sign these treaties. 
The first part of this appraisal will analyse the role of the corporate sector and IFIs in 
shaping South Africa's new economic framework. The second part will demonstrate 
how South Africa's approach to signing and processing its BITs is consistent with 
Poulsen's hypothesis. 
4.1 The Role of the Corporate Sector and IFIs in Shaping South Africa’s 
Neoliberal Policy Landscape 
Section 2 demonstrated how BITs were signed as part of the neoliberal economic 
reform taking place in the early days of the post-Apartheid era. It is important to note, 
however, that the ANC initially planned to adopt a different economic strategy which 
entailed a more prominent role for the State in regulating the economy (including 
FDI). This section analyses the role of the South African corporate sector and IFIs in 
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influencing the ANC's decision to embrace neoliberalism and adopt a more liberalised 
approach towards FDI. Through the ability to shape the framework within which the 
State interacted with corporate enterprises and private investors (as illustrated below), 
South Africa's corporate sector demonstrated how it held structural power. This 
structural power enabled these actors to strongly influence the South African State's 
approach to FDI and hence, along with the pressure applied by IFIs, played a 
preponderant role in the State's eventual decision to sign BITs presented by capital-
exporting countries during the early days of the post-Apartheid era. 
For many years, the ANC advocated radical change in the management and ownership 
of the economy, including outright nationalisation, and radical redistribution of 
wealth, including land (ODI, 1994). During the build-up to the 1994 election 
campaign, two different strategies were being debated for South Africa's post-
Apartheid economic future. On one side, the ANC promoted the establishment of a 
Welfare State through the RDP (Bakken, 2014). The RDP was borne out of the report, 
‘Making Democracy Work: a framework for macroeconomic policy in South Africa’, 
which was published by the Macro-Economic Research Group (MERG)123 (ODI, 
1994). The report emphasised the need for an active State and was in favour of a 
Keynesian macroeconomic framework (Bakken, 2014). The opposing strategy was the 
scenario promoted by the National Party (NP), ‘The Normative Model Approach’ 
(NEM). The NEM, which was based on the IMF recommendations provided in the 
1992 ‘Occasional Paper’ (Marais, 2001), was a neoliberal blueprint that promoted the 
creation of a business-friendly environment. The key measures recommended in the 
NEM included minimal State intervention, privatisation, liberalisation and tight 
monetary policies (Bakken, 2014). Despite initially rejecting the NEM, the ANC 
eventually adopted the GEAR programme as the post-Apartheid government's 
economic development model in 1996 (as previously discussed above). The economic 
strategy articulated in the GEAR reflected the same neoliberal approach adopted in 
the NEM and focused on the liberalisation of the South African economy.  
The implication of this policy reversal on FDI policy was a switch from a regulated 
approach to a more liberalised approach of attracting FDI. In 1994, the ANC did not 
                                               
 
123  MERG was set up set up jointly by the ANC and Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU). 
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have a substantial policy on FDI, but the government was reluctant to formulate a 
policy that would be supplied by the marketplace itself (Eisenberg, 1994). While there 
was no clear and coherent FDI policy, the ANC issued several statements to emphasise 
that the country was open to foreign investment. The policy guidelines published by 
the ANC and adopted at the National conference in May 1992 stated that (ANC, 1992): 
In a democratic South Africa, the ANC will welcome foreign investment, in 
accordance with our objectives for growth and development, and will adopt an 
open approach to the entry of foreign investment. 
The statement set the tone for the building of a liberal investment climate in post-
Apartheid South Africa. However, it also indicated that the ANC planned to adopt a 
more regulated approach to attracting FDI by introducing safeguards to ensure FDI 
inflows served the economic and social objectives of the future government. The 
ANC's commitment to affirmative action was expected to result in regulations 
imposing a new range of obligations on investors concerning employment practices, 
housing, training, trade union rights, women’s rights, access to land and environmental 
standards (Brown et al., 1994). In a study commissioned by the ANC in 1994, the 
government was advised to ensure that any foreign investment regulations or codes 
would provide the State with the necessary policy space to regulate FDI (Brown et al., 
1994). According to the study, the South African government should be able to 
provide preferential treatment (e.g. tax concessions or government subsidies) to 
particular types of investments that are considered especially desirable. These types 
include investments in under-developed regions, ‘or in favour of South African 
citizens who have hitherto been disadvantaged and who will need special measures to 
assist them to become owners, either directly or indirectly, of a significantly larger 
proportion of the country's productive assets’ (Brown et al., 1994, p. 48). This 
approach was indeed adopted in the ‘Platform of Guiding Principles for Foreign 
Investors’ which was drafted by the ANC and COSATU in 1992.124 The guidelines 
listed obligations the investors would be expected to abide by, such as environmental 
standards, employment and labour practices, and development of black business. 
                                               
 
124 The Platform of Guiding Principles for Foreign Investors. ANC and COSATU position presented to 
the National Conference in Support of the African National Congress and Other Democratic Forces for 
a New South Africa, 12-15 November, 1992, New York City. 
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However, under the influence of the corporate sector in South Africa and to a lesser 
extent the IFIs, the ANC eventually became convinced that the appeasement of 
domestic and international capital had become unavoidable (Marais, 2011). The next 
section explores how and why this policy reversal occurred, highlighting the influence 
of the corporate sector and IFIs on the formulation of South Africa’s FDI policy post-
Apartheid.  
4.1.1 South Africa’s Corporate Sector  
While it is quite common for developing countries in transition or suffering from an 
economic crisis to adopt neoliberal policies as part of a SAP imposed by the World 
Bank or IMF, in South Africa the neoliberal shift has mainly been internally generated 
(Carmody, 2002; Marais, 2011; see also Padayachee and Fine, 2018). South Africa’s 
relatively low level of external debt meant the leverage of IFIs like the World Bank 
and IMF was not as high as it was over countries that were suffering from a debt crisis 
(e.g. Bolivia and Egypt). Furthermore, the strength of the corporate sector, its 
bargaining power and vested interest in the liberalisation of the South African 
economy as illustrated below, meant that IFI’s did not need to persuade the South 
African government to adopt neoliberal policies. This is not to claim or argue that the 
IFIs did not play a role in the liberalisation of South Africa’s FDI regime which led to 
the signing of BITs. The IMF was indeed involved with the South African authorities 
in the Apartheid era and provided policy recommendations which were adopted in the 
NEM. Moreover, the IMF and World Bank started to play an active role in South 
Africa during the transitional phase that preceded the 1994 elections providing policy 
recommendations (see further below). After analysing how the South African 
corporate sector exercised its influence on the ANC, the role of the IFIs will also be 
addressed later in this section.  
The South African economy was dominated by a group of conglomerates, the four 
largest of which controlled 83 per cent of the companies listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) before the end of Apartheid (Carmody, 2002). 125  The 
investment strategies of these conglomerates were important not only in their own 
                                               
 
125 Fine and Rustomjee (2018) argue that the economy has been dominated by six conglomerates or 
‘axes of capital’: SA Mutual, Sanlam, Anglo-American Corporation, Liberty/Standard, 
Rembrandt/Volkskas and Anglovaal.  
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right, but also because the success of small businesses, and hence the potential for 
substantial job creation, was intimately linked to these conglomerates through their 
control of financing, linkage and demand effects, and technological spill overs 
(Carmody, 2002; Fine, 1997; Kaplinsky and Manning, 1998).  
South African policy elites were hijacked by business influence early on in the policy 
making stages of the ANC’s accession to power (Valsamkis, 2008). A ‘plethora of 
corporate scenario-planning exercises was unleashed after 1990’ (Marais, 2011, p. 
101) and had a telling impact in convincing ANC decision makers to abandon their 
developmental State model (Bond, 1996; Marais, 2011). The corporate sector, often 
represented by the Mineral Energy Complex (MEC) and Anglo American Company 
(AAC) (Bakken, 2014), published a significant number of economic scenarios 
dedicated to  correcting the ANC’s perceived economic flaws and highlighting the 
pitfalls of a mixed economy model (Taylor, 2001). According to Marais (2011), these 
interventions by the corporate sector shared an overarching set of assumptions and 
tenets. These assumptions included the need for macroeconomic stringency, restraint 
in social restructuring, an outward-oriented economy and a facilitating (as opposed to 
interventionist) State (Marais, 2011). The ANC was subjected to an ideological 
barrage as the corporate sector promoted its preferred economic policies ‘lavishly and 
ubiquitously in books, videos, multimedia presentations and newspaper supplements, 
and in a frenetic assortment of seminars, conferences, … and high-profile visits of 
carefully chosen foreign experts – all financed by business, donors and multilateral 
agencies’ (Marais, 2011, p. 101). According to Terreblanche (2002, p. 55), the 
corporate sector’s enormous bargaining power and its capacity to generate propaganda 
in both the economic and political arena cannot be overstated. Through this concerted 
campaign, the corporate sector was able to shape domestic economic policy. 
Consequently, by late 1993, ‘the language and tone’ of ANC and business policy 
documents were ‘so similar that at times they appear interchangeable’ (Kentridge, 
1993, p. 26).  
The South African corporate sector was without a doubt very influential during the 
transition period (Bakken, 2014). It controlled two structures specified by Susan 
Strange: production and knowledge. First, concerning the production dimension, the 
corporate sector enjoyed a significant degree of structural power as the economic 
backbone of a country engaged in political and economic transition (Valsamkis, 2008). 
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Second, through controlling the knowledge dimension, the corporate sector succeeded 
in convincing the ANC's top leadership that the ‘choices had become stark and binary: 
either yield to the injunctions of corporate capital or expose the economy to the wrath 
of the markets (and put the democratic transition at risk)’ (Marais, 2011, p. 106). 
Furthermore, the critical role of the corporate sector's discursive power in shaping and 
framing the newly elected ANC government's early economic policy (Valsamkis, 
2008) ensured that the ANC committed itself to pursue a list of neoliberal reforms, 
which was eventually manifested in the GEAR programme.  
As Bond (2005) argues, the corporate sector in South Africa was extremely active and 
successful in convincing the elite within the ANC of abandoning their heterodox 
policies in favour of a neoliberal and business-friendly policy. One of the main 
cornerstones of the GEAR strategy was the stimulation of private investment. The 
strategy advocated for minimal regulation by the State and the liberalisation of 
financial controls as well as the exchange rate (Bakken, 2014). By adopting this new 
strategy and signing BITs, the State also gave away its possibility to regulate 
investment in the economy (Bakken, 2014).  
4.1.2 The Role of the IFIs  
After the changes announced by the de Klerk government in the early 1990s signalling 
that the Apartheid era was coming to an end, the IMF, along with the World Bank, 
began to increase its visibility in South Africa (Kahn, 2000). IFIs, in general, became 
quite active in South Africa through holding more frequent discussions with the State, 
issuing policy documents with recommendations for economic measures to be adopted 
by the government, as well as engaging with academics, labour movement and NGOs. 
The IMF, in particular, was concerned with the economic policies that would be 
followed by the new government, as this was at a time of intense debate over future 
economic policy (Kahn, 2000). The debate was settled in favour of adopting the 
neoliberal path as demonstrated above through internal forces, namely the dominant 
corporate sector. 
The influence of IFIs in post-Apartheid South Africa did not come through loans and 
conditionalities. Instead, the real impact was through the policy advice provided by 
these institutions. More importantly, the South African government was convinced 
that signing agreements with institutions like IMF signified its ‘stamp of approval’ for 
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South Africa's democratic transition and economic policies. This stamp of approval 
was expected to unlock potential FDI and international credit for the South African 
economy (Padayachee and Fine, 2018). By encouraging the South African 
government to undergo further economic liberalisation and persuading it that it was 
necessary for attracting foreign investors, IFIs paved the way for capital-exporting 
countries to sign BITs with South Africa. 
After de Klerk‘s 1989 speech in Parliament, when he called for multiracial elections, 
the IMF, just like the World Bank, began to engage with the transitional government 
(Bakken, 2014). In 1992, the IMF launched the Occasional Paper called Economic 
Policies for a New South Africa (Lachman and Bercuson, 1992). The report on South 
Africa focused on issues like the scope for a more liberal trade and payment system 
of an outward-looking strategy (Bakken, 2014; Padayachee, 1997). It emphasised the 
importance of a limited State and the liberalisation of trade and financial policies 
(Bakken, 2014). The report was well received by the corporate sector as it supported 
the neoliberal economic approach it was advocating for (Padayachee, 1997). 
In 1993, the Transitional Executive Council (TEC)126 and the IMF signed a deal to 
borrow 850 million USD from the Fund. This agreement was an IMF Compensatory 
and Contingency Financing Facility. A quick review of the policy measures included 
in the Letter of Intent which accompanied the loan facility reveals ‘striking 
similarities’ with the National Party’s NEM (Marais, 2011) and the policies advocated 
for by the South African corporate sector. The Letter of Intent warned in general terms 
against the dangers of increases in real wages in the private and public sectors, stressed 
the importance of controlling inflation, supported trade and industrial liberalisation, 
and repeatedly espoused the virtues of market forces over regulatory interventions 
(Padayachee, 1997; Padayachee and Fine, 2018). These policies were also reflected 
later on in the GEAR programme, which further suggests that the IMF was 
consolidating the new economic framework shaped by the corporate sector and the 
National Party for post-Apartheid South Africa. Furthermore, in 1994, the same year 
South Africa signed its first BIT with the UK, the IMF published a report, ‘Key Issues 
in the South African Economy’ which pushed for abolition of exchange controls and 
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argued that the liberalisation of trade and financial relations was a prerequisite for 
increased export and foreign investment (IMF, 1994; Marais, 2011).  
The World Bank was also active during that phase, as it reengaged with the South 
African government in 1990 after an absence of over twenty years (Bond, 2005). As 
is the case with the IMF, the World Bank’s influence came through its policy advice 
and not its lending and conditionalities (Bakken, 2014; Bond, 2005). In its 
publications, the World Bank warned against an expansionary role for the State, 
especially with regard to fiscal instruments to stimulate demand, an outward-oriented 
strategy of development and controlling the real exchange rate (Padayachee, 1997). 
Like the IMF, the World Bank strongly advised the ANC to liberalise its economy in 
order to attract FDI inflows. In 1992, a World Bank Consultant stated that amongst 
the most critical factors keeping foreign investors away from South Africa were 
political instability and uncertainty about the possible economic policies of a future 
government (Schneidman, 1992). Accordingly, the South African regime scaled up its 
efforts to reassure foreign investors by signing the MIGA Convention in 1992.  
The World Bank and IMF were not the only multilateral institutions pushing the South 
African government to provide further guarantees to foreign investors. The United 
Nations Centre for Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) also warned the South 
African government that the lack of a code or special regime for foreign investment 
would harm South Africa’s chances of attracting FDI and hence negatively impact its 
economic development. A UNCTC (1992, p. 9) report stated that: ‘failure to step 
forward with articulated policies would create doubts and uncertainties in the 
international community very damaging to economic prospects’. As a result of these 
warnings and the pressure exerted by the corporate sector, the ANC responded with a 
concerted effort to assure foreign investors that they would not be subjected to 
expropriation or nationalisation and that they would be free to repatriate profits and 
dividends in the lead-up to the 1994 elections (Peterson, 2006). 
When South Africa first started to enter into BITs with capital-exporting European 
countries, one of the main aims was to gain the trust and approval of the international 
community. The capital-exporting countries sought clear signals that foreign 
investments would be protected. The ANC was desperate to reassure countries that 
had invested in South Africa during the Apartheid era that the new regime would not 
nationalise or expropriate their investments. It was against this background that the 
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British Prime Minister, John Major, fearing that the ANC might expropriate British 
assets in South Africa, was the first to approach the then Apartheid government in 
1993 with an OECD BIT template (Langalanga, 2016). During a visit in 1994, Major 
emphasised the need for liberalising the South African economy and was equipped 
with pledges for 530 million Rand in development aid (Major, 1994). While there is 
no indication that signing the BIT was a conditionality for the aid package provided 
by the UK, South African officials at the time did find there was considerable political 
pressure to sign the treaty (Poulsen, 2017). 
Finally, the raft of investment treaties that South Africa went on to sign over the 
following decade represented the broader policy of significantly liberalising the FDI 
regime, as part of the overall shift to a more neoliberal economic model under the 
GEAR programme (Peterson, 2006). As demonstrated in this section, South Africa‘s 
neoliberal trajectory after the end of Apartheid was a result of an elite compromise 
between the South African corporate sector, IFIs, and the first government of the post-
Apartheid era which included ANC but also had representatives from the National 
Party, who shared the corporate sector's vision for a neoliberal economic model 
(Bakken, 2014; Terreblanche, 2002). The corporate sector, in particular, was 
instrumental in creating this compromise (Terreblanche, 2002).  
While the context may explain why South Africa signed its BITs as part of liberalising 
its FDI regime, it does not adequately explain why South African officials did not 
analyse the treaties to ensure they did not conflict with their plans to introduce 
affirmative action measures to redress the legacies of the Apartheid era. This is where 
the Bounded Rationality framework can complement the explanation above to explain 
why officials only realised the potency of these BITs once South Africa was hit with 
an ISDS claim challenging its BEE programme. 
4.2 Explaining South Africa’s BIT Signing Process using the Bounded 
Rationality Framework 
This section deploys the Bounded Rationality framework as adapted by Poulsen to 
explain how South Africa signed treaties that were effectively nullifying its efforts to 
introduce affirmative action. When South African officials embarked on signing BITs 
in the 1990s, they failed to evaluate the implications of specific provisions of these 
treaties and were unaware of their potential impact on South Africa's future policies. 
Poulsen (2017) argues that the combination of bureaucratic conditions and lack of 
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expertise and coordination led South African officials to ignore the risks of BITs and 
overestimate their benefits. Poulsen's research further reveals that BITs were signed 
merely because they were available and ready to adopt. The government did not 
undertake a careful consideration of the costs and benefits of these treaties compared 
to alternative investment promotion instruments (Poulsen, 2017). Consequently, the 
implications of entering into these investment treaties were brushed aside and did not 
receive scrutiny until the South African government found itself on the receiving end 
of its first serious claim in 2007 – the Piero Foresti v. Republic of South Africa (2007) 
case,127 which will be elaborated on further in Section 5. 
Although the new post-Apartheid South African government signed its first BIT with 
the UK in 1994, the BIT was presented to the outgoing National Party government a 
year earlier. As previously mentioned, the UK government at the time was said to be 
wary of the South African government, then, fearing it would not protect existing 
British investments and would nationalise or expropriate property (Williams, 2009). 
Accordingly, the British government acted swiftly by presenting its draft model BIT 
to the outgoing government, which simply accepted the draft model BIT with minimal 
if any negotiation when it was presented in 1992/93 (Williams, 2009). The proposed 
text was based on a standard OECD model128 and contained the provisions outlined in 
Section 3.  
At the time, these treaties were considered harmless by South African officials as was 
the case with many developing countries that signed them. However, a close analysis 
of the terms of the UK-South Africa BIT and South Africa's Constitution reveals 
substantial incompatibility and, in hindsight, it is quite striking that this was 
overlooked (Mossallam, 2015). One clear example is that the national treatment 
standard in the BIT contained no explicit provision allowing the State the right to give 
local firms preferential treatment. This clause directly contradicted the new 
Constitution, which was in the process of being developed when the BIT was signed, 
and, which included affirmative measures to redress the historical injustices faced by 
the black population (Poulsen, 2017). Many more contradictions started to appear once 
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the Constitution was finalised. These included the lack of a distinction between 
expropriation and deprivation in the BITs signed by South Africa, implying that 
deprivation was tantamount to expropriation and would result in compensation. In 
contrast, the Constitution clearly stipulated that deprivation would not require 
compensation if the measures were pursuant to law and not arbitrary (Mossallam, 
2015). Another important aspect was how compensation for expropriation would be 
calculated, which in the Constitution included taking public interest into account and 
allowing for less than market compensation. This qualification is particularly 
significant in cases where, for instance, it was proven that the land was acquired during 
the Apartheid era. However, the relevant clause in the BITs would not allow any 
deviation from market value (Mossallam, 2015). Last but not least is the arbitration 
provision that allowed investors to sidestep domestic courts and file claims against 
South Africa in international courts like ICSID. Through these treaties, South Africa 
introduced investor-State arbitration over a wide range of regulatory issues, which was 
a first for South Africa and gave foreign investors access to a dispute settlement forum 
and enforcement mechanisms not available to local South African investors (Poulsen, 
2017). As was the case initially for most developed and developing countries that 
signed these BITs, South Africa had no reason to be sceptical as in the early 1990s 
there were few if any, cases to reveal arbitration as the threat it constitutes today. 
These contradictions between the BITs and South Africa’s Constitution were 
overlooked. Strikingly, after the President signed the BIT in 1994, officials did not 
voice any concerns to the Parliamentary committee (Poulsen, 2017). Instead, they 
asserted that the BIT with the UK did not contain any substantive obligations that 
would be placed on South Africa (Williams, 2009). Furthermore, the BIT between 
South Africa and the UK was adopted by South Africa as a draft model and used as 
the basis for concluding most of their subsequent BITs (Poulsen, 2017). This brings 
us to the question of how South African officials entered into agreements that 
significantly constrained their ability to regulate and implement their social and 
economic agenda.  
Poulsen's research findings on this particular question point to weak levels of 
organisation, and uninformed and poorly coordinated government officials dealing 
with these issues. For instance, the public officials charged with negotiating the 
treaties were not lawyers and had little legal and technical expertise in international 
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law (Poulsen, 2017). Accordingly, the mistaken impression that these treaties did not 
have any implications and their provisions entirely corresponded to South African law 
meant there was no reason for Parliamentarians to investigate these BITs and their 
importance for attracting FDI. Politicians also did not question the scale of the legal 
guarantees granted to these investors (Poulsen, 2017). As a consequence of the lack 
of oversight, BITs were signed in many cases for diplomatic reasons, ignoring the 
material commitments they entailed. Few records exist to explain why South Africa 
took the approach it did towards BITs in the 1990s. However, a draft Cabinet 
memorandum from 1994, which appears to contain no legal or economic analysis of 
the risks associated with BITs, provides a few observations (Mossallam, 2015). These 
observations include that 16 countries had requested the conclusion of BITs with 
South Africa; the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) was convinced that such 
agreements would create an investor-friendly environment; and that the aspects 
covered by BITs can be viewed as ‘basic investor rights’ (DTI, 2009). 
In interview, Xavier Carim, then the Director-General for International Trade and 
Economic Development at the DTI explained that the implications of South Africa's 
first BITs were not adequately analysed before they were signed (cited in Mossallam, 
2015). In interview, Carim elaborates: ‘we had signed on BITs without proper 
analysis, part of the global trend of signing BITs without understanding the 
implications’ (cited in Mossallam, 2015). Moreover, as articulated in the DTI (2009) 
report, the impact of BITs on future policies was not critically assessed and the 
inexperience of negotiators coupled with the lack of knowledge about investment law 
at that time resulted in agreements that were not in South Africa's long-term interest 
(DTI, 2009). 
Having conducted an appraisal of how and why South Africa signed its BITs, the next 
section traces how South Africa began to realise the potency of its BITs and documents 
its first investment treaty arbitration case.  
5. BITs Bite: The Beginning of a Shift in South Africa’s Position on 
BITs  
South African officials claim that in the late 1990s they became aware of the 
challenges posed by these investment treaties (Mossallam, 2015). The signals first 
appeared when observing the fractious debate in the OECD over a multilateral 
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investment agreement in the late 1990s (Carim, 2012). However, it was the surge in 
the number of international investment arbitrations that followed the financial crisis 
in 2001 that made developing countries like South Africa aware of the potential risks 
associated with BITs (Carim, 2012). Nevertheless, the South African government only 
reacted after it was on the receiving end of an investment arbitration claim itself. 
In 2001, a legal officer from the multilateral trade negotiations unit within the DTI 
attended one of UNCTAD’s BIT signing sessions129 as part of the South African 
delegation (Poulsen, 2017). The officer was puzzled about the rapid adoption of 
treaties in Geneva, as South Africa signed around four BITs 130  in that session 
(Poulsen, 2017). While he could not object at the time, later that year the legal officer 
in question was appointed in charge of negotiating South Africa's investment treaties. 
Reflecting on his reaction after taking over as South Africa's BIT negotiator the 
Officer reveals that he was ‘quite horrified’ to read the content of the BITs, which 
‘places all the obligations on the host State and gives all the rights to the investors’ 
(Williams, 2009). Once he began investigating the treaties signed by South Africa over 
the previous six years, he strongly advised the government to halt all negotiations over 
new BITs with developed countries (Williams, 2009). His recommendation was taken 
on board, and a decision was taken to refrain from signing any new BITs until a clear 
strategy was devised (Williams, 2009). Accordingly, this new approach marked a 
notable change in South Africa's external investment policy. The implications of this 
change included halting the ratification of several existing BITs as well as the 
negotiation of new ones (Poulsen, 2017). More crucially, the legal officer also stopped 
South Africa from joining the ICSID Convention by objecting to the chapter of 
domesticating the ICSID Convention in the Arbitration Bill that was submitted to 
Parliament in 2001 (Poulsen, 2017). The experience with arbitration claims, which 
will be addressed further below, led the DTI to conclude that it was not in South 
Africa's interest to join ICSID and concerns about the enforcement mechanisms under 
the ICSID Convention motivated the DTI decision to remove this chapter from the 
final Arbitration Bill (Poulsen, 2017). The DTI took this decision against 
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recommendations made by the South African Law Commission in 1998. The 
Commission after receiving inputs of prominent arbitrators and international experts 
had recommended that South Africa should follow the example of most other African 
countries and ratify the Convention, as this would create the necessary legal 
framework to encourage foreign investment and further economic development in the 
region (South Africa Law Commission, 1998, p. 22). The Commission also warned 
that the ‘failure to ratify the Convention would leave South Africa as one of the very 
few African countries which have not done so and a continued failure to do so appears 
difficult to justify’ (South Africa Law Commission, 1998, p. 167). Hence, the decision 
not to ratify the ICSID Convention marked the beginning of a new policy towards FDI 
in South Africa.  
5.1 South Africa’s Arbitration Cases 
Although concerns did exist in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it was only when the 
first serious claim131 landed in 2007 that the South African government began to 
address these concerns and change its FDI policy (Mossallam, 2015). Before the Piero 
Foresti claim in 2007, South Africa had only experienced investment treaty arbitration 
once, in 2001, when a Swiss-owned farm had been subjected to a series of incursions, 
thefts and vandalism perpetrated over the course of a decade (Peterson, 2008). The 
owner of the property filed a claim using the Swiss-South Africa BIT alleging that the 
South African police failed to protect his property and that his investment was 
subjected to an expropriation (Peterson, 2008). The confidential arbitration was 
processed under the UNCITRAL rules of arbitration, which allows parties to initiate 
and pursue arbitration proceedings without public disclosure (Peterson, 2008). While 
the Tribunal dismissed the expropriation claim, it held South Africa to have breached 
the obligation to provide for ‘full protection and security’ of foreign investments under 
the Switzerland-South Africa BIT (Peterson, 2008). In 2004, the Tribunal awarded the 
investor damages of 6.6 Million SAR, plus interest (c. 1 million USD). 
While the Swiss claim was South Africa's first introduction to arbitration under BITs, 
it was the second claim that spurred the South African authorities to take action and 
review their BITs network. The ultimate trigger of the BIT review was the realisation 
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that South Africa's most comprehensive and far-reaching social policy since apartheid, 
its BEE programme, was conflicting with its obligations under BITs (Yazbek, 2010). 
The BEE policy was introduced as an attempt to redress inequalities in the political, 
social and economic spheres of South Africa. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, 
the implementation of the BEE programme had resulted in multinationals such as 
Deutsche Bank, Merrill Lynch, and de Beers selling equity stakes to black-owned 
enterprises or black employees, appointing black managers and entering into joint 
ventures with black operators (Poulsen, 2017; Schneiderman, 2008). Eventually and 
following a lengthy consultative process (Leon, 2009), the South African authorities 
decided to extend the programme to cover the mining industry (Poulsen, 2017). The 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) enacted in 2002 aimed 
to ‘substantially and meaningfully expand opportunities for historically disadvantaged 
persons … to enter the mineral and petroleum industries and to benefit from the 
exploitation of the nation’s mineral and petroleum resources’. 132  Under the new 
system established by the MPRDA, ownership of all mineral resources in South Africa 
was transferred to the State (Vis-Dunbar, 2009). The previous system of private 
ownership of mineral rights was replaced with a new licensing system under which 
mining enterprises that held old order mineral rights were obliged to convert these into 
new order rights (Vis-Dunbar, 2009). Another crucial element concerning the 
MPRDA was the introduction of requirements that enterprises have to fulfil to qualify 
for exploration or mining licenses, this included the requirement that a 26 per cent (or 
higher) ownership stake in the enterprise be held by historically disadvantaged South 
Africans (HDSA) (Friedman, 2010). 
The conflict between BEE and BIT obligations became evident in the wake of the 
2007 claim by several Italian citizens, and a Luxembourg corporation filed a claim 
under the Belgium- Luxembourg BIT, the Piero Foresti Case (Mossallam, 2015). The 
claimants charged that the implementation of the MPRDA amounted to the 
expropriation of their mineral rights.133 The Act required mining companies to transfer 
26 per cent of their shares to historically disadvantaged South Africans. The claimants 
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argued that these measures were expropriatory in nature and contradicted certain 
obligations that existed in the BITs signed by South Africa. 134  The government 
responded by defending its obligation to promote equality under both international 
human rights law and the South African Constitution, arguing that the mining policy 
was aimed at realising its human rights obligations.135 
The case was ultimately settled on the merits in 2010, with the Tribunal only required 
to make an award on costs (Peterson, 2010). The Piero Foresti Case, however, 
highlighted to the South African authorities that the ability of the State to regulate its 
domestic public policy objectives was under serious threat from BIT obligations in 
general and international investment arbitration in particular (Mossallam, 2015). In 
the wake of the settlement, South Africa initiated a review of its investment policy 
regime (Steenkamp, 2014). While the Foresti Case triggered the review, it is important 
to acknowledge a wider trend in international policy circles that bolstered the position 
of the South African government (Mossallam, 2015). As public statements by South 
Africa's Trade Minister reveal at the time, the government justified its decision to 
update the investment protection regime as consistent with global trends. A growing 
number of countries were seeking to address the faults in the treaties and investor-
State arbitration processes (Davies, 2014).  
6. South Africa’s BIT Review 
In the aftermath of the Foresti Case, South Africa embarked on a comprehensive and 
public review of its BITs. This process was a first in the developing world where 
countries had thus far either decided to immediately terminate all their treaties, or 
settle for incremental changes once the threats posed by BITs became apparent. The 
government's decision to review its approach to BITs mirrored BIT revisions in both 
developing countries in South America and developed countries, including the United 
States, Canada and Australia. South Africa's review process coincided with the general 
disenchantment with the international investment agreements regime, and hence its 
experience was carefully observed by developing countries that were wary of the 
potential backlash of such an exercise. The South African government embarked on a 
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systematic review of its investment policies in 2007, and this entailed looking at both 
the macro and microenvironment surrounding BITs (Mossallam, 2015). The macro-
policy research conducted under this review aimed to determine the policy and 
strategy considerations that motivate BITs and to assess the gains to South Africa from 
signing such treaties (DTI, 2009). The micro-environment study examined the legal 
obligations stipulated in the existing BITs and evaluated the changes that would be 
needed for the government to safeguard its policy objectives (Williams, 2009). 
The review process involved more than a hundred stakeholders from business, labour, 
government, local and international institutions, intending to inform and update the 
Executive on the legal implications and impact of BITs on South Africa's 
developmental agenda (DTI, 2009). Furthermore, the review process entailed detailed 
interviews at management level with the different sector desks at the DTI, which had 
led BIT negotiations. The objective of the review was to trace the reasons why the 
government failed to pursue a coordinated policy which led to the conflict between 
BIT obligations and national policies and to draw out lessons for cross-governmental 
policy integration (DTI, 2009, pp. 6, 24) . 
The policy framework review process produced three drafts, the first of which was an 
initial policy document based on research outcomes from interviewing the bilateral 
units in the international trade division which directly worked with BITs (Williams, 
2009). After receiving feedback from relevant policymakers in a government-
organised workshop, a second draft of the policy paper was published online as well 
as in the newspapers for public comment. This step failed to generate sufficient public 
participation and feedback, so a public workshop was held, attended by a wide range 
of stakeholders including academics, NGOs, business representatives, lawyers, labour 
unions and civil society (Williams, 2009). The feedback received from this event was 
integrated into the third draft that was sent to the Cabinet. The review was concluded 
in 2010. The key finding of the macro-review was that there is no correlation between 
a bilateral investment treaty with a particular country and the flow of FDI from that 
country. Instead, some of South Africa's principal investors came from countries they 
did not sign BITs with, such as, the United States (Mossallam, 2015). In interview, a 
former DTI Director explained that substantial investments came in from non-treaty 
partners, including the United States, India, Malaysia, and Brazil (cited in Mossallam, 
2015). The Director further elaborated, ‘… we could not see any clear, unambiguous 
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evidence that the treaties themselves encourage investment, which was also part of the 
calculation in weighing the possible benefits of the treaties compared to the risk’ (cited 
in Mossallam, 2015).  
Perhaps more importantly, the review confirmed that BITs, as they are currently 
drafted, extend too far into developing countries’ policy space, imposing damaging 
binding investment rules with far-reaching consequences for sustainable development 
(DTI, 2009, p. 11). In South Africa's case, the policy space constraint was in the form 
of legal challenges to public interest regulation. Accordingly, the DTI recommended 
that South Africa restructure its policy framework to ensure that broader social and 
economic priorities are not undermined (DTI, 2009, p. 24) . The review concluded that 
a new overarching investment policy strategy was needed to cover all of South Africa's 
investment-related policy efforts (DTI, 2009, p. 6) . 
The South African Cabinet made a series of landmark decisions from the review, and 
the DTI presented these resolutions to Parliament. The core decisions were to 
(Mossallam, 2015):136 
(i) end first generation BITs after offering the partners the possibility to renegotiate; 
(ii) develop investment legislation to codify BIT provisions into domestic law; 
(iii) develop a South African Model BIT as the basis for any new agreement; 
(iv) establish an inter-ministerial committee to oversee the process. 
6.1 Replacing BITs with a Domestic Framework 
In the aftermath of the review and subsequent Cabinet decisions, the South African 
government began notifying several of its partners that it would not be renewing its 
existing BITs. The South African government is said to have consulted extensively 
with governments with whom it had signed BITs on the issue of not renewing its BITs, 
following the Cabinet decision in July 2010 to terminate all BITs (Schlemmer, 
2016).137 The process of engaging with BIT partners was led by the Department of 
International Relations and Cooperation. Between 2011 and 2014, South Africa 
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provided the necessary notice to terminate three of its most important BITs: with 
Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands. These three treaties were given priority as 
they were subject to automatic renewal clauses and, therefore, would have been 
extended had the notice not been sent in time (Mossallam, 2015). Both the German 
and Swiss treaties include a 12-month notice period with run-off protection for 
existing protected investments of 20 years, whereas the Netherlands treaty has a six-
month notice period with a 15-year run-off period (Kolver, 2013). The South African 
government went on to terminate 15 BITs according to the DTI (2017), 13 of which 
were with European capital-exporting countries.138 Discussions have since continued 
with European and non-European BIT partners over termination in various forums 
(DTI, 2017).  
In tandem, the government drafted a Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill 
(PPIB) which was intended to provide investors with a domestic law that would 
protect their investments, and in effect, replace the BITs it was terminating 
(Mossallam, 2015). Interviews with senior officials revealed that the government had 
a firm conviction that South Africa's domestic law would be able to provide adequate 
guarantees to all investors, their investment and returns on investment (Interview with 
Carim, 2014; Interview with De Gama, 2014). The PPIB was a draft law issued by an 
inter-ministerial workgroup commissioned to devise an Investment Protection Act. 
The Bill aligned the national treatment, expropriation, compensation and transfer of 
funds provisions with South Africa's Constitutional principles. Concerning the right 
to regulate, the Bill stipulated that the government may take measures to, among other 
things: redress inequalities; preserve cultural heritage; foster economic development 
and industrialisation; achieve socio-economic rights, and protect health and 
environment (Carim, 2016).  
One of the major changes was the exclusion of what can be considered as a cornerstone 
standard in any BIT. The FET provision was left out entirely as it was deemed to be 
too widely framed and subject to controversial interpretation (Mossallam, 2015). The 
Bill also excluded the MFN clause. The DTI argued that this clause was no longer 
relevant as the Bill applies only in South Africa and that the Bill moves away from the 
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concept of nationality and treats all investors in a similar manner irrespective of their 
nationality (Mlumbi-Peter, 2015). 
In interview, Mustaqeem De Gama, the former Director of Legal, Trade and 
Investment at DTI, clarified that the national treatment standard in the Bill is subject 
to exceptions in respect of measures to redress inequalities as stated in the South 
African Constitution and to uphold rights guaranteed in the Constitution (cited in 
Mossallam, 2015). These exceptions, according to the Legal Director, should allow 
the government to address social and economic inequalities through measures like the 
BEE, without violating the national treatment standard (cited in Mossallam, 2015). 
There were also substantive changes made to the expropriation and compensation 
clauses in the Bill in comparison to those found in most BITs. Whereas most 
expropriation clauses in BITs do not differentiate between direct and indirect 
expropriation, the issue of indirect and creeping expropriation was addressed in the 
Bill (Mossallam, 2015). The PPIB differentiates between deprivation and 
expropriation as defined in Article 25 of the South African Constitution, and clarifies 
that incidental adverse impact on the economic value of the investment does not 
constitute expropriation (De Gama, 2014). Also, while BITs usually call for prompt 
adequate and effective compensation and stipulate that market value is the only 
reference for determining compensation for expropriation, the PPIB in line with 
Article 25 of the Constitution provides for just and equitable compensation. Tellingly, 
the significant modification in the compensation formula is that market value is not an 
endpoint. In the cases where the expropriation was proven to the court to be exercised 
in light of legitimate objectives of public interest, a lower than market value 
compensation can be determined at the discretion of the court (Mossallam, 2015).  
Influenced by South Africa’s experience in the Swiss arbitration claim, the Bill also 
modified the security and protection clause. The Bill emphasised that the government 
must accord foreign investors and their investments a level of security as may 
generally be provided to domestic investors, subject to available resources and 
capacity (Mlumbi-Peter, 2015). Finally, concerning investor-State dispute settlement, 
the Bill contained no provisions that provide for investor-State arbitration in 
international courts and limits dispute resolution to domestic remedies. Only subject 
to exhaustion of such remedies, may State-to-State arbitration be sought. 
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Since it was released in 2013, the PPIB was subjected to transparent and extensive 
consultations from a broad range of stakeholders including government, NGOs, 
domestic and international policy think tanks and academics. The government 
received written submissions which it eventually published along with the DTI’s 
responses139 before holding a public hearing in September 2015. As a result of public 
comment, in 2015 a revised Bill was released and later promulgated as the Protection 
of Investment Act (PIA). 
6.2 The Reaction of Foreign Investors 
As mentioned above the PPIB was subject to a rigorous consultation process between 
the government and stakeholders (Mlumbi-Peter, 2015). These stakeholders also 
included representatives of foreign investors, such as the EU, Swiss, German and 
American chambers of commerce. For foreign investors, the new legislation 
represented a downgrade to the scope of protection and expansive rights that were 
provided in the BITs. The EU is South Africa’s largest trading partner and source of 
FDI, and it was particularly vocal (Steyn, 2013).  
Interestingly, the EU and European investors did not question the decision of the 
government to embark on a review of its investment policies. However, concerns were 
expressed at the decision not to renew the BITs and the narrowing of the scope of 
protection standards provided in the PPIB. According to Axel de La Maisonneuve, the 
former Head of Economic and Trade section of the EU Delegation in South Africa: 
‘this was the sovereign right of the government to take policy steps of this nature. ... 
South Africa is entitled to believe at a certain stage that BITs have done their time and 
that they need to modernise the framework’ (cited in Mossallam, 2015).  
While most representatives of foreign investors raised objections which will be 
addressed below, some were sympathetic to the South African government's situation 
(Mossallam, 2015). As the well-known lawyer Peter Leon, who also served as co-
counsel to the claimants in the Piero Foresti case acknowledged (cited in Mossallam, 
2015):  
                                               
 
139 Summary of Submissions for the Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill (PPIB) [B18-2015]. 
Available at: http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west1.amazonaws.com/150922Summary_of_Matrix.pdf 
(Accessed 2 May 2016).  
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I have to say I do have sympathy with the government here, I do think they 
signed these BITs under ignorance and pressure from the UK. The South 
African government should have obtained advice about what they were signing 
from international investment lawyers. They did so under pressure on the basis 
that this would open a veritable Pandora’s Box for a whole flood of 
investments 
Nevertheless, interviews with European stakeholders (including officials from 
chambers of commerce and diplomats)140 revealed three main concerns with South 
Africa's decision not to renew BITs: (i) that South Africa could not afford to take such 
a move considering the negative implications it would have on the investment climate; 
(ii) the insufficient communication/consultation over the decision not to renew BITs; 
and (iii) the lack of an alternative framework in place immediately after BITs were 
terminated and the uncertainty it caused to investors.  
According to the EU Delegation official, it was the handling of the termination and 
not whether it was expected that was most disappointing. It was unforeseen that South 
Africa would proceed to end its BITs with EU partners unilaterally (cited in 
Mossallam, 2015). The official added that this decision contradicted the nature of 
bilateral treaties, and the result was not only a diplomatic concern but could also 
damage investor confidence. In an interview with the then Head of Economic 
Cooperation and Development at the Embassy of Switzerland, the diplomat argued 
that South Africa was not in a position to take such measures, considering its low 
ranking in reports like Doing Business at the time. He added that although some 
countries have high FDI rates without having signed BITs, this does not apply to South 
Africa as it is one thing to sign a BIT in the first place and another to cancel existing 
treaties without providing clear alternatives (cited in Mossallam, 2015). With regard 
to the concern that the alternative framework in the form of the PPIB was not 
immediately available after BITs expired, the Executive Director of the South African-
German Chamber of Commerce stated that: ‘the BIT terminations came three months 
before the PPIB was released. The lack of coordination and consultation conveyed a 
message to investors that South Africa only wanted FDI on its own terms’ (cited in 
Mossallam, 2015). 
                                               
 
140 Officials interviewed include: Head of Economic Cooperation and Development at the Embassy of 
Switzerland, Executive Director of the South African-German Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
and the Head of the Economic and Trade Section of the EU Delegation in South Africa. See Mossallam 
(2015) for a more detailed account of these interviews.  
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Interviews with representatives of foreign investors also revealed the concerns they 
had with the legislation that was replacing the BITs as the new regulatory framework. 
These concerns included: 141  first, the absence of the FET provision, with the 
implication that domestic law can change in ways that disadvantage investors. Second, 
the legal protection of investments under the PPIB only covers direct expropriation. 
No claim for compensation exists for measures having an equivalent effect to 
expropriation – contrary to what the expropriation standard in BITs covered. Third, in 
contrast to the BIT framework, compensation payments in cases of expropriations can 
be below market value, as the basis for any decision is the general provision of fair 
and equitable treatment. Fourth, also in contrast to the BIT framework, the legislation 
does not provide recourse to international arbitral tribunals.  
6.3 The South African Government’s Response to these Concerns 
Interviews with leading policy-makers in the South African government shed light on 
the government's rationale for terminating BITs and how it responded to criticism 
from investors. Government officials firmly rejected the assertion that the new 
domestic legal framework does not offer investors adequate protection. The former 
lead official for BITs at the DTI described the new legal framework as one that is 
underpinned by the Constitution, which firmly entrenches private property rights and 
protects against expropriation (cited in Mossallam, 2015). As for the delay in 
introducing the new framework and the uncertainty it caused, the former Legal 
Director at DTI responded that investors and BIT partners were well aware of the 
existence of survival clauses in BITs. The reality that existing investments would 
continue to be protected by BITs after it was terminated meant that investors were 
under no threat from the legal vacuum resulting from the absence of a regulatory 
framework prior to the introduction of the PPIB (cited in Mossallam, 2015). De Gama 
acknowledged, however, that the legal vacuum applied to new investments and 
conceded that the drafting of the PPIB took the government longer than initially 
expected. 
The reaction of foreign investors and European officials to the government's decision 
to review and exit the treaties was, from Carim's perspective, disproportionate. 
                                               
 
141 See Mossallam (2015). 
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According to Carim, in his 20-year career at the DTI, no investor had made an explicit 
link between an investment and the existence of an investment treaty (cited in 
Mossallam, 2015). Crucially, he was also not aware of any instance where an investor 
had refused to invest in South Africa because there was no treaty signed between its 
country and South Africa. He further argued that foreign governments appeared to 
care more about the existence of a treaty than foreign investors because they consider 
these treaties to be part of their policy framework (cited in Mossallam, 2015). For this 
reason, many of the objections to South Africa's decision not to renew its BITs came 
from foreign governments rather than the investors themselves. The DTI's assessment 
of South Africa's experience with BITs revealed that it had not been an investor 
concern, but once governments started to raise it, the investors started to pick up on it 
(Mossallam, 2015). To defend its point of view, the South African government has 
used examples of investments that have occurred around the time of termination or 
shortly after it. These include investments by Mercedes Benz at around the same time 
the government of South Africa was terminating its BIT with Germany. Similarly, in 
July 2014 the Dutch Foreign Trade & Development Cooperation minister visited 
South Africa with a delegation of potential investors, even though South Africa had 
terminated its BIT with the Netherlands in the previous year (Netherlands Embassy in 
Pretoria, South Africa, 2014). 
That said, the government does acknowledge the impact of wider policy trends on 
foreign investment. As Carim explains, investors have raised concerns about a general 
trend of policy developments that they feel negatively affect foreign investment. This 
includes the labour strikes, rising electricity costs, and currency volatility. From the 
investors' perspective, the decision not to renew BITs is, therefore, part of a wider and 
more general concern, and it is difficult for the government to decipher the relative 
weight of each of these factors in investors' decisions (cited in Mossallam, 2015). 
From the government's perspective, this underscores the reality that the presence or 
absence of a BIT does not affect foreign investment. Investors invest in South Africa 
because they can see economic opportunities and they are comfortable with the legal 
framework according to the DTI (Interview with Carim, 2014).  
The South African government's response to the criticism of the new domestic 
framework, is that the new Law does not do away with foreign investor protections 
but is instead making changes to the way in which protection standards are 
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safeguarded (Lang, 2013). According to De Gama, the new framework seeks to 
achieve several balances, including the rights and obligations of investors, the 
provision of provide adequate protection to foreign investors, ensuring that South 
Africa’s Constitutional principles are upheld, and that the government retains the 
policy space needed to regulate in the public interest (cited in Mossallam, 2015). 
During interviews, senior officials discussed the government's position on the specific 
concerns raised by investors with regard to the contents of the PPIB and its 
shortcomings when compared to the BITs. Concerning the FET standard, the former 
Legal Director at the DTI explained that there is no mention of the international 
investment law principle of FET in the PPIB because this concept is too broadly 
framed, and subject to various controversies. He further elaborated that the South 
African law already provides sufficient guarantees for substantive and procedural due 
process (cited in Mossallam, 2015). In the stakeholder consultations held over the final 
draft of the PPIB in 2015, the DTI also reiterated its stance on the exclusion of the 
FET clause arguing that the protection standards contained in the Constitution and 
existing legislation provide sufficient protection for legitimate interests that investors 
may have (Mlumbi-Peter, 2015). 
On the definition of expropriation, De Gama stated that this issue had been a 
longstanding government concern. For many years the government has had a draft 
Expropriation Bill which sought to ensure that Article 25 of the South African 
Constitution (which allows for less than market value compensation in certain cases) 
was reflected in South Africa's ‘international obligations’. The expropriation clause in 
these international treaties stipulated market value for any taking that the government 
makes regardless of the circumstances and history of acquisition and property use 
(Mossallam, 2015). According to Carim, the definition of expropriation in the new 
Law is an improvement on the draft Expropriation Bill, as the term is defined more 
clearly with specific reference to the Constitution and it sets out public interest 
measures that would not be considered as expropriation and therefore not require 
compensation (cited in Mossallam, 2015). South African officials did acknowledge, 
however, that the way the clause was drafted in the Bill might have sent the wrong 
signal to investors by keeping the list of exceptions for what constitutes expropriation 
open-ended. They stressed that the final draft would remove the open-ended list of 
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exceptions and merely ensure the clause was consistent with Article 25 of the 
Constitution (Mossallam, 2015). 
Finally, concerning the question of arbitration, South African officials argue that it is 
difficult to draw a direct comparison between international arbitration and domestic 
legal systems. De Gama argues that the calls for ISDS to be watered down or excluded 
from the TTIP are not that different from the South African demands, because in both 
instances it is about preserving legitimate public spaces for public policy (cited in 
Mossallam, 2015). Furthermore, the government is confident that the domestic legal 
process is sufficiently robust to protect investors. South African officials refused the 
notion that the South African government is incapable of handling the legal 
obligations, as they claim it has a strong Constitution and a robust legal framework. 
While conceding that deficiencies exist, officials maintain that most issues are settled 
relatively promptly (Mossallam, 2015). South Africa is also working on empowering 
its domestic courts and enabling them as per the recommendations by the Cabinet. In 
describing South Africa’s efforts to reform its investment framework, De Gama 
concludes: ‘at the end of the day we have this process to really indicate that we are 
serious about investor rights but also about the right to regulate…. Making these 
requirements means we are more serious about sustainable growth and not that we are 
against more investment’ (cited in Mossallam, 2015).  
As previously mentioned, the DTI published a summary of the submissions it received 
and its responses to them, before submitting a final draft to the Cabinet. The Cabinet 
endorsed the Bill on 24 October 2014. The Parliament then held public hearings over 
the Bill inviting a wide range of stakeholders to discuss the latest draft in September 
2015. The PIA was finally enacted by the Parliament in December 2015 and upheld 
most of the substantive changes in the PPIB. The Act responded to concerns by foreign 
investors on some of the definitions including those of ‘investments’ and 
‘expropriation’. In the case of expropriation, the new Act excluded the clause, and the 
government clarified that it would be addressed in a separate Expropriation Bill (which 
was released in 2015). Essentially according to South African officials, the new 
Expropriation Bill ensures that the expropriation standard will be consistent with 
Article 25 of the Constitution as originally intended, but it will remove the open-ended 
list of exceptions to the measures that would not be interpreted as expropriation which 
existed in the PPIB (cited in Mossallam, 2015). To ensure that its investor protection 
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standards are consistent across all its binding international treaties and agreements, 
South Africa led the process of amending Annex 1 of The South African Development 
Community (SADC) Finance and Investment Protocol in August 2016. Some of the 
main changes in the amended version include the following (UNCTAD, 2017c, p. 
113): 142  (i) the exclusion of the FET provision and the ISDS mechanism; (ii) 
redefinition of investment and investors; (iii) introduction of exceptions to the 
expropriation provision for public policy measures; (iv) clarification of the national 
treatment provision (with reference to ‘like circumstances’); and (iv) the inclusion of 
detailed provisions on investor responsibility and the right of host countries to regulate 
investment for the public interest. 
The long-term effects of this new policy cannot yet be judged. It is too early to tell 
whether the South African government met its objectives, or equally if the new policy 
will impact foreign investment flows. Furthermore, the impact of these changes will 
need to be assessed over a more extended period and in the context of the policies that 
the government intends to adopt as part of its transformative agenda. These policies 
include BEE policies, Mining Charter and land reform (Expropriation Bill), all subject 
to heated debate at the time of writing. The purpose of this case study is not to assess 
the success of South Africa's policy decisions, but instead to analyse how it signed 
these BITs and how it has reacted once it realised the constraint these BITs pose on its 
ability to regulate in the public interest. In the existing investment treaty literature, 
South Africa's chosen route is classified as a case of ‘exit’, and under Hirschman's 
framework, it would also fit with his definition of exit. The next section, however, 
argues that it should be considered a case of ‘voice’. 
7. Exit or Voice? An Appraisal 
7.1 South Africa’s Failed Attempts to adopt the ‘Voice’ Route 
From the onset, South Africa's approach to managing its BITs was quite different 
compared to its Latin American counterparts. For instance, while Bolivian officials 
                                               
 
142 See Agreement Amending Annex 1 (Cooperation on Investment) of the SADC Protocol on Finance 
and Investment. Available at: 
https://www.sadc.int/files/7114/9500/6315/Agreement_Amending_Annex_1_Cooperation_on_invest
ment_-_on_the_Protocol_on_Finance__Investment_-_English_-_2016.pdf. 
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had explicitly announced that domestic investment was prioritised over foreign 
investment and reversed its neoliberal economic policies, South Africa remained loyal 
to its neoliberal economic model. In consultations with stakeholders including former 
BIT partners, South African officials have consistently reiterated the message that the 
purpose of the new framework is to ensure South Africa remains open to foreign 
investment. According to the DTI, the new framework aims to provide investors with 
adequate security and protection (including several of the clauses that existed in the 
BITs), while preserving the sovereign right of the State to regulate in the public 
interest and pursue development objectives (Mlumbi-Peter, 2015). Moreover, while 
South Africa has replaced its BITs with a domestic legal framework, it has ensured 
that this new framework maintained the neoliberal approach to FDI regulation by 
retaining most of the principles and norms that shaped the investment treaty regime.  
South Africa also consciously ensured that its treaties were terminated when they 
expired to avoid violating any terms of the agreement. South African officials refuted 
the claim by their European counterparts that the process of terminating the BITs was 
abrupt and unilateral. During interviews, senior officials explained that the review 
started in 2007 and the government began to informally approach European 
counterparts in 2008-9 when it became clear that the current treaties had severe 
shortcomings (cited in Mossallam, 2015). At the time, South Africa participated with 
the EU in the G8+G5 process and informally raised the possibility of renegotiation of 
treaties with individual representatives of the countries present. According to the 
South African officials, representatives from these partner countries made it very clear 
that the agreements were ‘basic’ in content and that any renegotiation would entail 
measures to liberalise foreign investment regulation further (cited in Mossallam, 
2015). According to Carim, EU countries were also made aware of South Africa’s 
intention to renegotiate or terminate BITs during UNCTAD conferences in Doha and 
Geneva in 2012 and 2013, through public statements by senior officials and the lead 
Minister (cited in Mossallam, 2015). These claims have been acknowledged by some 
of the foreign investors’ representatives. For instance, in interview, the Executive 
Director of the South African-German Chamber of Commerce and Industry, stated 
that they had known since 2011 that the South African government intended to review 
its BITs (not only German BITs) that were concluded in the 1990s. What surprised 
  
198 
them was that the termination of the BITs was conveyed before an alternative for 
protection of investments was finalised (cited in Mossallam, 2015). 
Furthermore, the effort exerted by the South African government to involve its foreign 
counterparts in consultations and to consider their feedback (see above), indicates that 
South Africa was open to reaching a mutual decision on how to reform the BITs if its 
counterparts had been willing to make concessions. In interviews, senior officials at 
the DTI explained that the government had made extensive efforts to solicit input from 
a broad range of stakeholders. At the very early phases of the review, the South African 
government invited public comment and organised public forums where the 
government's approach to BITs and the initial findings of the review were discussed 
(Interview with Kruger, 2015; Interview with De Gama, 2014). The State also engaged 
in meetings outside of South Africa, at UNCTAD and the South Centre. The 
government received written submissions from a range of stakeholders including 
governments, think tanks and NGOs. Accordingly, and on these grounds, senior 
government officials argue that it is implausible that any of South Africa's treaty 
partners were not aware of the review process (Mossallam, 2015). Not to mention that 
the government only started taking concrete steps to terminate specific BITs towards 
the end of 2012, almost three years after the government published the key findings 
of the review and the Cabinet decisions, which set out the measures South Africa was 
planning to take. According to the former Legal Director at DTI, ‘during that period, 
we had several consultations and specifically with the EU delegation; we had a full-
on discussion regarding the rationale… We took criticisms on board and addressed 
them while striving to make our clauses consistent with the Constitution and existing 
legal frameworks’ (cited in Mossallam, 2015). Accordingly, De Gama describes 
claims by former BIT partners that the State did not consult its treaty partners over the 
renegotiation of BITs before deciding not to renew them as unfair criticism. A former 
DTI Director adds that the South African government met with EU representatives a 
year before officials started to provide notices of their decision not to renew BITs to 
explain the options that the South African government was considering (cited in 
Mossallam, 2015). 
Even if South Africa's European counterparts had shown willingness to renegotiate 
the BITs with South Africa, there was still the crucial element of timing. The former 
Legal Director of the DTI elaborated that the Lisbon Treaty was due to come into force 
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at the point when the South African government sought to renegotiate BITs with 
individual European member States (cited in Mossallam, 2015). Under the Lisbon 
Treaty, competencies for investment moved from the member States to the European 
Commission. It was therefore unclear whom the South African government could 
approach, to discuss the possibility of new agreements as the EU was in flux. This led 
to a tricky situation for South Africa. After waiting for two years, the South African 
government decided not to renew several BITs that were reaching the automatic 
renewal date that would extend the treaty for another 10-15 years. The option of not 
renewing or terminating BITs when they reached the initial expiry date was allowed 
in the provisions of the BITs. According to the former Legal Director at DTI: ‘we 
waited two years, and it only became clear that EU member States had limited capacity 
to negotiate their agreements and hence it was too late for us’ (cited in Mossallam, 
2015).  
Finally, the South African government has also made it clear that it is not opposed to 
the negotiation of new BITs and does not want to exit the system entirely. The South 
African government has been actively participating in discussions on ISDS reform on 
the international stage by constructively engaging at the OECD and the UNICTRAL. 
According to De Gama, South Africa does not intend to remove itself from the 
international arbitration system as a whole: ‘if there is serious reform and a more 
credible and transparent system is in place, the South African government will 
reconsider international arbitration’ (cited in Mossallam, 2015). Moreover, the DTI 
has been working on developing a draft model BIT that would be in line with the PIA 
and the model BIT adopted by SADC (Interview with De Gama, 2014; Interview with 
Kruger, 2015).143 South Africa was actively engaged with the International Institute 
for Sustainable Development (IISD) in developing the SADC model BIT that was 
completed by 2012 and adopted in 2013. 
8. Conclusion: Revising ‘Voice’ in Hirschman’s Framework  
The review conducted by the South African government had established that there was 
no evidence that BITs led to an increase in FDI in South Africa, but that their financial 
                                               
 
143 As mentioned earlier, the draft BIT has been finalised and is currently being reviewed by the Cabinet 
as per the DTI 2017 Annual Report. 
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and sovereignty costs were significant. While there were discussions about possible 
reform in multilateral fora, future improvement via this route was/is very much an 
open question, not only concerning its possibility but also more fundamentally 
regarding its nature and character (Katselas, 2014). South Africa was in a difficult 
situation, as although the costs of keeping these treaties seemed to exceed the direct 
benefits, unlike its Latin American counterparts, it was wary of sending out the signal 
that it was adopting protectionist policies or turning its back on the free market model. 
While South Africa's decision to exit its BITs was well publicised, its efforts to engage 
and sound any potential for reform in the form of renegotiation as illustrated above 
are not well known. 
According to Hirschman's framework, South Africa’s route would be considered as 
an ‘exit’ decision. First, because it left the system and replaced its treaties with 
alternative domestic legislation and, secondly, because voice entails ‘any attempt at 
all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs’ (Hirschman, 
1970, p. 3), and ‘always involves sticking to the deteriorating organization’ 
(Hirschman, 1970, p. 38). Furthermore, according to Hirschman, once the decision to 
exit is made, there is no longer scope for voice. This categorisation of South Africa's 
chosen route is also shared by scholars and practitioners that have addressed the 
possible routes that can be adopted by countries looking to reform their BITs, where 
South Africa has been deployed as an example of a country that adopted the ‘exit’ 
option (see Gordon and Pohl, 2015; Katselas, 2014). 
The findings of this case study reveal that South Africa did attempt to adopt a voice 
route as per Hirschman's conceptualisation. However, South African officials realised 
that South Africa's chances of reforming its existing BITs were slim due to the need 
for a mutual agreement between both parties, which judging from the response they 
received in informal discussions with some of their capital-exporting partners, was not 
feasible. Due to its lack of bargaining power and mutual interest with its capital-
exporting partners (excluding those with which they had strategic relations, e.g. 
BRICS countries), South Africa could not convince its treaty partners to make the 
compromises needed to ensure a balance between the rights of investors and its right 
to regulate in the public interest. Consequently, it had to exit its BITs first by choosing 
not to renew them, before introducing a new framework that included several 
components of its expired BITs yet excluded the clauses that constrained the State's 
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ability to pursue its development objectives. Based on the definition of the investment 
treaty regime in Chapter 2, South Africa’s decision to terminate its BITs means it has 
exited the legal framework of the regime. However, by retaining most of the neoliberal 
norms and principles of the regime in the domestic legal framework that replace its 
BITs, South Africa ensured it was only a partial exit. 
Hence, in this case study, it is argued that South Africa's experience demonstrates that 
for developing countries the only way to effectively practice voice in the regime is 
through a quasi-exit strategy that combines both exit and voice tactics. This argument 
suggests that Hirschman's definition of voice and the dynamics of the interplay 
between exit and voice would need to be revisited to explain the options available to 
developing countries dealing with their BITs.  
Accordingly, the findings of this case study demonstrate the need for revising 
Hirschman’s conceptualisation of the voice route in order to account for the dynamics 
of the international investment regime. Chapter 8 expands more on the suggested 
contribution to the framework and the change in dynamics between exit and voice 
proposes the replacement of ‘voice’ with ‘quasi-exit’. 
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Chapter 7. Loyalty: An Egyptian Case Study  
1. Introduction 
The mid-1970s marked the beginning of the neoliberal era in Egypt as President Sadat 
announced the ‘Infitah’ (opening) of the Egyptian economy by implementing a 
neoliberal economic agenda that aimed to enforce a retreat by the State as an economic 
actor in favour of private and foreign capital. It was in this context that Egypt decided 
to join the international investment regime by launching its BIT network and signing 
the ICSID Convention. Since then Egypt has signed 111 BITs placing it among the 
top ten signatories of BITs worldwide, despite being a net capital importer.  
Egypt became aware of the constraints that these treaties can pose to its policy space 
when it started facing arbitration cases triggered by BITs in the late nineties. An 
internal review of BITs by the Egyptian authorities in 2006 exposed the unbalanced 
nature of the treaties and the absence of a link between these treaties and FDI inflows. 
Furthermore, in the aftermath of the January 25th revolution in 2011, efforts to redress 
the corruption and inequality legacies of the Mubarak regime triggered a wave of 
investment arbitration claims.  
Despite vocally criticising the investment treaty regime and calling on reforms to 
balance investor rights with the right of host State to regulate, Egypt has remained 
committed to the regime by refraining from amending or replacing its BITs. Instead, 
successive governments that took office post-2011 have maintained a neoliberal 
approach to FDI by retaining the expansive protection standards provided in Egypt’s 
existing BITs and ensuring that domestic legislation contained similar provisions. 
Furthermore, since 2012, Egyptian authorities have gone a step further by introducing 
new legislation to provide foreign investors with further protection that goes above 
and beyond what is already provided in the BITs it has signed. 
Nevertheless, the decision to remain committed to the international investment regime 
has not stopped the arbitration cases filed against Egypt from accumulating. As of 
September 2018, Egypt has faced 33 investment treaty arbitration cases triggered 
through BITs ranking it amongst the top five most frequent respondents (as host 
States) to investment treaty arbitration cases in the world.	
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	Egypt’s decision to maintain the status quo is in line with the general trend in the 
developing world: a significant number of developing countries have refrained from 
exiting the investment treaty regime or introducing substantial reforms to their BITs 
despite realising the extent to which the regime can constrain their ability to regulate. 
What makes Egypt’s case unique, however, is its decision to maintain the status quo 
despite openly contesting the investment treaty regime in public forums. Accordingly, 
an in-depth study of Egypt’s experience with the investment treaty regime is necessary 
to understand why, unlike its counterparts (South Africa and Bolivia), it has yet to act 
to on its discontent with the regime. This case study traces the process the country has 
undergone from joining the regime, to its reaction, to realising the constraints its 
membership of the regime imposed on its policy space to regulate. The objective of 
this chapter is to analyse how and why Egypt signed its BITs and why it has decided 
to maintain the status quo despite vocally expressing its discontent with the regime.  
The chapter argues that, in line with the two other case studies, the Structural Power 
and Bounded Rationality theories can be combined to explain different aspects of 
Egypt’s BIT signing process. Whereas Poulsen’s adaptation of the Bounded 
Rationality framework is used to explain how BITs were signed without being 
reviewed or taken seriously, Gwynn’s use of the Structural Power framework is 
deployed to justify why Egypt joined the international investment regime by signing 
BITs despite rejecting some of the key investment rules in these BITs in multilateral 
forums.  
Concerning Egypt’s reaction to its discontent with the regime, the chapter proposes 
that the economic conditions Egypt faced post-2011 established a similar context to 
the one which had allowed IFIs and capital-exporting countries to hold structural 
power when it signed its BITs several decades earlier. The IMF and the GCC 
countries, both of which influenced the government’s decision to refrain from 
amending its BITs or its domestic legal framework, exercised structural power through 
conditionalities imposed in return for credit and aid. Thus, Egypt’s decision to 
maintain the status quo and remain in the international investment regime is not due 
to an attachment to a system it believes will eventually result in benefits for its 
economy, as Hirschman’s loyalty would imply. Instead, the route taken by Egypt is 
more likely to have been motivated by fear of the possible economic and political 
repercussions deriving from its vulnerable economic position.  
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Finally, this chapter concludes that Hirschman’s conceptualisation of loyalty cannot 
adequately explain why developing countries like Egypt remain members of the 
regime. This creates a need to revise Hirschman’s framework and to introduce a new 
category that reflects better the route taken by countries like Egypt. In Chapter 8 the 
concept of ‘silence’ is suggested as a possible addition to the framework to explain 
such a trajectory.  
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the historical political 
and economic context in which BITs were signed. Sections 3 documents Egypt's 
introduction to the international investment regime and describes the main features of 
Egypt's BIT program. Section 4 conducts an appraisal of Egypt's BIT signing process. 
After analysing how Egypt developed its BIT network the chapter traces how Egypt 
realised the extent to which BITs can constrain its policy space both pre- and post-
2011 as well as its reaction to this realisation in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 first 
documents how Egypt refrained from revising its position towards BITs and instead 
furthered protection provided to foreign investors by introducing legislation to grant 
investors immunity from accountability to the domestic judicial system. The rest of 
Section 7 analyses the context in which Egyptian governments decided to maintain the 
status quo and make further concessions to appease foreign investors. Finally, the last 
section concludes that despite remaining committed to BITs and the international 
investment regime, the route Egypt has chosen is not consistent with Hirschman's 
Loyalty option.  
2. Historical Context of the BIT Signing Process  
Before addressing the evolution of Egypt’s BIT program, this section documents the 
economic and political context in which these BITs were signed. Starting in the late 
1960s, Egypt changed its economic orientation, abandoning planned development in 
favour of market forces and private initiative (Abdel-Khalek, 1981). The impetus 
behind Egypt's shift to the West and the adoption of the neoliberal economic model is 
better understood against the backdrop of the economic situation of the country 
following the 1973 October War with Israel (Ikram, 2007). GDP growth was sluggish, 
the budget deficit was widening, and the deficit on the current account of the balance 
of payments was rising. In parallel, the external debt was increasing, and Egypt 
required substantial and immediate funds to service it (Ikram, 2007). 
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President Sadat conveyed the gravity of Egypt’s economic predicament in the 
following statement,(cited in Scobie, 1981, p. 31): 
I wanted to tell them [the National Security Council] that we had reached the 
‘zero stage’ economically … in every sense of the term … I could not have 
paid a penny toward our debt instalments falling due on January 1, 1974, nor 
could I have bought a grain of wheat in 1974. There would not have been bread 
for the people. 
Ahmed Abou Ismail, then Minister of Finance, while reflecting on the situation after 
1973, reveals that Egypt had made a political choice in deliberately orienting its 
foreign policy towards countries that were economically stronger than the Soviet 
Union (cited in Ikram, 2007, p. 28). Accordingly, this decision entailed abandoning 
the philosophy of a centralised economy and substituting political dependence on the 
communist bloc with dependence on the United States and other powerful Western 
countries and financial institutions. In 1974, President Sadat initiated the ‘Open Door’ 
policy which aimed at liberalising the Egyptian economy and attracting foreign 
investment. The shift of economic and political relations towards Europe and United 
States coincided with changes in the international arena that created a general 
ideological atmosphere favouring economic liberalisation (Ateş et al., 2006). 
Despite the symbolism of the Open Door policy which is associated with Egypt’s 
abandonment of the ‘socialist’ model and alliance and embrace of Western capitalism, 
the policy itself was not considered to be a well-developed economic strategy. 
Following Sadat’s Prime Minister at the time Abdel-Aziz Hegazy, the Open Door 
policy was to serve more as an ‘investment promotion program’ than a blueprint for a 
free economy (cited in Ikram, 2007, p. 20). The main objective of the policy was to 
set up a framework that would encourage an inflow of capital from the Gulf countries 
and the West. The promulgation of Investment Law No. 43 of 1974 (which will be 
discussed further in Section 3) was a crucial part of this framework as it was issued 
with the aim of easing the path for Arab and other foreign investment (Ikram, 2007). 
Thus, it becomes clear that the main objective of Egypt’s Open Door policy was to 
raise external funds that Egypt desperately needed through foreign aid and FDI by 
restructuring its international economic relations (Abdel-Khalek, 1981). 
The period immediately after the announcement of the Open Door policy witnessed a 
significant role for the World Bank, the IMF and the USAID, who were advising 
Egyptian policymakers on how to transition to a free market economy (Ikram, 2007). 
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Egypt required a substantial inflow of external funds and both the IMF and the World 
Bank were the prime candidates for providing much of these resources. Moreover, the 
scale of external financing required by the country meant it needed to enlarge the 
number of donors. Accordingly, the World Bank set up a ‘Consultative Group’ (an 
association of Egypt’s main donors), who held its first meeting in Paris in May 1977 
(Ikram, 2007). The resource transfer from these institutions was accompanied by 
conditionalities which will be touched upon later in this case study.  
Egypt’s dependence on these organisations and foreign governments for financial 
credit consequently meant that they strongly influenced the process of reintegrating 
the Egyptian economy into the world capitalist market (Abdel-Khalek, 1981). The 
influence was exercised by a variety of means including providing consultants, signing 
loan agreements and facilitating external aid through Consultative Group meetings 
(Abdel-Khalek, 1981).  
In 1974, the World Bank sent a consultant to Egypt to provide policy advice to the 
Egyptian government on a new development strategy. In his essay ‘Towards a 
Development Strategy in Egypt’ the World Bank consultant, Balassa (1977, p. 88) 
made the following recommendation: 
There is a need to define the role of public decision-making in the national 
economy ... reorienting government activities from the regulation of prices, 
production and foreign exchange allocation towards determining the main 
directions of the economy and the ‘rules of the game’ applicable to public, 
private, and foreign firms. In particular, one would need to indicate the areas 
in which private and foreign firms may operate; the constraints imposed on 
them; and the incentives to be provided … in order to encourage the 
establishment of private firms, their status would need to be clarified. This 
would entail publicly stating the permitted scope of private investment and 
disclaiming any intention of future nationalization. 
Balassa (1977, p. 96) concluded the essay with other recommendations to achieve the 
objective of ‘establishing a market system where public, private and foreign firms 
coexist in the framework of an open economy’. The World Bank’s policy 
recommendations that appeared in this essay coincided with the publication of the 
October Paper, the official document in which the Open Door policy was first 
articulated (Abdel-Khalek, 1981). Since the essay was published with the concurrence 
of the Egyptian government (Balassa, 1977), it came as no surprise when the Open 
Door policy articulated in the October Paper published by President Sadat adopted the 
recommendations made by the World Bank consultant. The Open Door policy 
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according to the Paper signalled a decisive break with the Egyptian economy’s public-
sector-dominated past, with the private sector and foreign investment replacing the 
public sector’s role in the economy (Sadat, 1974).  
In addition to the World Bank, both the IMF and the Consultative Group exerted 
significant pressure on the Egyptian government to liberalise the economy (Abdel-
Khalek, 1981). The guiding and even forcing role of the IMF became evident as the 
size of both external and internal debt grew (Momani, 2003). After the deterioration 
of its external economic situation, Egypt began its negotiations for an upper credit 
tranche arrangement with the IMF in the mid-1970s (Laobooncharoen, 2004). 
Following prolonged negotiations of nearly three years, an agreement was reached in 
1977 when the IMF Executive Board approved of SDR 125 million Stand-By 
Arrangement (SBA) for Egypt (Laobooncharoen, 2004). The main objective of the 
economic reform programme under the SBA was ‘to restructure relative prices so as 
to develop the external sector’.144 To achieve this aim, several conditionalities were 
set by the IMF including exchange reform, external trade policy, domestic price 
liberalisation, fiscal policy, monetary and credit policy, and external debt policy and 
arrears (Laobooncharoen, 2004). 
In January 1977, riots broke out throughout Egypt after the government announced 
price increases in the 1977 budget (Laobooncharoen, 2004). Nevertheless, IMF talks 
were resumed in 1978 over a new stabilisation programme for an Extended Fund 
Facility (EFF). The policy measures Egypt was required to implement in return for the 
720 million USD loan included: reducing the budget deficit, adopting a deflationary 
money and credit policy, eliminating multiple-exchange rates (a de facto devaluation 
of the Egyptian pound), removing exchange controls (except on capital transactions), 
and phasing out bilateral trade agreements (Abdel-Khalek, 1981). 
According to Abdel-Khalek (1981), these measures forced the doors of the Egyptian 
economy wide open for foreign investments at the expense of the domestic industries, 
under the pretext of creating a more attractive climate for foreign investment. In this 
context, an open economy specifically meant open to the capitalist industrialised 
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countries (Abdel-Khalek, 1981). Egypt’s promotion of these policies meant a 
commitment to liberalising the Egyptian market, and this included liberalising 
treatment of foreign investments. This commitment became more evident when, under 
pressure by the leading donors in the first Consultative Group meeting in 1977, the 
Egyptian delegation announced several measures the government was planning to 
adopt within the framework of the Open Door policy to encourage investments 
(Abdel-Khalek, 1981, p. 404):  
(i) Amending Law 43 for 1974 to give more incentive to the private sector; 
(ii) Approving a large number of private sector projects in free zones; 
(iii) Ending monopoly of foreign trade by the public sector; 
(iv) Minimising administrative obstacles confronting foreign investors; and 
(v) Activating the stock exchange. 
 
The liberalisation measures adopted had a significant impact on the Egyptian 
economy. Although the economy did not grow or structurally change as anticipated, it 
became much more dependent on trade and external capital flows (Ateş et al., 2006). 
During the period between 1972-1979, Egypt’s exports and imports as a percentage of 
GDP rose from 14.6 per cent and 21 per cent to 43.8 per cent and 53 per cent 
respectively (Ateş et al., 2006). Moreover, over the same period, external debt as a 
percentage of GDP rose from 38 per cent to 58 per cent (Ateş et al., 2006). 
More importantly, Egypt continued to depend on external credit from donors and IFIs 
to keep the economy afloat. Initially, Egypt was mostly reliant on Arab countries for 
support. The Gulf countries decided to scale up their aid programmes in the immediate 
aftermath of Egypt’s 1973 war with Israel (Ikram, 2007). The total amount of main 
types of Arab assistance to Egypt (grants, cash loans and deposits, and project and 
programme loans) rose from 905 million USD in 1973 to a peak of c.2.7 billion USD 
in 1975 (Ikram, 1980). However, in the following year, Egypt developed new sources 
of financial assistance owing to its rapprochement with the West and the alteration in 
its foreign policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict marked by Sadat's visit to 
Jerusalem in November 1977. In the period between the Camp David Summit 
(September 1978) and the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty (March 1979), the US 
under the Carter Administration increased its aid, pledging 300 million USD in post-
treaty economic assistance to supplement the on-going billion-a-year programme 
(Laobooncharoen, 2004). The US government also promised a supplemental package 
of 1.5 billion USD in military aid, to be spread over three years (Burns, 1985).  
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During the same period, the major Western capital exporters commenced a substantial 
programme of economic assistance to Egypt. Egypt eventually became utterly 
dependent on the West for financial assistance, trade and capital inflows after nineteen 
Arab countries decided to impose economic sanctions against Egypt at the Baghdad 
Arab League summit following the signing of Egypt's peace treaty with Israel (Ikram, 
2007). The main sources of financial aid were the US, Western European countries 
and Japan as a sizeable pipeline of commitments was soon built up (Ikram, 2007). By 
1981, the total disbursement of official loans and grants into Egypt was put at c.1.6 
billion USD, or 7 per cent of GDP (Ikram, 2007).  
Egypt’s dependence on the West was not limited to aid. The capitalist countries also 
became the largest trade partners of Egypt (Abdel-Khalek, 1981). Between 1974 and 
1977, the United States and the Western European countries accounted for 44.5 per 
cent of Egypt's foreign trade (both exports and imports) (National Bank of Egypt, 
1979). Furthermore, by 1978, the number of commercial agencies exceeded 1,000, 
and they were representing 2,600 commercial firms that belonged to 56 countries 
(Abdel-Khalek, 1981). Multinationals from West Germany, Britain, France, Italy, 
Switzerland and the United States topped that list (Abdel-Khalek, 1981). 
It was in the context described above that Egypt joined the international investment 
regime by signing the ICSID Convention in 1972 and initiating its BITs programme 
in 1973.145 The next section will focus on Egypt’s new FDI regime and its introduction 
to the international investment regime concluding with a brief overview of the main 
features of its BIT programme. 
3. Egypt’s New FDI Policy and Introduction to the Investment 
Treaty Regime  
The foundations for Egypt’s first FDI policy, as well as its engagement with the BITs 
system, were laid when Egypt adopted the Open Door policy as illustrated in the 
previous section.  
A centrepiece of the Open Door programme was a new investment law, Law No. 43 
of 1974 (Parra, 2015), which replaced Law No. 65 of 1971 and was considered the 
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first real comprehensive investment law. The new law’s primary objectives were to 
expand the types of desired investments and to provide incentives and guarantees 
beyond those previously afforded foreign investors (Bushnell, 1980). The Law 
provided for the opening of the Egyptian economy to FDI in almost every field.146 It 
also extended incentives and guarantees to foreign investment, including a guarantee 
against uncompensated expropriation and granting foreign investors equal treatment 
to that provided to domestic investors among other benefits. 
During the same period, Egypt joined the international investment regime by signing 
the ICSID Convention on 11 February 1972 (entered into force on 2 June 1972) and 
concluding the first of its 111 BITs. Between 1973 and 1977 Egypt signed twelve 
BITs, primarily with major European capital exporters such as Germany, France, and 
the UK. However, before describing the main features of Egypt’s BIT programme, it 
is important to note that Egypt’s first brush with ISDS came through its very own 
Investment Law as explained further below.  
More than 50 years ago the ICSID Convention was finalised and submitted to the 
member governments of the World Bank. In a report by the Executive Directors of the 
Bank which accompanied the Convention they explained that while the written 
consent of the parties would be a prerequisite for resorting to arbitration under the 
Convention, there was no requirement that the consent of both parties be documented 
in a single instrument such as an investment contract between them (Parra, 2015). To 
demonstrate what that entailed, the Executive Directors suggested that ‘a host State 
might in its investment provision legislation offer to submit disputes arising out of 
certain classes of investments to the jurisdiction of the Centre, and the investor might 
give his consent by accepting the offer in writing’ (IBRD, 1965, p. V). 
Once the ICSID Convention came into force in 1966, investment promotion laws 
began to appear with general consents of the type envisaged by the Executive Directors 
(Parra, 2015). Amongst the earliest was Egypt’s Law No. 43 of 1974 (Parra, 2015) 
which contained an ICSID arbitration provision that is elaborated on further below 
when discussing the arbitration case that took advantage of that provision. A year later 
in 1967, Aron Broches, the founding Secretary-General of ICSID (also dubbed the 
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‘father of ICSID’), proposed that BITs should also provide for investor-State 
arbitration under the Convention (Parra, 2015). This suggestion was taken up by 
governments, and it eventually became a cornerstone of most BITs signed thereafter, 
including the majority of Egypt’s BITs (Parra, 2015).  
Arbitration cases initiated under such general consents in investment laws or treaties 
would be called ‘arbitration without privity’147 because they are not based on pre-
existing arbitration agreement between the parties (Parra, 2015). In his paper, ‘ICSID 
Arbitration and Developing Countries’, former arbitrator Professor Ahmed El-Kosheri 
predicted that this type of arbitration would eventually dominate the caseload of ICSID 
(El-Kosheri, 1993). His prediction was fulfilled as, by the end of the 1990s, the number 
of investor-State arbitrations without privity had exceeded the number of cases being 
brought to ICSID through arbitration clauses in investment contracts (Parra, 2015).  
This shift in the type of cases began with the first ICSID case involving Egypt in 1984. 
The case generally known as the ‘Pyramids case’,148 as it involved the cancellation by 
the Egyptian government of a tourism complex near the Pyramids, was the first ever 
arbitration without privity (Parra, 2015). In the case, the claimant successfully relied 
on the general consent in the translated version of Egypt’s Investment to establish 
ICSID jurisdiction.  
In 1974, SPP, a Hong Kong company, entered into agreements with Egypt to establish 
a joint venture (ETDC) intending to develop an international tourist complex at the 
Pyramids Oasis in Egypt (Ripinsky and Williams, 2008). In interview, El-Kosheri149 
reveals that this was the first project under the new Investment Law (Interview with 
El-Kosheri, 2017). The project went ahead until 1978 when, as a result of domestic 
and international pressure due to the perceived threat the project posed to undiscovered 
antiquities, the government cancelled the project. In 1978, under the contractual 
arbitration clause, SPP filed an arbitration claim at the ICC, under the pretext that the 
cancellation of the project amounted to expropriation and obtained an award of 12.5 
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million USD in damages (Ripinsky and Williams, 2008).150 However, this award was 
later annulled by French courts on jurisdictional grounds (Ripinsky and Williams, 
2008). The annulment did not spell the end of SPP’s efforts to seek compensation for 
the cancellation of the project. The claimant’s counsellor Jan Paulsson was inspired 
by the text in one of Broches’ articles in which he explained that States may express 
agreements on ICSID jurisdiction in contracts – or alternatively in treaties or laws 
(Broches, 1966; Paulsson, 2012). Accordingly, in 1984, the Claimants decided to take 
the same matter before an ICSID tribunal, pursuant to Egypt’s Investment Law No. 43 
of 1974 which contained an ICSID arbitration provision. The Law contained a dispute 
settlement clause that stipulated the following (according to the translated version of 
the Law):151  
Investment disputes in respect of the implementation of the provisions of this 
Law shall be settled in a manner to be agreed upon with the investor, or within 
the framework of the agreements in force between the Arab Republic of Egypt 
and the investor's home country, or within the framework of the Convention 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between the State and the nationals 
of other countries to which Egypt has adhered by virtue of Law no. 90 of 1971, 
where such Convention applies … Disputes may be settled through arbitration. 
An important decree, Decree No. 375 of 1977 was issued in furtherance of the 
implementation of the 1974 law. This Decree was critical to the SPP v. Egypt (1984) 
case as it established a hierarchical relationship among the dispute settlement methods 
stipulated in the Law.152 The Decree stipulated that in the absence of a BIT or an 
agreement between the State and the investor, ‘disputes between the State and the 
nationals of other countries are to be settled in accordance with the provisions of the 
Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, to which the Arab Republic of 
Egypt has adhered pursuant to Law No. 90 of 1971’. 153 
The case was registered in 1984, and by 1992 the tribunal held that Egypt’s actions 
constituted a lawful expropriation of the claimants’ investment and that Egypt was, 
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therefore, liable to pay equitable compensation for the value of the expropriated 
investment (Ripinsky and Williams, 2008). In total, the tribunal awarded 27.6 million 
USD.154  El-Kosheri revealed in interview that despite initially attempting to annul the 
award, Egyptian authorities eventually settled with the claimant for a sum in the region 
of c.15 million USD (Interview with El-Kosheri, 2017). 
This experience revealed that the Egyptian authorities had included this ICSID 
provision which was promoted by the World Bank (ICSID is funded by and part of 
the World Bank Group) in their Investment Law without understanding the 
implications of that provision. Even after realising how this provision exposed Egypt 
to international arbitration claims, the authorities did not act to amend the Law until 
another claimant successfully used the dispute settlement provision of Law No. 43 of 
1974 to file a second arbitration case against Egypt in ICSID five years later.155  
A month after the second case was registered, Law No. 43 was replaced by Law No. 
230 of 1989 amending the clause that provided consent to ICSID jurisdiction in Law 
No. 43 (Parra, 2015). The new Investment Law contained a provision which clearly 
stated that the choice of any of the several alternatives of dispute settlement contained 
in the Law would require the agreement of the parties involved.156 The modified 
legislation also stipulated that Egyptian courts would generally have jurisdiction over 
such disputes.157  
Through its early experience with investor-State arbitration, Egypt had the advantage 
of having an early warning of what consent to international arbitration entails while it 
was still in the very early phase of its BIT network. Most developing countries only 
realised the implications of this provision after they had already signed most of their 
BITs. Accordingly, with the knowledge acquired from these two arbitration cases, it 
would be naturally expected that Egypt could approach its BITs more carefully. This 
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impression was misleading, as will be demonstrated in this case study. Before 
conducting an appraisal of Egypt’s BIT signing process, the next section provides an 
overview of the main features of Egypt’s BIT programme.  
3.1 Overview of the Key Provisions in Egypt’s BITs and Trends in BIT 
Signings 
According to the General Authority for Foreign Investment and Free Zones (GAFI), 
Egypt has signed a total of 111 BITs, only 57% of which came into force (GAFI, 
2012). The 103 of these treaties that are publicly available are listed in Appendix III. 
Egypt is both the top-ranked Arab and African country in terms of BITs signed and is 
ranked seventh globally.158 Strikingly amongst the top 10 countries that have signed 
most BITs in the world, Egypt stands out as the only net capital importer. 
Some of the most common features of Egypt’s BITs include (Mossallem, 2016):  
• The definition of investment in BITs signed by Egypt is generally broad and 
includes language like ‘every kind of assets’. Definitions include tangible and 
intangible assets and generally apply to existing as well as new investments.  
• The majority of BITs provide MFN and NT standards. In most cases, these 
standards cover ‘the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal' of 
investments.  
• The majority BITs provide for FET in general terms (unqualified) often 
complemented with standards, such as those prohibiting arbitrary or 
discriminatory measures or requiring the duty to observe investment related 
commitments.  
• All BITs entered into by Egypt contain protection against expropriation, and 
most of them provide for the payment on adequate compensation in case of 
expropriation of the investment. The majority of BITs extend guarantees 
against expropriation to indirect expropriation measures.  
• The full protection and security standard is present in most of Egypt’s BITs.  
• The majority of BITs signed by Egypt provide general consent for ISDS with 
ICSID featuring as the most common forum. Most BITs also provide for State-
State dispute resolution. 
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• The majority of Egypt's BITs have an initial ten-year duration, and in several 
cases, automatic renewal is allowed for an indefinite term. Most treaties also 
have a survival clause that extends protection for ten years post-termination.  
Egypt’s BIT signing efforts went through three phases as demonstrated in the graph 
below (Figure 13). In the first phase, between 1973-1990, the number of BITs signed 
grew at a relatively stable pace (Hussein, 2013). During the phase in which Egypt 
made the shift both politically towards the West and economically towards 
neoliberalism, Egypt signed BITs with some of the leading capital exporters including 
the US, UK, Germany, France and Japan. The second phase, from 1990-2000, 
witnessed an exponential growth rate in Egypt's BITs which coincided with the boom 
in the rate of BITs signed on the international scene. During this decade the number 
of BITs signed with developing countries, in particular, grew significantly (although 
at least 30 per cent of these BITs did not enter into force). The third and final phase 
(2000-2010) saw a steep decline in the number of BITs signed by Egypt. This decline 
coincided with Egypt's introduction to investment treaty arbitrations, which started in 
1998, and the subsequent internal review conducted by GAFI to address the 
implications of these treaties. 
Figure 13: Number of BITs concluded by Egypt, annual and cumulative (1973-
2010) 
Source: GAFI (2010); Hussein (2013)
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4. An Appraisal of Egypt’s BIT Signing Process 
There is hardly any available documentation on how and why Egypt signed so many 
BITs. Discussions with Egyptian officials reveal that there was no clear policy 
followed. In the majority of cases, Egypt was presented with a draft BIT from the 
capital exporting partners, which it usually signed without an assessment of the costs 
and benefits and with little input or negotiation from the Egyptian side. In cases where 
Egypt signed BITs with other developing countries, the BITs generally followed a 
template based on the OECD model. Until 2006 (more than three decades after Egypt 
signed its first BIT), there was no institution responsible for managing BITs, setting a 
strategy for what kind of BITs would be signed and which countries Egypt would seek 
to sign BITs with. Another fundamental issue concerning Egypt's BIT signing process 
that needs to be explained is the reality that, in signing BITs, Egypt accepted 
investment protection rules that it consistently rejected in multilateral forums both 
before it began signing BITs and after. Before conducting an appraisal of how Egypt's 
BIT network was developed below, the first part of this section reflects on one specific 
BIT signing experience. The US BIT is selected, as it represents a rare occasion in 
which Egyptian officials attempted to re-negotiate a BIT after initially signing the 
template that was presented by the capital exporting partner. The US-Egypt BIT 
signing experience reveals two key issues or themes that will be elaborated further 
below. The first concerns the initial decision by the Egyptian government to sign a 
BIT that was based on a template provided by the capital exporting partner without 
any prior assessment or negotiation. The second relates to Egypt's acceptance of 
investment rules it had contested in multilateral forums after the renegotiation process 
resulted in minimal concessions by the US. 
4.1 The US BIT Signing Experience  
An interview with El-Kosheri regarding the US BIT experience provided critical 
insights into the approach adopted by the Egyptian officials when signing BITs. This 
BIT is the most widely discussed of Egypt's BITs as it was the first BIT signed by the 
US under their BIT programme which was launched in 1981. The Treaty was first 
signed in Washington in 1982. However, shortly after signing the BIT, the Egyptian 
government indicated a need to renegotiate a number of the treaty's provisions before 
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it was ratified.159 After joint discussions, both parties agreed to a few changes which 
were reflected in a supplementary protocol signed in 1986.160 
The treaty with Egypt was the result of the first BIT negotiation undertaken by the US, 
and despite the revisions made upon the Egyptians’ request; the treaty remained close 
to the objectives of the then-US Model BIT.161 The provisions included in the final 
version of the BIT were fairly consistent with the clauses outlined in Section 3.1 
except for the absence of the FET standard. Egypt’s agreement to these standards of 
protection, the ISDS option, and in particular its acceptance of international law as the 
governing law, was considered an important achievement by the then US 
administration, for the BIT programme and US FDI and international arbitration 
policies more generally.162 
Based on knowledge acquired from public officials, in interview, El-Kosheri claims 
that the US government submitted the first draft of the BIT to the Egyptian government 
in the 1970s. At the time the Egyptian Minister of Economy was in charge of 
investment policies in Egypt, and he was not convinced that this BIT was worth 
pursuing and hence the draft BIT was ‘kept in the drawer, and no action was taken’ 
(Interview with El-Kosheri, 2017). It was not until Waguih Shindy was appointed as 
Minister of Investment in 1982 that discussions over the BIT were revived. According 
to El-Kosheri, shortly after Shindy acceded to that role an American diplomat 
responsible for economic affairs at the US embassy in Cairo visited the Minister of 
Investment to follow up on the BIT arguing that it would ‘open the door for American 
investments’. The diplomat also extended an invitation for the Minister to visit 
Washington and sign the BIT in a ceremony (Interview with El-Kosheri, 2017). 
According to El-Kosheri’s government sources, the Minister approved the BIT 
without a proper review and made the trip Washington to sign the BIT in a grand 
ceremony (Interview with El-Kosheri, 2017). 
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Before the BIT was ratified, there was a reshuffle in the Egyptian Cabinet, and Sultan 
Abu Aly became Minister of Economy in 1985. El-Kosheri claims that once Abu Aly 
reviewed the BIT signed with the US, he informed his American counterparts that the 
BIT could not be submitted to the parliament for ratification in its existing form 
(Interview with El-Kosheri, 2017). The discussions and negotiations were not public, 
but the outcomes were revealed in the revised BIT. The main amendments included 
amending the definition of investments in the BIT by clarifying that control entails 
having ‘a substantial share of ownership rights and the ability to exercise decisive 
influence’.163 The second main amendment was the introduction of a list of sectors to 
be excluded from the national treatment standard.164  
Overall, the changes were quite limited, as the Egyptian officials were not able to 
negotiate any fundamental changes to the BIT. As Vandevelde (1988, p. 223) argues, 
the deviations from the US model BIT in the final draft of the BIT with Egypt were 
not concessions to Egypt but were instead based on the language of earlier 1982 model 
texts which had been used to negotiate the Egypt BIT.  
Despite Egypt’s attempt to renegotiate, the final BIT contained a general consent to 
investor-State arbitration in ICSID amongst other forums contradicting Egypt's 
previous decision to remove the consent from its Investment Law as discussed in 
Section 3. The treaty also includes expansive protection standards like the scope of 
protection for expropriation and indirect expropriation, not to mention the national 
treatment standard (even with the exceptions). These protection standards contradict 
Egypt's previous stance on foreign investment protection measures during the 1960's 
and early 1970's as illustrated in more detail below. 
Egypt's experience with the US BIT revealed that there was no preparation for signing 
BITs and no task force to review BITs. The decision to review and renegotiate the US 
BIT seemed more like a one-off intervention by the Minister at the time to try and 
limit some of the expansive protection privileges provided by the BIT, but it was not 
part of an effort to bring Egypt’s BITs it in line with Egypt's economic priorities or 
policies. 
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In the rest of this section, an eclectic approach is adopted to explain how and why 
Egypt signed its BITs. As argued in Chapter 3, this thesis proposes to combine the 
Bounded Rationality framework and the Structural Power theory as adapted by 
Poulsen and Gwynn respectively to explain how and why developing countries signed 
BITs. In Egypt’s case, Poulsen's hypothesis is useful to explain how Egypt signed 
BITs assuming they would increase FDI inflows without proper review. The Structural 
Power framework, however, can explain why Egypt accepted the same investment 
rules that it had initially rejected in multilateral forums like the UN, before signing 
BITs, and which it continued to resist in bodies like the WTO, after it had signed a 
significant number of BITs. 
The first part of this appraisal discusses the author's research findings on Egypt's 
approach to signing BITs and demonstrates how this can be explained using the 
Bounded Rationality framework. The second part traces Egypt's history in resisting 
investment protection rules promoted by capital-exporting countries in multilateral 
forums, before deploying the Structural Power framework to explain the dichotomy in 
Egypt's stance towards investment protection rules in bilateral and multilateral 
settings. 
4.2 Explaining Egypt’s Approach to Signing BITs using the Bounded 
Rationality Framework 
According to an Egyptian official involved in Egypt's BIT programme, in 1973 when 
Egypt was in dire need of external capital, developed countries from the West were 
exerting pressure on their developing counterparts to sign BITs, convincing them that 
they were necessary to attract FDI (Interview with Egyptian official 1, 2017). The 
official claimed in interview that Egyptian governments which signed these BITs were 
convinced of ‘the arguments made by major capital exporting countries and started 
signing BITs with the expectation that they would attract FDI’ (Interview with 
Egyptian official 1, 2017). However, there was no study or assessment of the costs 
and benefits of the treaties signed and later ratified by the Egyptian government, nor 
was there a model of the type of BIT Egypt would be willing to sign. Instead during 
the period 1973-1990, Egypt signed BITs mostly with major capital-exporting 
countries each of which presented template BITs that were based on their preferences 
and served their interests (Interview with Egyptian official 1, 2017). Egypt signed 
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these BITs with minimal negotiations, and there are no accessible records of any 
discussions regarding BITs within government or in parliament.  
Experts in the legal field in Egypt were puzzled that the State did not build on its 
experience with the US BIT negotiations to set out a clear policy on what it was 
looking for in BITs (Interview with El-Kosheri, 2017; Interview with partner in 
Egyptian law firm, 2017). The expectation was that after that experience Egyptian 
officials would start taking BITs seriously after acknowledging the expansive nature 
of the protection standards in them. It was also an opportunity to create a task force to 
carefully assess these treaties and develop a model to be used in negotiations for future 
treaties. On the contrary, officials and experts interviewed about Egypt's approach to 
signing BITs reveal that the US BIT experience was ignored, and that during the 
1990s, the period in which Egypt signed most of its treaties, Egypt started using BITs 
for political and diplomatic reasons. According to an Egyptian official there were no 
clear criteria as to with whom Egypt would seek to sign BITs (Interview Egyptian 
official 1, 2017). 
During that decade (1990-2000), BITs were signed at very high frequency and in a 
haphazard manner with no apparent pattern as to which countries were being targeted. 
Egypt signed around 70 BITs in that phase. The Egyptian official's claim that BITs 
were signed for political reasons was endorsed by an international expert who is well 
acquainted with Egypt’s BIT programme. The international expert reiterated that BITs 
were being signed during missions by then President, Hosni Mubarak, as a tool to 
signal intent of developing cordial relations with these countries (Interview with 
international expert, 2017). The international expert also claims that there were no real 
negotiations held before signing. Instead an OECD BIT template was being casually 
signed during Mubarak's diplomatic visits (Interview with international expert, 2017). 
According to the expert, a mapping of Mubarak's major diplomatic missions during 
that period could be used to trace when BITs were signed and with whom they were 
signed (Interview with international expert, 2017). Hence, BITs were treated as if they 
were Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) rather than binding legal treaties. 
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Towards the end of the 1990s, Egypt started experiencing its first set of investment 
treaty arbitration cases. It was not until the ‘SIAG case’,165 discussed in further detail 
in Section 5 below, that Egypt started to take its BITs more seriously. Despite it being 
the eighth case Egypt had faced, the size of compensation claimed, and the 
controversial nature of the claim rang alarm bells for the Egyptian government. In the 
aftermath of the case, Egypt restricted the signing of new BITs, and in 2006, GAFI 
was designated as the authority responsible for managing, negotiating and signing 
Egypt's BITs. For more than thirty years since Egypt signed its first BIT, it was never 
clear which body was in charge of BITs. This explains why BITs were signed by 
different Ministries including Trade, Economy, Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation.  
The findings above regarding Egypt’s approach to signing BITs are consistent with 
Poulsen’s hypothesis. The Bounded Rationality framework can be used to explain 
three central themes that are deduced from the findings on Egypt's approach to signing 
BITs. The first theme is the assumption that BITs would attract FDI and the lack of an 
assessment of the benefits and costs of these BITs. Poulsen argues that during the 
1990s, when BITs signed globally witnessed the highest rate of growth (which was 
the case for Egypt as well); there were no systematic or rigorous analyses of BITs 
available, but instead mostly anecdotes. Instead of conducting investor surveys or 
studies on the relationship between the earlier BITs signed and FDI levels during the 
same period, governments seemed to adopt ‘inferential shortcuts’ which may have led 
to exaggeratedly optimistic views on the necessity of BITs to attract FDI (Poulsen, 
2014, p. 8). This explanation is based on applying a combination of the heuristics of 
representativeness and availability according to Poulsen. 
The second theme is Egypt’s signing of BIT templates drafted by the foreign partner 
instead of negotiating the treaties based on their own model, in addition to using an 
OECD model BIT when negotiating with other developing countries. According to 
Poulsen's framework this would be explained by the availability heuristic that policies 
based on a ‘concrete and clear model’ are highly likely to spread widely as they enable 
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policymakers to adopt ‘an already defined prototype rather than going through the 
hassle of tailoring to local circumstances – however rational that may be’ (Poulsen, 
2014, p. 9; Weyland, 2006, pp. 52–54). 
Finally, the third theme is that Egypt only began to take BITs more seriously when it 
faced a controversial investment treaty claim despite readily available information 
from the experience of other developing countries with investment treaty arbitration. 
Not to mention that Egypt had experienced investment arbitration in the past (as 
covered in Section 3) even though it was triggered through the Investment Law and 
not BITs. Poulsen’s theory explains this behaviour, again relying on insights from 
behavioural economics which reveal that individuals often ignore low probability high 
impact risks, such as an investment treaty claim in this case, until they experience it 
themselves (Poulsen, 2014, p. 3). Moreover, the bounded rational learning hypothesis 
posits that risks were not just underestimated due to imperfect information as would 
be explained by a Bayesian framework but instead ignored completely (Poulsen and 
Aisbett, 2013, p. 10). 
While the Bounded Rationality framework can explain how Egypt processed its BITs 
without a proper assessment of their costs and benefits, it does not explain Egypt's 
paradoxical behaviour in signing BITs that contained the same investment rules it 
rejected in multilateral forums both in the past and the present. The next part of this 
section first illustrates the dichotomy in Egypt's position towards investment 
protection rules in bilateral and multilateral settings. The rest of the section explains 
how Gwynn's adaptation of the Structural Power theory can explain this paradox. 
4.3 Explaining Egypt’s Paradoxical Behaviour using Structural Power 
Theory 
Egypt’s decision to sign BITs represents a paradox for two main reasons. First, Egypt 
adopted an unequivocal stance against some of the protection standards in its existing 
BITs in multilateral forums both before and after they signed these BITs. This is 
evident in Egypt's position on foreign investment protection rules in UN forums during 
the period that preceded the birth of the BITs regime, as well as its position on the 
Investment Issue in the WTO since it was introduced as part of the ‘Singapore Issues’ 
in 1996. The second reason is that unlike other developing countries, Egypt had the 
advantage of an early experience with international investment arbitration cases as 
demonstrated above. Whereas this experience led Egypt to amend its investment 
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legislation, the BITs it signed after these experiences included the very same general 
consent to ISDS that allowed investors to take the State to international arbitration 
without requiring prior agreement of the State or exhausting local remedies (via 
domestic courts) first. 
These two reasons make it difficult to argue that Egypt was utterly unaware of the 
potential threat that these treaties pose. Having discussed Egypt's experience with 
arbitration triggered through the investment dispute settlement clause in the 
Investment Law in Section 3, this Section traces Egypt's rejection of some of the 
principal investment protection rules (included in its existing BITs) in multilateral 
forums both before it signed its BITs and after. As argued in Chapter 3, the Structural 
Power theory can be used to explain why developing countries have accepted 
investment rules in their BITs which they had explicitly rejected in multilateral 
forums. In Egypt's case, structural power is exercised by the creditors who used their 
influence to pressure Egyptian governments to undergo intensive investment 
liberalisation. While BITs were never specifically included in any of the 
conditionalities set by the funders, signing them was clearly part of the investment 
framework promoted by the capital-exporting countries and the IFIs. The first segment 
of this section documents Egypt's historical resistance of investment protection 
standards promoted by capital-exporting countries, before illustrating how the 
Structural Power theory can explain why Egypt accepted these rules in its BITs in the 
next segment. 
4.3.1 The Dichotomy in Egypt’s Multilateral Stance and Bilateral Stance on 
Investment Protection Rules 
The debate between developing and developed countries over investment protection 
rules in the 1960s and 1970s was covered in Chapter 3. Hence, this section will mainly 
focus on Egypt's position on investment rules in multilateral forums and how this 
contradicts the decision to sign BITs. 
As documented in Chapter 3, from the early 1960s through the mid-1970s, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations was dominated by developing countries and passed a 
series of resolutions that endorsed the sovereignty of nations in regulating foreign 
investment. These resolutions reflected the developing countries' interests by stating 
that foreign investments would be regulated according to the domestic laws of the host 
State and that foreign investment disputes should be settled in the courts of the host 
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State. Developing countries’ efforts were led through the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM)166 and the G77167 both of which were a culmination of the Third World Project 
of the 1955 Bandung Conference (Abou-El-Fadl, 2015). Egypt was a founding 
member of both the NAM and the G77. Hence, it was unequivocally against the 
investment protection rules promoted by the developed countries. 
One of the biggest achievements of the NAM was the UN General Assembly 
Resolution No. 1803 (Anghie, 2007).168  Under the pressure of the G77, another 
resolution was passed in 1973 that strengthened the position of the developing 
countries (United Nations General Assembly, 1973).169 Furthermore, in 1974, the UN 
Resolution No. 3201, established the NIEO which was originally drafted in the NAM 
summit in Algiers in 1973 (Tarrosy, 2005).170  
Although these General Assembly resolutions were not binding and did not represent 
authoritative statements of international law, they were reflective of the state of 
international law (Guzman, 1998). Remarkably, however, Egypt (amongst several 
other developing countries) ended up signing BITs which not only included the rules 
it had resisted vociferously for years in the UN but also extended the scope of 
protection provided to foreign investors as listed in Section 3.1 above. Egypt presided 
over the G77 in 1972/1973 and signed its first BIT with Switzerland in 1973. The 
paradox does not end there, for after Egypt had signed these BITs and accepted these 
standards they rejected similar standards in another multilateral forum: the WTO in 
the mid-1990s. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, most developing countries opposed the introduction of 
negotiations on investment at the WTO. Since the issue was first raised at the WTO 
Ministerial in Singapore in 1996, Egypt, amongst other developing countries, 
questioned whether the WTO was an appropriate forum for an investment agreement 
                                               
 
166 The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) created in the Bandung Conference in 1955 emerged in the 
context of the wave of decolonisation and the independence struggles in the developing world. 
167 The G77 was founded in 1964 by seventy-seven developing countries, signatories of the Joint 
Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries issued at the end of the first session of 
UNCTAD in Geneva. 
168 See Chapter 3. 
169  The resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (United Nations General 
Assembly, 1973). See Chapter 3. 
170 See Chapter 3. 
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and argued that it would threaten their economic development (ActionAid, 2003). The 
widespread opposition culminated in a joint statement issued at the start of the Cancun 
Ministerial Conference in 2003 by Ministers which represented 70 developing 
countries. Egypt was amongst these developing countries and was, in fact, a co-
sponsor of the statement. The following extract from the statement indicates the clear 
position these developing countries held regarding the liberalisation of investment 
regulation (WTO, 2003): 
The co-sponsors of this paper believe that binding disciplines on Singapore 
issues would certainly not only curtail the policy space for developing 
countries but would also entail high costs, which many developing countries 
cannot afford at their present level of development.  
While Egypt, along with other developing countries, rejected the investment 
regulations proposed in the WTO, arguing that it would curtail their policy space and 
have negative repercussions on their development, it continued to accept the same 
provisions in the BITs it was signing at the time.  
4.3.2 The Role of Structural Power  
The paradoxical behaviour of Egypt and other developing countries can be explained 
using Gwynn’s Structural Power framework, as set out in Chapter 3. When analysing 
the context in which Egypt signed its BITs through the lens of structural power, a clear 
reliance on the financial dimension in the form of financial credit emerges. As Gwynn 
(2016) explains, the power is exercised in this dimension by limiting the range of 
choices of the financially weaker party to the extent that what is proposed by the 
creditor will generally be accepted. As was the case for other developing countries 
like Bolivia, Egypt's economic and debt crises meant it had to resort to IFIs and capital 
exporting countries to bail it out. The last part of this section builds on the historical 
context in Section 2 to demonstrate how Egypt's dependence on IFIs and adoption of 
the liberalisation policies (that were an integral component of the conditionalities 
imposed by these institutions) effectively led to its decision to sign BITs. 
As demonstrated in Section 2, Egypt's dire economic conditions and desperate need 
for external funds led the regime to shift its allegiance from the Eastern bloc to the 
Western bloc of the Cold War. In order to seek capital in the form of aid and 
investment from the West, Egypt had to accept the conditionalities imposed by the 
Bretton Woods institutions. These policy conditions entailed the liberalisation of the 
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Egyptian economy. The economic support of major capital-exporting countries in the 
West was also contingent on adopting these policy prescriptions. While no documents 
specified signing BITs as one of the conditionalities of IFI policy-based loans, the 
signing of BITs was consistent with the investment liberalisation reforms required by 
the funding institutions and donor countries. This was first reflected through the 
promulgation of an Investment Law (No. 43 of 1974) which embodied the main 
investment protection standards in the BIT templates promoted by the capital-
exporting countries and signed by Egypt during the same period that the Law was 
issued. BITs were presented to the Egyptian authorities by capital exporting countries 
as soon as Egypt started showing commitment towards adopting investment and trade 
liberalisation measures. The first four BITs Egypt signed during the first few years of 
the neoliberal era (Switzerland (1972), Germany (1974), France (1974) and United 
Kingdom (1975) were with the very same capital exporting countries that Egypt was 
seeking aid and investment from (see Section 2).171 
In a few years, Egypt went from resisting a set of investment rules in the UN to 
accepting them by signing BITs. This clearly demonstrates the structural power 
enjoyed by both the IFIs and the capital-exporting countries. These actors continued 
to exercise this structural power over the Country in the 1990s, the decade in which 
Egypt signed the majority of its BITs.  
By 1990, Egypt was facing bankruptcy only to be saved by massive debt write off by 
the Paris Club creditors in return for Egypt's military intervention in the Gulf War. 
The cancellation of approximately 24 billion USD or half of Egypt's external debt 
(Harrigan and El-Said, 2009) came with strings attached. As a pre-requisite for the 
cancellation of the debt and for new credit inflows, Egypt had to agree to an Economic 
Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) with the IMF and World 
Bank. One of the key policy recommendations of this reform programme was the 
liberalisation of inward FDI and accordingly Egypt continued to sign BITs on the 
external level and introduced a series of new laws at the domestic level aimed at 
                                               
 
171 The British BIT, for instance, was introduced in connection with other agreements, one of which 
was a credit arrangement to finance British participation in Egyptian development projects worth 40 
million GBP (Poulsen, 2017, p. 64). This agreement was considered important to the Egyptian party 
and facilitated the negotiation of the treaty by providing a ‘helpful background’ (Poulsen, 2017, pp. 64–
65). 
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attracting foreign investments which were consistent with the protection standards in 
the BITs being signed. One of the main pieces of legislation introduced was 
Investment Law No. 8 of 1997. The Law provided investment incentives and 
guaranteed foreign investors protection against confiscation, sequestration, and 
nationalisation of their property. This Law also granted foreign investors equal legal 
treatment regardless of nationality and granted exemptions from certain labour 
requirements. 172  The reality that new domestic investment laws and regulations 
reflected a lot of the clauses in Egypt’s BITs was no coincidence considering that more 
than 70 per cent of its BITs were signed during the 1990s.  
In conclusion, this section argued that Egypt's economic weakness and need for 
financial credit clearly limited its options when engaging with the actors that held the 
structural power. In the case of receiving credit from the IMF, the conditionalities 
were explicitly aimed at liberalising Egypt's economy, and this included liberalising 
the treatment of foreign investments. The support of the major capital exporters from 
the West was also contingent on adopting these structural adjustment policies. By 
controlling the financial dimension, the major capital-exporting countries were able to 
impose through BITs the rules that reflected their interest in the framework for 
international investments (Gwynn, 2016). 
The next section documents how Egypt began to realise the potency of BITs and the 
results of the first internal BIT review conducted by GAFI. 
5. BITs Bite: Egypt’s First BIT Review 
5.1 Siag Case Triggers the BIT Review  
Egypt only started to realise the extent to which BITs can ‘bite’, and hence grasped 
their legal and political implications, when it started facing treaty-based arbitration 
cases from the late 1990s. Between 1998 and 2011, Egypt faced 11 investment 
arbitration cases.173 The State prevailed in seven cases, lost three and settled one case 
before the tribunal reached a verdict. The total amount awarded in compensation in all 
the cases lost by Egypt until 2011 reached approximately 100 million USD (El-Kady, 
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2012).174 According to an Egyptian official, one case, in particular, rang alarm bells, 
namely the controversial Siag v. Egypt (2005) case filed in ICSID.175 The case alerted 
the Egyptian authorities to the threat posed by BITs due to the size of compensation 
awarded and the manner in which one of the claimants was able to circumvent a rule 
under the ICSID convention that prohibits individuals from pursuing arbitration 
against their own State (Interview with Egyptian official 1, 2017). A divided ICSID 
tribunal ordered the government of Egypt to pay 74.5 Million USD to an Italian 
national, Mr Waguih Siag, as a result of the expropriation of a commercial real-estate 
venture.176  
The controversy relates to whether Mr Siag had, in effect, lost his Egyptian nationality 
during the period in which his investment was expropriated as well as whether he had 
committed fraud in the process of acquiring another nationality. It should be noted 
that, as per Article 25 clause (2)(a), a natural person who was a national of the State 
party to the dispute would not be eligible to be a party in proceedings under the 
auspices of the Centre, even if at the same time he had the nationality of another State 
(ICSID, 1966). This exclusion is absolute. There is no way to override it, not even by 
the States that signed a BIT, and not even by an explicit agreement between the 
investor and the State involved (Anzola, 2016). Thus, for Mr Siag to be able to sue 
Egypt at ICSID, he needed to establish that he no longer had Egyptian nationality by 
the time that he filed for arbitration with ICSID. 
Despite receiving evidence that Mr Siag had an Egyptian passport at the time of the 
investment, the majority of the tribunal concluded in its May 2007 jurisdiction award 
that Mr Siag’s Egyptian nationality automatically lapsed one year after his acquisition 
of Lebanese nationality in 1989.177 According to the tribunal this automatic lapse 
occurred as a result of the claimant's failure to expressly request that his Egyptian 
nationality be preserved, as is required under Egyptian law (Peterson, 2009b).178 
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Following the jurisdiction award, Egypt presented new evidence which it alleged 
proved Mr Siag had fraudulently procured his Lebanese nationality, hence casting 
doubt on the validity of Mr Siag’s acquisition of the Lebanese nationality (Peterson, 
2009b) . 
In its final verdict, the ICSID tribunal was split on the question of whether fraud or 
some other impropriety had occurred (Peterson, 2009b). Two of the three arbitrators 
on the panel, ruled that there was no convincing evidence of fraud or impropriety.179 
However, in the view of the dissenting arbitrator, Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuna, 
there was enough circumstantial evidence to support an inference of fraud or 
impropriety on the part of one of the claimants (Peterson, 2009b).180 Strikingly, the 
majority proceeded to add that even if a fraudulent act had occurred during the 
acquisition of Mr Siag’s Lebanese nationality, this might not have been detrimental to 
his claim (Peterson, 2009b).181 
As mentioned above Egypt’s experience in the Siag case led officials to start taking 
BITs seriously. While Egypt had been experiencing treaty-based arbitration cases 
since 1998, it was the Siag case that triggered the decision to conduct a review of its 
BITs. An internal review of Egypt’s BIT network conducted by GAFI in 2006 
concluded that there was a state of imbalance that characterised Egypt’s BITs in favour 
of foreign investors at the expense of the host country's policy space, deviating from 
one of the essential objectives stipulated in treaty preambles concerning the 
contribution to the economic development of its contracting parties (GAFI, 2010). 
Despite the results of the review, and unlike its counterparts (Bolivia and South 
Africa), the Egyptian authorities maintained the status quo and refrained from making 
any substantive changes to Egypt’s BITs. The next section documents the results of 
the review process in more detail, and Section 6 addresses how the decision to 
maintain the status quo allowed investors to challenge efforts by the State to redress 
corruption and introduce progressive economic policies post-2011. 
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5.2 The Outcome of the BIT Review: A New Model BIT with Incremental 
Reforms  
As a result of its experience with arbitration cases, and in line with the growing trend 
at the time, Egypt conducted an internal review of its BITs. In 2006, GAFI engaged 
with UNCTAD to conduct a review of its BITs network. The review was far from 
comprehensive compared to similar exercises completed by other developing 
countries such as South Africa and was not published. Nevertheless, an internal 
assessment of Egypt’s BIT network revealed a lack of consistency in the content of 
the BITs signed and the absence of a link between the content of the treaties and 
Egypt's economic objectives or priorities. This lack of consistency was the result of 
the ‘dominance of the political objectives over the economic ones during the processes 
of negotiation and signature’ (GAFI, 2012, p. 5) According to an Egyptian official, 
the review also revealed that there was no evidence of a causal relationship or even 
correlation between BITs and FDI despite being cited as one of the primary 
motivations behind signing BITs (Interview with Egyptian official 1, 2017).  
Egypt's response after its first review was to launch a reform programme to ensure 
there was a clear system in place for signing new treaties. The objectives of this 
programme were to ensure that any new BITs signed would be driven by real 
economic interests and ensuring the content of these BITs achieved a more balanced 
relationship between the interests of the investor and that of the State. Furthermore, as 
a result of this process, the Egyptian Model of Investment Promotion and Protection 
Agreement was adopted in 2007 (‘Model BIT’). The main objectives of the new Model 
BIT according to GAFI (2012, p. 9) were: 
 (i) Achieving consistency and conformity between Egyptian BITs; and (ii) 
Restoring the sustainable balance between the objectives of promotion, 
protection and liberalisation of foreign investments, on the one hand, and its 
regulation by the State, on the other hand. These objectives were driven by the 
desire to enforce the sovereign right of the host State to regulate FDI in order 
to ensure it contributes to achieving sustainable development, as well as the 
need to maintain the policy space necessary to achieve national social and 
economic objectives. 
Some of the main features of the Model BIT included (GAFI, 2012; Mossallem, 2016): 
1. The Model BIT provided more precise definitions of the main terms in BITs, 
especially those of ‘investment’ and ‘investor’. These changes included 
moving from the traditional broad asset-based definition of ‘investment’, 
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through specific limitations and linking covered investments with satisfying 
certain economic characteristics and respecting the laws and regulations of the 
host State, besides excluding ‘non-investment’ activities. Also, the new 
definition of ‘investor’ concentrated on proving a real relationship between the 
investor and his home country, either a natural person or a legal entity, to 
exclude unwelcome investors, e.g. shell companies. 
2. Regarding substantive standards of protection, the Model BIT retained the FET 
provision but equated it to the minimum standard of treatment of aliens under 
customary international law. In an attempt to eliminate ‘treaty shopping’ 
practices, the Model BIT excluded the application of MFN standards on ISDS 
clauses. The Model BIT also amended the free transfer of funds clause by 
acknowledging the host State's right to take safeguard measures to deal with 
any severe short-term balance of payments or monetary policy difficulties. 
Other key substantive provisions including expropriation, NT and protection 
and security standards remained relatively unchanged. 
3. Concerning the ISDS provision, the Model BIT introduced limitations on the 
time period to submit investment claims. 
This exercise represented the first concerted effort by Egyptian authorities to engage 
in treaty drafting. In practice, however, unlike the examples of responses by other 
developing countries including the two other case studies in this thesis (South Africa 
and Bolivia) the changes in the new Model BIT were mild, leaving the most 
controversial clauses including FET, expropriation and ISDS provisions relatively 
unchanged in existing treaties. More importantly, this Model BIT was not used to 
attempt to renegotiate any of the existing treaties, leaving Egypt dangerously exposed 
to what are now publicly known and widely acknowledged threats to its sovereignty 
to legislate and regulate its economy. 	
6. The Implications of Egypt’s Decision to Maintain the Status Quo  
Despite the growing awareness globally of the threats posed by BITs and 
corresponding efforts to amend or withdraw from these treaties by an increasing 
number of developing and developed countries (as documented in Chapter 2), Egypt 
has remained reluctant to amend or replace its existing treaties. Failing to revise the 
existing treaties returned to haunt Egypt in the aftermath of the January 25th 
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revolution, when it realised that BITs might not only lead to the loss of policy space 
but also impede efforts to devise new investment policies and regulations to address 
specific development objectives (El-Kady, 2012). The rest of this section 
demonstrates how Egypt’s membership in the investment treaty regime has restricted 
its ability to regulate in the public interest. 
6.1 BITs Restricting Egypt’s Regulatory Space Post-2011: Theory and 
Practice 
One of the triggers that led to the January 25th, 2011 revolution was the neoliberal 
economic policies implemented over the past several decades, which provided the 
conditions for both the emergence of a capitalist oligarchy within the regime and an 
unprecedented rise in socio-economic inequality in society at large (Roccu, 2013). 
Rapid deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation efforts aimed at increasing FDI 
inflows also paved the way for rampant corruption (El-Kady, 2012). In the 1990s, a 
privatisation programme which was part of an IMF sponsored ERSAP was 
implemented. Several public institutions were privatised either through outright sale 
or government partnerships with private investors (Hazzaa and Kumpf, 2015). This 
process lacked both transparency and anti-corruption control measures (Hazzaa and 
Kumpf, 2015). Moreover, government officials regularly undervalued State-owned 
assets and sold these to foreign and domestic investors for a fraction of their market 
values (El-Kady, 2012), as revealed by the court rulings post-2011. Economic 
liberalisation certainly benefited foreign investors as investor-friendly laws were 
issued. However, FDI benefits to the national economy were limited as FDI failed to 
promote sufficient economic growth to improve income distribution and lower 
poverty levels (Kheir-El-Din and El-Laithy, 2006, p. 28). Instead, the beneficiaries of 
FDI and economic policies during that era were the higher income segments of the 
population and the class of crony capitalists close to the regime (Fadel, 2011).  
According to Bonnitcha (2014), a common feature of authoritarian regimes is that 
economic benefits, including investment opportunities, are distributed through 
networks of patronage and cronyism. Consequently, in the event of a revolution or a 
transition to a new regime, there may be demands for the reclamation of public funds 
and assets as well as the introduction of more progressive economic and social policies 
with the aim of achieving a more equitable sharing of these economic benefits. This 
was precisely the situation in Egypt post-January 2011, before the State realised that 
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in many respects investment treaties do not provide sufficient flexibility to incoming 
regimes as they preclude various options for redistribution and reform. Egypt's 
experience post-2011 was consistent with the results of a study conducted on 114 
developing countries which concluded that BITs can directly reduce host government 
incentive and ability to implement redistributive policies (Bodea and Ye, 2017). By 
enabling investors to challenge efforts to introduce progressive economic and social 
policies, BITs tend to indirectly lock-in initial favourable policies to foreign investors 
in the fields of taxes, welfare spending, and labour practices and constrain the future 
policy improvements in these fields (Bodea and Ye, 2017). 
The rest of this section demonstrates how BITs restricted Egypt’s regulatory space 
post-2011, both in terms of theory and practice.  
6.2 In Theory 
Post-2011, the primary regulatory concern for Egypt stemmed from the impact of BITs 
on the ability of the government to regulate the economy in line with its efforts to 
reform the failed economic liberalisation policies of the ousted regime. Another major 
concern was the extent to which these treaties allow Egypt to take measures to combat 
corruption when it involves deals between foreign investors and the previous regime. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the substantive protection clauses in BITs come with 
limited safeguards to allow host country governments to regulate with the aim of 
protecting the public interest. This section focuses on the expansive nature of two of 
the most problematic substantive provisions in Egypt’s BITs, FET and expropriation, 
highlighting how they empowered foreign investors to restrict the ability of the State 
to regulate post-2011. 
6.2.1 Fair and Equitable Treatment 
A significant challenge faced by Egyptian governments post-2011 is the issue of 
‘legitimate expectations’ of foreign investors arising from previous government 
policies and measures to attract investment before the revolution (El-Kady, 2012). As 
discussed in Chapter 2, arbitration tribunals have consistently identified these 
expectations as a critical aspect of the FET standard in BITs. Again as demonstrated 
in Chapter 2, in practice, it is difficult to predict when actions of a government will 
breach the FET standard. The wording of the clause itself typically gives no detailed 
guidance, and tribunals considering this obligation have delivered widely differing 
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interpretations. Indeed, some tribunals have interpreted the FET standard as a 
guarantee against all significant changes to the laws and policies governing a foreign 
investment (Bonnitcha, 2014). 
According to El-Kady (2012), this concept is particularly important in times of 
political and social change and uncertainty. This was evident in Egypt’s case. El-Kady 
(2012, p. 6) argues that the ‘legitimate expectations’ of foreign investors under FET 
reduced the ability of Egyptian governments to implement new regulations that could 
potentially impact foreign investors without increasing the risks of breaching the 
clause, even if those measures are implemented to serve ‘legitimate public 
purposes’.182 Accordingly, this posed a serious challenge to Egyptian policymakers 
who are expected to intervene in the economy and introduce regulatory changes with 
the aim of pursuing economic and social justice (El-Kady, 2012).  
The FET standard has triggered several investment claims against Egypt, and in this 
particular context, i.e. post-2011, one case to be discussed in the next section is the 
Veolia v. Egypt (2012) case. Furthermore, this standard can also be considered as one 
of the main drivers of the regulatory chill effect as it threatens any new regulatory 
measures that may affect the profitability or interests of foreign investors.  
6.2.2 Expropriation 
As currently drafted, Egypt's BITs do not allow scope for an incoming regime to 
renationalise foreign investments or cancel concessions, except on payment of full 
market value compensation (see Section 3.1). The protection extends to investments 
acquired from the host State in a transaction that was not at arm’s length or acquired 
at a price that is significantly below their market value (Bonnitcha, 2014). 
Furthermore, these investments would be entitled to full market value compensation, 
as the principle of full market value compensation does not allow a tribunal to adjust 
compensation to reflect the circumstances in which investment was originally 
acquired (Bonnitcha, 2014). As Bonnitcha (2014) notes, this raises concerns over the 
fairness of the application of these investment treaties for countries in transition. He 
further elaborates that by granting foreign investors a right to full market value 
compensation (even if the investments were originally acquired for a small fraction of 
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their market value from the previous regime), these treaties ‘restrict the ability of an 
incoming regime to recover assets transferred to associates of the authoritarian regime, 
and to engage in more radical forms of redistribution’ (Bonnitcha, 2014, p. 108) . 
Egypt's experience post- 2011 is a case in point, as the Mubarak legacy of corruption 
led to efforts to recover public assets that were privatised or acquired by investors at 
rates that were significantly below their market value. Egyptian courts issued at least 
11 rulings in the few years following the revolution and more than a dozen lawsuits 
followed. These court decisions ordered the State to reverse deals signed by the former 
President's administration (Fick, 2013). Such deals included privatisations as well as 
concessions and acquisitions of public assets (including land, public companies and 
factories) by foreign investors. The decision by the State to implement the court 
rulings triggered several treaty-based and commercial arbitration cases. Eventually, 
the threat of these cases led the State to back down from its efforts to recover these 
assets and instead resort to settlements to appease foreign investors and avoid 
arbitration. 
The next section on how BITs have constrained Egypt's regulatory space in practice 
provides examples of the arbitration cases filed. 
6.3 In Practice: Arbitration Cases 
Egypt has faced 22 new investment treaty-based arbitration cases since 2011, 
increasing the total number of cases to 33 and making Egypt one of the top five 
countries in the world when it comes to the number of investment arbitration cases 
faced as a host State.183 Of these 22 cases, the State has lost three cases, won two cases, 
and settled 10 cases. The remaining seven cases are pending. To provide a glimpse of 
the size of the financial burden these cases have on the public budget of the State, it is 
worth noting that Egypt paid c. 164 million USD for only three of the 10 settled 
cases.184 In one of the three cases Egypt has lost, the tribunal has ordered the State to 
pay the investor c. 2 billion USD in compensation.185  In the remaining two, the 
                                               
 
183 See Appendix IV. 
184  The three cases for which the settlement amounts were publicly disclosed are: Indorama 
International Finance Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt. ICSID, Case No. ARB/11/32; ASA 
International S.p.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt. ICSID, Case No. ARB/13/23; and ArcelorMittal S.A. 
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185 Unión Fenosa Gas, S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt. ICSID, Case No. ARB/14/4. 
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tribunals have yet to determine the compensation to be paid by the State to the 
investors, but the damages claimed by the investors exceed 1.7 billion USD.186 Of the 
seven pending cases, information on the compensation claimed by investors is only 
available for one case and amounts to c. 150 million USD.187  
The rest of this section will address four cases that have been triggered by the 
introduction of new labour legislation, land sales and other commercial transactions 
involving corruption. The disputes below concern situations in which the incoming 
Egyptian governments sought to revoke or amend measures adopted by the previous 
regime. These claims illustrate how BITs have constrained Egypt's regulatory space 
in practice. It is important to note that 18 other cases were filed post-2011, some of 
which entail much more significant financial implications and also have an impact on 
policy space. However, this chapter focuses on the four below as these indicate how 
attempts to redress corruption and introduce more progressive economic policies were 
stifled early on. Going forward, successive governments have taken measures 
reminiscent of the pre-2011 era by catering to investors at the expense of public 
interest. 
The Veolia v. Egypt (2012) case188 is an example of a claim triggered by the incoming 
Egyptian government’s efforts to redress the economic policies of the previous regime 
(Bonnitcha, 2014) and introduce progressive economic policies. French multinational 
Veolia had an ICSID arbitration claim for 82 million EUR registered against Egypt in 
2012. Veolia signed a contract in 2001 for waste management in Alexandria. 
However, the 15-year contract was terminated early in 2011, as a result of a series of 
disputes between the local authority and Veolia (Peterson, 2012b). One of the main 
issues in this dispute was the company’s demand to be compensated for changes to 
local labour laws which include an increase in minimum wages (Peterson, 2012). The 
company claimed that provisions in the contract between the authority and company 
stipulated that the authority should compensate the company for financial implications 
                                               
 
186 The two other cases that Egypt has lost post-2011 are: Ampal-American Israel Corp., EGI-Fund (08-
10) Investors LLC, EGI-Series Investments LLC, BSS-EMG Investors LLC and David Fischer v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt. ICSID, Case No. ARB/12/11; Yosef Maiman, Merhav (MNF), Merhav-Ampal 
Group, Merhav-Ampal Energy Holdings v. Arab Republic of Egypt. PCA, Case No. 2012/26. 
187 Al Jazeera Media Network v. Arab Republic of Egypt. ICSID, Case No. ARB/16/1. 
188 Veolia Propreté v. Arab Republic of Egypt. ICSID, Case No. ARB/12/15. 
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of such changes in legislation (Peterson, 2012b). After six years of defending the case, 
which may potentially cost millions of dollars in legal and arbitration costs, the ICSID 
tribunal ruled in favour of the State in May 2018.189 
The Indorama v. Egypt (2011) case190 is an example of an arbitration case in which an 
investor challenged efforts to combat corruption by the domestic judiciary system 
through a BIT.191 In 2007, Indorama, a multinational textile company, acquired the 
privatised Shebin El Kom textile factory for c. 15 million USD (Al Borsa News, 2015). 
In September 2011, the Egyptian Administrative court ruled that the privatisation 
process had been unlawful because the investor had not paid full market value for the 
factory (Fick, 2013). This renationalisation was one of several ordered by the Egyptian 
courts on the grounds that privatisations carried out by the Mubarak regime had not 
been conducted on a fair market value basis. Indorama initially claimed 156 million 
USD in compensation before eventually settling for 54 million USD in 2015 (Al Borsa 
News, 2015). The financial cost incurred by this claim was not the only consequence 
of the challenge faced by Egypt. The threat of arbitration eventually led Egyptian 
authorities to back down from efforts to renationalise or cancel concessions that had 
proven to be acquired in corrupt circumstances and instead seek settlements with the 
investors implicated in these transactions.  
The Damac v. Egypt (2011) 192 and  Utsch v. Egypt (2013)193 cases are both examples 
of cases where the investments involve allegations that they were not acquired through 
an arm's length transaction and that the price paid was significantly below the fair 
market value (Bonnitcha, 2014). Both also included criminal convictions against the 
investors but ended up eventually being settled out of court.194  
In the case of ‘Damac’, the investor, Hussain Sajwani, had acquired a plot of land on 
Gamsha Bay on the Red Sea Coast in 2006 for the development of a residential 
                                               
 
189 Tribunal documents are not publicly available.  
190 Indorama International Finance Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt. ICSID, Case No. ARB/11/32.  
191 Tribunal documents not publicly available.  
192 Hussain Sajwani, Damac Park Avenue for Real Estate Development S.A.E., and Damac Gamsha 
Bay for Development S.A.E. v. Arab Republic of Egypt. ICSID, Case No. ARB/11/16. 
193  Utsch M.O.V.E.R.S. International GmbH, Erich Utsch Aktiengesellschaft, and Mr Helmut 
Jungbluth v. Arab Republic of Egypt. ICSID, Case No. ARB/13/37. 
194 Tribunal documents for both cases are not publicly available.  
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complex. Shortly after the revolution Sajwani and former tourism minister Zuhair 
Garranah were charged for corruption in the process of purchasing the land and the 
squandering of public assets respectively. Sajwani was sentenced ‘in absentia' to five 
years, fined 40 million USD and ordered to return the land to the State. Sajwani reacted 
by filing an ICSID claim in May 2011. In 2013, the government negotiated a 
settlement ‘aiming to spare Egypt the risks of international arbitration, safeguard its 
image abroad and reassure investors amidst continuing political uncertainty’ (Fick, 
2013). The official terms of the settlement were confidential. 
In the Utsch case, or the ‘License Plates' case, as it was publicly known, three members 
of the Cabinet (former Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, former Interior Minister Habib 
El Adly, and former Finance Minister Youssef Boutros Ghali) were indicted on 
corruption charges related to the 2008 purchase of car license plates from Utsch 
(Enterprise, 2017). The court in 2011 had also convicted both Erich Utsch, AG's 
Chairman and CEO Helmut Jungbluth in absentia (Enterprise, 2017). The Company 
responded by filing an international arbitration case against Egypt in ICSID seeking 
compensation for damages. Jungbluth was later acquitted, and after negotiations with 
The Ministerial Committee for Settlement of Investment Disputes, both parties agreed 
to suspend case proceedings in July 2016 before reaching a resolution to drop the case 
that did not involve any settlements (Enterprise, 2017). The controversial decision to 
settle criminal charges through an extrajudicial committee bypassing the Egyptian 
courts was part of the regulatory chill caused by the influx of arbitration cases which 
is addressed further in the next section. 
7. Remaining Loyal to the Regime? Egypt Backtracks in the Face of 
Arbitration 
7.1 Regulatory Chill 
Post-revolution promises to unwind the Mubarak era FDI policies and hold investors 
implicated in deals that involved embezzlement of public funds or assets accountable 
were short-lived. After realising the extensive nature of the substantive provisions of 
BITs and how they can constrain the State’s sovereignty to regulate for the public 
interest, the successive governments that took office refrained from introducing any 
new FDI regulatory measures that could trouble foreign investors (e.g. progressive 
taxation, minimum wage). The State realised that prospects of successfully 
implementing the judicial rulings on the corruption cases were low, as the likelihood 
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that a tribunal will find that these decisions constitute expropriation or other breaches 
under the BITs was high (Hazzaa and Kumpf, 2015). Upon this realisation, the 
Egyptian government started backtracking on its efforts to hold investors accountable 
for corruption by first introducing dispute settlement committees to negotiate 
settlements with investors before eventually going a step further to prevent domestic 
courts from annulling contracts (Hazzaa and Kumpf, 2015).  
7.1.1 Dispute Settlement Committees 
In 2012, faced with an increasing number of investment disputes, the Prime Minister 
issued Decree No. 1115 of 2012 establishing an Investment Dispute Settlement 
Ministerial Committee, presided by the Minister of Justice (Abbas and Matouk, 2016). 
This committee was established to address investors' complaints, requests and disputes 
with any governmental entity.195 In 2015, in applying the new amendments of the 
Investment Law, the Prime Minister established another ministerial committee headed 
by the Prime Minister through Decree No. 3412 of 2015. This committee was granted 
the competency to negotiate amicable settlements for disputes arising out of 
investment contracts to which the government or an affiliated public or private 
government entity are parties (Abbas and Matouk, 2016). 196  It also allowed the 
government to bypass the Administrative Courts and settle with investors who had 
been indicted with corruption charges as illustrated in the Utsch case above.  
After backtracking on introducing new progressive policies and reconciling with 
investors who were charged for corruption in privatisation and other commercial deals 
under the threat of arbitration cases, Egypt represented a classic example of the 
regulatory chill effect (see Chapter 2). Moreover, Egyptian authorities have gone a 
step further by introducing new legislation to provide protection that goes above and 
beyond what is already provided in BITs. 
7.1.2 Introducing Legislation to Make Investors Immune from Judicial 
Accountability 
The success of court cases in undoing Mubarak era deals sent shockwaves through the 
investment community in Egypt (Hazzaa and Kumpf, 2015, p. 5). The interim 
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government in March 2014 announced in a public memorandum that the high 
probability of losing investment arbitration cases and incurring large amounts of 
damages as a result would have a devastating effect on the much-needed economic 
recovery process (Youm 7, 2014). Consequently, the Egyptian government sought to 
stop the Administrative Courts from annulling the investment contracts by banning 
Public Interest Law in all pending and future cases (Hazzaa and Kumpf, 2015).  
Earlier in 2012, the transitional government issued Law No. 4 of 2012, creating an 
extra-judicial committee to resolve cases of embezzlement and undermining the 
ability of Egypt’s courts to hold investors accountable (Joya, 2017). This Law shifts 
the responsibility to seek reconciliation with investors from the judiciary to the 
General Authority for Investment and Free Zones, de facto denying courts’ 
jurisdiction over cases of corruption, theft and embezzlement of public funds 
involving any investor (Khalil et al., 2015).197 In 2014, the Egyptian government 
proposed a sweeping ban on third-party litigation through Law No. 32 of 2014 limiting 
the right to challenge the validity of government contracts to the parties and creditors 
only.198 As Hazzaa and Kumpf (2015) explain, by issuing this Law the government 
has blocked an avenue for the public to respond to institutionalised and widespread 
corruption and has also foreclosed the courts' review power in the name of foreign 
investment. 
Finally, these measures adopted to protect investors from any domestic judiciary 
oversight were complemented with additional dispute settlement committees in a 
desperate attempt to avoid international arbitration. As of the latest Investment Law 
(Investment Law No. 72 of 2017), there are three committees.199 Ten cases have been 
settled thus far, but with the lack of transparency over the terms of the settlements and 
the lack of accountability on the financial settlements agreed, it becomes almost 
impossible to assess if they served the public interest.  
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Ironically, however, what has been confirmed to a large extent is that all these 
measures to appease foreign investors and remain committed to BITs have not 
stemmed the accumulation of new investment arbitration cases as there have been at 
least eight new cases since 2015 (see Appendix IV).  
7.2 A Second BIT Review and Model BIT: Status Quo Maintained 
Although Egypt has made no attempt to revise its current BITs and the government 
has sought to ensure that its domestic legislation reflects the same standards in its 
existing BITs, the State has continued to engage with UNCTAD and has publicly 
stated that it needed to revise its unbalanced BIT network. 
In the UNCTAD Expert Meeting on Taking Stock of IIA Reform in March 2016, a 
GAFI official stated that BITs tend to ‘favour the protection of foreign investors at the 
expense of the legitimate rights of the host countries in the regulation and treatment 
of foreign investments in accordance with the right to achieve sustainable economic 
development’ (GAFI, 2016, pp. 1–2). The statement also revealed that in order to 
address these imbalances, Egypt is embarking on reforming its network of investment 
treaties in line with recent developments and best practices using UNCTAD's 
investment policy framework and its roadmap for reform (GAFI, 2016). The Egyptian 
official’s statement also revealed that in 2013 Egypt re-engaged with UNCTAD to 
conduct a more comprehensive review of its BITs and introduce a new Model BIT 
(‘2013 Model BIT’). The model passed through several phases starting with an 
internal technical review, consultation with stakeholders from the public and private 
sector and a peer review presented by relevant international organisations advanced 
by UNCTAD (GAFI, 2016). Although the 2013 Model BIT is not publicly available, 
the Vice President of the ICC, Dr Mohamed Abdel Wahab provides an overview of 
this model BIT in his chapter on Egypt in the publication ‘Enforcement of Investment 
Treaty Arbitration Awards’ (Abdel Wahab, 2015). Like the 2007 model, the 2013 
Model BIT refrains from making any significant reform or revision of the investment 
protection standards. The Model BIT includes the same investor protection standards, 
e.g. expropriation, FET, protection and security and the free transfer funds with the 
inclusion of ‘broadly drafted exclusions or exceptions’ (Abdel Wahab, 2015, p. 206). 
The 2013 Model BIT also includes an investor-State arbitration provision; the only 
notable change is the introduction of an article excluding non-discriminatory 
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regulatory actions or measures intended to protect legitimate public welfare objectives 
in an attempt to limit recourse to investment arbitration (Abdel Wahab, 2015).200  
Overall, the 2013 Model BIT has introduced modest changes leaving the two most 
expansively interpreted protection clauses – FET and expropriation – relatively 
unchanged, and sticking with ISDS. Most importantly, this model, which has not been 
officially released as of September 2018, will remain of little significance until Egypt 
decides and succeeds to replace or renegotiate its existing BITs.  
A statement by an Egyptian official at a UNCTAD forum in 2016, revealed that the 
State in collaboration with UNCTAD prepared a comprehensive analytical report on 
Egypt's BITs (GAFI, 2016). The report, which is not publicly available, provides 
policy options for the reform of the critical provisions of Egypt's BITs and provides 
recommendations for Egypt's International Investment Agreements reform efforts 
(GAFI, 2016). GAFI was expected to hold a conference during 2016 along with the 
relevant stakeholders and UNCTAD to present the findings of the report. However, as 
of September 2018, there has been no announcement regarding neither the results of 
this review nor plans to reform Egypt’s BIT regime.  
These statements by the Egyptian officials contradict the actual policies adopted by 
successive governments that have taken office since 2011. Instead of considering the 
need to amend or replace existing BITs, successive governments have ensured that 
any new investment policies or legislations mirror the expansive protection standards 
provided in Egypt's BITs. The latest episode of this cycle has been the Investment Law 
No. 72 of 2017 which provides investment protection standards that are consistent 
with those in Egypt's existing BITs. 
7.3 Factors Behind Egypt’s Decision to Maintain the Status Quo 
Despite acknowledging the unbalanced nature of these treaties and the lack of clear 
benefits compared to the substantial costs incurred since the internal review conducted 
in 2006, Egypt has refrained from an exit or renegotiation. On the one hand, this case 
study has demonstrated how arbitration cases have led to the backtracking of the State 
on changing its domestic FDI regulatory framework (both legislation and economic 
policies). On the other hand, the same structural power dynamics that explained why 
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Egypt signed BITs and agreed on the content of these BITs can also explain why Egypt 
has refrained from revising these BITs. Post-2011, Egypt has faced fiscal and debt 
problems that are quite similar to the difficulties faced in the 1970s and 1980s and 
hence have turned to donor countries (this time Gulf States) and the IMF for help.  
The economic and political turmoil since 2011 has further exposed and exacerbated 
Egypt's longstanding and deeply-rooted structural economic problems (Mossallem, 
2017). These problems have been compounded by widening fiscal deficits, rising 
public debt, fragility in the balance of payments and, hence, losses of foreign exchange 
reserves (Mossallem, 2017). For several years, Egypt's primary sources of income and 
foreign currency have stalled (Mossallem, 2017). Suez Canal revenues stagnated due 
to the recession in international trade (Adly, 2016). Tourism revenues have also 
contracted because of a series of internal and external shocks over the past few years. 
The Central Bank has used the reserves to finance the import of fuel and foods and to 
defend the value of the Egyptian pound (Mossallem, 2017). During the period between 
2011 to 2015, the trade deficit increased from -11.5 per cent of GDP to -11.7 per cent 
of GDP and the current account deficit reached -3.6 per cent of GDP. These conditions 
have led to a sizeable public debt which reached 91.1 per cent of GDP in June 2017 
(Central Bank of Egypt, 2017a), with external debt at around 41 per cent of GDP by 
June 2017 (Ministry of Finance, 2017). 
Since mid-2012, Egypt relied on financial assistance from Gulf countries to finance 
their fiscal and external deficits. Funding from the Gulf over FY13/14, for instance, 
amounted to 20 billion USD (Ministry of Finance, 2015), in the form of cheap credit, 
deposits in the Central Bank of Egypt (which were used to replenish foreign currency 
reserves and grants and in-kind aid, which helped absorb the political backlash of 
worsening economic conditions) (Adly, 2016). As of March 2017 around 30 per cent 
of Egypt's external debt was owed to Arab countries (mainly United Arab Emirates, 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) making them the creditors with the most significant share 
of Egypt's foreign debt (Central Bank of Egypt, 2017b). Furthermore, the Gulf States 
have been the primary source of FDI post-2011. Between 2012 and 2016 around 40 
per cent of greenfield FDI projects in Egypt came from the Middle East (Dhaman, 
2017). Together the UAE and Saudi Arabian contributions account for 20 per cent of 
the green FDI projects during that period (Dhaman, 2017). 
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The Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC) have used this leverage to pressure 
the Egyptian government to maintain the same protection standards as well introduce 
new investment-friendly reforms (Hazzaa and Kumpf, 2015; Joya, 2017). In the 
aftermath of the annulment of investment contracts by Egyptian courts, investors 
began to lobby for increased protection through amendments to the Investment Law 
(Hazzaa and Kumpf, 2015). For example, the active lobbying by Saudi Arabian 
investors to introduce amendments to the Investment Law that would ensure that rights 
and privileges enjoyed by investors under previous contracts would remain intact was 
widely covered by the Egyptian press (Hazzaa and Kumpf, 2015). The proposed 
amendments by the Saudi investors aimed to place restrictions on the right to sue 
investors in criminal courts and barred Public Interest Law challenges against 
investment contracts (Daily News Egypt, 2014). These proposals were initially met 
with outrage by Egyptian labour and human rights organisations and subsequently 
dropped (Al-Essawi, 2014). Nevertheless, the pressure exerted by investors eventually 
led to the introduction of Law 32 of 2014 ‘Regulating Some Procedural Aspects of 
Challenging Government Contracts’ which denies third parties the right to file claims 
relating to contracts between investors and the government, as previously discussed 
above.  
Another example of the pressure exerted was the warning by the Saudi government in 
2011 that it would cancel the work visas of over 1 million Egyptians in Saudi Arabia 
if privatisation deals were reversed or revised (Abdelhadi, 2012; Joya, 2017). The fear 
of investor and donor backlash also led the Egyptian government to resort to settling 
with investors by establishing investment dispute settlement committees as early as 
2012 (Joya, 2017), again, as illustrated above. Investment treaty-based cases 
settlements with GCC investors included the Damac case and a case that involved a 
Kuwaiti company, Bawabet Al Kuwait Holding 201  (Enterprise, 2016). Other 
commercial arbitration cases include Saudi's Prince Alwaleed bin Talal's Kingdom 
Agricultural Development Co. and Saudi's Anwal group over the privatisation of 
Omar Effendi (departmental store) (Fick, 2013; Joya, 2017).  
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Egypt's dependence on the Gulf States for both aid and FDI demonstrates the structural 
power these actors hold and its impact on the ability of the State to revisit FDI 
regulations including BITs. The Gulf States, however, were not the only actors that 
had that kind of influence on Egypt's policymaking. Post-2011, the IMF has played a 
central role in guiding and shaping Egypt's economic policies. Despite only reaching 
a loan agreement towards the end of 2016, capital inflows from donors and creditors 
were generally contingent on the structural adjustment policies prescribed by the IMF 
even before 2016. The IMF's SAPs consisted of the same combination of austerity and 
liberalisation measures that were discussed in detail in Sections 2 and 4 and hence any 
attempts to introduce new regulatory measures or reduce the scope of protection 
provided to investors was certainly not part of the plan.  
Consequently, despite facing a substantially higher number of arbitration cases 
compared to other developing countries like South Africa and Bolivia, Egypt has 
refrained from revising its BITs and FDI regulatory framework. Instead Egyptian 
governments since 2012 have introduced new legislation that has not only maintained 
the protection standards present in BITs (which they have publicly stated required 
reform) but also added new layers of protection as demonstrated above. 
8. Conclusion: Egypt, a Case for Hirschman’s Loyalty? 
Over the past decade, a broad consensus has been emerging regarding the threat posed 
by BITs on the national regulatory space of developing countries. During this period, 
multilateral organisations like UNCTAD have been vocal about the need to reform 
these treaties after acknowledging that investment treaties have placed limits on host 
countries’ sovereignty in domestic policymaking (UNCTAD, 2015). Furthermore, 
given rising concerns about the limitations set by BITs, reform of these treaties needs 
to ensure that countries retain their right to regulate for pursuing public policy 
interests, including sustainable development objectives. This also includes 
safeguarding the right to regulate needed for implementing economic or financial 
policies (UNCTAD, 2015) . 
This case study has demonstrated how Egypt’s decision not to amend or replace its 
existing treaties after the findings of the BITs review conducted in 2006 has cost the 
State its ability to legislate and regulate in the public interest after the January 25th 
revolution in 2011. Furthermore, Egypt has become one of the most frequent 
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defendants in ISDS cases, as it ranks fifth in terms of international investment 
arbitration cases faced by a host country. Defending these cases has serious financial 
implications both in terms of costs of arbitration proceedings and the awards rendered 
or settlements reached. Could Egypt’s decision to refrain from exercising neither voice 
nor exit be explained as an act of loyalty towards the international investment regime? 
According to Hirschman, the loyalty of a member of an organization/regime is higher 
when the entrance costs (moral, physical, material or cognitive) are higher 
(Hirschman, 1970). He contends that the possibility of exit may be further reduced 
where options to exit are less appealing, i.e. small job market, political or financial 
hurdles (Hirschman, 1970). Hirschman’s conceptualisation of loyalty to an 
organisation (in this study the organisation is the investment treaty regime as explained 
in Chapter 3) includes both an expectation by the member that there is scope for future 
improvement and that it serves as a predicate for the practice of voice. Loyal members 
become especially devoted to the organization's success when their voice will be heard 
and they can reform it (Hirschman, 1970).  
In the investment treaty regime literature it is argued that the States most likely to feel 
some semblance of loyalty to their investment treaties and the international investment 
regime are those that stand the most to gain and the least to lose from membership 
(Katselas, 2014). That group appears to be the large capital exporters that feel the 
greatest need to protect their nationals’ foreign investments through investment 
treaties and have the least risk of liability under them (Katselas, 2014). For developing 
countries, however, it is a different situation. As capital importers, they are keen to 
avoid losing out on FDI inflows and avoid arbitration cases. Consequently, their 
motivation to retain their treaties instead of exercising voice or exit has more to do 
with avoiding possible repercussions and less with loyalty, as defined by Hirschman. 
Moreover, the State may have determined that it has more to gain and less to lose by 
seeking to reduce its risk from within the international investment regime rather than 
from the outside (Hirschman, 1970). Hirschman’s conceptualisation of loyalty may 
apply to developing countries that are exposed to arbitration cases through BITs, but 
nonetheless benefit from the system due to the protection their investors receive when 
investing in other developing countries (e.g. China). However, it does not account for 
members who have incurred significant costs in the form of investment disputes and 
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little benefits from their membership of the international investment regime and yet 
have refrained from reacting through exit or voice.  
Despite being cited as one of the main causes of the high levels of inequality that 
triggered the revolution in 2011, successive Egyptian governments post-2011 have 
continued to embrace the neoliberal economic model. Accordingly, when expressing 
its dissent with the investment treaty regime, the objective of the State was to practice 
voice rather than exit the regime. As documented in this case study, government 
officials have been vocal about their discontent with the unbalanced nature of the 
existing international investment regime, with particular emphasis on BITs and the 
need to revise these treaties. However, Egypt’s lack of bargaining power and leverage 
due to its economic position means that it is not in a position to consider the voice 
option in the same manner that South Africa did. Furthermore, this case study revealed 
how accumulating arbitration cases led to a regulatory chill and how the economic 
conditions Egypt faced post-2011 gave rise to the same type of structural power 
exercised by capital exporters and multilateral institutions that led Egypt to signing 
BITs in the first place. In this case the structural power was used by the 
aforementioned actors to ensure Egypt maintained the existing FDI regulatory 
framework (including BITs). Thus, Egypt’s decision to maintain the status quo and 
remain in the international investment regime is not due to an attachment to a system 
it believes will eventually result in benefits for its economy, as Hirschman’s loyalty 
would imply. Instead, the route taken by Egypt (maintaining the status quo) is more 
likely to be due to the lack of voice mechanism combined with an inability to exit both 
due to the survival mechanisms in the treaties and fear of the possible economic and 
political repercussions deriving from its vulnerable economic position.  
In conclusion, Hirschman’s conceptualisation of loyalty cannot adequately explain 
why developing countries like Egypt remain as members of the regime. This creates 
the need to revise Hirschman’s framework and introduce a new category that reflects 
the route taken or choice made by countries like Egypt more accurately. In Chapter 8 
the concept of ‘silence’ is suggested as a possible addition to the framework to explain 
the trajectory of countries like Egypt.  
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Chapter 8. Conclusion: Exit, Quasi-Exit, and Silence 
 
1. Introduction 
This thesis contributes to our understanding of the nature of the contestation of the 
investment treaty regime by developing countries. It does so by addressing a gap in 
the existing literature to account for the variation in reactions of developing countries 
that have vocally contested the regime. Furthermore, it tackles another issue that has 
been neglected in the literature by identifying the actual options available to 
dissatisfied developing countries.  
To achieve the above this political economy study conducted a qualitative comparative 
case study analysis critically examining the experience of three developing countries 
– Egypt, South Africa, and Bolivia – that share similarities in the way they signed 
BITs, but which reacted differently to their realisation of the extent to which their 
membership of the regime constrains their policy space. Mobilising Hirschman’s Exit, 
Voice and Loyalty framework, this study assessed and formulated the options 
available to developing countries (in practice). Moreover, as established in Chapter 3, 
an in-depth understanding of the options available to dissatisfied developing countries 
is not possible without taking into consideration the factors that influenced both how 
and why they joined the regime and why they reacted differently after expressing their 
discontent. Hence, to give greater theoretical depth to a “Hirschman-ian” 
categorisation of different responses to discontent with the international investment 
regime, additional theoretical frames were deployed.  
This thesis identified three main factors that can supplement the Hirschman 
framework:  ideological motives of the ruling regime, bounded rational behaviour of 
government officials, and structural power dynamics. These three factors generally 
contribute to explaining both the entry to and contestation of the regime. However, 
this thesis argues that the extent to which they answer the questions of how and why 
the countries joined the regime and how they reacted differently varies. While 
structural power dynamics play a significant role in answering the research questions 
of how and why developing countries joined the regime and why they reacted 
differently, bounded rational behaviour is deemed more relevant to explaining how 
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developing countries entered the regime, and ideological motives are more useful in 
determining the different routes adopted when reacting to discontent.  
The rest of this chapter uses the findings of the three case studies to answer the three 
research questions outlined in Chapter 4.  
Concerning the first research question regarding how and why developing countries 
signed BITs that constrain their policy space with limited economic benefits, it is 
argued that an eclectic approach can be adopted to explain how and why developing 
countries joined the regime by combining the Structural Power framework as adapted 
by Gwynn with the Bounded rationality theory as adapted by Poulsen.  
With regard to the second research question concerning the factors that drive 
developing countries to decide on whether to exit, use voice, or remain ‘loyal’ to their 
BIT commitments, the findings of the case studies point to two main factors affecting 
which route is taken by the case study country. First, the ideological position of the 
regime (mainly whether or not the country embraces the neoliberal model), determines 
whether the State will seek to exit the system or whether it will attempt to practice 
voice through a quasi-exit route. Second, structural power dynamics influenced by the 
economic position of the country and the results of a cost-benefit assessment202 by the 
country’s officials determine whether it has the leverage to challenge its capital-
exporting treaty partners and proceed with either exit/quasi-exit or remain silent. 
The third and final research question addressed in this thesis is: how Hirschman’s 
framework can be reconceptualised to reflect the different routes adopted by 
dissatisfied developing countries? This thesis concludes that in order to reflect the 
power dynamics of the investment treaty regime and the challenges faced by 
developing countries a revised framework is introduced where: ‘exit’ is 
reconceptualised, ‘voice’ is replaced with ‘quasi-exit’, and ‘loyalty’ with ‘silence’.  
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 illustrates how the 
findings of the case studies reveal that structural power dynamics and bounded rational 
behaviour explain to varying degrees how and why each country joined the regime. 
Section 3 presents the new framework proposed in this thesis to illustrate the routes 
                                               
 
202 The cost-benefit assessment can be a full-fledged financial feasibility study as was the case of 
Bolivia, or a judgment by the State officials as in the case of South Africa and Egypt.  
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available in practice to developing countries that are discontent with the regime. Under 
the headings of ‘reconceptualised exit’, ‘quasi-exit’, and ‘silence’,  each sub-section 
explains the need to reconceptualise Hirschman’s categories of exit, voice and loyalty 
in order to reflect the dynamics of the investment treaty regime and the challenges 
facing developing countries in this regime. In addition to drawing on insights from 
existing contributions in the investment treaty literature, as well as scholars from the 
political science and management fields, these sections demonstrate the role of 
ideological motives and structural power dynamics in determining the route taken by 
each country. To illustrate how the findings of this thesis can apply to other developing 
countries, examples of other countries that fit under each category are provided. 
Finally, the chapter concludes by highlighting the dissertation’s contribution to the 
political economy of investment treaty literature and identifying areas for further 
research. 
2. How and Why Developing Countries Joined the Regime 
The experiences of Bolivia, South Africa and Egypt, as documented in this thesis, 
reveal common trends regarding how and why they joined the regime. In the three 
cases, BITs were signed despite initial rejection of the investment protection model 
promoted in these treaties, or preference for a more regulated approach to attracting 
FDI. Both Egypt and Bolivia had a history of resisting investment rules promoted by 
capital-exporting countries on the grounds of sovereignty, before eventually 
conceding and accepting these rules when signing BITs. While South Africa was not 
engaged in the debate on investment protection rules that took place before the 
proliferation of BITs (in the 1960s and early 1970s), the ANC initially advocated for 
an active State role in regulating FDI to redress the legacies of the Apartheid era. 
However, like its two counterparts, South Africa eventually abandoned the regulated 
FDI approach by signing BITs presented by their capital-exporting partners. 
Furthermore, even though the three countries were initially reluctant to embrace the 
investment protection model promoted through BITs, none of them seemed aware of 
the extent to which these BITs could constrain their ability to regulate until facing 
their first serious investment arbitration claim. 
This thesis has argued that two theories from the existing literature can be combined 
to explain why and how countries sign investment treaties that eventually constrain 
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policy space to regulate in the public interest despite the lack of evidence regarding 
the economic benefit of these BITs. First, Gwynn’s adaptation of the Structural Power 
theory argues that the context in which these BITs are signed and the influence of the 
actors that hold structural power has a crucial impact on the decision of States to sign 
BITs proposed by their capital-exporting counterparts. For Egypt and Bolivia, the 
actors that held structural power were the IFIs and the capital-exporting countries. 
These actors controlled the financial dimension (of Strange’s four structures) by 
holding access to the financial credit that both States needed at the time to survive 
their economic crises. South Africa, on the other hand, was not suffering from an 
economic or debt crisis, and hence, IFIs did not have the same leverage they had over 
countries like Bolivia and Egypt. In South Africa's experience, the actor that held 
structural power was the corporate sector. The corporate sector in South Africa 
controlled two further structures specified by Strange: knowledge and production. 
Accordingly, we can conclude that structural power dynamics had a stronger impact 
on the decision of the Bolivian and Egyptian regimes to join the regime compared to 
the influence it had on their South African counterpart. 
While Gwynn’s hypothesis explains why BITs were signed, it fails to answer the 
question of why these countries only realised the potency of these treaties after they 
started facing arbitration cases. This was explained by analysing the process by which 
the governments signed their BITs. The findings of three case studies revealed a 
similar pattern in the way BITs were processed by Bolivian, South African and 
Egyptian officials. The main similarities were lack of a thorough review of the treaties 
before signing, the signing of templates provided by capital-exporting countries with 
minimal negotiation from the developing countries’ officials, and reliance on 
anecdotal evidence regarding the efficacy of BITs in attracting FDI. These findings 
are consistent with Poulsen’s framework, which uses insights from the Bounded 
Rationality theory to explain how developing countries signed BITs. In line with 
Poulsen’s hypothesis, this thesis argues that due to the manner in which States 
processed these BITs, they did not appreciate or recognise the extent to which they 
were sacrificing their policy space to regulate by joining the investment treaty regime 
until they faced investment arbitration cases. It could be argued that the Bounded 
Rationality argument is more convincing in the case of South Africa, considering that 
unlike its two other counterparts, it did not have a history of resisting the investment 
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protection. Egypt and Bolivia, on the other hand, both had a history of challenging the 
type of protection standards they ended up committing to in their BITs and hence were 
aware of their implications. Nevertheless, their experience, as documented in the case 
studies reveals that they only realised the extent to which their membership of the 
regime would constrain their policy space after facing their first substantial investment 
treaty arbitration claim. 
Finally, it is worth noting that another common trend across the three case studies is 
that they joined the regime as part of a shift to a neoliberal economic model. However, 
as established above the neoliberal model of FDI regulation was adopted under the 
influence and pressure of actors that held structural power. Accordingly, the extent to 
which ideological motives can be considered as a driving factor in the decision to join 
the regime is questionable.   
3. Reconceptualising Hirschman’s Framework  
A better understanding of the variation in these reactions was one of the primary 
motivations behind this thesis. In the existing literature, there have been efforts to 
categorise the various options available to developing countries and to analyse the 
effectiveness of these different routes in achieving the objective of alleviating policy 
space concerns of these countries (in theory). However, there has been less attention 
paid to the experience of developing countries that have adopted different routes and 
less focus on explaining their variegated reactions. This thesis contributes to filling 
this gap through an in-depth study of the experience of three countries that have taken 
different routes. In addition to identifying the main factors that influenced the decision 
of each country to take a particular route, this chapter also uses the findings of the case 
studies to revise Hirschman's framework in order to reflect the actual options available 
to developing countries in practice.  
When members of the investment treaty regime (in this case developing countries) 
started to express their discontent with the limited benefits they gained from their 
membership compared to the constraints on their ability to regulate, they began to 
assess their options. Based on the findings of the case studies, this thesis argues that 
Hirschman's exit is still generally relevant when analysing the reactions of dissenting 
members that attempt to leave the regime. However, certain assumptions need to be 
revised and additional factors need to be integrated to expand his conceptualisation of 
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exit and reflect the complexity of the exit option in this system, as well as the power 
dynamics involved. The findings also reveal the need to revise Hirschman's 
theorisation of voice and loyalty in order to account for the power dynamics in the 
regime and the challenges facing developing countries when deciding which route to 
take. 
 The South Africa case study suggested that voice can only be practised after an initial 
exit, contradicting Hirschman's assumption that the exit option limits any chance of 
adopting the voice option. Hence, a new category which combines both exit and voice 
tactics, ‘quasi-exit’ is proposed as the only feasible route to practice voice in the 
regime. This route entails a partial exit of the regime as States disengage from the 
existing legal framework by deciding to terminate their BITs. They remain part of the 
regime by ensuring that the new framework introduced to reform their legal 
commitments retains most of the neoliberal norms and principles that shape the 
regime. 203  The revised legal framework can be introduced through domestic 
legislation, as was the case for South Africa, or through new BITs, as demonstrated in 
the cases of India and Indonesia, which will be discussed in further detail below.  
Finally, Egypt's case study questioned whether maintaining the status quo for 
developing countries was a result of loyalty as Hirschman defined it. Instead, 
considering that the Egyptian officials have regularly expressed their dissatisfaction 
with the system and the need for more policy space, the decision to remain seemed to 
be more related to the concept of ‘silence’.  
After analysing these changes in further detail below, this section concludes with a 
flowchart in Figure 14 illustrates the potential routes for developing countries 
dissatisfied with the regime and how ideological motives and structural power 
dynamics determine these routes. Furthermore, a table that summarises the main 
revisions made to each category both in terms of Hirschman’s conceptualisation and 
how they have been applied in the literature is provided in Appendix VI.  
3.1 Exit  
Bolivia’s experience reveals that State-society relations and the ideology of the new 
administration both influenced the regime’s decision to consider the exit route. This 
                                               
 
203 Based on the definition of the investment treaty regime outlined in Chapter 2.  
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conclusion would be consistent with Calvert’s hypothesis that these two factors play 
a pivotal role in shaping a government’s response to constraints posed by the 
investment treaty regime and hence the decision to exit or not. However, based on the 
findings of the case study, one of these factors was more decisive in determining the 
route taken by Bolivia than the other. While popular revolutions led the State to 
express its discontent with the regime, it was the ideological motives of the new 
administration that motivated the decision to seek an exit from the regime rather than 
attempt to practice voice. Furthermore, the case study reveals another crucial factor 
which determined the route adopted by Bolivia and was not explicitly addressed by 
Calvert, which is the change in the structural power dynamics that strongly influenced 
the State’s decision to join the regime in the first place. The upturn in Bolivia’s 
economic fortunes as a result of the commodity price boom and the result of the cost-
benefit assessment conducted by the State officials ended Bolivia’s financial 
dependency on the IFIs and capital-exporting countries. Consequently, this shift in 
structural power dynamics in favour of the Bolivian State ensured that it had the 
leverage to confront its capital-exporting partners and creditors with its decision to 
exit the regime and to actually proceed with its exit plans. This particular finding is 
also relatively consistent with Koivumaeki’s hypothesis that the decision to sanction 
the exit plan was predicated upon a strategic cost-benefit analysis conducted by 
Bolivian officials.  
Elected on the back of two major uprisings, the Morales administration was under 
immediate pressure to implement radical economic and social reforms. As 
demonstrated in Chapter 6, domestically, the reversal of the neoliberal policies was 
evident through the nationalisation programme and the expansion in the role of the 
State in regulating the economy and providing social welfare. On the global scene, 
Morales was a vocal critic of the neoliberal investment and trade frameworks. Bolivia 
had grievances from its experience with ICSID and BITs, but more generally, there 
was a fundamental problem with the ideological grounds on which these instruments 
and institutions (BITs and ICSID) were premised. Unlike South Africa, Bolivia's exit 
was not a prelude to exercising voice. Instead, the decision to exit was an explicit 
rejection of the current international investment regime and the fundamental principles 
that shape it. This was confirmed through the new framework to regulate FDI which 
was introduced through the 2009 Bolivian Constitution.  
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Popular pressure and the ideological motives of the regime had a definite influence on 
the government’s preference for the reversal of existing neoliberal policies and exiting 
the investment treaty regime. However, Bolivia was still considered to be a small 
developing country that strongly relied on credit from IFIs and foreign investment to 
promote development. Accordingly, the prevailing economic conditions were the 
critical factor that empowered the State to proceed with these decisions. Commodity 
price booms enabled the Bolivian regime to re-nationalise SOEs and to overhaul the 
hydrocarbons sector reversing the neoliberal reforms adopted over the previous two 
decades. Through these measures, the State was able to compensate for the loss of aid 
funds that followed its decision to end its dependency on the IFIs (who had played a 
dominant role in the policymaking process in Bolivia until Morales rose to power). 
Hence, Bolivia’s strong economic position resulted in a shift in structural power 
dynamics in favour of the State which enabled it to proceed with its nationalisation 
plans and the exit option despite the opposition of IFIs and its capital exporting 
partners. Furthermore, it enabled the Bolivian government to cover the costs of 
international arbitration and the resulting compensation. 
The magnitude of the costs incurred as a result of challenging the international 
investment regime highlights why developing countries may refrain from attempting 
to exit the regime despite awareness of the costs of membership. The Bolivian 
experience allows us to conclude that the State only sanctioned the plans to implement 
the nationalisation programme and exit the regime when officials were confident that 
the strategy would ensure that benefits of the new economic policies would exceed the 
costs of contesting the regime. Once in office, the Morales administration pursued its 
economic mandate strategically and pragmatically.  
As demonstrated in the Bolivian case study, exiting the investment treaty regime is far 
from neat: it requires the resigning State to travel a long, challenging, and open road 
before it can forfeit its obligations. Due to survival clauses, any policy space gained 
by the decision to exit is limited to new investments/investors for at least another 
decade or two. Countries that have pursued the exit route are still subject to costly 
arbitration cases triggered through BITs post-termination. Accordingly, the nature of 
the exit process in the investment treaty regime is not entirely consistent with 
Hirschman's conceptualisation of exit and its expected outcomes. Moreover, 
Hirschman’s framework implies that determining factors for choosing the exit option 
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include the certainty that comes with exit and the low costs associated with the 
decision to exit, both of which are unlikely in the developing country context. 
Accordingly, there is a need to reconceptualise Hirschman's framework to reflect the 
nature of exit from the investment treaty regime. The next section addresses the 
aspects that are missing from Hirschman’s framework and identifies what needs to be 
included to better reflect the exit process.  
3.1.1 Reconceptualising Hirschman’s Exit  
As per Hirschman's analysis, there is a tipping point for a member when electing to 
opt for the exit route. In Bolivia's case once the newly elected regime realised that its 
membership in this system would restrict its ability to introduce economic and social 
reforms and deliver on its electoral mandate, it began to consider the exit option. This 
is similar to Hirschman's description of the situation in which a member cannot 
tolerate the disadvantages they are facing as a result of remaining in an organisation 
and decide to disengage and eventually exit (Hirschman, 1993, 1970). Hirschman also 
implied the existence of power dynamics between the management of an organisation 
and its members, as he argued that there is a tendency for management to attempt to 
limit the bargaining power of members by manipulating costs of exit and voice 
(Hirschman, 1970). However, he did not expand on this idea and underestimated the 
impact it has on the ability of members of an organisation to exercise voice and exit. 
In the investment treaty regime, these dynamics have a significant impact on the type 
of routes available for developing countries.  
Exit from the regime is more complicated than how Hirschman envisioned it, both 
regarding cost and procedure. While Hirschman’s model reflects the economists’ view 
that exit is costless, Bolivia’s experience confirms that exit in the investment treaty 
regime is costly and the outcomes are uncertain. Hirschman also argued that loyalty is 
a determining factor in deciding whether to exit or use voice. However, as Bolivia's 
experience again reveals, the decision to proceed with the exit route was determined 
by ideological motives and structural power dynamics. 
To address the limitations of Hirschman's model in explaining the exit process from 
the investment treaty regime, it is useful to draw on some of the relevant contributions 
made by political scientists and applied in the management field. One of these 
contributions is Gehlbach’s reconceptualisation of Hirschman's model which explores 
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the power relationship between management and employees in the workplace and the 
overall implications for exit, voice and loyalty (Gehlbach, 2006; Gleeson, 2016). 
Gehlbach addressed one of the limitations of Hirschman’s model which is the 
insufficient weight given to the role of power dynamics and how it impacts the 
decision to exit. Hirschman acknowledged that organisations would typically want to 
avoid allowing members to gain bargaining power by attempting to influence the 
feasibility of exit or voice, with the aim of preventing both from occurring 
(Hirschman, 1993, 1970). He, however, underestimates how effective these tactics can 
be (Barry, 1974; Birch, 1975; Gehlbach, 2006; Gleeson, 2016). This argument is 
highly applicable in the international investment regime in which capital-exporting 
countries supported by multilateral institutions structured the treaties that formed the 
fragmented international investment regime in a manner that made any decision to 
attempt to exit or resort to voice a highly costly and complicated one. Gehlbach’s 
(2006) game theory model was used to understand how cost-benefit analysis informs 
when employees in a workplace decide to exit the organisation and how management 
can impact the feasibility of these options by manipulating the costs associated with 
exit and voice (Gleeson, 2016). The view adopted by Gehlbach as well as other 
scholars in the organisational literature was that the choice of exit needs to be 
considered as the member's response to the organisation's decline, based on the 
dissenter's perceptions of organisational conditions (Gleeson, 2016). The conditions 
that are assessed when deciding to exit according to scholars like Kassing (2002) 
include whether the organisational climate recognises and responds to dissenters as 
well as assessing the cost of retaliation.  
These dynamics are missing from Hirschman's framework. Just as an analysis of these 
dynamics is needed to explain when and how employees decide to exit their company, 
so one is needed to provide a better account of the process whereby developing 
countries may exit from the investment treaty regime. In establishing the international 
investment regime, there was an apparent manipulation of the availability of voice and 
exit options by the capital-exporting countries, which shaped the regime. Due to the 
absence of a centralised body to govern the fragmented system, composed of bilateral 
treaties, the management role in the investment treaty regime is played by the capital-
exporting countries that crafted the investment rules and promoted the treaties. The 
system was established and consolidated when capital-exporting countries succeeded 
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in diffusing these binding treaties, which were based on investment protection 
standards catering to their interests. By equipping these treaties with survival clauses, 
capital-exporting countries ensured they were resilient to any attempts by treaty 
partners to terminate them. They also ensured voice would be costly, since any 
amendments would need to be mutually agreed upon – as will be demonstrated in 
further detail when addressing the findings of the South African case study. Despite 
the bilateral nature of these treaties, the protection offered is generally enjoyed by the 
capital-exporting partners who seek to protect their nationals' investments abroad 
through BITs and face a relatively lower threat of being respondents to ISDS cases 
compared to capital-importing developing countries. Consequently, the interests are 
not aligned and the power dynamics have a significant impact on the decision-making 
process of the dissenting developing countries.  
Bolivia’s case study demonstrates that there was a high cost for exiting the system by 
terminating its BITs, denouncing the ICSID convention, and reversing the neoliberal 
policies adopted by the previous regimes. The decision to exit coincided with 
disengaging from multilateral institutions that had been the primary source of credit 
for Bolivia and threats from capital-exporting countries that the level of FDI inflows 
would be negatively impacted as a result of this decision. More importantly, the State 
remained obliged to honour its commitments after its exit. Accordingly, Bolivia faced 
the same threat of arbitration by investors that existed before its decision to terminate 
its treaties and withdraw from the international investment regime. In determining 
whether to opt for exit or voice, Bolivia's experience reveals that loyalty played no 
role in the decision-making process. The State’s decision to proceed with exit and to 
adopt the policy reforms that would trigger arbitration claims was contingent on the 
shift in structural power dynamics in its favour as a result of the favourable economic 
conditions and the assessment of the benefits it would gain from the proposed 
economic policies and its ability to cover the potential costs. If Bolivia had decided to 
maintain the status quo like Egypt or adopt the voice route like South Africa, it would 
have been because it did not have the leverage to confront its capital-exporting 
partners or due to negative projections emerging from a cost-benefit analysis rather 
than its loyalty to the system as per Hirschman's analysis.  
Accordingly, in the revised framework proposed here the exit route factors in the 
resilience of the investment treaty regime and the power dynamics between the regime 
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shapers and their developing treaty partners to understand why a complete and 
immediate exit is generally not feasible for developing countries. Furthermore, exit in 
this regime is understood to be costly and with uncertain outcomes. Hence, while 
discontent with the constraints imposed by the regime and ideological motivations 
may drive developing countries to consider the exit route, they are unlikely to proceed 
with that option if the State does not have enough leverage to confront its capital 
exporting partners and if policymakers are not convinced that they will be able to 
mitigate the potential costs. This hypothesis is supported by the experience of the two 
other developing countries that have attempted to exit the system thus far: Ecuador 
and Venezuela.  
Ecuador and Venezuela together with Bolivia were part of the ‘pink tide’ of leftist 
governments that swept to power in Latin America in the early 2000s (Calvert, 2017). 
As was the case with Morales, both Chavez and Correa were elected after running on 
platforms that opposed neoliberalism, and both candidates promised to reclaim State 
sovereignty over natural resources and strategic sectors. Both regimes were under 
pressure from their civil societies to reverse the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s and 
recover the State’s capacity to deliver welfare to its citizens.  
Despite their awareness of the protection that BITs afforded foreign investors, after 
being respondents to ISDS cases, both countries proceeded with the overhaul of their 
hydrocarbons sector and a wave of nationalisations (in the case of Venezuela). The 
decision to implement these policies and overstep BITs occurred after the boom in 
commodity prices. The significant rise in oil prices prompted officials to forecast high 
gains from the new windfall taxes, amended service contracts with MNCs, and 
nationalisations (Koivumaeki, 2015a). In both cases, governments’ bargaining 
position vis-a-vis foreign investors was strengthened by the favourable economic 
conditions as it reduced their economies’ dependence on foreign investment (Calvert, 
2017). 
Furthermore, both countries only began to take steps towards exiting the regime after 
the boom in commodity prices in the early 2000s. In both cases, governments 
concluded that the profits and revenues generated would exceed the potential costs of 
the measures adopted and their decision to contest the investment treaty regime. In 
Ecuador's case, the government decided to withdraw from ICSID in December 2007 
and denounced a few BITs in 2008. In 2012, a few months after the 1.77 billion USD 
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award in favour of Occidental, Correa established a Citizen’s Audit Commission to 
assess the constitutionality of the remaining BITs and their impacts (Calvert, 2017). 
The Commission concluded that the remaining BITs should be terminated and that 
any new treaties should narrow the scope of protection standards, provide for State-
State dispute resolution instead of investor-State, and include investor obligations 
(CAITISA, 2017; Calvert, 2017). Correa announced the termination of the rest of 
Ecuador’s BITs shortly before the 2016 elections (Calvert, 2017). Venezuela, on the 
other hand, withdrew from ICSID in 2012 but only terminated its BIT with the 
Netherlands. Thus, unlike Ecuador and Bolivia, Venezuela did not attempt to exit the 
investment treaty regime completely. 
Ecuador has faced 23 known investment arbitration cases so far, the most costly of 
which involved MNCs in the hydrocarbons sector. By 2017, awards rendered to oil 
companies exceeded 1.6 billion USD (excluding interest and arbitration costs) 
(Calvert, 2017). Nevertheless, like its Bolivian counterpart, Correa’s government 
successfully convinced most MNCs in the hydrocarbons sector to adopt service 
contracts. Indeed, Correa managed to go a step further and persuaded these companies 
to also forfeit their right to ICSID arbitration over contractual issues (Calvert, 2017). 
The new contracts combined with the revenues generated from the windfall tax (aided 
by the commodity price boom) ensured the State captured a significantly larger share 
of profits in the sector compared to its share under the pre-2005 regulations. State 
revenue generated from the hydrocarbons sector increased from c. 2.2 billion in 2005 
to c. 12.9 billion USD in 2012 and has so far outweighed the costs of arbitration claims 
(Calvert, 2017).  
Out of the three Latin American countries discussed in this section, Venezuela has had 
the most challenging path, which may or may not explain why they have not 
terminated the rest of their BITs. Venezuela has faced 41 known investment arbitration 
cases to date, one in 1996 and the rest between 2000 and 2016 (Roffinelli et al., 2018). 
Most of the claims (19) were related to non-negotiated expropriation, and the sum of 
compensation claims in 16 cases alone reached c.7.7 billion USD (Roffinelli et al., 
2018). So far the State has won 8 cases, lost 15 and has 14 cases that are pending a 
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decision by the arbitration tribunals.204 Initially, Venezuela seemed in a comfortable 
position as it complied with the decisions rendered by the arbitration tribunals and 
quickly settled awards which included a 908 million USD award issued by the ICC in 
2011 (Koivumaeki, 2015a). Venezuela’s compliance with the awards and prompt 
payment indicated that its officials were anticipating these costs and were prepared for 
them using the gains from their nationalisation programme (Koivumaeki, 2015a). 
However, Venezuela’s tally of arbitration cases has continued to grow and in a single 
case that Venezuela settled with ConocoPhillips (US oil company) in August 2018 it 
agreed to pay the claimants a 2 billion USD settlement (Bohmer, 2018). While it 
initially seemed like the Venezuelan regime had matters under control, the Venezuelan 
economy has spiralled into a deep recession over the last few years, shedding severe 
doubt over its ability to comply with the accumulating awards rendered in favour of 
investors by arbitration tribunals. Plagued with hyperinflation, Venezuela's cash-
constrained economy, which is almost entirely dependent on oil exports, has also been 
significantly impacted by the US-imposed sanctions (Parraga, 2018). At the moment, 
the country is facing severe shortages in medicine and food, painting a bleak picture 
for a country that is expected to pay billions of dollars in awards over the next few 
years. 
Finally, it can be argued that the three countries have enjoyed varying levels of success 
in their attempts to exit the investment treaty regime. Moreover, in addition to 
Venezuela’s economic struggles which may halt the exit process, Ecuador’s newly 
elected government has announced a reversal in the country’s approach towards FDI. 
The return of the neoliberal approach includes retreating from the exit strategy adopted 
by the Correa administration as the new regime has revealed plans to replace the 
terminated BITs and restore ISDS mechanisms. For the purpose of this thesis, 
however, the focus is on what prompted these countries to consider the exit route and 
the implications of their decision to contest the investment rules of the regime. The 
experiences of both Venezuela and Ecuador seem in line with the conclusions reached 
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in the Bolivia case study. In both cases, regimes were elected to reverse the neoliberal 
policies and restore the capacity of the State to regulate in the public interest. Both 
governments expressed their discontent with the investment treaty regime which they 
believed imposed illegitimate constraints on their sovereignty. However, as 
demonstrated above, officials began to adopt policies that challenged the investment 
rules in the investment treaty regime and started the process of exiting the regime after 
favourable economic conditions empowered them. Governments in both countries 
were aware of the potential costs of their actions and proceeded with their plans after 
assessing that the economic gains of the measures taken combined with the boom in 
oil prices would outweigh these costs.  
3.2 Quasi-Exit  
Despite not facing major social uprisings like its two counterparts in this thesis, the 
South African government was under pressure by civil society to introduce affirmative 
action legislation aimed at redressing the legacy of Apartheid, by bringing about social 
redress and addressing economic inequality. While South Africa sought to revise the 
scope of protection it offered to foreign investors; it remained committed to the 
neoliberal principles underpinning the investment treaty regime. Hence, although it 
exited the legal framework of the regime by refusing to renew its BITs, South Africa 
ensured the domestic legislation that replaced these BITs retained most of the norms 
and principles that shaped the investment treaty regime as defined in Chapter 2. 
Accordingly, this thesis argues that South Africa’s adopted route represents a ‘quasi-
exit’ of the investment treaty regime as this route represented a combination of exit 
and voice tactics that are not consistent with Hirschman’s conceptualisation of voice.  
 South Africa's economic position meant it was able to challenge the regime and 
withstand the criticism and warnings directed towards its decision to revise its 
investment protection framework by representatives of capital-exporting countries. 
While South Africa continues to rely on FDI, its officials are convinced that the South 
African economy will remain an attractive destination for FDI even without BITs. 
This conclusion was reached based on the internal review of South Africa's BITs 
framework, which found that there was no causal relationship between the BITs signed 
and FDI inflows. Furthermore, South Africa’s position as a leading destination for FDI 
in Africa due to its extractible sources, growing manufacturing sector and market size, 
compared to its peers in the continent, further empowered the South African 
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government. Hence, unlike its Egyptian counterpart, structural power dynamics did 
not prevent it from proceeding with its decision to reform its legal obligations under 
the regime.  
South Africa belongs to a group of emerging countries that while traditionally 
recipients of FDI have also become capital exporters over the past two decades (e.g. 
India). While they are considered countries with sufficient leverage to challenge 
existing investment rules, they do not have enough bargaining power to act like regime 
shapers (the major capital-exporting countries) and to develop an alternative system 
(Morosini and Badin, 2017, p. 6). In South Africa's experience, this conclusion was 
evident in its failed attempts to lure its capital-exporting partners to renegotiate their 
existing treaties. Eventually, however, South African officials determined that the 
costs of maintaining the status quo far exceeded the benefits, and that voice in its 
conventional form (i.e. treaty amendments or replacements) did not seem feasible in 
the foreseeable future. Consequently, the South African government concluded that 
the only way to practice voice in this regime and introduce substantial reforms to its 
investment protection model was through a quasi-exit route.205  
Following the completion of a full and comprehensive review (the first of its kind), 
the South African government began to implement its recommendations. These 
included legally terminating existing BITs after offering the partners the possibility to 
renegotiate, developing investment legislation to codify BIT provisions into domestic 
law and developing a new model BIT to serve as a basis for new investment treaties. 
After deducing that renegotiations were unlikely, the government began to send 
notices to its treaty partners (mainly capital-exporting) with whom existing BITs were 
due to expire soon. In parallel to exiting the existing investment treaties, the DTI 
developed a new investment law (PIA) which was enacted in 2015 and a new model 
BIT which is being reviewed by the Cabinet at the time of writing. The PIA introduced 
amendments to the substantive protection standards and procedural rules for 
arbitration that existed in the BITs with the aim of rebalancing investor rights and 
regulatory space. The reformed investment framework aligned protection standards 
like national treatment, expropriation, compensation and transfer of funds provisions 
                                               
 
205 It is important to note that the amendments to these legal obligations will only apply to new 
investments/investors until the survival clauses of the terminated BITs expire.  
  
264 
with South Africa's constitutional principles. The most controversial changes were the 
exclusion of the FET standards and the replacement of the ISDS mechanism with 
domestic remedies or State-State arbitration.  
Finally, as the new model BIT is being finalised, South African officials have 
reiterated that it is not opposed to the negotiation of new BITs and does not want to 
exit the system entirely. They have also indicated that it would be willing to reconsider 
providing investors with access to international arbitration if ongoing multilateral 
efforts result in a more credible and transparent system. The South African 
government has been actively participating in discussions in multilateral talks on ISDS 
and investment treaty regime reform by constructively engaging at the OECD and the 
UNICTRAL forums. Hence, this section concludes that despite exiting from its 
existing BITs, South Africa has continued to practice voice in the regime. The next 
section expands on why this thesis argues that Hirschman’s voice does not accurately 
reflect the route taken by developing countries that sought to substantially reform their 
investment protection commitments under the investment treaty regime. Instead, this 
thesis proposes ‘quasi-exit’ to more accurately reflect the route adopted by countries 
that have introduced these reforms to date.  
3.2.1 Replacing ‘Voice’ with ‘Quasi-Exit’ 
As established in Chapter 6, South Africa’s route has been categorised as an ‘exit’ 
decision by some in the literature. This reflects its termination of existing treaties 
instead of sticking to the regime and attempting to change it from within. Furthermore, 
according to Hirschman, once the decision to exit is made, there is no longer scope for 
voice. However, based on the findings of the South African case study it is argued that 
South Africa did attempt to adopt a voice route through one of the traditional channels 
of voice as outlined in Chapter 3 before realising it was not possible. From the outset, 
South Africa's reaction to its realisation that BITs were constraining its policy space 
to regulate in the public interest differed from Bolivia’s. A neoliberal approach to FDI 
regulation was maintained, and the government’s statements before and after the BIT 
review indicated its aim to reform the existing investment framework rather than reject 
it entirely. Furthermore, as established above, based on the definition of the investment 
treaty regime outlined in Chapter 2, South Africa’s decision to terminate its BITs and 
exit its legal framework represents a partial exit of the regime. After failing to 
convince its capital-exporting partners to renegotiate the BITs between them, South 
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Africa’s only feasible route to introduce its reforms was through replacing its BITs 
with a new legal framework. Hence, this combination of voice and exit tactics is best 
described through the quasi-exit category proposed in this thesis.  
According to Hirschman, the two principal determinants of readiness to resort to voice 
when exit is possible are: (i) the extent to which members or different parties are 
willing to trade off the certainty of exit against the uncertainties of their organisation's 
future improvement, and (ii) the estimate members have of their ability to influence 
the organisation. Concerning the first determinant, South Africa was facing a 
conundrum. On the one hand, its treaties were expiring and if it did not act many 
treaties would be automatically renewed for at least another decade. On the other hand, 
these treaties had survival clauses that ensured that the current terms of protection 
would be provided to existing investors for another 10-15 years. Hence, an ‘exit’ 
would never be a full exit, and the new investment protection law/treaty would only 
apply to new investors until the duration stipulated in the terminated BITs has elapsed. 
This situation seemed ideal for effective use of the voice option since Hirschman 
argues that for voice to be effective and functional, exit has to be an option but not too 
easy or too attractive (Hirschman, 1970, p. 83). However, it was the second of the two 
principal determinants identified by Hirschman that proved the sticking point for 
South Africa. 
Due to the way BITs were designed to lock-in treaty partners to their commitments in 
ways that give the treaty continuing effect for many years (Gordon and Pohl, 2015), 
South Africa needed to convince its capital-exporting partners to agree on the reforms 
it sought in order to recalibrate the scope of investment protection offered in its 
existing BITs. However, it eventually realised that it lacked the bargaining power 
necessary to persuade most of its capital-exporting treaty partners to make the 
compromises needed to ensure a balance between the rights of investors and its right 
to regulate in the public interest. Consequently, South Africa adopted a quasi-exit 
strategy which enabled the government to introduce the desired reforms to its legal 
obligations under the regime. It has also developed a new model BIT (which is 
consistent with its new investment legislation to be used as a reference for future 
BITs). 
South Africa’s experience is in line with findings in the current literature on the reform 
of the international investment regime that reveal that the regime is particularly 
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resistant to reform (Johnson et al., 2018). If a State wants to amend its BITs to resolve 
an issue of scope, or reach an interpretive agreement with its treaty partners to clarify 
the substantive meaning of standards, it may have to do so on an individual treaty-by-
treaty basis (Johnson et al., 2018). This exercise is not only time consuming, but also 
requires technical and legal capacity that may not be available in many developing 
countries. Furthermore, Johnson et al. (2018) reveal that based on anecdotal evidence 
(feedback of developing countries in UNCTAD forums 206  and interviews with 
officials from several countries 207 ), these efforts are often unsuccessful, due to 
asymmetries in power between the treaty parties or other misaligned interests (Johnson 
et al., 2018).  
Accordingly, there has been a growing trend of developing countries that refuse to 
renew their existing BITs as a method of voicing their dissatisfaction. These countries 
have replaced their expiring BITs with either domestic legislation (that includes 
similar protection standards but omits or amends the controversial ones) or with new 
BITs that would be based on their own model treaties as a reference. This approach 
has been described as a hybrid approach that combines both exit and voice tactics, 
which may be useful in balancing enhanced sovereignty with the need to maintain a 
reputation for a favourable investment climate (Langford et al., 2018, p. 81). This trend 
was started by South Africa and has been more recently adopted by India and 
Indonesia as will be demonstrated below.  
These findings indicate that the voice option available to developing countries in 
practice is not consistent with Hirschman's theorisation of voice, nor can it be 
implemented through any of the traditional routes categorised as 'voice' in the 
literature (as illustrated in Chapter 3). It also explains why efforts to introduce 
substantial reform to BITs for developing countries have mainly come through the 
hybrid approach adopted by South Africa. The alternative routes have been either 
undertaking incremental reforms and maintaining the status quo (which will be 
described as silence later in this chapter), or attempting to completely exit the system 
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and abandon the protections standards that were stipulated by BITs, as illustrated 
above.  
Accordingly, this thesis has concluded that the only way to effectively adopt the 
‘voice’ option is through the quasi-exit route adopted by South Africa. This argument 
suggests that Hirschman’s theorisation of voice and the dynamics of the interplay 
between exit and voice inadequately explain the options available to developing 
countries dealing with their BITs. Instead of undermining voice as implied by 
Hirschman, exit facilitates it. Hence, this thesis proposes the replacement of ‘voice’ 
with ‘quasi-exit’ to more accurately reflect the route taken by developing countries to 
practice voice in the investment treaty regime. This hypothesis is supported by the 
recent experience of countries like India and Indonesia that have had to exit their 
treaties to negotiate new BITs. 
Like South Africa, both India and Indonesia have not condemned the investment treaty 
regime from an ideological standpoint. Indeed, they have expressed their willingness 
to remain part of the regime if certain reforms are made to the substantive protection 
standards and arbitration procedures to increase the policy space available for the host 
State to regulate. As in the case of South Africa, despite deciding to terminate their 
BITs, they remained loyal to the normative foundations of the investment treaty 
regime by retaining the core principles and standards of the regime in their new model 
BITs. Furthermore, both countries were in an economic position that provided them 
with sufficient leverage to challenge existing investment rules, but they did not possess 
enough bargaining power to persuade their capital-exporting treaty partners to modify 
their existing BITs.  
The BIT reviews conducted by the Indian and Indonesian authorities reached 
relatively similar conclusions with recommendations to amend or exclude certain 
substantive protection standards (such as FET, indirect expropriation, MFN and NT) 
and introduce procedural limits to the ISDS mechanism. Consequently, both countries 
sought to develop new model BITs, 208  which, while maintaining a traditional 
investment treaty template which embodies most of the neoliberal standards of 
investment protection present in their existing BITs, introduces reforms to narrow the 
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scope of protection offered to investors and limit the discretion of arbitration tribunals 
to interpret the investment treaties. The purpose of developing these models was to 
provide a template and guidelines for negotiating and concluding new investment 
treaties that would replace the existing treaties. As with South Africa, Indonesia and 
India have signalled their commitment to update their investment regulatory 
framework based on the recommendations reached in their BIT reviews.  
The fact that both countries concluded that in order to introduce these reforms they 
needed to exit their existing investment treaties further supports the hypothesis that 
voice in the investment treaty regime is exercised through a quasi-exit route. Indonesia 
decided to exit its BITs through a gradual discontinuation approach which entails 
terminating BITs that are due to expire according to the required period set in the 
termination clause of the BIT. However, if the BIT authorises either party to end the 
treaty at any time, then the State would immediately discontinue it (Jailani, 2016). 
Indonesia has so far terminated 29 of the 55 BITs (in force).209 India, on the other 
hand, adopted a ‘two-pronged approach’ with respect to managing its existing BITs 
(Prabhash et al., 2018, p. 10). Firstly, the government has served termination notices 
to 58 countries (mainly including capital-exporting countries like the United 
Kingdom, France and Germany) with whom existing BITs have either expired or will 
expire soon (Prabhash et al., 2018). India has indicated that it is open to renegotiating 
new BITs with these countries based on its model BIT. For the remaining 25 countries, 
India has asked for joint interpretive statements to clarify ambiguities in treaty texts 
to avoid expansive interpretations by arbitration tribunals. However, only Bangladesh 
has accepted India’s proposed joint interpretive statement note so far (Prabhash et al., 
2018).  
It is important to highlight an essential difference between the reforms undertaken by 
South Africa and those adopted by India and Indonesia, which is their decision to 
refrain from excluding the ISDS mechanism. This could lead to questions over 
whether the three countries should be placed in the same category. However, while it 
can be argued that India and Indonesia have adopted more conservative reforms 
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compared to South Africa, the overall objectives of the three countries are similar. 
Their shared objective was to reach a balance between reassuring foreign investors 
that the host State will continue to provide them with protection standards similar to 
those that exist in the investment treaty regime, while introducing amendments to 
ensure that the State has more policy space to regulate in the public interest. More 
importantly, despite of their desire to remain part of the regime, the three countries 
realised that to introduce the required substantial reforms to their legal obligations, the 
quasi-exit route was more feasible than the traditional channels of voice documented 
in the literature (addressed in more detail in Chapter 3) which would require 
convincing capital-exporting countries to agree on these reforms. While South Africa 
introduced a revised legal framework through replacing its BITs with domestic 
legislation, India and Indonesia introduced their amendments through their new model 
BITs. Indeed, some scholars have predicted that in the future this quasi-exit route or 
hybrid approach is likely to become more frequently adopted by States who believe 
that BITs are one-sided agreements that protect investors at the expense of a State’s 
legitimate policy goals and its ability to regulate in the public interest (Langford et al., 
2018, p. 83). 
3.3 Silence  
In the aftermath of the January 25th revolution in 2011, the Egyptian State was under 
immense pressure to redress the corruption and inequality legacies of the Mubarak 
regime. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 7 both the judicial verdicts ordering the 
reversal of privatisations that took place under the ousted regime on corruption 
grounds and the limited efforts to introduce progressive policies (e.g. minimum wage) 
triggered a wave of investment arbitration claims which led to a regulatory chill. 
Successive governments that took office post-2011 have maintained the same 
neoliberal economic framework adopted by the former regime. They have done so 
despite the significant criticism it attracted from civil society which attributed the high 
levels of poverty and inequality in Egyptian society to the neoliberal reforms that were 
adopted by the previous regimes under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank. 
Accordingly, Egypt's approach to FDI remained the same, and there was no real 
prospect of seeking a complete exit from the investment treaty regime.  
After conducting a preliminary review of Egypt's BITs programme, the Egyptian 
government concluded that the costs of its membership in the regime had outweighed 
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the benefits it had received thus far. Eventually, Egyptian officials vocally criticised 
the investment treaty regime and called for reforms to Egypt’s BITs to balance 
investor rights with the rights of the host State to regulate. However, unlike its 
counterparts, Egypt’s ailing economy did not provide the government with sufficient 
leverage to build on its verbal criticism through actions to contest the investment treaty 
regime. Post-2011 Egypt faced an economic and debt crisis which established a similar 
context to the one which had allowed IFIs and capital-exporting countries to hold 
structural power when it signed its BITs several decades earlier. The structural power 
was held by the IMF and the GCC countries, both of whom influenced the 
government’s decision to refrain from amending its BITs or its domestic legal 
framework through the conditionalities imposed in return for the credit and aid 
provided. Hence, despite the dissent expressed in public forums and the continuous 
reviews undertaken by the relevant authorities, who also issued several model BITs, 
the Egyptian regime conceded that the costs of attempting a quasi-exit route would 
exceed the benefits. Accordingly, it has thus far maintained the status quo and ensured 
that any new investment legislation codified the same controversial provisions that 
existed in its BITs. Indeed, the Egyptian government has gone a step further by 
introducing further layers of protection through legislation that made investors 
immune to judicial accountability.  
Egypt has effectively refrained from exit and voice by deciding to remain committed 
to its existing BITs. However, as concluded in Chapter 7, Hirschman’s 
conceptualisation of loyalty cannot adequately explain why developing countries like 
Egypt have maintained the status quo. The next section starts by demonstrating how 
Egypt's reaction is inconsistent with Hirschman's conceptualisations of conscious and 
unconscious loyalty. Instead, it is argued that the concept of ‘silence’, and particularly 
‘enforced silence’, is a more accurate reflection of the way the Egyptian government 
reacted after announcing its dissatisfaction with the investment treaty regime.  
3.3.1 Replacing Hirschman’s Loyalty with Silence  
Hirschman describes loyalty as a ‘special attachment’ to an organisation whereby the 
member who possesses it is willing to trade off the certainty of exit for the 
uncertainties of voice (Gleeson, 2016; Hirschman, 1970, p. 77). ‘As a rule, loyalty 
holds exit at bay and activates voice’ according to Hirschman (1970, p. 78). Based on 
his theory, the driving factors behind a member’s loyalty might be their desire to assist 
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in changing their organisational circumstances, or their being content to remain 
passively loyal to their organisation in the hope that things will improve (Gleeson, 
2016; Hirschman, 1970, p. 78). He elaborates that while a member can remain loyal 
to an organisation in the face of discontent without being influential themselves, it 
would not be possible without ‘the expectation that someone will act or something 
will happen to improve matters’ (Hirschman, 1970, p. 78).  
These criteria do not apply to the investment treaty regime. Firstly, the future 
improvement upon which the decision to be loyal rests, according to Hirschman's 
framework, is questionable for developing countries in the investment treaty regime, 
both concerning its possibility, but also more ‘fundamentally in terms of its nature and 
character’ (Katselas, 2014, p. 361). As Katselas (2014) points out, the main issues with 
applying Hirschman's concept of loyalty to the regime are that, while it is not clear 
that BITs lead to an increase in inward FDI, their financial and sovereignty costs are 
substantially high. Egypt's experience endorses both these observations as; on the one 
hand, an internal review of Egypt’s BIT network in 2006 concluded that there are no 
apparent links between FDI levels and the signing of BITs. On the other, Chapter 7 
demonstrated the magnitude of both the financial and sovereignty costs Egypt has 
experienced due to arbitration cases triggered by the BITs it signed. Secondly, as 
demonstrated above, the existing power asymmetries between treaty partners in the 
investment treaty regime limit the capacity of developing countries to reform the 
regime from within. Accordingly, as this thesis has argued, the only way to practice 
voice in this system is through a quasi-exit route. Again as established in Chapter 7, 
Egypt’s economic predicaments imply that it lacks the leverage to consider the quasi-
exit route.  
There are some aspects of Hirschman's theorisation of loyalty that may initially seem 
applicable to the investment treaty regime. For instance, Hirschman acknowledges 
that while he considers loyalty as a force which saves organisations from the perils of 
a premature exit of its members by strengthening the voice option and postponing exit, 
there are situations when loyalty does not play such a ‘providential role’ (Hirschman, 
1970, p. 81, 92). He explains that ‘the various institutions designed to foster loyalty 
have obviously not been established with the purpose of elaborating an improved 
mixture of voice and exit’ (Hirschman, 1970, p. 92). There is a possible scenario when 
loyalty can lead to an exit-voice mix that unduly neglects the exit option. Moreover, 
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he stresses that ‘loyalty-promoting institutions are not only uninterested in stimulating 
voice at the expense of exit: indeed they are often meant to repress voice alongside 
exit (Hirschman, 1970, p. 92). While an organisation is meant to benefit from the 
active participation of its members through their feedback, Hirschman argues its 
usually in the interest of those managing or controlling the organisation to enforce 
their own agenda or ‘act as they wish’ with little complaints or desertions from its 
members (Hirschman, 1970, p. 93). Hirschman identifies high costs for entering an 
organisation and stiff penalties for an exit as two of the main ‘devices generating or 
reinforcing loyalty in such a way as to repress either exit or voice or both’ (Hirschman, 
1970, p. 93). He explains that, using these two devices, organisations or systems can 
convert conscious loyalty to unconscious loyalist behaviour. Based on Hirschman's 
theorisation there is no clear line between conscious and unconscious loyalist 
behaviour because a ‘member of the organisation may have a considerable stake in 
self-deception’ (Hirschman, 1970, p. 93). 
As argued in Section 8.2, Hirschman’s argument that those controlling the system can 
ensure voice and exit options are costly enough to deter members from adopting them 
is consistent with how capital-exporting countries have structured the investment 
treaty regime in a manner that makes both exit and voice options challenging for 
developing countries. However, as established above, these tactics have not been 
sufficiently expanded on by Hirschman as he limits the type of organisations in which 
members would face high penalties for exiting to a very narrow category: either the 
most traditional human groups, such as the family, the tribe, the religious community, 
and the nation; or more ‘modern inventions’ such as gangs and totalitarian parties 
(Hirschman, 1970, p. 96). The kind of penalties Hirschman was alluding to range from 
the ‘loss of life-long associations to loss of life, with such intermediate penalties as 
excommunication, defamation, and deprivation of livelihood’ (Hirschman, 1970, p. 
96). Hence, he fails to account for other types of organisations like the investment 
regime where power dynamics between the members can lead to similar outcomes. 
More importantly, Hirschman implies that organisations in which high penalties are 
enforced in the case of exit cultivate unconscious loyalty from their members. 
According to Hirschman unconscious loyalist behaviour is free from felt discontent 
(Hirschman, 1970, p. 91) and entails being in denial about the defects of the 
organisation. This conception of loyalty cannot be applied to developing countries like 
  
273 
Egypt which not only realised but also publicly criticised the faults of the investment 
treaty regime. 
Hence, based on the above we can conclude that Egypt's reaction cannot be adequately 
explained by either of Hirschman's conceptualisations of loyalty (conscious and 
unconscious). His model does not account for the frequent scenario in organisations 
in which conditions worsen, voice and exit options are not feasible, and members 
silently remain, not out of loyalty, but waiting for the right opportunity to react 
(Gleeson, 2016, p. 78).  
In the search for a broader definition of Hirschman's concept of loyalty that can 
account for the behaviour of countries like Egypt, this thesis explores the concept of 
silence that has been introduced in other fields of study (e.g. political science and 
management or organisational literature) to expand Hirschman's definition of loyalty 
and cover a broader range of choices for members of an organisation that choose not 
to exit but cannot practice voice. Political scientists Brian Barry (1974) and Anthony 
Birch (1975) have suggested that Hirschman's conceptualisation of loyalty fails to 
account for the different choices a member has when they decide not to exit an 
organisation in the face of discontent. As Gleeson (2016) summarises: Hirschman's 
loyalty effectively collapses two separate choices into one: first there is a choice 
between exit and non-exit; if the decision not to exit is made, there is a further choice 
between voice and silence (Barry, 1974; Birch, 1975; Gleeson, 2016, p. 25). For Barry 
(1974, p. 91), ‘one choice is between exit (leaving) and non-exit (staying), the other is 
between voice (activity, participation) and silence (inactivity, non-participation)’. 
Another way to look at it is that there is a choice between engaged loyalty, which is a 
decision to stay out of a desire to rectify decline and a silent non-exit form (Barry, 
1974; Gleeson, 2016, p. 14). 
In his attempt to re-examine Hirschman’s model through a game-theoretic 
interpretation of the relationship between exit and voice, Gehlbach (2006) recognises 
that the model implies the existence of the dynamic of silence. This dynamic, 
according to Gehlbach, depends on the relative bargaining power between the 
organisational hierarchy and the member (Gleeson, 2016). Gleeson (2016, p.11) 
explains that silence manifests in two ways: apathy and enforced silence. An apathetic 
member ‘accepts the status quo, abides by the rules, is productive and sees no reason 
to engage in voice’ (Gleeson, 2016, p. 11). Such members demonstrate loyalty in the 
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form of silence, which is not accounted for in Hirschman’s original conceptualisation 
of loyalty in which he perceived loyalty as being the necessary predicate of voice 
(Gleeson, 2016). The dynamic of enforced silence, on the other hand, emerges when 
there is no adequate outlet for an effective voice route in an organisation and the option 
of exit is also not feasible (Donaghey et al., 2011; Gleeson, 2016).  
This thesis argues that the concept of ‘enforced silence’ more accurately reflects 
Egypt’s experience. The State’s decision to remain in the investment treaty regime is 
not due to an attachment to a system it believes will eventually result in benefits. 
Instead, its decision is more likely to reflect the lack of a possible voice mechanism 
combined with an inability to exit, both due to the survival mechanisms in the treaties 
and the fear of the possible economic and political repercussions, especially 
considering Egypt's vulnerable economic position.  
While there are examples of countries that can fit in the ‘exit’ and ‘quasi-exit 
categories’, it is difficult to find other developing countries that fit into the ‘enforced 
silence’ category in the manner that Egypt does. A significant number of developing 
countries have faced several arbitration cases and have refrained from attempting to 
exit or take the quasi-exit route. Moreover, several of them have voiced their 
discontent in consultations conducted in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and 
UNCITRAL (Johnson et al., 2018). However, whenever developing countries have 
decided to vocally and publicly express their discontent with the investment treaty 
regime while indicating that they will take steps to reform their BITs, they have 
generally proceeded with one of the first two options mentioned above (exit or quasi-
exit). While this might change in the near future as an increasing number of developing 
countries have indicated that they would initiate reviews of their BITs, the closest 
example to Egypt’s case thus far is Argentina.  
Argentina has been a respondent to 60 known investment arbitration cases to date. 
Accordingly, it is currently ranked as the country that has faced the highest number of 
investment arbitration claims in the world.210 Between 1990 and 2001, Argentina 
                                               
 
210 UNCTAD, ‘Argentina – as respondent State’. International Investment Agreements Navigator. 
Available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/8?partyRole=2 (Accessed 2 
September 2018). 
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signed 58 BITs, 55 of which entered into force.211 The year 2001 also marked the 
beginning of a surge in investor claims against the State which coincided with the 
worst economic crisis the country has suffered in its history (Pérez-Aznar, 2016). 
More than 45 cases were triggered by emergency measures that the government 
adopted in response to the economic crisis and led to altering the neoliberal regulatory 
framework that was established in the 1990s (Calvert, 2017, p. 6; Pérez-Aznar, 2016). 
As discussed in Chapter 2, under the rule of the Kirchners, the Argentinian 
government was vocally critical of the investment treaty regime. However, despite 
calls from legislators and civil society the Kirchners refrained from terminating 
Argentina’s BITs (Calvert, 2017; Pérez-Aznar, 2016).  
The Kirchners were critical of the constraints imposed by Argentina’s existing BITs 
but remained loyal to the neoliberal approach to FDI that was adopted by their 
predecessors. The Argentinian regime was wary of the potential costs of terminating 
BITs and sought the path of reform as opposed to the exit route adopted by its Latin 
American counterparts. Its economic position meant that, like Egypt, it lacked the 
leverage to consider the quasi-exit route and hence remained silent in its role as a 
principal in the investment treaty regime. During the 2000s, initiatives from the 
Argentinian government to reform its existing BITs were minimal. A comprehensive 
review of Argentina’s BIT programme never took place, and the development of an 
alternative BIT model was never finalised (Pérez-Aznar, 2016). The government 
placed a moratorium on signing BITs which lasted until 2016; the termination of BITs 
with India, Bolivia and Indonesia were a result of initiatives by the three countries and 
not based on a decision by the Argentinian party (Pérez-Aznar, 2016).  
However, as argued in Chapter 2, Argentina’s response cannot be placed in the same 
category as countries like Egypt due to its active role as a litigant in the regime. While 
Argentina represented another case of ‘enforced silence’ with regard to its 
commitment to BITs and the ISDS mechanism, it was not passive when it came to 
contesting the awards issued by arbitration tribunals. The Argentinian government 
under Néstor Kirchner sought an annulment on all awards rendered against it and 
                                               
 
211 UNCTAD, ‘Argentina’. International Investment Agreements Navigator. Available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/8#iiaInnerMenu (Accessed 2 September 
2018). 
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where annulment failed it refused to fulfil the awards unless they were reviewed by 
domestic courts (Calvert, 2017). Argentina’ s Minister of Justice at the time, Horacio 
Rosatti, explicitly rejected the notion that decisions by ICSID tribunals should 
supersede Argentina’s constitution and asserted that they needed to be reviewed by 
Argentine courts for compatibility (Calvert, 2017; see Goodman, 2007). 
Consequently, Argentina withheld payment on five awards after claimants refused to 
submit them to Argentine courts for review (Calvert, 2017). Eventually, however, 
further deterioration in Argentina’s economic situation led to a more conciliatory 
approach towards foreign investors, and in 2013 Cristina Kirchner agreed to pay five 
outstanding arbitral awards (Calvert, 2017). The decision reflected the government’s 
assessment that the costs of contesting the regime overweighed the benefits for a 
country that needed access to international capital (Peinhardt and Wellhausen, 2016). 
Finally, the election of President Mauricio Macri in December 2015 resulted in a shift 
in Argentina’s stance towards BITs as the new administration placed attracting FDI as 
one of its top priorities (Pérez-Aznar, 2016). Argentina has since signed two BITs with 
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.  
To conclude this section on the reconceptualisation of Hirschman’s framework, a 
flowchart in Figure 14 illustrates the potential routes for developing countries 
dissatisfied with the regime and how ideological motives and structural power 
dynamics determine these routes. Furthermore, a summary of the main revisions made 
to each category both in terms of Hirschman’s conceptualisation and how they have 
been applied in the literature is provided in Appendix VI. 
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Figure 14: Potential routes for dissatisfied developing countries 
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4. Final Conclusions 
It is well established in the existing literature that the investment treaty regime is 
currently facing a backlash from both developed and developing countries. The 
magnitude of the legitimacy crisis facing the investment treaty regime cannot be 
underestimated as FDI policies represent an integral component of development 
strategies for both capital-exporting and capital-importing countries (Morosini and 
Badin, 2017). Investment treaty making reached a turning point in the year 2017, 
which witnessed the lowest number of new international investment treaties since 
1983, signalling a period of reflection on, and review of, international investment 
policies (UNCTAD, 2018a, p. 1). Capital-exporting countries that have more recently 
become frequent respondents to investment arbitration cases have responded to the 
legitimacy crisis facing the regime in their capacity as regime shapers. Their efforts to 
reform the regime have been restricted to clarifying substantive clauses and 
introducing procedural reforms to limit their exposure to investment arbitration while 
ensuring the neoliberal investment protection model they established remains intact. 
Developing countries, on the other hand, have been predominantly the more frequent 
respondents to arbitration cases and, as demonstrated in this thesis, their membership 
of the regime has had a significant impact on their capacity to implement their 
development strategies. Consequently, a small group of developing countries have 
contested the existing order and what they perceived as the unbalanced foundations of 
the regulations in the existing investment treaty regime that overprotects investors at 
the expense of the host State’s regulatory space. The growing discontent has led to 
experimentations with alternative frameworks and attempts to reconceptualise 
investment regulation in the developing world (Morosini and Badin, 2017).  
Nevertheless, unlike their earlier efforts to create a new international economic order 
in the 1960s and 1970s, developing countries have not joined forces to develop an 
alternative model to the existing investment treaty regime this time around (Trubek, 
2017). Moreover, the resistance to the regime involves several at times conflicting 
tactics by different developing countries (Trubek, 2017). While the general 
overarching objective of developing countries that have expressed their discontent 
with the regime has been to preserve State autonomy to regulate in the public interest 
(Morosini and Badin, 2017), responses have varied. Reactions have included attempts 
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to exit the regime altogether, and efforts to amend the rules while adhering to the 
general principles of the regime, while in most cases countries have settled with 
maintaining the status quo. These developments have not received sufficient attention 
in the existing literature. Despite the emergence of innovative methods to contest the 
existing rules of the investment treaty regime in the developing world through new 
model treaties and national laws, most of the existing debate in the policy and 
academic spheres has focused on multilateral efforts to reform the regime. These 
efforts include negotiations over mega-regional investment regulation through the 
TPP and the TTIP, reform initiatives led by UNCTAD and UNCITRAL, and the 
multilateral investment court initiative by the EU.  
Moreover, most of the existing literature on the experience of developing countries 
with the investment treaty regime has focused on categorising the different reactions 
and analysing which route is most effective in alleviating constraints posed by BITs 
in theory. Less attention has been paid to the actual experience of developing countries 
that have attempted different routes. Consequently, as argued by Calvert (2016), the 
existing literature has yet to fully grasp the new forms of contestation in the developing 
world. Indeed, a limited amount of studies have explored why developing countries 
with the same concerns have adopted divergent approaches to the investment treaty 
regime. Furthermore, the implications of these experiences in terms of revealing the 
actual options available to these developing countries in practice have also been 
neglected. 
While taking into consideration the limitations of this study addressed below, this 
thesis has contributed to filling this gap in the literature by analysing the different 
reactions of developing countries that have expressed their discontent with the 
investment regime, through a detailed and comprehensive comparative case study 
analysis using original empirical research. In the three case studies analysed in this 
thesis, States expressed their discontent with the investment treaty regime after 
realising how their membership in the regime significantly constrained their policy 
space to regulate. This thesis argues that two main factors influenced how each country 
reacted after expressing its discontent. First, the ideological position of the regime in 
power determined whether or not the exit option was being considered. The second 
factor was the structural power dynamics influenced by the economic position of the 
country and the results of a cost-benefit assessment by its officials which determines 
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whether the State has the leverage it had to confront its capital-exporting partners with 
its desire to exit or amend its existing treaties and to proceed with either route. 
Whereas scholars and practitioners have argued that countries can choose between exit 
or voice, the findings of this study reveal that the actual choices available to 
developing countries are more complicated than those proposed in the existing 
literature. This thesis argues that in order to reflect the options available to developing 
countries, Hirschman’s framework can be reconceptualised to take into consideration 
the power dynamics in the investment treaty regime and the challenges facing 
developing countries when deciding which route to take. The proposed revisions 
include a reconceptualised ‘exit’, the replacement of ‘voice’ with ‘quasi-exit’, and  
‘loyalty’ with ‘silence’. 
In light of the current legitimacy crisis facing the investment treaty regime, it is 
expected that more developing countries will revise their membership of the regime 
and will certainly draw on the earlier experiences of their counterparts. While current 
efforts to reform the investment treaty regime on the multilateral level might result in 
changes in the regime to address the concerns shared by both developed and 
developing countries, any initiatives for radical or significant reconceptualisations of 
the regime are likely to emerge from the developing world. For the reasons above this 
study on the experiences of developing countries in the investment treaty regime is 
both timely and necessary.  
This study focused on developing a better understanding of how developing countries 
became members of the investment treaty regime and why developing countries that 
have publicly expressed their discontent with the regime have reacted differently. The 
findings, however, cannot be generalised across the developing world as several 
dimensions are not covered in this thesis. First, a complete consensus on BITs and the 
investment treaty regime does not exist in the developing world. Indeed, there are 
examples of developing countries for which the benefits of BITs and the ISDS 
mechanism seem to outweigh their costs. These countries include capital-exporting 
countries like China as well as capital-importing countries like Chile. In the case of 
China, ISDS is perceived as potentially a useful tool to protect the interests of its 
investors abroad (Morosini and Badin, 2017). While it shares the concerns of other 
developed and developing countries regarding the impact of ISDS on its regulatory 
space, it has had limited exposure so far as a respondent to investor-State arbitration 
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cases (Morosini and Badin, 2017). Chile, on the other hand, has continued to include 
ISDS in its treaties and to negotiate other agreements with similar provisions to those 
in BITs because it believes that it has gained more from adopting the liberal investment 
and economic rules than it has lost (Morosini and Badin, 2017). It is worth noting that 
the number of investment claims filed by Chilean investors (i.e. Chile as a home State) 
(7) exceeds the number of cases it has faced as a respondent (5) at the time of 
writing.212 
Moreover, the categories addressed in this thesis do not include developing countries 
like Brazil who have not ratified any BITs. In 2015, Brazil has introduced a new model 
investment agreement to regulate the relationship between foreign investors and host 
countries: Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreements (CFIAs).213 Finally, 
there are several developing countries that have been frequent respondents to ISDS 
cases but have expressed their discontent more discreetly. Hence, it is important to 
reiterate that this thesis has focused primarily on developing countries that have 
publicly contested the investment treaty regime before proceeding to react in different 
ways. 
Another avenue for further research that has been already touched upon in this thesis 
is the assessment of the reaction of developing countries as litigants and not just as 
principals (which was the focus of this thesis). As established, once a State has joined 
the investment treaty regime by consenting to a BIT that includes ISDS, it forgoes its 
ability to immediately withdraw from the regime, or amend its obligations as a 
member, unless it reaches a mutual understanding with all its treaty partners, or the 
survival clauses in its BITs elapse. Accordingly, once an arbitration claim has been 
initiated, the State's ability to contest the claim is limited to litigation tactics as 
demonstrated in chapter 2. This is an important dimension to how countries have acted 
on their discontent with the regime which has not been addressed in this thesis. While 
                                               
 
212 UNCTAD, ‘Chile – as home State’. International Investment Agreements Navigator. Available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/41?partyRole=1 (Accessed 2 September 
2018). 
213 Brazil has signed 8 CFIAs so far with other developing countries. These treaties update some of the 
traditional clauses included in BITs and introduce new safeguard clauses to regulate investments and 
investors’ behaviour (corporate social responsibility clauses and provisions to protect the environment, 
labour affairs and public health). These agreements also include an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism to the investor-State arbitration option in BITs (Moreira, 2018). 
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scholars like Langford et al. (2018) have documented some of the different tactics 
adopted by developing countries, it remains an area that could benefit from a more in-
depth analysis in the form of case studies, in the way this thesis has assessed the tactics 
developing countries adopted as principals.  
Finally, a third topic for future research is the effectiveness of the different routes 
adopted by developing countries. While there have been efforts in the existing 
literature to assess the different options available in theory, conclusions on the 
effectiveness of the routes adopted in practice and whether they can be considered as 
a success or failure may be premature at this point. Considering that developing 
countries generally started to react to the realisation that BITs are a threat to their 
sovereignty less than a decade ago, it will take a considerable amount of time before 
the full impact on their economy of the routes each has chosen is revealed or unpacked.  
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Appendix I. Quantitative Studies Examining the 
Relationship between BITs and FDI 
 
Author of study  Causal mechanism  Main findings 
Danzman (2016) Signalling effects Developing countries that 
sign BITs with developed 
countries experience an 
increase in FDI inflows in 
the infrastructure sector, 
however they do not 
experience an increase in 
total FDI inflows.  
Egger and Merlo (2007)  Commitment 
effects 
 
BITs increase OECD 
countries’ outward FDI 
stock in partner countries 
(i.e. commitment effect). 
Dixon and Haslam (2016) Commitment and 
signalling effects 
 
BITs do not increase FDI 
through signalling effects; 
‘strong’ investor 
provisions in ratified BITs 
among Latin American 
States increase FDI 
through commitment 
effects in the context of, or 
combined with, trade 
agreements. 
Aisbett (2009) 
 
Commitment and 
signalling effects 
BITs with OECD countries 
do not increase FDI to 
developing countries either 
through commitment or 
signalling effects. 
Banga (2008) Signalling effects BITs with developed 
countries increase FDI to 
Asian developing countries 
through signalling effects. 
Berger et al. (2011) 
 
Commitment 
effects 
BITs with full advance 
consent to investment 
treaty arbitration have no 
greater impact on FDI than 
other BITs, suggesting that 
BITs do not increase FDI 
through commitment 
effects. 
Berger et al. (2013) 
 
Commitment 
effects 
BITs and regional trade 
agreements with full 
advance consent to 
investment treaty 
arbitration have no greater 
impact on FDI than other 
investment treaties, 
suggesting that investment 
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treaties do not increase 
FDI through commitment 
effects. 
Busse et al. (2010) 
 
Commitment 
effects 
BITs increase FDI flows to 
developing countries 
through 
commitment effects. 
Büthe and Milner (2009) 
 
Signalling effects BITs increase FDI to 
developing countries 
through signalling effects. 
Gallagher and Birch 
(2006) 
 
Commitment and 
signalling effects 
BITs with the United 
States do not increase FDI 
in Latin 
American countries from 
the United States. But the 
number of BITs signed 
increases total FDI through 
signalling effects. 
Hallward-Driemeier 
(2003) 
 
Commitment 
effects 
BITs with OECD countries 
do not increase FDI to 
developing 
countries. 
Kerner (2009) 
 
Commitment and 
signalling effects 
BITs with OECD countries 
increase FDI to developing 
countries through both 
commitment and signalling 
effects. 
Neumayer and Spess 
(2005) 
 
Signalling effects BITs increase FDI to 
developing countries 
through signalling effects 
Peinhardt and Allee 
(2012a) and Peinhardt and 
Allee (2012b) 
 
 
Commitment effects BITs with the United States 
do not generally increase 
FDI. 
BITs with OECD countries 
increase FDI from partner 
countries, but there is no 
difference between the 
effect of BITs with and 
without investment treaty 
arbitration. 
UNCTAD (2009b) 
 
Commitment 
effects 
BITs have only a ‘minor 
and secondary’ impact on 
FDI. 
Yackee (2009) 
 
Signalling effects BITs do not increase FDI 
to developing countries 
through signalling effects. 
Rose-Ackerman and Tobin 
(2005) 
 
 
Commitment and 
signalling effects 
BITs with the United 
States do not increase FDI 
to developing countries 
from the United States; in 
general, BITs do not 
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increase FDI through 
signalling effects. 
Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 
(2011) 
 
Signalling effects BITs with OECD countries 
increase FDI to developing 
countries through 
signalling effects; these 
effects are greater for host 
countries with stronger 
domestic political 
institutions. 
Salacuse and Sullivan 
(2005) 
 
Signalling effects US BITs increase FDI to 
developing countries from 
all sources (i.e. signalling 
effect); other OECD BITs 
have no significant 
signalling effect. 
 
Source: Bonnitcha et al. (2017)  
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Appendix II. List of Interviewees 
1. Bolivia 
• Anonymous, Bolivian Diplomat, Skype interview, 12 April 2015.* 
• Pablo Menacho, Deputy Attorney General at the State Attorney General’s office, La 
Paz, 28 July 2015 and 29 August 2016.  
• Luis Carlos Jemio, former Minister of Finance, La Paz, 29 July 2015.  
• Beatriz Muriel, Senior Researcher at Institute for Advanced Development Studies, La 
Paz, 3 August 2015.  
• Luis Arce, Minister of Economy and Public Finance, La Paz, 5 August 2015 and 7 
September 2016. 
• Juan Antonio Morales, former President of the Central Bank, La Paz, 5 August 2015 
and 5 September 2016.  
• Anonymous, senior official at the State Attorney General’s office, La Paz, 11 August 
2015 and 23 August 2016.  
• Walter Clarems Endara, Vice Minister of Foreign Trade and Integration, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, La Paz, 11 August 2015 and 19 August 2016. 
• Anonymous, representative of an international financial institution, La Paz, 22 August 
2016.* 
• Anonymous, Partner at private law firm, La Paz, 24 August 2016. 
• Anonymous, representative of National Chamber of Commerce, La Paz, 26 August 
2016.  
• Anonymous, senior official at the Department of Investment Promotion, Ministry of 
Development Planning, La Paz, 29 August 2016.* 
• Carlos Arze, Economic Researcher at the Centre of Studies for Labour and Agrarian 
Development, La Paz, 30 August 2016. 	
• Anonymous, representative of a European commercial delegation, La Paz, 31 August 
2016.* 
• Anonymous, representative of National Chamber of Industry, La Paz, 1 September 
2016.  
• Anonymous, former Minister of Hydrocarbons, La Paz, 2 September 2016. 
• Anonymous, former Vice Minister of Finance, La Paz, 2 September 2016. 
• Karen Longaric, Professor of International Law at the Higher University of San 
Andrés and former Director of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, La 
Paz, 3 September 2016.  
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2. South Africa  
• Anonymous, expert on South Africa’s investment policy, Skype interview, 21 March 
2014.* 
• Anonymous, official at an international financial institution, Skype interview, 30 June 
2014.* 
• Matthias Boddenberg, Executive Director of the South African-German Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, Johannesburg, 21 July 2014.  
• Xavier Carim, Director-General for International Trade and Economic Development, 
Department of Trade and Industry, Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, 22 
July 2014.  
• Mustaqeem De Gama, Director of Legal, Trade and Investment Division, Department 
of Trade and Industry, Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, 24 July 2014. 
• Anonymous, Director at an international private law firm, Johannesburg, 28 July 
2014.* 
• Peter Leon, Partner at an international private law firm, Johannesburg, 30 July 2014 
and 14 December 2016. 
• Axel Pougin de La Maisonneuve, Head of Economic, Trade section of the EU 
Delegation in South Africa, Pretoria, 5 August 2014.  
• Markus Schrader, Head of Economic Cooperation and Development at the Embassy 
of Switzerland in South Africa, Pretoria, 6 August 2014.  
• Peter Draper, Managing Director at Tutwa Consulting and former Senior Research 
Fellow in the Economic Diplomacy Programme at the South African Institute of 
International Affairs, Johannesburg, 6 August 2014 and 15 December 2016. 
• Azwimpheleli Langalanga, trade and investment law policy advisor, Johannesburg, 
25 August 2015 and 8 December 2016.  
• Andrew Layman, Executive Consultant, South African Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, Johannesburg, 26 August 2015.  
• Anonymous, former senior official at Department of Trade and Industry, 
Johannesburg, 27 August 2015 and 16 December 2016.  
• Nikki Kruger, Chief Director, International Trade and Economic Development 
Division, Department of Trade and Industry, Department of Trade and Industry, 
Pretoria, 31 August 2015.  
• Anonymous, Senior Associate at a local think tank, Johannesburg, 2 September 2015. 
• Anonymous, Professor at Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of 
the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2 September 2015 and 14 December 2016.  
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• Anonymous, representative of World Trade Organisation, Skype interview, 10 
November 2015.*  
• Patrick Bond, Professor of Political Economy, University of the Witwatersrand, 6 
December 2016. 
• Anonymous, official at Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, 7 December 
2016.  
• Anonymous, Professor at School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, 12 
December 2016. 
3. Egypt  
• Anonymous, official at General Authority for Investment and Free Zones, Cairo, 30 
December 2014.* 
• Anonymous, advisor to the Minister of Investment, Cairo, 4 January 2015.  
• Anonymous, former official in a regional arbitration centre, phone interview, 17 
December 2015.  
• Anonymous, official II at Egyptian State Law Authority, Cairo, 20 December 2015 
and 26 December 2017.* 
• Anonymous, official I at Egyptian State Law Authority, Cairo, 22 December 2015 
and 1 June 2017.* 
• Anonymous, international expert on Egypt’s investment treaties, Skype interview, 24 
April 2017.  
• Anonymous, former Minister of International Cooperation, Cairo, 8 May 2017.* 
• Anonymous, senior official at General Authority for Investment and Free Zones, 
Cairo, 23 May 2017.  
• Ahmed El-Kosheri, arbitrator, former Vice President of ICC Court and Senior Partner 
of Kosheri, Rashed and Riad Law Firm, Cairo, 14 June 2017. 
• Anonymous, head of international arbitration and partner at a private law firm in 
Egypt, 31 July 2017. 
 
* Interviewees who would not or could not formally be interviewed. The information collected 
from these informal interviews was used by the author to gain a better understanding of the 
issues relating to investment treaties in the respective countries and not published in this thesis.  
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Appendix III. List of Bilateral Investment Treaties  
1. Bolivia 
BIT Date of 
signature 
Date of entry 
into force 
Bolivia - Germany BIT (1987) 23/03/1987 09/11/1990 
Bolivia - Switzerland BIT (1987) 06/11/1987 17/05/1991 
Bolivia - United Kingdom BIT (1988) 24/05/1988 16/02/1990 
Bolivia - France BIT (1989) 25/10/1989 12/10/1996 
Bolivia - Spain BIT (1990) 24/04/1990 12/05/1992 
Belgium - Luxembourg Economic Union-Bolivia 
(1990) 
25/04/1990 10/01/2004 
Bolivia - Italy BIT (1990) 30/04/1990 22/02/1992 
Bolivia - Sweden BIT (1990) 20/09/1990 03/07/1992 
Bolivia - Netherlands BIT (1992) 10/03/1992 01/11/1994 
Bolivia - China BIT (1992) 08/05/1992 01/09/1996 
Bolivia - Peru BIT (1993) 30/07/1993 19/03/1995 
Bolivia - Argentina (1994) 17/03/1994 01/05/1995 
Bolivia - Chile BIT (1994) 22/09/1994 21/07/1999 
Bolivia - Denmark BIT (1995) 12/03/1995 22/03/1997 
Bolivia - Cuba BIT (1995) 06/05/1995 23/08/1998 
Bolivia - Ecuador BIT (1995) 25/05/1995 15/08/1997 
Bolivia - Romania BIT (1995) 09/10/1995 16/03/1997 
Bolivia - Korea, Republic of BIT (1996) 01/04/1996 04/06/1997 
Austria - Bolivia (1997) 04/04/1997 01/07/2002 
Bolivia - United States of America BIT (1998) 17/04/1998 06/06/2001 
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Bolivia - Paraguay BIT (2001) 03/05/2001 04/09/2003 
Bolivia - Spain BIT (2001) 29/10/2001 09/07/2002 
Bolivia - Costa Rica BIT (2002) 07/10/2002   
 
Source: UNCTAD IIA Navigator  
2. South Africa  
BIT Date of 
signature 
Date of entry 
into force 
South Africa - United Kingdom BIT (1994) 20/09/1994 27/05/1998 
Netherlands - South Africa BIT (1995) 09/05/1995 01/05/1999 
South Africa - Switzerland BIT (1995) 27/06/1995 30/11/1997 
Korea, Republic of - South Africa BIT (1995) 07/07/1995 28/06/1997 
Germany - South Africa BIT (1995) 11/09/1995 10/04/1998 
France - South Africa BIT (1995) 11/10/1995 22/06/1997 
Canada - South Africa BIT (1995) 27/11/1995   
Cuba - South Africa BIT (1995) 08/12/1995 07/04/1997 
Denmark - South Africa BIT (1996) 22/02/1996 23/04/1997 
Austria - South Africa BIT (1996) 28/11/1996 01/01/1998 
Mozambique - South Africa BIT (1997) 06/05/1997   
Italy - South Africa BIT (1997) 09/06/1997 16/03/1999 
Iran, Islamic Republic of - South Africa BIT (1997) 03/11/1997   
China - South Africa BIT (1997) 30/12/1997 01/04/1998 
Mauritius - South Africa BIT (1998) 17/02/1998 23/10/1998 
South Africa - Sweden BIT (1998) 25/05/1998 01/01/1999 
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Senegal - South Africa BIT (1998) 19/06/1998 29/12/2010 
Ghana - South Africa BIT (1998) 09/07/1998   
Argentina - South Africa BIT (1998) 23/07/1998 01/01/2001 
BLEU (Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union) - 
South Africa BIT (1998) 
14/08/1998 14/03/2003 
Finland - South Africa BIT (1998) 14/09/1998 03/10/1999 
South Africa - Spain BIT (1998) 30/09/1998 23/12/1999 
Egypt - South Africa BIT (1998) 28/10/1998   
Chile - South Africa BIT (1998) 12/11/1998   
Greece - South Africa BIT (1998) 19/11/1998 06/09/2001 
Russian Federation - South Africa BIT (1998) 23/11/1998 12/04/2000 
Czech Republic - South Africa BIT (1998) 14/12/1998   
Nigeria - South Africa BIT (2000) 29/04/2000 27/07/2005 
South Africa - Uganda BIT (2000) 08/05/2000   
South Africa - Turkey BIT (2000) 23/06/2000   
Algeria - South Africa BIT (2000) 24/09/2000   
Rwanda - South Africa BIT (2000) 19/10/2000   
South Africa - Tunisia BIT (2002) 28/02/2002   
Libya - South Africa BIT (2002) 14/06/2002   
South Africa - Yemen BIT (2002) 28/01/2003   
Qatar - South Africa BIT (2003) 21/10/2003   
Equatorial Guinea - South Africa BIT (2004) 17/02/2004   
 Democratic Republic of the Congo - South Africa BIT 
(2004) 
31/08/2004   
Israel - South Africa BIT (2004) 20/10/2004   
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Angola - South Africa BIT (2005) 17/02/2005   
Gabon - South Africa BIT (2005) 02/08/2005   
South Africa - United Republic of Tanzania BIT (2005) 22/09/2005   
Kuwait - South Africa BIT (2005) 26/09/2005   
Congo - South Africa BIT (2005) 01/12/2005   
Madagascar - South Africa BIT (2006) 13/12/2006   
Guinea - South Africa BIT (2007) 25/09/2007   
South Africa - Sudan BIT (2007) 07/11/2007   
Ethiopia - South Africa BIT (2008) 18/03/2008   
South Africa - Zimbabwe BIT (2009) 27/11/2009 15/09/2010 
 
Source: UNCTAD IIA Navigator 
 
3. Egypt 
BIT Date of 
signature 
Date of entry 
into force 
Albania - Egypt BIT (1993) 22/05/1993 06/04/1994 
Algeria - Egypt BIT (1997) 29/03/1997 03/05/2000 
Argentina - Egypt BIT (1992) 11/05/1992 03/12/1993 
Armenia - Egypt BIT (1996) 09/01/1996 01/03/2006 
Australia - Egypt BIT (2001) 03/05/2001 05/09/2002 
Austria - Egypt BIT (2001) 12/04/2001 29/04/2002 
Azerbaijan - Egypt BIT (2002) 24/10/2002   
Bahrain - Egypt BIT (1997) 04/10/1997 11/01/1999 
Belarus - Egypt BIT (1997) 20/03/1997 18/01/1999 
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Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU)- Egypt 
BIT (1977) 
28/02/1977 20/09/1978 
BLEU- Egypt BIT 1999) 28/02/1999 24/05/2002 
Bosnia and Herzegovina - Egypt BIT (1998) 11/03/1998 29/10/2001 
Botswana - Egypt BIT (2003) 02/07/2003   
Bulgaria - Egypt BIT (1998) 15/03/1998 08/06/2000 
Burundi - Egypt BIT (2012) 13/05/2012   
Cameroon - Egypt BIT (2000) 24/10/2000   
Canada - Egypt BIT (1996) 13/11/1996 03/11/1997 
Central African Republic - Egypt BIT (2000) 07/02/2000   
Chad - Egypt BIT (1998) 14/03/1998   
Chile - Egypt BIT (1999) 05/08/1999   
China - Egypt BIT (1994) 21/04/1994 01/04/1996 
Comoros - Egypt BIT (1994) 13/11/1994 27/02/2000 
Congo, Democratic Republic of the - Egypt BIT (1998) 18/12/1998   
Croatia - Egypt BIT (1997) 27/10/1997 02/05/1999 
Cyprus - Egypt BIT (1998) 21/10/1998 11/05/1999 
Czech Republic - Egypt BIT (1993) 29/05/1993 04/06/1994 
Denmark - Egypt BIT (1999) 24/06/1999 29/10/2000 
Djibouti - Egypt BIT (1998) 21/07/1998   
Egypt - Ethiopia BIT (2006) 27/07/2006 27/05/2010 
Egypt - Finland BIT (1980) 05/05/1980 22/01/1982 
Egypt - Finland BIT (2004) 03/03/2004 05/02/2005 
Egypt - France BIT (1974) 22/12/1974 01/10/1975 
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Egypt - Gabon BIT (1997) 22/12/1997   
Egypt - Georgia BIT (1999) 10/08/1999   
Egypt - Germany BIT (1974) 05/07/1974 22/07/1978 
Egypt - Germany BIT (2005) 16/06/2005 22/11/2009 
Egypt - Ghana BIT (1998) 11/03/1998   
Egypt - Greece BIT (1993) 16/07/1993 06/04/1995 
Egypt - Guinea BIT (1998) 06/03/1998   
Egypt - Hungary BIT (1995) 23/05/1995 21/08/1997 
Egypt - Iceland BIT (2008) 08/01/2008 15/06/2009 
Egypt - India BIT (1997) 09/04/1997 22/11/2000 
Egypt - Indonesia BIT (1994) 19/01/1994 29/11/1994 
Egypt - Iran, Islamic Republic of BIT (1977) 25/05/1977   
Egypt - Italy BIT (1989) 02/03/1989 01/05/1994 
Egypt - Jamaica BIT (1999) 10/02/1999   
Egypt - Japan BIT (1977) 28/01/1977 14/01/1978 
Egypt - Jordan BIT (1996) 08/05/1996 11/04/1998 
Egypt - Kazakhstan BIT (1993) 14/02/1993 08/08/1996 
Egypt - Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of BIT (1997) 19/08/1997 12/01/2000 
Egypt - Korea, Republic of BIT (1996) 18/03/1996 25/05/1997 
Egypt - Kuwait BIT (1966) 02/05/1966 09/08/1966 
Egypt - Kuwait BIT (2001) 17/04/2001 26/04/2002 
Egypt - Latvia BIT (1997) 24/04/1997 03/06/1998 
Egypt - Lebanon BIT (1996) 16/03/1996 02/06/1997 
Egypt - Libya BIT (1990) 03/12/1990 04/07/1991 
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Egypt - Macedonia BIT (1999) 22/11/1999   
Egypt - Malawi BIT (1997) 21/10/1997 07/09/1999 
Egypt - Malaysia BIT (1997) 14/04/1997 03/02/2000 
Egypt - Mali BIT (1998) 09/03/1998 07/07/2000 
Egypt - Malta BIT (1999) 20/02/1999 17/07/2000 
Egypt - Mauritius BIT (2014) 25/06/2014 17/10/2014 
Egypt - Mongolia BIT (2004) 27/04/2004 25/01/2005 
Egypt - Morocco BIT (1976) 03/06/1976 07/09/1978 
Egypt - Morocco BIT (1997) 14/05/1997 01/07/1998 
Egypt - Mozambique BIT (1998) 08/12/1998   
Egypt - Netherlands BIT (1976) 30/10/1976 01/01/1978 
Egypt - Netherlands BIT (1996) 17/01/1996 01/03/1998 
Egypt - Niger BIT (1998) 04/03/1998   
Egypt - Nigeria BIT (2000) 20/06/2000   
Egypt -Palestine BIT (1998) 28/04/1998 19/06/1999 
Egypt - Oman BIT (1985) 28/04/1985   
Egypt - Oman BIT (1998) 25/03/1998 03/03/2000 
Egypt - Pakistan BIT (2000) 16/04/2000   
Egypt - Poland BIT (1995) 01/07/1995 17/01/1998 
Egypt - Portugal BIT (1999) 29/04/1999 23/12/2000 
Egypt - Qatar BIT (1999) 12/02/1999 14/07/2006 
Egypt - Romania BIT (1976) 10/05/1976 02/01/1977 
Egypt - Romania BIT (1994) 24/11/1994 03/04/1997 
Egypt - Russian Federation BIT (1997) 23/09/1997 12/06/2000 
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Egypt - Senegal BIT (1998) 05/03/1998   
Egypt - Serbia BIT (1977) 03/06/1977 20/03/1979 
Egypt - Serbia BIT (2005) 24/05/2005 20/03/2006 
Egypt - Seychelles BIT (2002) 22/01/2002   
Egypt - Singapore BIT (1997) 15/04/1997 20/03/2002 
Egypt - Slovakia BIT (1997) 30/04/1997 01/01/2000 
Egypt - Slovenia BIT (1998) 28/10/1998 07/02/2000 
Egypt - Somalia BIT (1982) 29/05/1982 16/04/1983 
Egypt - South Africa BIT (1998) 28/10/1998   
Egypt - Spain BIT (1992) 03/11/1992 26/04/1994 
Egypt - Sri Lanka BIT (1996) 11/03/1996 10/03/1998 
Egypt - Sudan BIT (1977) 28/05/1977 14/03/1978 
Egypt - Sudan BIT (2001) 08/07/2001 01/04/2003 
Egypt - Swaziland BIT (2000) 18/07/2000   
Egypt - Sweden BIT (1978) 15/07/1978 29/01/1979 
Egypt - Switzerland BIT (1973) 25/07/1973 04/06/1974 
Egypt - Switzerland BIT (2010) 07/06/2010 15/05/2012 
Egypt - Syrian Arab Republic BIT (1997) 28/04/1997 05/10/1998 
Egypt - United Republic of Tanzania BIT (1997) 30/04/1997   
Egypt - Thailand BIT (2000) 18/02/2000 27/02/2002 
Egypt - Tunisia BIT (1989) 08/12/1989 02/01/1991 
Egypt - Turkey BIT (1996) 04/10/1996 31/07/2002 
Egypt - Turkmenistan BIT (1995) 23/05/1995 28/02/1996 
Egypt - Uganda BIT (1995) 04/11/1995   
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Egypt - Ukraine BIT (1992) 21/12/1992 10/10/1993 
Egypt - United Arab Emirates BIT (1988) 19/06/1988 02/03/1998 
Egypt - United Arab Emirates BIT (1997) 11/05/1997 11/01/1999 
Egypt - United Kingdom BIT (1975) 11/06/1975 24/02/1976 
Egypt - United States of America BIT (1986) 11/03/1986 27/06/1992 
Egypt - Uzbekistan BIT (1992) 16/12/1992 08/02/1994 
Egypt - Viet Nam BIT (1997) 06/09/1997 04/03/2002 
Egypt - Yemen BIT (1988) 19/10/1988 03/03/1990 
Egypt - Yemen BIT (1996) 06/06/1996 10/04/1998 
Egypt - Zambia BIT (2000) 28/04/2000   
Egypt - Zimbabwe BIT (1999) 02/06/1999   
 
Source: UNCTAD IIA Navigator  
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Appendix IV. List of Investment Treaty Arbitration Cases 
1. Bolivia  
Year  Case  BIT  Dispute and Court  Status/Outcome 
2002  Aguas del 
Tunari S.A. v. 
Republic of 
Bolivia 
(ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/3) 
Bolivia- 
Netherlands 
BIT (1992) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
alleged actions and 
omissions of the 
government leading 
up to the rescission 
of a concession 
agreement for the 
provision of water 
and sewage services 
to the City of 
Cochabamba, Bolivia 
entered into with the 
claimant. 
 
Alleged BIT 
breaches: 
expropriation 
The case was settled 
for a nominal fee 
after internal and 
external pressure 
against the company.  
 
The ICSID tribunal 
issued an order 
taking note of the 
discontinuance of the 
proceeding in March 
2006. 
2006 Quiborax S.A., 
Non-Metallic 
Minerals S.A. 
v. Plurinational 
State of Bolivia 
(ICSID Case 
No. ARB/06/2) 
Bolivia – Chile 
BIT (1994) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
the revocation by 
Presidential Decree 
of eleven mining 
concessions 
allegedly held by 
claimants through an 
investment vehicle in 
Bolivia. 
 
BIT breaches found 
by tribunal: direct 
and indirect 
expropriation, fair 
and equitable 
treatment and 
arbitrary, 
unreasonable and/or 
discriminatory 
measures 
In September 2015 
the tribunal ruled in 
favour of the 
claimant awarding 
them compensation 
worth c. 57 million 
USD. The claimant 
had initially claimed 
damages of c.150 
million USD.  
 
In June 2018 the 
Office of the 
Attorney General 
announced that they 
reached an 
agreement with the 
claimant to reduce 
the compensation 
award to c.42 million 
USD.  
 
2007  
E.T.I. Euro 
Telecom 
International 
N.V. v. 
Plurinational 
State of Bolivia  
Bolivia – 
Netherlands 
BIT (1992) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
the government’s 
transfer of claimant’s 
50 per cent stake in 
the Bolivian 
telecoms company 
The case was settled 
and the ICSID 
tribunal issued an 
order taking note of 
the discontinuance of 
the proceeding in 
October 2009. 
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(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/07/28) 
ENTEL to the State 
after the company 
was nationalised in 
2007. 
 
Alleged BIT 
breaches: 
expropriation  
The claimant initially 
sought a 
compensation of c. 
700 million USD, but 
the Bolivian 
authorities managed 
to negotiate a 
settlement of 100 
million USD.  
 
2008
  
Ashmore 
Energy 
International 
(A.E.I) 
Luxembourg 
Holdings 
S.a.r.l. v. the 
Plurinational 
State of Bolivia  
BLEU 
(Belgium-
Luxembourg 
Economic 
Union) – 
Bolivia  
BIT (1990) 
Stockholm Chamber 
of Commerce (SCC). 
 
Claims arising out of 
the alleged 
government’s 
expropriation of 
shares in the natural 
gas pipeline 
Transporte de 
Hidrucarburos S.A. 
(Transredes) in 
which AEI held a 25 
per cent stake (as 
part of the 
nationalisation 
scheme).  
 
Alleged BIT 
breaches: 
expropriation 
The case was settled 
before the tribunal 
reached a final 
verdict.  
 
The claimant initially 
sought a 
compensation award 
of 500 million USD, 
before settling for 
121 million USD 
after negotiations 
with the Bolivian 
government.  
2010 Guaracachi 
America, Inc. 
and Rurelec 
PLC v. The 
Plurinational 
State of Bolivia 
(PCA Case No. 
2011-17) 
Bolivia- 
United 
Kingdom BIT 
(1988) 
 
Bolivia-United 
States of 
America BIT 
(1998) 
PCA 
 
Claims arising out of 
the failure to agree 
on compensation for 
the government’s 
nationalisation of 
Guaracachi America, 
Inc. and of Rurelec’s 
controlling 50.001 
per cent shareholding 
in the Bolivian 
electricity company 
Empresa Eléctrica 
Guaracachi. 
 
BIT breaches found 
by tribunal: 
expropriation 
The tribunal decided 
in favour of the 
investor after finding 
that the State has 
breached the 
expropriation clause.  
 
In January 31, 2014, 
an arbitral tribunal of 
the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration issued 
its final award, 
establishing a 
compensation 
amount of 28.9 
million USD in 
addition to 
compound interest at 
5.6% per annum 
from the 
nationalization date 
(May 1, 2010 up to 
the time of payment). 
The claimant had 
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initially claimed 
damages of c. 140 
million USD.  
  
The Bolivian 
government reached 
an agreement with 
the claimant for a 
compensation of 31.5 
million USD in total.  
 
2010 Pan American 
Energy LLC v. 
Plurinational 
State of Bolivia 
(ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/8) 
Bolivia- 
United States 
of America 
BIT (1998) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
the government’s 
nationalisation of the 
Chaco Petroleum 
Company (a 
subsidiary in which 
Pan American held a 
50 per cent interest) 
after failing to reach 
an agreements over 
the compensation 
value. 
 
 Alleged BIT 
breaches: 
expropriation 
 
 
The case was settled 
and the ICSID 
tribunal issued an 
order taking note of 
the discontinuance of 
the proceeding in 
February 2015. 
 
The claimant was 
initially seeking a 
compensation of 1.5 
billion USD but 
settled for 357 
million USD after 
negotiations with the 
Bolivian 
government.  
2010 Oiltanking 
GmbH, Graña 
Montero S.A. 
and Graña 
Montero 
S.A.A. v. 
Bolivia 
Bolivia-
Germany BIT 
(1987) 
 
Bolivia - Peru 
BIT (1993) 
PCA  
 
Claims arising out of 
the government's 
2008 nationalisation 
of the claimants' 
shares in Compañía 
Logística de 
Hidrocarburos S.A. 
(CLHB), a company 
that engages in the 
transportation and 
storage of 
hydrocarbons, 
following failed 
negotiations between 
the State and the 
company concerning 
the amount invested 
and the 
compensation owed. 
The case was settled 
before the tribunal 
reached a final 
verdict. 
 
In February 2011, it 
was reported that 
Oiltanking and Graña 
y Montero had 
dropped their 
arbitration claim 
against Bolivia after 
agreeing to a 
reported settlement 
of 16.4 million USD 
(against an original 
claim of 30 million 
USD). 
 
2011 Abertis 
Infraestructuras 
Bolivia - Spain 
BIT (2001) 
PCA 
 
In May 2017 Bolivia 
announced it had 
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S.A. v. 
Government of 
Bolivia 
(PCA Case No. 
2011-14) 
Claims arising out of 
allegations that 
Bolivia breached the 
concession 
agreement with 
Servicios de 
Aeropuertos 
Bolivianos S.A. 
(SABSA), an 
Abertis-controlled 
company that had 
operated three 
airports in Bolivia. 
The government later 
nationalized SABSA. 
 
Alleged BIT 
breaches: FET 
 
reached a settlement 
of 23 million USD 
with the claimant. 
The claimant had 
initially claimed 
damages of 85.5 
million USD.  
 
2013 South 
American 
Silver Limited 
v. The 
Plurinational 
State of Bolivia 
(PCA Case No. 
2013-15) 
Bolivia- 
United 
Kingdom BIT 
(1988) 
PCA 
 
Claims arising out of 
the government's 
issuance of a decree 
that revoked mining 
concessions that had 
been previously 
granted to claimant's 
subsidiary 
concerning the 
Malku Khota project. 
 
Alleged BIT 
breaches: 
 -expropriation 
(direct and indirect) 
-FET 
-NT  
 
 
Pending 
 
The claimant is 
seeking a 
compensation of 
385.7 million USD, 
or alternatively 
restitution of the 
Malku Khota project 
along with monetary 
damages in the 
amount of 176.4 
million USD.  
2014 Iberdrola, S.A. 
and Iberdrola 
Energía, S.A.U. 
v. The 
Plurinational 
State of Bolivia 
(PCA Case No. 
2015-05) 
Bolivia- Spain 
BIT (2001) 
PCA 
 
Claims arising out of 
Bolivia’s Supreme 
Decree No. 1448 of 
2012, which ordered 
the nationalisation of 
claimants’ 
(indirectly-held) 
shares in four 
electricity 
companies. 
 
Alleged BIT 
breaches: 
The case was settled 
before the tribunal 
reached a final 
verdict.  
 
According to the 
Supreme Decrees 
No. 2592 in 
November 2015 and 
published in 
Bolivia’s Official 
Gazette, Bolivia paid 
34.17 million USD to 
Iberdrola.  
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-direct expropriation 
-FET 
-full protection and 
security 
-NT 
-MFN 
 
2014 Red Eléctrica 
Internacional 
S.A.U. v. 
Plurinational 
State of Bolivia 
Bolivia - Spain 
BIT (2001) 
UNCITRAL  
Arbitration Rules  
 
Claims arising out of 
the government's 
issuance of Supreme 
Decree No. 1214 that 
seized and 
nationalised an 
electricity 
transmission 
company controlled 
by the claimant. 
 
Alleged BIT 
breaches: direct 
expropriation 
The case was settled 
before the tribunal 
reached a final 
verdict. 
 
In November 2014 
Bolivia announced it 
had reached a 
settlement of 36.5 
million USD with the 
claimant. The 
claimant was initially 
seeking 200 million 
USD in 
compensation.  
 
 
2015 Paz Holdings 
Ltd. v. 
Plurinational 
State of Bolivia 
 
Bolivia- 
United 
Kingdom BIT 
(1988) 
UNCITRAL  
Arbitration Rules  
 
Claims arising out of 
Bolivia’s Supreme 
Decree No. 1448 of 
2012, which ordered 
the nationalisation of 
claimant’s 
(indirectly-held) 
shares in four 
Bolivian electricity 
companies. 
 
The case was settled 
before the tribunal 
reached a final 
verdict. 
 
According to the 
Supreme Decrees 
No. 2594 in 
November 2015 and 
published in 
Bolivia’s Official 
Gazette, Bolivia paid 
19.5 million USD to 
Paz Holdings.  
 
  
303 
2016 Glencore 
Finance 
(Bermuda) Ltd. 
v. Plurinational 
State of Bolivia 
(PCA Case No. 
2016-39) 
Bolivia- 
United 
Kingdom BIT 
(1988) 
PCA.  
 
Claims arising out of 
Bolivia’s direct 
expropriations of two 
smelting plants, the 
Vinto Metallurgical 
Complex and the 
Vinto Antimony 
Plant, as well as the 
tin and zinc mine 
Colquiri mining 
centre, all of which 
are owned by the 
claimant’s local 
subsidiaries. They 
were nationalised by 
presidential decrees 
between 2007 and 
2012. 
The case is still 
pending. 
2018 Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya 
Argentaria S.A. 
v. Plurinational 
State of Bolivia 
(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB(AF)/18/5) 
Bolivia-Spain 
BIT (2001) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
Bolivia’s Pension 
Law No. 65 of 2010 
which stipulated the 
nationalisation of the 
pension fund.  
 
Alleged BIT 
breaches: 
expropriation  
The case is still 
pending. 
 
Sources: UNTCAD ISDS Navigator, Investment Arbitration Reporter, Official Gazette of Bolivia 
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2. South Africa 
 
Year  Case  BIT  Dispute and Court  Status/Outcome 
2001 Swiss Investor 
v. Republic of 
South Africa 
 
(confidential 
arbitration 
case) 
 
South Africa - 
Switzerland 
BIT (1995) 
UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules.  
 
Claims arising out of 
allegations by the 
claimant that the 
South African police 
failed to protect his 
property and that his 
investment was 
subjected to an 
expropriation. 
In 2003, the tribunal 
rendered an award in 
favour of the 
investor. The tribunal 
ruled that South 
Africa failed to offer 
sufficient police 
protection and 
security to the 
property of the Swiss 
investor.  
 
The claimant was 
subsequently 
awarded 6.6 million 
SAR in damages 
later in 2004.  
a subsequent arbitral 
award was rendered 
on October 19, 2004, 
awarding damages of 
6.6 Million South 
African Rand, plus 
interest. 
2007  Piero Foresti, 
Laura de Carli 
and others v. 
Republic of 
South Africa 
(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB(AF)/07/1) 
Italy - South 
Africa BIT 
(1997) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
the introduction of 
compulsory equity 
divestiture 
requirements with 
respect to the 
investors' shares in 
certain operating 
companies through 
the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources 
Development Act, 
and  
 
Alleged BIT 
breaches:  
-expropriation (direct 
and indirect) 
- FET 
- NT 
The case was 
ultimately settled on 
the merits in July 
2010.  
 
The claimant was 
initially seeking 375 
million USD in 
compensation. In 
August 2010 the 
tribunal ordered the 
claimants to 
contribute to the sum 
of 400,000 Euros to 
the respondent's costs 
and bear its own 
costs. 
 
 
Sources: UNCTAD ISDS Navigator and Investment Arbitration Reporter.  
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3. Egypt 
 
Year  Case  BIT  Dispute and Court  Status/Outcome 
1998 Wena Hotels 
Ltd. v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt (ICSID 
Case No. 
ARB/98/4) 
Egypt - United 
Kingdom BIT 
(1975) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
the alleged breach of 
agreements to 
develop and manage 
two hotels in Luxor 
and Cairo, Egypt, as 
well as an alleged 
campaign of 
continual harassment 
to the investor by the 
government of 
Egypt. 
 
BIT breaches found 
by the tribunal:  
-indirect 
expropriation 
- FET 
-full protection and 
security 
The ICSID tribunal 
ruled in favour of the 
investor in December 
2000.  
 
The investor claimed 
damages of 62.8 
million USD, but the 
tribunal awarded an 
8 million USD 
compensation for the 
investor which rose 
to 20.6 million USD 
after adding interest 
and legal costs. 
1999 Middle East 
Cement 
Shipping and 
Handling Co. 
v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt (ICSID 
Case No. 
ARB/99/6) 
Egypt - Greece 
BIT (1993) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
Egypt's alleged 
expropriation of 
Middle East 
Cement's interests in 
a business 
concession located in 
Egypt. 
 
BIT breaches found 
by tribunal: indirect 
expropriation. 
 
The ICSID tribunal 
ruled in favour of the 
investor in April 
2002.  
 
The investor claimed 
damages of 42.2 
million USD, but the 
tribunal awarded c. 
2.2 million USD plus 
interest. 
2002  Ahmonseto, 
Inc. and others 
v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt (ICSID 
Case No. 
ARB/02/15) 
Egypt - United 
States of 
America BIT 
(1986) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
the State’s credit 
policy towards the 
claimants including 
customs duties and 
taxes. In addition to 
criminal proceedings 
initiated by the State 
against the claimants.  
 
In June 2007 the 
ICSID tribunal 
rendered an award in 
favour of the State 
dismissing all the 
claims made by the 
investor.  
 
The investor had 
claimed damages of 
100 million USD.  
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Alleged BIT 
breaches:  
-indirect 
expropriation 
- FET 
-MFN 
2002
  
Champion 
Trading 
Company and 
Ameritrade 
International, 
Inc. v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/9) 
Egypt - United 
States of 
America BIT 
(1986) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
allegations by 
claimants that the 
cotton company in 
which they held 
shares in had been 
denied financial 
benefits conferred 
upon other players in 
the cotton industry.  
 
Alleged BIT 
breaches:  
-FET 
-full protection and 
security 
- arbitrary 
unreasonable and/or 
discriminatory 
measures 
In October 2006 the 
ICSID tribunal 
rendered an award in 
favour of the State 
dismissing all the 
claims made by the 
investor.  
 
The investor had 
claimed damages of 
365 million USD.  
2003 Joy Mining 
Machinery 
Limited v. 
Arab Republic 
of Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/03/11) 
Egypt - United 
Kingdom BIT 
(1975) 
 ICSID 
 
Claims arising out of 
the investor's supply 
of two sets of 
phosphate mining 
equipment to an 
Egyptian State 
enterprise, IMC. The 
claimant alleged that 
the equipment was 
paid for but the 
relevant guarantees 
were never released. 
 
Alleged BIT 
breaches: 
- indirect 
expropriation 
-FET 
- full protection and 
security 
- transfer of funds 
-arbitrary, 
unreasonable and/or 
In August 2004 the 
case was decided in 
favour of the State as 
jurisdiction was 
declined by the 
ICSID tribunal.  
 
The investor had 
claimed damages of 
4.5 million USD.  
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discriminatory 
measures 
 
2004 Jan de Nul 
N.V. and 
Dredging 
International 
N.V. v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/04/13) 
BLEU 
(Belgium-
Luxembourg 
Economic 
Union) - Egypt 
BIT (1999) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
disagreements over 
additional 
compensation 
allegedly due to the 
investor under a 
contract it had 
entered into with the 
Egyptian agency in 
charge of the 
operation of the Suez 
Canal for the 
deepening and 
widening of certain 
southern stretches of 
the Canal. 
 
Alleged BIT 
breaches:  
-FET 
-full protection and 
security 
In November 2008 
the ICSID tribunal 
rendered an award in 
favour of the State 
dismissing all the 
claims made by the 
investor.  
 
The investor had 
claimed damages of 
80 million USD. 
2005 Helnan 
International 
Hotels A/S v. 
Arab Republic 
of Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/05/19) 
Denmark – 
Egypt BIT 
(1999) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
the eviction from the 
management of the 
Shepheard Hotel in 
Cairo, following a 
decision of the 
Egyptian Ministry of 
Tourism to 
downgrade the 
hotel's classification 
from the five star 
status required under 
the management 
contract.  
 
Alleged BIT 
breaches:  
-indirect 
expropriation 
-FET 
In July 2008 the 
ICSID tribunal 
rendered an award in 
favour of the State 
dismissing all the 
claims made by the 
investor.  
 
The investor had 
claimed damages of 
65.7 million USD. 
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-full protection and 
security 
2005 Waguih Elie 
George Siag 
and Clorinda 
Vecchi v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/05/15) 
Egypt - Italy 
BIT (1989) 
ICSID 
 
Claims arising out of 
a series of acts and 
omissions by the 
respondent that 
allegedly 
expropriated 
claimants' property 
of oceanfront land, 
including the 
issuance of a 
ministerial resolution 
cancelling the 
project's contract and 
the physical seizure 
of the property on 
two occasions.  
 
BIT breaches found 
by tribunal: 
-expropriation 
-full protection and 
security 
-FET 
-arbitrary, 
unreasonable and/or 
discriminatory 
measures 
The ICSID tribunal 
rendered an award in 
favour of the investor 
in June 2009. 
 
The investor claimed 
damages of 230 
million USD, but the 
tribunal awarded c. 
127 million USD 
including compound 
interest.  
2008 Malicorp 
Limited v. 
Arab Republic 
of Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/08/18) 
Egypt - United 
Kingdom BIT 
(1975) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
the claimant’s 
allegation that the 
Egyptian government 
has expropriated its 
contractual rights to 
build and operate the 
Ras Sudr airport in 
Sinai.  
 
Alleged BIT 
breaches:  
-indirect 
expropriation 
-FET 
In February 2011 the 
ICSID tribunal 
rendered an award in 
favour of the State 
dismissing all the 
claims made by the 
investor.  
 
The investor had 
claimed damages of 
500 million USD.  
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2009 H&H 
Enterprises 
Investments, 
Inc. v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/09/15) 
Egypt - United 
States of 
America BIT 
(1986) 
ICSID 
 
Claims arising out of 
disagreements 
between the parties 
concerning a contract 
to manage and 
operate a resort in El 
Ain El Sokhna 
including the denial 
of claimant's alleged 
right to purchase the 
resort under an 
option to buy 
agreement leading to 
litigation before 
domestic courts and 
the government's 
subsequent eviction 
of H&H from the 
resort. 
 
Alleged BIT 
breaches: 
-indirect 
expropriation 
-FET 
-full protection and 
security 
In May 2014 the 
ICSID tribunal 
rendered an award in 
favour of the State 
dismissing all the 
claims made by the 
investor.  
 
The investor had 
claimed damages of 
833 million USD.  
 
 
2011 Mohamed 
Abdel Raouf 
Bahgat v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt (PCA 
Case No. 
2012-07) 
 
Egypt - 
Finland BIT 
(2004) 
Permanent Court of 
Arbitration  
 
Claims arising out of 
criminal charges 
allegedly brought 
against the claimant 
by the government 
and a related seizure 
of the claimant’s 
assets.  
 
This case is still 
pending. 
 
The claimant is 
seeking damages of 
200 million USD.  
2011 Bawabet Al 
Kuwait 
Holding 
Company v. 
Arab Republic 
of Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. ARB/11/6) 
Egypt - Kuwait 
BIT (2001) 
ICSID 
 
Claims arising out of 
the government's 
cancellation of the 
free zone status in 
which the claimant's 
fertilizer company 
operated, along with 
the increase in the 
price of gas supplied. 
 
The case was settled 
and the ICSID 
tribunal issued an 
order taking note of 
the discontinuance of 
the proceeding in 
November 2016.  
 
The Egyptian 
Ministry of 
Petroleum 
announced a 
settlement was 
reached with 
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Bawabet Al Kuwait 
Holding Company in 
October 2016. The 
settlement took place 
under the auspices of 
the Committee for 
the Settlement of 
Investment Contract 
Disputes led by the 
Council of Ministers.  
Details and terms of 
the settlement have 
not been disclosed.  
 
The claimant was 
seeking damages of 
2.2 billion USD. 
2011 Indorama v. 
Egypt 
Indorama 
International 
Finance 
Limited v. 
Arab Republic 
of Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/11/32) 
Egypt - United 
Kingdom BIT 
(1975) 
ICSID 
 
Claims arising out of 
the government's 
renationalisation of 
Indorama's Shebin 
al-Kom textile 
factory, in the 
Menoufia province. 
 
Alleged BIT 
breaches: 
expropriation 
The case was settled 
and the ICSID 
tribunal issued an 
order taking note of 
the discontinuance of 
the proceeding in 
July 2015. 
 
In July 2015 the 
Minister of 
Investment 
announced that a 
settlement was 
reached between the 
Egyptian government 
and Indorama.  
 
The investor was 
seeking damages of 
156 million USD, but 
settled for 54 million 
USD.  
 
 
2011 National Gas 
S.A.E. v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. ARB/11/7) 
Egypt - United 
Arab Emirates 
BIT (1997) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
the decision by Cairo 
Court of Appeal to 
set aside a 
commercial 
arbitration award 
rendered in favour of 
National Gas against 
the state-owned 
Egyptian General 
Petroleum Company 
under a gas pipelines 
In April 2014 the 
case was decided in 
favour of the State as 
jurisdiction was 
declined by the 
ICSID tribunal.  
 
The investor had 
claimed damages of 
36 million USD.  
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construction and 
operation agreement, 
on the alleged basis 
that the arbitration 
clause in the 
concession 
agreement had not 
been approved by the 
competent authorities 
as required by 
Egyptian law. 
 
Alleged BIT 
breaches:  
-indirect 
expropriation 
- FET 
2011 Hussain 
Sajwani, 
Damac Park 
Avenue for 
Real Estate 
Development 
S.A.E., and 
Damac 
Gamsha Bay 
for 
Development 
S.A.E. v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/11/16) 
Egypt - United 
Arab Emirates 
BIT (1997) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
the government's 
conviction of Mr. 
Sajwani and of 
Egypt's tourism 
minister on grounds 
of corruption 
concerning the 
investor's acquisition 
of land in Gamsha 
Bay for the 
development of a 
residential complex. 
 
 
The case was settled 
and the ICSID 
tribunal issued an 
order taking note of 
the discontinuance of 
the proceeding in 
September 2014. 
 
In May 2013 a 
settlement was 
reached between the 
Egyptian government 
and the investor. The 
official terms of the 
settlement were 
confidential, but 
according to some 
press reports it 
involved payment in 
the region of 40 
million USD by 
Sajwani and the 
forfeit of the land on 
the Red Sea Coast, 
while retaining the 
land where the Park 
Avenue Mall will be 
constructed. 
 
2012 Ampal-
American 
Israel Corp., 
EGI-Fund (08-
10) Investors 
LLC, EGI-
Series 
Investments 
LLC, BSS-
Egypt - United 
States of 
America BIT 
(1986) 
Egypt - 
Germany BIT 
(2005) 
Claims arising out of 
alleged breaches of a 
long-term contract 
for the supply of 
natural gas between 
the parties, including 
the prolonged 
interruption of gas 
supply and failure to 
The ICSID tribunal 
reached a decision in 
favour of the investor 
in February 2017, 
however 
compensation for the 
BIT breaches 
remains to be 
  
312 
EMG Investors 
LLC and 
David Fischer 
v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/12/11) 
deliver the agreed 
volume of gas. 
 
BIT breaches found 
by tribunal: 
-expropriation 
-full protection and 
security 
determined in a 
subsequent ruling. 
 
The claimant is 
seeking damages of 
c. 535.1 million USD  
 
 
 
 
2012 Yosef Maiman, 
Merhav 
(MNF), 
Merhav-Ampal 
Group, 
Merhav-Ampal 
Energy 
Holdings v. 
Arab Republic 
of Egypt 
(PCA Case No. 
2012/26) 
Egypt - Poland 
BIT (1995) 
Permanent Court of 
Arbitration  
 
Claims arising out of 
the alleged 
government's failure 
to protect a gas 
pipeline in which the 
claimants had 
invested from attacks 
that took place 
during the Arab 
Spring. 
 
BIT breaches found 
by tribunal:  
-FET 
-expropriation 
The UNCITRAL 
tribunal reached a 
decision in favour of 
the investor in 
December 2017, 
however 
compensation for the 
BIT breaches 
remains to be 
determined. 
 
The claimant is 
seeking damages of 
1.1 billion USD 
 
2012  Veolia 
Propreté v. 
Arab Republic 
of Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/12/15) 
Egypt - France 
BIT (1974) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
disagreements over 
the performance of a 
contract entered into 
between Veolia's 
subsidiary, Onyx 
Alexandria, and the 
governorate of 
Alexandria to 
provide waste 
management 
services, including 
Egypt's alleged 
refusal to modify the 
contract in response 
to inflation and the 
enactment of new 
labour legislation. 
The ICSID tribunal 
rendered an award in 
favour of the State in 
May 2018. The 
award has not been 
released or published 
yet.  
 
The claimant was 
seeking damages of 
c. 175 million Euros.  
2013 Ossama Al 
Sharif v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt (I) 
(ICSID Case 
No. ARB/13/3) 
Egypt - Jordan 
BIT (1996) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
the alleged 
interference by the 
government with 
The case was settled 
and the ICSID 
tribunal issued an 
order taking note of 
the discontinuance of 
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claimant's 
investments in a port 
development project. 
the proceeding in 
June 2015.  
Details of the 
settlement remained 
confidential. 
 
Reports in the press 
claim that the 
investor sought 
damages of 490 
million USD in total 
for the three 
arbitration claims 
filed in ICSID.  
2013 Ossama Al 
Sharif v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt (II) 
(ICSID Case 
No. ARB/13/4) 
Egypt - Jordan 
BIT (1996) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
alleged interference 
by the government 
with claimant's 
investments in a 
customs system 
project. 
The case was settled 
and the ICSID 
tribunal issued an 
order taking note of 
the discontinuance of 
the proceeding in 
May 2015. 
Details of the 
settlement remained 
confidential. 
 
Reports in the press 
claim that the 
investor sought 
damages of 490 
million USD in total 
for the three 
arbitration claims 
filed in ICSID.  
2013 Ossama Al 
Sharif v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt (III) 
(ICSID Case 
No. ARB/13/5) 
Egypt - Jordan 
BIT (1996) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
alleged interference 
by the government 
with claimant's 
investments in a bulk 
liquids terminal 
project. 
The case was settled 
and the ICSID 
tribunal issued an 
order taking note of 
the discontinuance of 
the proceeding in 
June 2015. 
Details of the 
settlement remained 
confidential. 
 
Reports in the press 
claim that the 
investor sought 
damages of 490 
million USD in total 
for the three 
arbitration claims 
filed in ICSID.  
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2013 ASA 
International 
S.p.A. v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/13/23) 
Egypt - Italy 
BIT (1989) 
ICSID 
 
Claims arising out of 
alleged government 
measures that 
affected the 
claimant's investment 
in a company that 
had concluded 
contracts for waste 
management services 
in Cairo. 
The case was settled 
and the ICSID 
tribunal issued an 
order taking note of 
the discontinuance of 
the proceeding in 
August 2016. 
According to a 
statement by the 
Ministry of 
Investment a 
settlement was 
reached with the 
investor in 2016. 
 
Local press report 
that the claimant was 
seeking a 
compensation of 750 
million EGP (c. 85 
million USD) but 
settled for 180 
million EGP (c. 20 
million USD).  
2013  Cementos La 
Union S.A. and 
Aridos Jativa 
S.L.U v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/13/29) 
Egypt - Spain 
BIT (1992) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
the alleged 
overpricing by the 
government of an 
operating license for 
a cement 
manufacturing plant, 
and the application 
of an allegedly 
uncommon system of 
granting the licenses 
through tenders. 
The case is pending.  
2013 Erich Utsch 
Aktiengesellsc
haft, Helmut 
Jungbluth and 
Utsch 
M.O.V.E.R.S. 
International 
GmbH v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/13/37) 
Egypt - 
Germany BIT 
(2005) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
the government's 
termination of a 
license plate supply 
and manufacturing 
contract concluded 
with the claimants, 
on the alleged basis 
that the transaction 
was closed for an 
uncompetitive price, 
leading to the 
conviction of Utsch's 
The case was settled 
and the ICSID 
tribunal issued an 
order taking note of 
the discontinuance of 
the proceeding in 
April 2017. 
 
The Egyptian 
government and the 
investor reached an 
agreement to suspend 
case proceedings in 
July 2016 before the 
claimant decided to 
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chief executive 
officer. 
withdraw the case in 
2017.  
 
 
 
2014 Unión Fenosa 
Gas, S.A. v. 
Arab Republic 
of Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. ARB/14/4) 
Egypt - Spain 
BIT (1992) 
ICSID 
 
Claims arising out of 
the alleged 
suspension of gas 
supplies by the 
government to a 
liquefied natural gas 
plant operated by the 
claimant, which 
caused the plant to be 
inoperative for over a 
year. 
In September 2018, 
Naturgy Energy 
Group S.A., who 
owns 50% of Unión 
Fenosa Gas, 
disclosed that an 
ICSID tribunal found 
that Egypt failed to 
afford FET to the 
investor, and has 
been ordered to pay 
c. 2 billion USD 
billion in 
compensation. 
2015 ArcelorMittal 
v. Egypt 
ArcelorMittal 
S.A. v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/15/47) 
BLEU 
(Belgium-
Luxembourg 
Economic 
Union) - Egypt 
BIT (1999) 
ICSID 
 
Claims arising out of 
the government’s 
alleged refusal to 
extend the 
development period 
for the claimant’s 
steel plant 
construction project, 
followed by a 
process to revoke the 
claimant’s licenses. 
According to the 
claimant, the 
construction was 
delayed due to the 
occupation of the 
property and 
problems with gas 
and electricity 
supply. 
The case was settled 
and the ICSID 
tribunal issued an 
order taking note of 
the discontinuance of 
the proceeding in 
April 2017. 
 
In November 2016 
the Minister of 
Investment 
announced that the 
government had 
reached a settlement 
with ArcelorMittal.  
 
The claimant was 
seeking damages of 
600 million USD but 
according to local 
press reports the 
settlement reached 
was 90 million USD.  
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2016  Al Jazeera 
Media 
Network v. 
Arab Republic 
of Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. ARB/16/1) 
Egypt - Qatar 
BIT (1999) 
ICSID  
 
Claims arising out of 
alleged destruction of 
the claimant’s media 
business in Egypt, by 
means of arrest and 
detention of 
employees, attacks 
on facilities, 
interference with 
transmissions and 
broadcasts, closure 
of offices, 
cancellation of 
claimant’s 
broadcasting licence 
and compulsory 
liquidation of its 
local branch. 
 
The case is pending.  
 
The claimant is 
seeking damages of 
150 million USD.  
2016 Champion 
Holding 
Company, 
James Tarrick 
Wahba, John 
Byron Wahba 
and others v. 
Arab Republic 
of Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. ARB/16/2) 
Egypt - United 
States of 
America BIT 
(1986) 
ICSID The case is pending.  
2016 Fund III Egypt, 
LLC, LP Egypt 
Holdings I, 
LLC and 
OMLP Egypt 
Holdings I, 
LLC v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/16/37) 
Egypt - United 
States of 
America BIT 
(1986) 
ICSID 
 
Claims arising from 
the decision of the 
New Urban 
Communities 
Authority (NUCA) to 
terminate a contract 
with Orascom 
Housing 
Communities and 
halt the construction 
work at the ‘Haram 
City’ affordable 
housing project. 
The case was settled 
and the ICSID 
tribunal issued an 
order taking note of 
the discontinuance of 
the proceeding in 
July 2018. 
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2016 Nile Douma 
Holding v. 
Arab Republic 
of Egypt 
Bahrain - 
Egypt BIT 
(1997) 
UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules  
 
Claims arising from 
dispute over a piece 
of land which the 
claimant alleges it 
has the right to use to 
build a hotel in the 
Rod El Farag area in 
Cairo.  
The case is pending.  
2017 Future Pipe 
International 
B.V. v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/17/31) 
Egypt - 
Netherlands 
BIT (1996) 
ICSID 
 
Claims arising from 
a dispute over water 
and sewage 
distribution in 
Egypt’s new 
administrative 
capital.  
The case is pending.  
2018 Tantalum 
International 
Ltd. and 
Emerge 
Gaming Ltd. v. 
Arab Republic 
of Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/18/22) 
Egypt-
Australia BIT 
(2001) 
ICSID 
 
Claims arising from 
Tantalum’s (a 
subsidiary of 
Arrowhead 
Resources Inc.) 
allegations that the 
State has 
implemented illegal 
measures to gain 
control of their 
exploitation 
Licences in the Abu 
Dabbab mine.  
The case is pending. 
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Sources: UNCTAD, Investment Arbitration Reporter and local press reports 
 
 
 
2018  International 
Holding 
Project Group 
and others v. 
Arab Republic 
of Egypt 
(ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/18/31) 
Egypt - Kuwait 
BIT (2001) 
ICSID 
 
Claims arising out of 
a dispute between the 
government and the 
claimant over a real 
estate project.  
This case is pending.  
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Appendix V. List of Nationalisation Decrees (Bolivia) 
• On the 1st May 2006, Supreme Decree No. 28701 mandated the government to revert 50 
per cent plus one of the shares of the major hydrocarbon companies in the sector to the 
State. These companies included: Empresa Petrolera Chaco SA, controlled by Pan 
American Energy through subsidiary Amoco Bolivia Oil & Gas AB; Andina SA, 
controlled by Repsol YPF; Transredes SA, controlled by Shell Gas Latin America BV and 
Ashmore Energy LLC; Petrobrás Bolivia Refinación SA, controlled by Petrobras; and 
Compañía Logística de Hidrocarburos Boliviana SA (CLHB), controlled by Oiltanking 
GmbH, Graña y Montero Petrolera SA. 
• On the 31st of October 2006, Supreme Decree No. 28901 stipulated the nationalisation of 
the Huanuni Mining Center operated by England’s Allied Deals PLC. 
• On the 7th February 2007, Supreme Decree No. 29026 ordered the ‘reversion’ of the 
Metallurgical Complex of Vinto, which was under the control of Swiss company Glencore 
International AG, to the State.  
• On the 1st of May 2008, 3 Supreme Decrees were issued: Supreme Decree No. 29541 
mandated the acquisition of majority shareholding interest (50 per cent plus 1) in Empresa 
Petrolera Chaco SA (from Amoco Bolivia AB) and Transredes – Transporte de 
Hidrocarburos SA (from Shell and Ashmore Energy) by the State. Supreme Decree No. 
29542 mandated the acquisition of the total share package of CLHB from Oiltanking 
GmbH by the State. Supreme Decree No. 29544 mandated the nationalisation of Entel SA 
which was owned by ETI Euro Telecom International NV’s by the State. 
• On the 2nd June 2008, Supreme Decree No. 29586 mandated the acquisition by the State 
of 100 per cent of the shareholding package of Shell Gas Latin America BV and Ashmore 
Energy LLC in oil and gas transportation corporation, Transredes SA.  
• On 23rd of January 2009, Supreme Decree No. 29888 mandated the acquisition by the 
State of 100 per cent of the shareholding interests of Amoco Bolivia Oil & Gas AB in 
Empresa Petrolera Chaco SA. 
• On the 1st of May 2009, Supreme Decree No.111 mandated the nationalisation of Air BP 
Bolivia SA, jet fuel investments in Bolivian airports. 
• On the 1st of May 2010, Supreme Decree No. 493 mandated the nationalisation of four 
power companies including Corani SA, Vallehermoso SA and Guaracachi SA. owned by 
GDF Suez, Carlson Dividend Facility SA, The Bolivian Generating Group LLC (BGG) 
and Rurelec PLC. 
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• On the 1st of May 2010, Supreme Decree No. 499 mandated the nationalisation of the 
Vinto-Antimony Plant, operated by Swedish Glencore International AG.  
• On the 1st of May 2012, Supreme Decree No. 1214 mandated the nationalisation of 
electrical carrier Transportadora de Electricidad SA, which was owned by Red Eléctrica 
Internacional SA. 
• On the 29th of December 2012, Supreme Decree No. 1448 mandated the nationalisation 
of four electricity companies: Electricidad de La Paz (Electropaz); Empresa de Luz y 
Fuerza Eléctrica de Oruro, Sociedad Anónima (ELFEO); Compañía Administradora de 
Empresas Bolivia, Sociedad Anónima (CADEB); and, Empresa de Servicios, Sociedad 
Anónima (EDESER). Majority stakes thereof belonged at the time of the nationalisation 
to a subsidiary of Iberdola SA.  
• On February 18th 2013, Supreme Decree No. 1494 mandated the nationalisation of airport 
operator Servicios de Aeropuertos Bolivianos Sociedad Anónima (SABSA) owned by 
Abertis SA.
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Appendix VI. Revising Hirschman’s Framework to Reflect Routes Available to Developing Countries in Practice 
 
                                               
 
1 I.e. BITs and/or ICSID Convention. 
Routes available to 
developing  
countries   (in 
practice) 
Description 
 
Revisions to the routes documented in 
the literature 
Reconceptualisations of 
Hirschman’s categories 
Exit Exit refers to disengaging from the legal 
architecture of the regime1 with no intent 
to renegotiate, as well as abandoning the 
neoliberal principles of foreign 
investment protection that shaped the 
regime in domestic legislation and other 
international investment agreements or 
provisions.   
The exit route in the existing literature focused 
only on an exit from the legal architecture of the 
regime. The most common definition is a 
disengagement from the regime by terminating 
existing treaties (see Gordon and Pohl, 2015; 
Langford et al., 2018; UNCTAD, 2017c). 
 
Exit from the investment treaty 
regime is more complicated than 
how Hirschman envisioned it, both 
regarding cost and procedure. 
Moreover, while Hirschman 
identified loyalty as a mitigating 
factor for exit, this thesis finds that 
ideological motives and structural 
power dynamics determine 
whether the member seeks to exit 
and proceeds with the decision, 
respectively.  
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2 See Gehlbach (2006) and Gleeson (2016). 
4 These tactics include (Gordon and Pohl, 2015; UNCTAD 2014b): (i) using instruments to influence the interpretation of the investment treaties; (ii) amending treaties; and 
(iii) renegotiation of new treaties to replace old ones. 
Accordingly, this thesis builds on 
relevant contributions from the 
political science and management 
fields2 to conclude that there is a 
need for factoring in the resilience 
of the investment treaty regime 
and the power dynamics between 
the capital-exporting countries 
(regime shapers) and their 
developing treaty partners to 
understand why exit is actually 
costly and with uncertain 
outcomes. 
 
 
 
Quasi-Exit 
Quasi-exit refers to a route that combines 
exit and voice tactics. A partial exit of the 
regime is implemented through 
disengaging from the legal framework of 
None of the traditional channels for voice4 in the 
existing literature were feasible options for 
developing countries that wanted to introduce 
One of the main conditions set by 
Hirschman for practising voice is 
the estimate members have of their 
ability to influence the 
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3 The new framework can be introduced through new BITs or domestic legislation.  
5 See Langford et al. (2018). 
6 It is important to note that the amendments to these legal obligations will only apply to new investments/investors until the survival clauses of the terminated BITs expire. 
the regime. Voice, on the other hand, is 
practised through introducing the desired 
reforms in the new legal framework that 
regulates FDI.3  
substantial reforms to their obligations under the 
regime.  
Instead, developing countries have practised 
voice through what has been described by 
scholars in the literature as a ‘hybrid’ approach5 
and categorised in this thesis as a quasi-exit 
route.  
organisation. A criteria that is not 
satisfied by most developing 
countries considering their status 
as rule takers in the regime. 
 Asymmetrical power relations in 
the regime ensured voice as 
conceptualised by Hirschman was 
a highly unlikely option for most 
developing countries. Indeed 
developing countries that have  
introduced substantial reforms to 
their legal obligations under the 
regime have only been able to do 
so through the quasi-exit route.6  
Hence, Hirschman’s theorisation 
of voice and the dynamics of the 
interplay between exit and voice 
inadequately reflects the route 
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available to developing countries 
to reform their obligations under 
the regime. Instead of 
undermining voice as implied by 
Hirschman, exit facilitates it. 
Accordingly, this thesis proposes 
the replacement of ‘voice’ with 
‘quasi-exit’ to more accurately 
reflect the route taken by 
developing countries to practice 
voice in the investment treaty 
regime.  
Silence Silence refers to maintaining the status 
quo by refraining from exiting the regime 
or attempting to practice voice through a 
quasi-exit route. 
In the existing literature the route ‘maintaining 
the status quo’ refers to refraining from making 
any substantive changes to commitments under 
their international investment treaties 
(UNCTAD, 2014b).  
While, this route is consistent with the third 
option proposed in this thesis, the point of 
contestation is whether it should be 
conceptualised as silence or loyalty.  
Hirschman’s conceptualisation of 
loyalty to an organisation includes 
both an expectation by the member 
that there is scope for future 
improvement and that it serves as 
a predicate for the practice of 
voice.  
These conditions do not  apply for 
developing countries that have 
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vocally expressed their discontent 
with the regime.  
Another form of loyalty under 
Hirschman’s framework is the 
unconscious loyalist behaviour 
which entails being in denial about 
the defects of the organisation. 
Again, however, this conception of 
loyalty cannot be applied to 
developing countries addressed in 
this thesis which not only realised 
but also publicly criticised the 
faults of the investment treaty 
regime. 
The decision to maintain the status 
quo has as more to do with 
avoiding possible political and 
economic repercussions and less 
with loyalty, as defined by 
Hirschman. 
Drawing on contributions from the 
political science and management 
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7 See Gehlbach (2006), Barry (1974), Birch (1975) and Gleeson (2016). 
8 See Donaghey et al. (2011) and Gleeson (2016). 
fields7  this thesis argues that the 
concept of silence and particularly 
enforced silence8 more accurately 
reflects the stance taken by 
countries that maintain the status 
quo.   
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